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Homage to Sorin Stati

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TOWARDS A DIALECTIC OF TOLERANCE

MARCELO DASCAL

Hommage à Sorin Stati

I was in Bucharest for a few days, not long before the fall of Ceaucescu's regime. The fear, both of the authorities and of the people, which reigned in the city was vividly felt everywhere.

To be sure, the communist regime was based on a doctrine that called itself "dialectic". Unfortunately, it was a "dialectic" that had nothing to do with dialogue, with listening to the other, respecting the other, and learning from the other. It assumed that "truth" and "justice" were the absolute monopoly of one side – the side which enforced its monopoly by the sheer force of power. The atmosphere couldn't but be of repression, since there was no room for alternative ideas, which for the dominant "dialectic" were necessarily wrong. There was no room for argument, debate and persuasion other than brainwashing and the passive acceptance of the ideas in power. The reigning doctrine was the nemesis of dialectic, for it denied its *sine qua non*: tolerance.

Sorin grew up in this atmosphere, where in spite of its oppressive character, he developed a concern for truth, a tolerant and gentle character, and a sense for the fundamental value of rational persuasion. No wonder that he was attracted by dialogue and argumentation, and devoted his research to them – not merely as an object of study, but also as a method of research and a form of life.

It is an honor for me, as a member of IADA, the association devoted to the study of dialogue founded by Sorin, of ISSA, the society whose object of study is argumentation, of IASC, the association that recognizes and investigates the essential role of controversy in the growth of knowledge and in the improvement of society, and as a friend, to pay a well deserved tribute to Sorin Stati's memory and to his achievements. He was one of the pioneers in the contemporary study of argumentation. Although his research in this field focused on the linguistic analysis of argumentative discourse, he did not neglect other approaches. His role in leading to the organization, in July 2002 in Lugano, of a memorable conference where the above mentioned three international associations joined forces with the Università della Svizzera Italiana in an interdisciplinary, cooperative as well as contrastive drive for increasing our understanding of the multi-faceted phenomenon of argumentation, was decisive. It wouldn't be an exaggeration to say that it is thanks to him that we are able to be here in Milano today, discussing together, from each of those perspectives, a topic so close to his work and interest, "Word Meaning in Argumentative Dialogue".

In his lecture on *The argumentative text*, delivered in the Prague IADA conference twelve years ago, Stati addresses certain "critical points and methodical doubts about the linguistic analysis of argumentation as it is conceived recently" (Stati 1998: 3). He undertakes to propose an approach to argumentation viewed as a linguistic, discursive process, a process that "unfolds through a succession of linguistic acts", which he called "argumentative roles" (*ibid.*)[1].

On Stati's view, the argumentative nature of an utterance is defined by its aim, namely, persuading. He stresses that "persuasion" refers to both, the intention of the speaker and the effect it produces in the audience – that is, what other scholars would dub, respectively, the "illocutionary" and "perlocutionary" forces of the utterance. The first point of his critique of current approaches to argumentation targets their attempt to replace persuasion, which he views as "a subjective and uncontrollable notion", by "acceptability", as in the definition of argumentation by van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1991: 154-155):

> Argumentation = a speech act designed to justify or refute a proposition by convincing another person, who acts reasonably, of the acceptability of a position or negative standpoint with respect to this proposition.

Stati points out that "to be persuaded by a thesis is as subjective as accepting the thesis", and reminds us that the same is true of Perelman's expression "adhesion to a thesis". This, for him, is not a flaw, for

> subjectivity, far from being a shortcoming, is the main characteristic of argumentative discourse, since the speaker builds his discourse for a certain hearer (and not for whoever is endowed with reason) (Stati 1998: 4).

In what follows, I will elaborate upon this point. But I will first address a related issue discussed by Stati, namely whether argumentation is inherently connected with conflict, that is, with "resolving a dispute" – a suggestion he also attributes to van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1991: 162).

Against this view, Stati argues that verbal conflict is only one of the types of argumentation, for there are also supportive argumentative dialogues, in which "the interlocutors cooperate in order to jointly solve a problem" (Stati 1998: 5). As an example of collaborative argumentation he mentions Lo Cascio's (1991: 229) observation that we can manifest our "support for an opinion expressed by someone else by justifying it through arguments other than those employed by the person who has initially expressed that opinion". Another example of non-polemic argumentative acts he gives is interpretation in the legal context, when "one argues for a particular understanding of authoritative texts or materials as a special kind of justifying reason for legal decisions" (MacCormick 1993).

I don't quite agree with Stati in considering the examples above, especially the second, as cases of "non-polemic argumentative acts". Whether they are or not depends on the con-

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[1] Nevertheless, he acknowledges that arguing is also a mental process whose study belongs to logic as well as to psychology.

text in which they are performed. Interpretation, for instance, as practiced in a court, is usually controversial, so that the parts can and often do disagree about it; consequently interpreting in a context of litigation any "authoritative text" – be it a law, a statute, a precedent, or a testimony – in a particular way amounts, in such a context, to providing an argument in favor of one side *and* against the other. Similarly, resorting to a supportive argument which is different from the one originally employed by the holder of a position can be in fact a polemic move if it turns out to be used in the context of defending that position from an objection attacking the original justification – whose repetition would be ineffective for this purpose. In a sense, one could describe the second argument as "repeating" the original one as far as its supportive function is concerned. This is perhaps the reason why Stati views the second too as non-polemic. But, although both indeed support the same position, the interposition of the objection endows the second with an additional, polemic function the first presumably does not have[2].

But I do agree with the spirit of his remark, because argumentation is not necessarily conflictive. In fact, it not only comprises the inherent cooperative element present in every act of communication, but this component may overcome its conflictive counterpart. No doubt, the agreement underlying argumentative cooperation in human affairs usually remains implicit, but it is not as rare as one tends to believe, and certainly not impossible[3]. Furthermore, as I have often argued (e.g., in Dascal 1998a, 1998b), controversies and other forms of polemic exchanges turn out to be, precisely because they are the activity *par excellence* where criticism is exercised, the most valuable – indeed, the essential – tools for the advancement of knowledge and human development. However, as we shall see, in order to achieve this, argumentation and controversy, as well as communication, must involve more than the usual kind of instrumental cooperation we are familiar with through research in pragmatics, dialogue analysis, argumentation theory, and conflict management.

Communication, as we all know, is an exercise in cooperation. As pragmaticists and analysts of dialogue, we have been focusing our attention on the study of the rational tools interlocutors employ in order to achieve success in this extremely complex social enterprise. And we may be proud of how much we learned about its mechanisms, its "logic". We must acknowledge, however, that this is not enough. For communication requires more than instrumental rationality. It implies an ethics, a moral attitude towards the very acts of speak-

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[2] Stati (1996), in his study of repetition in literary dialogues, observes that even in the case of lexical repetition the change of context within the dialogue usually implies a change in the pragmatic function of a repeated lexeme. *A fortiori*, one should not presume that argumentative moves conserve their "basic" polemic or non-polemic dialectical status if their position in the dialogue changes their function from "justification" to "counter argument".

[3] Leibniz's realistic cum optimistic attitude in this respect is worth recalling. He opens a text about how to develop his project of a "General Science" with the following words: "It is well known that of all visible things man is what can contribute most for human happiness; what is bad is that we do not join forces enough...; were we to work all in cooperation to achieve the common good, each of us would be happier" (*Recommandation pour Instituer la Science Générale*, 1686; in Leibniz 1999: 692).

ing and listening. Without it, no matter how well we master the communicative tools and use them efficiently, doubt always remains about whether we are communicating in the full sense of the term.

The moral attitude I have in mind is, essentially, an attitude of respect for the other. It is not only a matter of granting each other the turns of speech each of us is entitled to, nor of making the necessary effort for understanding the interlocutor and being understood by her, nor even of applying the principle of charity when interpreting the other. The moral respect interlocutors owe each other for communication to succeed implies also their belief that they have something to say to each other, and that this something is valuable: not only instrumentally useful, but intrinsically valuable. The ethics of communication transcends the instrumentality of information. Humans are worth listening to and speaking to not just as sources or users of useful information, but *per se*, *qua* beings intertwined with us in such a way that we belong to a shared communicative network which is a major component of our lives. This moral attitude is inseparable from what dialogue is all about.

It is also an essential ingredient of confrontations of ideas and attitudes which, thanks to the presumption that each of the parties is a valuable contributor to the debate, permit and stimulate the contenders to be at their best in actually making their contributions – be it critical or supportive of their own or of their adversary's position. Confrontations based on this presumption fulfill one of the central requirements of what I mean by "dialectic of tolerance"[4].

You might think that I am referring to the attitude characteristic of that privileged kind of dialogue between persons that reach each other as persons, which Martin Buber calls an "I/Thou" dialogue, in contradistinction to "I/It", in which one of the sides is treated as a mere object. No doubt the person-to-person relation is an important component of the moral attitude I am talking about. But on Buber's view an I/Thou relationship goes beyond that, for it refers to the most genuine and most demanding form of contact between human beings, which requires nothing less than "the perception of one's fellow man as a whole, as a unity, and as unique" (Buber 1965: 80). The privileged character and rareness of this kind of inter-human relation is easily understood once one realizes the enormity of what it demands in order to be achieved. In Buber's words:

> To be aware of a man ... means in particular to perceive his wholeness as a person determined by the spirit; it means to perceive the dynamic centre which stamps his every utterance, action, and attitude with the recognizable sign of uniqueness. Such an awareness is impossible, however, if and so long as the other is the separated object of my contemplation or even observation, for this wholeness and its centre do not let themselves be known to contemplation or observation. It is only possible when I step into an elemental relation with the other, that is, when he becomes present to me (*ibid*.).

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[4] For further discussion of the relationship between tolerance and mutual respect, in the inter-personal as well as inter-group levels, see Dascal 2003 (Chapters 20 and 21).

Although Buber highlights a set of requirements that might prevent the realization of the kind of relationship he privileges[5], the basic characteristic of the inter-human for him is that it consists in the meeting of *particular* persons:

> The only thing that matters is that for each of the two men the other happens as the particular other, that each becomes aware of the other and is thus related to him in such a way that he does not regard and use him as his object, but as his partner in a living event (Buber 1965: 74).

In this respect he is much closer to the kind of moral attitude to dialogue that I am trying to characterize. For, though relatively common, since it occurs also in simple happenings such as exchanging glances in a crowded streetcar, this attitude manifests the moral respect for the other that consists in accepting him as he actually is:

> The chief presupposition for the rise of genuine dialogue is that each should regard his partner as the very one he is. I become aware of him, aware that he is different, essentially different from myself, in the definite, unique way which is peculiar to him, and I accept whom I thus see, so that in full earnestness I can direct what I say to him as the person he is (Buber 1965: 79).

Still, the properties of "genuine dialogues" that take place in the inter-human sphere are definite enough for Buber to insist in drawing a sharp demarcation between the realms of the "inter-human" and the "social". The former consists in essentially personal relationships and the latter in a set of shared experiences, perhaps most of which – I would add – have to do with instrumental relations. The existence of socially shared experiences, however, "does not mean that between one member and another of the group there exists any kind of personal relation" (Buber 1965: 72). The inter-human is a "separate category of our existence, even a separate dimension... extremely important not only for our thinking, but also for our living" (*ibid.*). Therefore, it is a mistake – which he admits having made when he first introduced the term "das Zwischenmenschliche" – to indiscriminately "ascribe what takes place between men to the social realm, thereby blurring a basically important line of division between two essentially different areas of human life" (*ibid.*).

Leibniz, in contrast to Buber, and in accordance with his own principle of continuity, establishes a common ground for the moral and the instrumental uses of the Golden Rule, which may help us to further understand the nature and role of the moral attitude I have suggested to be a constitutive component of communication, argumentation, and dialectics. In a short but important text, significantly titled *The Other's Place*, he argues that this metaphor, which turns our attention to our fellow humans, captures not only an essential aspect of morality, but also conceptualizes a fundamental cognitive tool of our theoretical and practical activity in other fields.

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[5] Part of these requirements may originate in the influence of his work on mysticism on his conception of dialogue. See Mendes-Flohr (1989).

The paper begins with the blunt, surprising statement that "The *other's place* is the true point of view both in politics and in morals" (Leibniz 2006: 164). Since the Golden Rule is well known as a basic principle of Christian morality[6], in the remaining paragraphs Leibniz is concerned with explaining, justifying, and applying its counterparts in politics and other domains. The moral tenor of this extension of scope of the "other's place principle", sometimes discussed in terms of juridical considerations, remains present throughout the argument.

The first example is politics, where putting oneself in the place of the other is presented as a mental device capable of revealing the "designs our neighbor may harbor against us" (*ibid.*), just as in morals it reveals our duty towards our neighbor. By pretending, for instance, to be counselor or State minister of an enemy or suspect prince[7], Leibniz testifies, he himself often managed to "guess with utmost precision what is concocted elsewhere" (*ibid.*). Even though the knowledge it affords is not certain, this intelligence tactics is morally justified and can be used in self-protective measures, Leibniz argues, provided the harm caused by these measures is less than the harm that would be caused otherwise.

The grounds for resorting to this mental device, says Leibniz, is that "the place of the other is an appropriate place, both in morals and in politics, to make us discover thoughts that would otherwise not occur to us" (Leibniz 2006: 165). Among these, Leibniz mentions the thoughts that "everything we would consider unjust, if we were in the other's place, must seem to us suspect of injustice" and that "everything we would not desire if we were in that place must make us hold on and examine it more maturely" (*ibid.*). Thus, the other's place principle, though eventually yielding moral attitudes, seems to be basically an epistemological principle, which allows us to overcome our epistemic limitations by resorting to other perspectives or points of view (see Dascal 2000). Its application results not necessarily in abandoning one's beliefs or even in modifying them, but in leading us to reflect more carefully about their justification and their consequences and thus moderating one's natural impetuosity to act on the basis of first impressions or thoughts.

Leibniz's analysis thus grants the other's place principle a surprisingly broad and innovative meaning, combining epistemological and prudential considerations, which ultimately fit its moral origin as well its juridical overtones:

> Thus, the sense of the principle is: do not do or refuse with ease what you would not like to be done or refused to you[8]. Think more maturely about it, after having put yourself in the other's place, as that will provide you with the appropriate considerations for better knowing the consequences of your acts (*ibid.*).

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[6] Matth. 7,12 "So, whatever you wish that men would do to you, do so to them, for this is the law of the prophets"; Luc. 6, 31 "And, as you wish that men would do to you, do so to them".
[7] He actually occupied these positions in the Hanover court.
[8] It is worth noticing that the key expression in this sentence is "with ease" (*aisément*).

Although not directly mentioned by Leibniz in "The Other's Place" as one of the domains of application of the principle, it is evident that communication fits the bill. From the point of view of pragmatics, for instance, the quoted recommendations and their corollaries are invaluable guidelines for using the pragmatic maxims of the "logic of conversation". The place of the other principle offers a set of concrete suggestions for implementing the two basic duties of communication, namely making the efforts necessary for being, *qua* speaker, understood by the other and, *qua* addressee, for understanding the other[9]. Given the general asymmetry and the dynamic character of any conversation, these are far from trivial tasks. The interlocutors must make sure that they are relating, at each stage of the conversation, to the same "conversational demand" (cf. Dascal 2003: 37-41), that various kinds of potential misunderstandings are prevented and actually avoided, that directly as well as indirectly conveyed meanings – be it through the so-called "implicatures" or otherwise – are understandable to the other and correctly interpreted by her, and so on. The ongoing mental visualization as well as the actual perception of "the other's place" is an essential tool for performing these tasks. That this is the case is demonstrated by the fact that conversation is punctuated by linguistic and paralinguistic signs through which, throughout the conversation, the interlocutors indicate to each other "where" they are, "wherefrom" they come and "towards" what they move. Without such constant monitoring of the place of the other the conversational machine would hardly work.

That the other's place is not static is of course a consequence of, among other things, the fact that one of the main purposes of conversation and other forms of communication is to provoke changes in the other's place, be they mental changes, behavioral changes, or both. From this point of view, the communicator acts as a causal agent *vis-à-vis* the addressee, rather than merely as an observer of her "place", and the relation thus established between the former and the latter is primarily instrumental, an "I/It" rather than an "I/Thou" relation. If in this relation, however, one keeps as the focus of attention the other's place, a place that is occupied by a specific particular person who is a wholesome wholeness, rather than by a fragment thereof, as pointed out by Stati and stressed by Buber, the instrumentality of the relation neither excludes nor overrides the moral attitude necessarily involved in a true communicative exchange. In other words, the ever present importance of the place of the other is the unmistaken reminder – for interlocutors as well as for analysts – of the dialogical character of a communicative interaction.

The moral attitude I have been describing up to this point is hardly acknowledged as part and parcel of true communicative interaction because in every such interaction the moral and the instrumental relations between the communication partners are inextricably intertwined, rather than neatly separated. These relations are, in fact, in a dialectical interplay: the cooperation inherent to a non-coercive instrumental interaction cannot be in place without the moral acknowledgment of the other's place and rights; but such an acknowl-

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[9] On the use of the term "duty" regarding the task of understanding, see Dascal 2003 (Chapter 4).

edgment cannot, in its turn, rule out the very possibility of that cooperation and its effective implementation.

In an attempt to disentangle these two components of "genuine dialogue", Martin Buber distinguishes, in a passage already partially quoted in this paper, between accepting the other as *the person* he is and accepting *the ideas* or positions that person holds. The former, he believes, is a condition for the latter, but not *vice-versa*: whereas disagreement at the level of ideas can give rise to controversy without thereby suppressing the moral recognition of the other as a potential partner of dialogue, no controversy is possible without such recognition.

> Perhaps from time to time I must offer strict opposition to his view about the subject of our conversation. But I accept this person, the personal bearer of a conviction, and his definite being out of which his conviction has grown – even though I must try to show, bit by bit, the wrongness of this very conviction. I affirm the person I struggle with: I struggle with him as his partner, I confirm him as creature and as creation, I confirm him who is opposed to me as him who is over against me. It is true that it now depends on the other whether genuine dialogue, mutuality in speech arises between us. But if I thus give to the other who confronts me his legitimate standing as a man with whom I am ready to enter into dialogue, then I may trust him and suppose him to be also ready to deal with me as his partner (Buber 1965: 79-80).

This quote introduces us directly into the topic announced in the title of this paper. In fact, it defines one of the levels of what I am calling "dialectic of tolerance". This is the level in which dialectic confrontation can be tolerant because the condition of mutuality is satisfied. That is to say, the partners' reciprocal acceptance as persons is sufficiently solid to permit large divergences in their opinions and free discussion of these divergences without harm to their basic mutual respect.

Consider now a situation in which there is no mutual personal acceptance between opponents A and B. In this case, the mutuality condition is not satisfied and therefore genuine dialogue cannot evolve between A and B. In particular, there is no room for a sharp dialectic confrontation on issues that are significant for both, for such dialectical clashes would risk to eradicate whatever traces of mutual personal acceptance might still exist between the opponents. Were such confrontation to arise, far from being tolerant, in all likelihood it would belong to the type of polemical exchanges I have dubbed "dispute", in which all that matters is victory over the adversary (see Dascal 1998a).

Notice that, having denied the possibility of a tolerant dialectic in situations of mutual non-acceptance, Buber does not further consider what should be done in such cases. In the end of the above quoted passage he considers the case in which one of the contenders, by accepting the other as an opponent, demonstrates thereby his personal acceptance toward him. This, Buber presumes, allows him to trust the adversary will reciprocate his gesture, thus reducing this asymmetric situation to the symmetric case of mutual acceptance. But the same logic or psychology should lead to the presumption that if one side demonstrates non-

acceptance toward the other (e.g., by refusing to discuss or negotiate with him), the other will reciprocate with non-acceptance too, and the situation would then be reduced to non-mutuality, i.e., to the impossibility of tolerant dialectics.

Ultimately, therefore, Buber's framework offers only two alternatives. That is, it sets up a classical dichotomy that permits tolerant dialectics only at one of its poles, the one in which both sides fulfill the condition of fully accepting the opponent as a person. Obviously, the existence of this single possibility of tolerant debate, which can materialize only under very stringent conditions, implies that this option is not a real alternative to violence in the large number of conflicts in which the contenders do not recognize the moral legitimacy of each other *qua* persons, viz. *qua* dialogue partners.

Does this mean that in such cases we should condone war and admit the "dialectic of force and victory", entirely subservient to the sheer instrumentality of exercising power to achieve one's aims, as the only way of handling such conflicts? The prospect of a positive answer to this question mandates further reflection about the framework that yields it. More generally, it mandates inquiring whether the scope and varieties of tolerant debate can be extended beyond the limits set up for it by the dichotomy underlying Buber's well-intentioned analysis, as well as other, less well-intentioned dichotomies that also justify war in desired cases, thus leading to a similar conclusion. Such an endeavor amounts to no less than developing a more comprehensive and subtle "dialectic of tolerance". This is a task which cannot be undertaken in the present context. Nevertheless, I will briefly present some lines of argumentation along which a more optimistic – yet not naïve – picture can be sketched, defended, and further elaborated.

The first point concerns the nature of the key concepts in the issues under discussion, e.g., acceptance, moral attitude, person, tolerance. We have been using these concepts as if they have a generally accepted standard definition that can be spelled out in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. This is not the case. These, and other central concepts in the discussed issues, comport a significant margin of flexibility, which we must not only be aware of in order to avoid falling prey to it, but also for being able to take advantage of it for making progress in the solution of the problems we are trying to solve. Their flexibility (which some would see as vagueness) is due to the fact that, denoting complex, multi-faceted phenomena or entities, their characterization comprises a set of heterogeneous properties. Sometimes this causes ambiguity, and can be overcome by dividing the concept into two or more related (or unrelated) different concepts, as in the pair "accepting someone as a person" and "accepting someone's opinions".

When no clearly identifiable ambiguity is discerned, another way of characterizing the concept's meaning without forcing upon it an arbitrary definition is to view it as a "cluster concept". By this I mean singling out a set of properties or parameters that are "semantically relevant" for describing the concept[10]. These properties are semantically relevant for the concept because they apply to most of the entities or phenomena denoted by the concept (i.e.,

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[10] The term "semantically relevant" in the sense here used was introduced by Achinstein (1968).

comprised in its extension), but no subset of them applies to all the extension, hence none of them is strictly necessary for identifying something as falling under the concept. Furthermore, the semantically relevant properties may have different centrality or importance in the application of the concept, depending on the context, purpose, domain, and user of the concept. Therefore, the cluster they form has a flexible structure, which may account not only for its different uses but also for its historical evolution.

The concept of "accepting someone as a person", for example, includes in its cluster, among others, properties such as "welcoming his marriage with my daughter", "leaving part of my heritage to him", "respecting his political views", "defending his rights", as well as "perceiving his wholeness as a person determined by the spirit", "perceiving his uniqueness which stamps his every utterance, action, and attitude", "being aware that he is essentially different from myself", and "a man with whom I am ready to enter into dialogue". Clearly for someone concerned with the welfare of his family the first property in the list would carry more weight than the others, for the purposes of explaining the importance of dialogue in interpersonal relations, the last one would be privileged, and in a discussion of the role of spirituality in human life, the fifth. These choices reflect not only the subjective perspectives of the concept's users, but also the multiple ways in which the objective phenomena it covers can be structured. Conceived as a cluster, therefore, a complex concept's composition can be better represented and understood than by reducing it to a standard definition, which suggests a monolithic homogeneity.

A debate, a polemical exchange, a violent conflict are agonistic confrontations that necessarily involve, as a whole, some sort of opposition between the contenders. They usually comprise different stages or cycles, which may contain their appropriate modalities of opposition. My second point addresses the interpretation and status of the oppositions underlying conflicts or debates and different phases thereof.

On Buber's analysis, as we observed, the stage of "genuine dialogue" can only be reached if at a prior stage the contenders accept each other as persons. The latter, therefore, has a more basic status than the former, for it conditions the former's very possibility. Furthermore, according to Buber at that prior stage there are in fact only two mutually exclusive alternatives: either mutual acceptance or mutual non-acceptance. This is a classical dichotomy, which permits advancing to the second stage only in case a determinate pole of the dichotomy materializes. This means a severe limitation of the number of paths towards a possible solution of the conflict. Clearly, it is the result of an interpretation of the opposition between the contenders at the first, basic level, as a logical contradiction. To be sure, from a logical point of view such an interpretation simplifies the problem. Yet, it renders the prospects of solving and of not solving it equally probable. If instead of a dichotomy, a larger number of options were available, additional paths (e.g., selective partial mutual acceptance) for reaching the second stage, and thereby broadening the possibilities of solution, might be opened. This suggests that the strategy of dichotomization of an issue, although useful for the simplification and sharpness it provides, should be replaced by the strategy of

de-dichotomization when the target is not to simplify but to resolve a problem or at least to reduce the brutality of a conflict, especially when it is a complex one[11].

The next point is a simple reminder. It aims to call the attention of the reader to the fact that human conflicts are as old as humankind and have been a constant challenge for humans to cope with. This led to the evolution and accumulation through history, in many cultures, of a large and diversified body of wisdom concerning the management and resolution of conflicts of all kinds. This wisdom comprises an enlightening repertoire of variations on our theme, which are useful to this day. It includes practical recommendations as well as theoretical analyses and principles that together constitute a family of related "arts" – from the art of warfare to the art of avoiding and terminating warfare, through the arts of debating, of arguing, of conducting a controversy, of being always right, of persuading, of seducing, of cunning, of criticizing, of deliberating, of converting, of negotiating, of mediating, etc.[12]. This ancient and ever growing treasury contains much material relevant for the theme of this paper in general, and particularly for the development of a dialectic of tolerance.

The fourth and final point I want to mention is essential for justifying the belief that developing a dialectic of tolerance capable to help resolving apparently unsolvable conflicts is not an ungrounded, utopian dream. Recent advances in the study of rationality and its evolution have, slowly but steadily, led to models of cognition and action other than the traditional logic-based paragon of rationality. Of particular significance for the venture this paper urges us to engage in is the progressive recognition of the role of "soft rationality" in our thought and lives. By this expression, I mean roughly forms of rational reasoning and behavior that, though not relying on the capacity to make inferences with deductive or quasi-deductive certainty and act upon their conclusions, are not condemned, for this reason, to be demoted to the realm of the irrational. "Soft rationality" refers in fact to the immense domain of the "reasonable", which covers the vast areas, most of which are still unexplored, lying between the small peaks of certainty and the abysses of irrationality[13].

It is clear to me that the notion that emerges from the combination of the concepts "tolerance" and "dialectic" cannot but be one of the districts of reasonableness[14], where, like in its neighboring districts, order and peace are achieved and maintained thanks to the kind of agreement and moral acceptance based on the exercise of soft, rather than to the impositions of rigid rationality. Nowhere the need of acknowledging this truth and of further developing the dialectic of tolerance needed to implement it is more evident than in those

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[11] On these two pragmatic strategies, their uses and their consequences, see Dascal (2008b).

[12] As a small sample of the literature representing or referring to classical examples of some of these arts, see Berti (1987), Corns (1987), Fumaroli (1994), Gracián (2000), Graham (1989), Hettema and van der Kooij (2004), Leibniz (2006), Lloyd (1992, 1999), Schopenhauer (1942), Stump (1989), Sun Tzu (1972).

[13] For further details on my conception of "soft rationality", a concept I consider fundamental not only for the proper understanding of Leibniz's rationalism, see, for example Dascal (2001 and 2008a).

[14] Unlike Rawls (1993) and Thiebaut (1999), who argue that reasonableness is *the* form of rationality that should predominate in the *public sphere*, I defend a broader scope for reasonableness, which includes also the inter-

inhospitable places in the world which its prolonged absence may render place-of-the-other-free, mutual-acceptance-free, genuine-dialogue-free, reasonableness-free, and perhaps ultimately life-free.

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human, i.e., the domain of inter-personal relations, which – as we have seen – Buber rightly distinguishes from the public or social domain. It is in this domain that "genuine dialogue" is possible, provided the interlocutors satisfy the condition of mutual acceptance. If they do, they are in a sufficiently open relationship *vis-à-vis* each other that, contrary to what happens according to Rawls and Thiebaut in the public sphere, they can tolerate rather deep divergences in their philosophical or cultural presuppositions for they accept each other *as the persons they are*. This means that the exclusion of their differences in philosophical and/or cultural background from their public arguments, as proposed by Rawls as a means to avoid the breakdown of public debate, is not needed in the case of the inter-human domain, which is not endangered by the discovery of differences that are assumed anyhow to exist at this level. Once expanded to the inter-human, reasonableness is the rationality that governs "genuine debate", as I would put it, which thus becomes ruled by a dialectic of tolerance that does not require the imposition of arbitrary restrictions upon its argumentative moves.

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TALKING THE TALK, WALKING THE WALK: CANDIDATE PROFILES IN ELECTION CAMPAIGN INTERVIEWS

CORNELIA ILIE

Introduction

The study of language as communication implies and leads necessarily to the examination of language use in various social, cultural and political settings. Particular linguistic practices are shaped by and help to shape social, historical and cultural conventions, which become apparent in intertextual and metadiscursive patterns, as well as in collocations and co-selections of lexis and grammar. Acts of dialogic communication are forms of discursive socialisation and indicate, among other things, the interlocutors' status, role, position, identity and power relations. Due to the complexity and interdependence of these specific elements, there is a close and often overlapping relationship between the dialogue in the private sphere and the dialogue in the public sphere. As was shown in Ilie (2001), the talk show, as a subgenre of media discourse, exhibits dialogue features belonging both to the private sphere (conversational dialogue) and to the public sphere (institutional dialogue). Nevertheless, it is hardly possible to draw a line between conversational and institutional aspects of talk shows since «conversational talk often acquires certain institutional characteristics, while conversely, institutional talk may exhibit a more conversational character» (Ilie 2001: 219).

A closer examination of various instantiations of *dialogue in the public sphere* can reveal three main subtypes: *dialogue within institutions* (e.g. broadcasted debates between participants at professional conferences, between MPs in parliament, between experts in a particular field, a.s.o.), *dialogue between institutions* (e.g. broadcasted monitored debates between representatives of various societal institutions: health care organisations, education establishments, trade unions, political parties, a.s.o.) and *dialogue between citizens and institutions* (e.g. broadcasted debate programmes in which citizens are questioning institutional representatives and debating current issues). In many instances the dialogue in the public sphere takes the form of a *media interview* which is monitored by a media representative – a reporter/journalist who both designs and conducts the dialogic interaction. The media interview has become a prototypical form of media dialogue performed for the benefit of the public at large. By virtue of its own nature, the media interview is a very complex form of interview in that it enables interviewers, on the one hand, and interviewees, on the other, to gain access to the public arena and to promote their respective agendas. At the same time, both interviewer and interviewee are fully aware that they are conducting a dialogue for the same of an overhearing and/or overlooking audience. This is why the inter-

viewer and the interviewee can be seen to pursue double agendas: on the one hand, the institutionally oriented agenda aimed at carrying out the pre-established institutional goals, and on the other, the audience-oriented agenda aimed at adjusting to and meeting audience expectations.

In media interviews, the interviewer establishes and follows a particular institutional agenda by asking carefully targeted questions, most of which are meant to solicit information and/or opinion, while some others require simply the interviewee's confirmation or acknowledgement of information regarding particular events, pieces of information, statements, etc. While striving after a neutrality stance and an objective role, the interviewer exhibits nevertheless to a certain extent the bias of choosing a line of questioning that may reveal certain assumptions, prefigure a positive/negative attitude towards certain standpoints or suggest preference for certain answers. Moreover, the interviewer acts in a double capacity: as media representative with a particular institutional agenda to follow, and as a representative of the public at large with another, more open, agenda to follow.

In terms of discourse structure and form, the *media interview* lies at the interface between institutional and non-institutional (conversational) forms of talk. Like other forms of public dialogue, media interviews display a 'public-colloquial' language use and behaviour, bridging the gap between institution-specific linguistic features and conversational speech patterns. At the same time, it is important to note that "institutional discourse represents a continuum including a range of varieties, some of which are more, some less institutionalised" (Ilie 2001: 218). Thus, the news interview can be regarded as a more strongly institutionalised discourse type than the talk show, because it appears to be more constrained by institutional role-distribution and predictable turn pre-allocation and less prone to spontaneous interventions. Unlike the talk-show host, who, alongside his/her role as a moderator, is often expected to play the roles of entertainer, moraliser, adviser, therapist, arbiter and interlocutor, thereby revealing, deliberately or non-deliberately, certain sides of his/her personality, preferences, etc., the news interviewer is supposed to assume a more neutral institutional role, i.e. to be detached and objective, and to avoid voicing his/her personal opinions and preferences.

Aim and method

Both media dialogue and political dialogue have acquired increasing importance in many areas of postmodern society. As a result, both types of dialogue can be seen to attract large audiences and to involve a continuously increasing number of people. At the same time, both types of dialogue are undergoing a process of convergence, in that political dialogue is becoming increasingly mediatised, whereas media dialogue is increasingly concerned with politics and the mediatisation process is being shaped accordingly. An important percentage of media interviews are political interviews. As a result of growing media openness and public scrutiny, the study of various types of political interviews has registered an unprece-

dented development during the last two-three decades. However, a number of issues related to the correlation between the interview as social interaction/event and the interview as mediated dialogue have been under-researched.

A particular subcategory of political interviews which has been less researched is the *election campaign interview*. This is a rather complex form of interview since it displays features of at least two types of interviews: political interviews and job interviews. In an election campaign interview the interviewer and the interviewee have to perform more than one role. Thus, the interviewer can be seen as a talk monitor, as an investigator, as a questioner, as an interlocutor. The interviewee, i.e. the political candidate, can be seen to act as a respondent, as an interlocutor, as a job seeker. For the purposes of the present study I have chosen to examine interviews with the two Democratic presidential candidates in the 2008 American presidential election campaign, Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama.

The analytical approach uses the tools of pragma-rhetoric (Ilie 2006, Ilie forthcoming) by focusing on multifunctional communicative acts and on multi-voiced rhetorical acts of information elicitation and argumentative persuasion. Dialogic practices in the media have become increasingly complex and this is why their analysis requires trans-disciplinary perspectives. Pragmatics and rhetoric are two complementary perspectives that are integrated in one analytical framework in order to examine the emergence and the co-construction of ongoing interpersonal communication and behaviour.

The interview tradition – a brief survey

Nowadays most of us take for granted the use of the interview as a form of media interaction meant to provide the intended audience with news and information of public and private interest. However, it is important to bear in mind that the interview tradition, which has become the staple form of media discourse, represents a development of the 20th century. For example, the interview was almost entirely absent from the cinematic tradition before the 1930s and its technique and structure have changed significantly over time. On reporting on the emergence of the new interview technique, the BBC documentary-maker Swallow (1956) signalled a significant fact: the professional expert was replaced by the enquiring reporter, a man whose initial knowledge is no greater than that of the viewer on whose behalf he conducts the enquiry. The reporter asks the questions that a sensible layman would ask.

This renewed role cast of the interviewer has gradually resulted in a blurred boundary between the public and the private sphere with regard to the scope and focus of the interviewing process. Thus, most interviewees, including high profile ones, are nowadays also faced with questions concerning rather personal details with respect to their private lives, hobbies, leisure, etc. Due to the growing tendency towards more individualised interest/enquiry, the media interview is often regarded as a particular kind of social encounter (Corner 1991).

One of the most common definitions of news interviews was provided by Heritage (1985: 112):

> The news interview is a functionally specialized form of social interaction produced for an overhearing audience and restricted by institutionalized conventions.

Definitions like these are meant to outline the basic nature and function of interviews, but do not provide further insights into the various aspects of the interviewing process. As was noted by Heritage and Roth, "in most Western societies, interviewers are specifically not authorized to argue with, debate, or criticize the interviewee's point of view, nor, conversely, to agree with, support, or defend it" (1995:1). According to the authors, interviewers have well-defined goal-oriented interactional and institutional tasks in keeping with the principle of neutrality. In a more recent study, however, Heritage (2002) admits that, in spite of the interviewer's generally postulated neutrality, news interview questions are unavoidably 'slanted' in various ways. It is, after all, the interviewer who has control over the question-asking process and the liberty to reiterate or rephrase certain questions in order to elicit a particular answer. The power balance between interviewer and interviewee depends a lot on the extent to which the interviewer exerts his/her institutional power to decide on the structure, content, and focus of the line of questioning, on the one hand, and the extent to which the interviewee has the opportunity to share with the interviewer the task of shaping the interview.

Taking into account the eventful evolution and radical changes undergone by the media on the eve of the 21st century, Heritage's definition raises today new questions: How much restricted is the news interview today? To what extent have the institutionalised conventions being kept in place and to what extent have they changed? Have new conventions been adopted? What about the roles of the interviewer and the interviewee?

It was David Silverman who introduced the notion of "the interview society" (1993) and characterised the interview as a widespread social and professional form of dialogue and information-eliciting interaction. A number of scholars have explored the institutional features of media interviews, such as questioning-answering patterns (Harris 1991, Bull 1994, Ilie 1999), evasive interviewee responses (Harris 1991), turn-taking mechanisms (Heritage 1985, Blum-Kulka 1983, Greatbatch 1988), topical organisation and interview roles (Greatbatch 1986, Corner 1991), footing and interviewer neutrality (Clayman 1992) and interruptions (Beattie *et alii* 1982, Ilie 2005).

Some of the central goals of the interview have partly changed over time. Initially, the purpose of the interview was to provide information, official and less official, about institutions, institutional activities and institutional actors, to the public at large. The end-goal was to help form public opinion and set the political agenda.

Gradually, the interviewer started scrutinising, on behalf of the wider public, the efficiency of institutional actors and the way in which institutional activities are being carried out. This double role of the interviewer, i.e. as media representative and as spokesperson of

the general public, is not unproblematic, since it raises a crucial question: whose interests does the interviewer pursue, those of the media company that hired him/her or those of the general public?

During the post-modern period the interview has increasingly become a double-edged communication tool used to handle information circulating to and from the citizens, to form and reflect public opinion and to set the public and political agenda jointly with representatives of the public. However, due to growing openness and public scrutiny it has reached the point where its allegedly major purpose is not only to attract and raise the citizens' curiosity and interest, but to actually involve the citizens and to motivate them to use their influence and contribute actively to setting the political agenda.

Dialogue frameworks in political interviews

A political interview aims at investigating political matters having to do with the daily work of politicians in general, and of Government and Administration representatives in particular. In analytical terms, the notion 'political interview' has been referred to as a type of speech event (Hymes 1972) or an activity type (Levinson 1979). A political interview involves interactional moves, which assign pre-established roles to interviewer and interviewee, and commit the interviewer and the interviewee to particular rights and obligations in relation to institutional conventions, on the one hand, and to the intended audience, on the other. The dialogue in a political interview presupposes a certain shared knowledge between interviewer and interviewee, and between them and the wider overhearing audience. It is the interviewer's role to mediate the exchange of knowledge and information according to his/her assessment of the audience's presumed wishes and needs. An important task of the interviewer is to elicit relevant factual information and to try to correlate it with specifically elicited personal information regarding the interviewed politician.

Like other types of media interviews, the political interview is a hybrid subgenre of mediatised dialogue in that it displays features of both a social encounter dialogue and a mediated probing dialogue. The former type of dialogue allows for free turn-taking and spontaneous role shift (as in casual conversation), whereas the latter is expected to follow normative institutional rules for verbal interaction and behaviour in the public sphere. Through a convergence of these two types of dialogue, the political interview is an instantiation of a semi-institutionalised dialogue at the interface of rule-based answer-eliciting questioning dialogue and casual conversational dialogue. In spite of the occasional conversational touch, the political interview has gradually become one of the most important ways in which the political debate is conducted and "a crucial testing ground for politicians" (Harris, 1991: 77). Chilton views political interviews "as a sub-genre of the institution 'political discourse'" (2004: 72) since the participants are aware of particular social structures and of the discourse practices associated with or constituting those structures. The view taken here is that the institutional practice of political interviewing is a socio-historically and

politically based rhetorical process in that the ensuing dialogue gets articulated through deliberate linguistic choices, interpersonal behaviour patterns and purposeful audience targeting.

An important subcategory of political interviews is the *election campaign interview*, which is specifically aimed at scrutinising and challenging political candidates, at unveiling their status and power relations, at exposing their strengths and weaknesses, at inducing them to publicly spell out their political commitments. In doing that, election campaign interviews enable interviewees to gain access to the public arena and to promote their own political agendas in order to reach and persuade a large number of electors. Ideally, election campaign interviews are meant to provide citizens with the opportunity to receive continuously updated information about the election candidates, details about their past political activities, current initiatives and future visions.

A less explored aspect about election campaign interviews concerns the ways in which they act as institutional platforms providing political candidates with the opportunity to market themselves by showing why they deserve to be elected to the political position they are competing for. This aspect has considerable significance if we regard the election campaign interview as a hybrid interview which exhibits features of both a *political interview* and a *job interview*. Accordingly, in the election campaign interview the interviewed candidates display double roles: the role as public persons actively involved in political campaigning and high-level decision-making, on the one hand, and the role as job seekers competing for one of the top ranking jobs in a country's political hierarchy. It is not surprising, therefore, that election campaign interviews should attract greater interest than other political interviews. This is particularly noticeable in a country like the United States, where presidential election campaigns tend to attract as much interest abroad as at home.

Interviews with the 2008 American Democratic presidential candidates

The present study focuses on interviews with the two democratic presidential candidates – Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama – in the 2008 American presidential election, which has been regarded as a historic political event both inside and outside the United States. For a number of reasons, the race for the White House in the 2008 campaign was by far harsher and more spectacular between the two Democratic candidates than between the Democratic and the Republican candidates. Hillary Clinton, the former First Lady, has been in the public eye on the national level for a period of sixteen years. This may explain why, fairly or unfairly, most people have formed an opinion about her. Unlike Hillary, Barack Obama, the former Senator from Illinois, with seven years in the Illinois State Senate and one term in the US Senate, was a Washington outsider, starting from scratch. His popularity, unlike Clinton's, has had more to do with what he is and wants to do, rather than what he has done or not done.

Initially, the central issues of the 2008 American presidential election were full employment, health care, environmental challenge, quality of life. By struggling to get control over the discourse, each of the two presidential candidates were keen on imposing their own socio-political agenda and their own perceptions of the events. In order to have comparable data, a basic criterion for the corpus selection has been to choose interviews with the two candidates carried out by the same interviewer and/or interviewing institution. By taking into account the central issues of the 2008 election campaign, I decided to examine a set of two interviews conducted with Clinton and Obama separately. These interviews focus on energy issues and were carried out by the same interviewer, Amanda Griscom Little, on behalf of 'Grist', a non-profit environmental organisation based in Seattle, and «Outside» magazine.

Environmental and energy issues featured prominently at the beginning of the election campaign. So it is not surprising that this is the topic of both 'Grist' interviews: *An interview with Hillary Clinton about her presidential platform on energy and the environment* (9th August, 2007), and *An interview with Barack Obama about his presidential platform on energy and the environment* (30th July, 2007). What makes the two interviews very appropriate for a comparative study is the fact that most questions are identical or very similar. So both candidates are expected to provide answers to the same or similar questions. Let us consider the answers given to the very first question in (1) below:

(1)

'Grist' interview with Hillary Clinton

Q: What makes you the strongest green candidate? What sets your energy and environmental platform apart?

A: *I believe my proposals for energy and environmental priorities are really well thought-out and comprehensive*. You know, *I have been focusing on these issues for years*. Obviously, I have been a child advocate for most of my adult life, and *as first lady I focused on the environmental effects on children's health. I have served, since I arrived in the Senate, on the Environment and Public Works Committee*, and *I am proud of the work that I've done to stand up against the Bush administration's many efforts to weaken environmental laws*. (added italics)

'Grist' interview with Barack Obama

Q: Why should voters consider you the strongest candidate on environmental issues? What sets your green platform apart from the rest?

A: To begin with, *people can look at my track record, I am proud of the fact that one of the first endorsements I received in the race for the U.S. Senate was from the League of Conservation Voters. I've since cast tough votes on behalf of the environment*. For example, *I voted against the "Clear Skies" bill* that George Bush was promoting, despite the fact that the administration had heated up support for the bill in southern Illinois, which you know is a

coal area of the country. *So I think people can feel confident that I don't just talk the talk, I also walk the walk.* (added italics)

The answers to the first question are symptomatic for each of the two candidates. They reveal that neither candidate has been a particularly strong champion of environmental issues. Clinton refers in general terms to her political proposals and to her focus on energy environmental priorities. A more concrete element is her having served on the Environment and Public Works Committee. Obama's environmental track record is, understandably, much less impressive: he mentions having cast votes on behalf of the environment and having received one of the first endorsements in the race for the U.S. Senate from the League of Conservation Voters. A more concrete element that he mentions is having voted against Bush's "Clear Skies" bill. However, although neither candidate has a very strong environmental profile, both candidates are rhetorically skilful and know how to maximise their respective strengths and to turn weaknesses into strengths. Clinton deliberately refers to her long White House experience: «*as first lady* I focused on the environmental effects on children's health». Obama is banking on his popularity among the grassroots as a successful newcomer to the scene of the American presidential candidacy: «*people* can look at my track record», «*people* can feel confident that I don't just talk the talk, I also walk the walk». Since he has not managed to accomplish too many things in the field of energy and environment, Obama is trying to turn this disadvantage into an advantage, namely the fact that he is still an average American who has not distanced himself from ordinary people.

More deep-going insights into the two candidates' views on environmental issues emerge in their answers to the second question, illustrated in example (2) below:

(2)

'Grist' interview with Hillary Clinton

Q: In the Senate, you have supported the goal of an 80 percent reduction in greenhouse gases by 2050. Is this a centerpiece of your platform?

A: It is. *I joined* with Sens. [Barbara] Boxer and [Bernie] Sanders because *I thought* that their bill was the most forward-leaning in terms of what needs to be done to deal with the threat of global warming, and *I'm very proud to support their legislation.*
And obviously *I have my own proposals. I want to create a Strategic Energy Fund* that would be funded by taking money away from the oil companies, by giving them the choice to invest in renewable energy or pay into the fund. *We would take away their tax subsidies* as well, and *we would use this fund to create a clean-energy industry and millions of jobs in America.* (added italics)

'Grist' interview with Barack Obama

Q: How central will energy and the environment be to your campaign?

A: I consider energy to be one of the three most important issues that we're facing domestically. And the opportunities for significant change exist

> partly because *awareness of the threat of climate change has grown rapidly over the last several years. Al Gore deserves a lot of credit* for that, *as do activists in the environmental community and outlets like Grist. People recognize the magnitude of the climate problem.*
>
> Not only is there environmental concern, but you're also seeing *people who are recognizing that our dependence on fossil fuels from the Middle East is distorting our foreign policies*, and that *we can't sustain economically continuing dependence* on a resource that is going to get more and more expensive over time. As all those things converge, *we have to move boldly on energy legislation*, and *that's what I'll do as the next president.*
> (added italics)

As in example (1), the standpoints expressed in Clinton's and Obama's answers in example (2) are quite similar. In answering the interviewer's questions, they both put forward sound ideas and valuable proposals concerning the future energy legislation. However, the ways in which they position themselves as political frontrunners on energy issues differ considerably. As an experienced politician with a substantial track record, Clinton speaks in the 1st person singular about her past and present actions, as well as about her future intentions: «*I* joined», «*I* thought», «*I* have my own proposals», «*I* want to create a Strategic Energy Fund». However, when referring to future legislative measures, she switches from the 1st person singular pronoun to the 1st person plural pronoun so as to show her commitment to working in a team: «*We* would take away their tax subsidies», «*we* would use this fund to create a clean-energy industry and millions of jobs in America». Moreover, in the last sentence of her answer she explicitly shows a strong sense of responsibility as a politician concerned not only with investments in renewable energy but also with people's job situations: «to create a clean-energy industry and millions of jobs in America».

  Although Obama is self-assured as a politician, he avoids using the 1st person singular pronoun, which may be explained both factually and tactically. First, he is aware that his is not a very long political career and therefore his past achievements are not so numerous, so he should tone down foregrounding himself; second, he is fully aware that he owes his quickly growing popularity to the people who are supporting him, be they close collaborators or ordinary citizens. He is therefore wise first to give credit to senior politicians like Al Gore («*Al Gore* deserves a lot of credit»), and to community activists who are acknowledged for leading the way on environmental issues («as do *activists* in the environmental community and outlets like 'Grist'»). But Obama's most powerful rhetorical strategy consists in paying tribute to the common sense of ordinary people, by showing appreciation for ordinary people's awareness about the serious environmental challenges: «*People* recognize the magnitude of the climate problem»; «you're also seeing *people* who are recognizing that our dependence on fossil fuels from the Middle East is distorting our foreign policies». As a corollary, towards the end of this answer Obama uses the 1st person plural pronoun to include all those actively involved in shaping the new energy legislation: «*we* have to move boldly on energy legislation». Only in the very last sentence does Obama

speak in the 1st person singular when he hypothetically refers to himself as the next president: «that's what *I*'ll do *as the next president*».

It is significant to note that although the two presidential candidates do share a lot of farsighted commitments and envisage similar measures for a future environmental legislation, they address these issues in different ways and from different perspectives. Clinton has a lot to show with regard to her past activities and initiatives as an experienced politician and as a White House insider. This is why it is but natural for her to self-refer in the 1st person singular. Having a more limited experience as a professional politician and executive leader, Obama maximises instead his close connections with the grassroots, enhancing his image as a politician who is used to speaking with and to listen to the citizens. To use a musical metaphor, whereas Clinton is emphasising her qualities as a gifted soloist, Obama is enhancing his profile as an orchestra conductor. They obviously appeal to and grasp the attention of different categories of voters: Clinton appeals to a more senior and homogeneous audience, whereas Obama appeals to a younger, more heterogeneous audience.

By complying with their role constraints as respondents, the two interviewees legitimise the interviewer's prerogative to elicit, test and probe their views, beliefs and actions on behalf of the wider audience of voters. At the same time, each interviewee is also aware that his/her suitability for the presidency is being evaluated by both interviewer and American voters in comparison with the counter-candidate's qualifications. While they express similar views and their answers contain comparable messages, their rhetorical strategies differ significantly. As a result, they are perceived differently by voters.

Before proceeding further I find it relevant to take a closer look at the comments addressed to Obama by the interviewer before asking the following question:

> (3)
>
> Q: *You've consistently emphasized consensus and putting aside partisan battles.* Many argue that, when it comes to climate change, the maximum of what's politically possible falls short of the minimum we need to do to solve the problem. In other words, *consensus* won't get us where we need to go. *Will you fight the political battles needed to move the consensus on this issue, even if that means aggravating partisan rifts?*
>
> A: *Consensus doesn't mean 100 percent consensus* -- there is undoubtedly going to be resistance from certain parts of the energy sector, and there may be ideological resistance within the Republican Party, and we are going to have to attend to the regional differences in terms of how *people* get energy. But I believe that we can put together a strong majority to move forward, as long as we are thoughtful about the potential losers in any big piece of energy legislation.

The interviewer's question in example (3) touches upon a recurrent feature in Obama's rhetoric in general, namely his propensity to seek consensus rather than confrontation in dealing with major political issues. This tendency becomes apparent both in his speeches and in his public declarations. In this particular question, the interviewer addresses explicitly the

difficulty of reaching consensus across the political spectrum in connection with measures related to climate change. In asking the question, the interviewer's purpose is to challenge Obama's commitment to consensus-orientation so as to trigger a direct reaction from him. Obama avoids giving a straightforward answer. However, in order to uphold his rhetorical ethos (especially his credibility), he needs to re-adjust his rhetorical logos: and he does this by concentrating on word semantics. So, rather than backing from his alleged commitment to consensus, he argues for a complete relativisation of the notion of consensus, which thereby loses its original meaning: "*Consensus doesn't mean 100 percent consensus*". His statement obviously begs the question: what does then consensus actually mean? By revising the consensus principle in a most radical way, Obama reduces it to a mere version of majority-based compromise solution: "there is undoubtedly going to be resistance from certain parts of the energy sector, and there may be ideological resistance within the Republican Party [...] But I believe that we can put together a strong majority to move forward." While conceding the expected resistance from parts of the energy sector and the Republican Party, Obama's main concern is about "how *people* get energy", which is consistent with the priority that people's needs have on his agenda, as illustrated above in examples (1) and (2).

Let us consider now the answers in example (4), where the question addressed to Obama is a follow-up to the interviewer's question in example (3):

(4)

'Grist' interview with Hillary Clinton

Q: What role will coal play in your plan?
A: *I think we have got to take a hard look at clean coal. I have advocated carbon sequestration*, *I have advocated* power plants looking for ways to use coal more cleanly and efficiently. *I doubt* very much that using coal in liquid form for transportation could ever pass the environmental test, but *I am willing to do the research* to prove one way or another.
   The political pressure [to use coal] will remain intense, and *I think* you have got to admit that coal – of which *we* have a great and abundant supply in America – is not going away. *So how do we best manage* the possibility of using clean coal, but having very strict environmental standards? It is not going to do *us* any good if *we* substitute one dirty energy source for another.

'Grist' interview with Barack Obama

Q: Do you believe that we can achieve *political consensus* on this goal of 80 percent reductions [of carbon emissions] by 2050?
A: *I think with presidential leadership we can meet this goal*, and *it will be one of my top priorities*. But it is going to require a thoughtful approach that accounts for the possibility that electricity prices will go up, and that low-income people may need to be compensated. *We'll have to deal with the fact* that many of our power plants are coal burning, and *consider what investments we're willing to make in coal sequestration. If we make sure* that the

> burdens and benefits of a strong environmental policy are evenly spread
> across the economy, *then people will want to see us take on this problem in
> an aggressive way*.

In example (4) above it is enlightening to see how the issue of «carbon sequestration» is tackled rhetorically by Hillary Clinton and by Barack Obama, respectively. To the interviewer's question «What role will coal play in your plan?», Clinton provides a straightforward and informative answer: «*I have advocated carbon sequestration*». This message is reinforced in her immediately following statements: «*I have advocated* power plants looking for ways to use coal more cleanly and efficiently». In Obama's answer, the issue of «carbon sequestration» is not a top priority and it also involves complications: «We'll have to deal with the fact that many of our power plants are coal burning, and *consider what investments we're willing to make in coal sequestration*». While Clinton can report that she has already advocated carbon sequestration, Obama is still cautious about committing himself to investing in carbon sequestration. His main concern is striking the right balance between the burdens and the benefits «of a strong environmental policy», to make it possible to receive the endorsement of the «*people*»: «If we make sure that the burdens and benefits of a strong environmental policy are evenly spread across the economy, then people will want to see us take on this problem in an aggressive way». Obama shows that he is reluctant to take measures before they are understood and accepted by ordinary people.

As in her preceding answers to the interviewer's questions, Clinton assumes confidently the responsibility of leading the way and taking tough measures on environmental issues. So she is comfortable using the 1st person singular pronoun to refer to herself as the agent of verbs of action («I have advocated», «I am willing to do the research») or verbs of thinking («I think»), whose consequences are likely to affect people's present and future daily lives. Clinton displays a strong conviction and a determination to motivate people. To emphasise the big dilemma «of using clean coal, but having very strict environmental standards» she resorts to a rhetorical question: «So how do *we* best manage the possibility of using clean coal, but having very strict environmental standards?» Compared to a statement, a rhetorical question has the illocutionary force of emphatically displaying the utterer's strong conviction, while at the same time involving the hearer(s) in the ongoing reasoning process. In this particular instance, Clinton uses the 1st person plural pronoun «we» because she wants her audience to get mentally involved and to become aware of the difficult decisions that a political leader, like the president, is normally faced with.

The same dilemma that is conveyed by Clinton in a rhetorical question is presented by Obama as a logical problem by means of a conditional inference: «If *we* make sure that the burdens and benefits of a strong environmental policy are evenly spread across the economy, then *people* will want to see *us* take on this problem in an aggressive way». Both of them use the 1st person plural pronoun «we» to refer to the decision-makers: «*We*'ll have to deal with the fact», «what investments *we*'re willing to make», «if *we* make sure». But, as in the answers he gave to the questions in examples (1), (2) and (3), Obama refers to *people* as directly involved agents: «*people* will want to see *us* take on this problem». Unlike

Clinton, Obama avoids using the 1st person singular pronoun, except for the occasional, downplayed introductory «I»: «*I think with presidential leadership we can meet this goal*». In Obama's rhetorical argumentation, «people» functions not only as an 'ad populum' argument (appealing to popular sentiment and relying on people's support), but also as an 'ad verecundiam' argument (appealing to the authority of expert opinion). It is precisely the combined use of such arguments in a Grassroots campaign that contributed to Obama's electoral success. He referred less to himself and more to his audience – the public at large –, which shows that he knows how to truly engage with and connect with people.

The dichotomy of change (represented by Obama) versus experience (represented by Clinton) was a common theme in the presidential campaign, with Hillary Clinton positioning herself as the candidate with experience and Obama enacting the role of the candidate set on bringing change to Washington. The pragma-rhetorical analysis of the interviews with Clinton and Obama carried out in this paper provides comparative insights into the linguistic framing characteristic of each of the two presidential candidates.

Conclusions

For the present study I chose to examine a set of interviews carried out with the two Democratic presidential candidates – Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama – during the 2008 American presidential election campaign. It was a historic campaign in many respects. The two democratic presidential candidates were running a very tight race and thereby a very demanding campaign. From several viewpoints they instantiate difference in similarity, and similarity in difference: two highly eligible presidential candidates who were repeatedly being evaluated by the media in terms of campaigning and voting results, as well as discourse and activity performance.

The election campaign interview can be seen to exhibit features of both a political interview and a job interview. Accordingly, in the election campaign interview the interviewed candidates display double roles: the role as public persons actively involved in political campaigning and high-level decision-making, on the one hand, and the role as job seekers competing for the top ranking job in their country's political hierarchy.

The analysis has focused on the answers provided by the two candidates to identical or similar questions posed by the same interviewer. The comparability of questions has contributed to a systematic and consistent examination of the similarities and differences between Clinton and Obama in terms of topic framing, leadership role, personal achievements, future visions. While at first sight the two candidates appear to display similar and compatible standpoints and attitudes, their language use reveals differences in the focus and strength of their commitments, their political priorities, their relations with the voters, and their rapport with the interviewer. Although Clinton and Obama expressed very similar views on several crucial issues for the 2008 election campaign, they were per-

ceived as embodying two separate political symbols: old vs. new, senior (political veteran) vs. junior (political newcomer).

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LOCUS A CAUSA FINALI

EDDO RIGOTTI

1. *The purposes of the paper*

This paper pertains to a research project[1] which aims at focusing on the constitution of arguments by taking into account, beside the debate on this theme developed by contemporary argumentation theorists, the important contribution given by the Topical tradition. My first objective here is to bring to light the role played by semantic analysis of inferential rules in an adequate approach to argument schemes.

In this regard, I start by considering a relevant methodological suggestion offered by van Eemeren and Grootendorst in their article "The fallacy from composition and division" (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 1999) that is largely devoted to the whole-parts argument scheme. Here, a deep semantic analysis of the whole-parts relation, which specifies the categories of properties that are transferable or non-transferable from the whole to the parts and vice-versa, allows to define the proper interpretation in which the concerned argument scheme is valid. A strict connection between the argument schemes and the semantic-ontological level of discourse emerges.

Interestingly, the Topics tradition, especially in its Medieval phase, shows to have acquired a clear awareness of this connection. In fact, in the debate about locus, a relevant distinction emerged between *locus maxima*, then simply named *maxima*, a notion very close to the current notion of argumentative principle, and *locus differentia maximae*, later named *locus*, understood as the semantic-ontological relation (*habitudo*), like causality, alternativity, analogy, implication etc., linking the class of states of affairs to which the standpoint belongs to another class of state of affairs in the same or in another possible world. It emerges that one locus may produce one or more maxims; in other words, the same ontological relation creates different implications (inferential rules). However, no systematic semantic-ontological analysis is proposed by the Topics tradition for loci; in other words the mechanism through which each locus "generates" the maxims that are related to it was not brought to light by the Topics tradition.

In this paper, I will sketch such an analysis for the *locus a causa finali*, developing an ontology of action from which various maxims may be derived. I will try to specify the con-

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ditions of semantic applicability for one of the maxims that are generated by this locus: "if the goal is good, the means are too", or, to quote a proverb, "The end justifies the means".

The validity of maxims is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for the constitution of arguments; the Aristotelian notion of *endoxon*, which was substantially neglected by the Medieval scholars[2], proves to identify an essential component (bound to the context and its culture) of the constituency of arguments, which conditions their soundness and effectiveness. The reintegration of this notion in the analysis of arguments is all the more required for the study of how argumentation works in the different contexts of its application (Rigotti 2006).

2. *A relevant methodological suggestion*

In their paper, "The fallacies of composition and division", Frans van Eemeren and Rob Grootendorst have analyzed in depth the whole-parts argument scheme. Their analysis shows that not all properties (predicates) can be transferred from the parts to the whole and vice-versa. The transferability of predicates depends on their semantic nature: structure-dependent properties are not transferable and, among the structure-independent properties[3], only the absolute – non-relative – properties[3] can be transferred.

In fact, all structure-dependent properties characterize the whole from various points of view in its wholeness: for its form (*round* or *rectangular*) or for its "functional" qualities (*edible*, *poisonous*, *expansive*, *tasty*, *strong*, *coherent*).

As regards the relative structure-independent properties like *heavy*, *light*, *fat*, *big*, their non-transferability depends on the fact that they involve the whole not focusing on its structure, but implicitly comparing it with other entities considered under the same point of view; thus their scope involves the concerned reality in its wholeness: a big heap of light things (say of hay) may be intolerably heavy.

I reproduce, in order to sum up the analysis made by van Eemeren and Grootendorst, the scheme they offer in the paper mentioned above.

Transferable (+) and nontransferable (−) properties	structure-independent properties (2a)	structure-dependent properties (2b)
Absolute properties (1a)	red, white, blue, glass, iron, wooden (+)	round, rectangular, edible, poisonous (−)
Relative properties (1b)	heavy, small, light, big, fat, slim (−)	good, expansive, strong, poor (−)

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[2] The Medieval Topics tradition refers to Aristotle through Boethius, who exclusively focused on the dialectical component of arguments.

[3] Structure-dependency presupposes a distinction between structured and unstructured wholes. Hamblin (1970) introduces an analogous distinction between physical and functional collections. Peter of Spain (*Summulae Logicales* 5.7;5.14-5.23; in particular 5.14-5.18) analogously distinguishes between *totum universale* and *totum integrale.* Interesting remarks are put fore by Buridan (*Summulae de dialectica* 6.4.2 ss.).

Though I am concerned with another class of arguments, pertaining to the domain of finality, I have briefly recalled van Eemeren & Grootendorst 1999 for its methodological relevance: an in-depth semantic analysis enabled the authors to make explicit the conditions under which a certain argument scheme is validly or fallaciously applied.

They show that precise semantic conditions must be met in order to ensure the validity of this argument scheme. In fact, I am convinced that the fallacious or sound use of argument schemes is often not determined by their presumptive or probabilistic nature, but by an uncertain definition of their semantic applicability conditions.

In section 5, I shall try to specify the semantic conditions of validity for a particular argument scheme – or a particular maxim, if we follow the topical tradition to which I shall largely refer in this paper – that is generated by the locus from final cause: "if the goal is good, the means are too". I shall try to show how an adequate representation of the ontology of action that is presupposed by the concerned locus from final cause can explain its fallacious interpretations and establish the limits of its applicability.

3. *The conceptual and theoretical framework of Topics*

In order to properly lay out the subject we want to face, it is certainly useful, and maybe also necessary, to recall in its essential features the conceptual and theoretical framework on which my discourse will be based.

I shall prevailingly refer to the doctrine of topics set out by Aristotle, elaborated by Cicero and systematized by Boethius, Abelard, Peter of Spain, Buridan and others. Topics was thought of by Aristotle as a method for finding out an appropriate argument in relation to any standpoint (*problema*)[4].

This method works with rules named *topoi* (translated into Latin with *loci*). It is well known that there is not a universally accepted interpretation of this Aristotelian notion, for which, by the way, no satisfactory definition is given by Aristotle.

Braet (2005) offers an important contribution to a convincing interpretation of the Aristotelian perspective. Starting from the lacunose presentations of *loci* given by Aristotle in *Rhetoric* (2.23), Braet reconstructs an ideal systematic model of an Aristotelian locus bringing to light four components:

1. the name (e.g. *ek ton enantion* = from the contraries);
2. advice suggesting a fair procedure for establishing the concerned type of argument;
3. a topical principle that shows to be a rule establishing an inferential implication between general statements, like "if the cause exists, then the effect does";
4. an actual example of argumentation applying this rule (Braet 2005: 69).

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[4] See Aristotele's *Topica*, Book I, Chapter 1.

In Braet's view the topical principle, "while occasionally quite abstract, always contains enough substantial thought-guiding terms" (Braet 2005: 79) and can be interpreted "as the generalized 'if-then' statement in a modern argumentation scheme".

This interpretation suggestively opens the way to an understanding of the rhetorical enthymemes "as combinations of a logical argumentation form (which can generally be reconstructed as *modus ponens*) and an argumentation scheme" (*ibidem*). This interpretation of Aristotle's conception of topics, which brings to light a certain contrast between the logical orientation of the doctrine of topics and the prevailing syllogistic – non propositional – orientation of Aristotle's logic, is interestingly aligned with the following developments of the topical tradition. In my opinion, it also shows the possibility of a fruitful dialogue between this tradition and the current theoretical approaches, which, under the label of "argument schemes", substantially focus on the same problematic domain of argumentation theory[5].

We start by reconsidering a particular point of Braet's reconstruction of the Rhetoric version of topics, which he identifies as "the name" of *topos*.

Indeed, Aristotle seems to attribute to this component a mere function of label, even though it represents, as Braet remarks, the main component of the "if-part" of the "if-then"-structured topical principle (e.g. "if the cause exists"...). In the following tradition the role of this apparent label – as Braet foreshadows in a note (Braet 2005: 81 n. 15) of his paper – becomes decisively more substantial. An important signal is already given in Cicero's *Topica* which emphasizes this notion identifying it with the proper place of arguments – *sedes argumenti* – and, more importantly, with the source from which arguments are drawn: *unde argumenta ducuntur*. This emphasis on locus as the source and basis of an argumentative move is interestingly mirrored by the typical preposition *from* introducing any class of arguments (e.g. argument *from* expert opinion) throughout the tradition of argumentation studies until the current argumentation theory.

In the following topical tradition, Boethius, who critically synthesized the two interpretations of Aristotelian topics offered by Cicero and Themistius, designates this component as *topica differentia*, which is to be understood as the particular ontological domain to which certain inferential principles (named *maximae propositiones*) are bound.

A certain terminological complexity, which indeed causes some obscurity, is introduced by Boethius, who adopts the term "locus" both for the *maxima propositio* – later renamed *locus maxima* – and for the ontological domain on which the maxim depends – named *locus differentia maximae*. We shall use "loci" for *loci-differentiae* and "maxims" for *loci-maximae*.

Independently from this terminological complexity, a more substantial problem is represented by the nature of loci and their connection with maxims: Boethius remarks that

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[5] See Garssen 2001 for an informative review of the literature on argument schemes; for the comparison of different contemporary approaches to argument schemes with topics tradition see Rigotti & Greco Morasso (forthcoming).

the maxims outnumber the loci, because the specific differences constituting the types or classes of maxims are less numerous than maxims themselves[6].

Peter of Spain tries to justify the definition of loci as differences of maxims:

> Locus differentia maximae est id per quod una maxima differt ab altera, ut istae duae maximae: 'omne totum est maius sua parte', 'de quocumque praed- icatur definitio et definitum', differunt tantum per terminos ex quibus con- stituuntur" (*Summulae Logicales* 5.07) [the locus – difference of maxims – is that for which a maxim differs from another; thus the following two maxims 'every whole is bigger than anyone of its parts' and 'to whatever the definition holds, the defined holds too' differ only for the terms they consist of].

In other words, loci are differences of maxims because they are implementations in differ- ent ontological domains of the same logical connections. The awareness that maxims are more numerous than loci is anyway implicitly acknowledged by all authors through the list of loci and maxims they offer. Indeed, between the set of maxims and the set of loci, an in- jective function is established: to each maxim corresponds exactly one locus, while to each locus may correspond one or more maxims. For instance, several maxims are bound to the *Locus a causa materiali* by the Topical tradition:

> *If the material lacks, the thing is impossible;*
> *If the material is there the thing can exist too;*
> *If the thing is there the material is there or was there[7].*

4. *Loci as semantic-ontological relationships*

The proper nature of loci emerges, gradually, through the Medieval tradition, where, at a cer- tain moment, locus-difference is presented as one extreme of a relation (in Latin *habitudo*), whose other extreme coincides with the standpoint itself.

For example, the locus from cause *is the extreme of a cause-to-effect relation whose other extreme – the effect – is the standpoint*. Peter of Spain wrote:

> Locus a causa efficiente est habitudo ipsius ad suum effectum [The locus from efficient cause is the relation of the efficient cause to its effect]

In the locus from definition, the relation concerned ties together the definition (i.e. the defining phrase) and the defined object. In Peter of Spain's words,

> definitio est oratio quae est esse rei significans. Locus a definitione est habi- tudo definitionis ad definitum (5.10) [a definition is an utterance which is

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[6] See Boethius, *De differentiis topicis* 1186: "atque ideo pauciores deprehenduntur hi loci qui in differentiis positi sunt, quam propositiones ipsae quarum sunt differentiae".

[7] In the formulation of this maxim I take into account the distinction between permanent matters (coexisting with the thing, like iron vs. knife) and transient matters (disappearing at the arising of the thing, like flour vs. bread). Cf. in particular Peter of Spain, *Summulae logicales* 5.25 and Buridan, *Summulae de dialectica* 6.4.11.

> meaning the mode of being of a thing. The locus from definition is the rela-
> tion of the definition to the defined]

Analogously, we could define the Aristotelian "locus from all the more and all the less" as the relation between an entity for which a state of affairs, though being more likely to be the case, is not indeed the case ("even gods do not know everything") and an entity for which this state of affairs is much more likely not to be the case: this relation entails, as one of its maxims, that it is surely false that this state of affairs is the case for this latter entity ("if even gods do not know everything, all the less will humans know everything": *Rhetorica* 1397 b 16-17).

Let us consider some passages by Abelard and Buridan in which some relevant consequences of the interpretation of locus as extreme(s) of a *habitudo* are brought to light. Abelard connects with the *habitudo* the solidity of inference:

> Est autem locus differentiae ea res in cuius habitudine ad aliam firmitas con-
> secutionis consistit (*De dialectica*, 263) [locus difference is that thing on
> whose relation to another thing the solidity of the inference is based].

In his sharp commentary to Peter of Spain's *Summulae*, Buridan makes this connection even more explicit, identifying the locus with the terms of which the maxim consists:

> Locus differentia maximae est termini ex quibus constituitur maxima et ex
> quorum habitudine ad invicem maxima habet notitiam et veritatem. Verbi
> gratia, cum haec propositio 'quidquid vere affirmatur de specie, vere affirma-
> tur de genere' sit locus-maxima, isti termini 'species' et 'genus' sunt locus-dif-
> ferentia maximae; *ex habitudine enim speciei ad suum genus maxima habet
> veritatem et efficaciam* (*Summulae de dialectica* 6.2.2).

Starting from this fundamental comment by Buridan, I suggest the following updated interpretation of locus in its connection with maxims:

> *The locus is a specific relation connecting different states of affairs that* generates
> *one or more maxims, providing them with semantic transparency* (notitia) *and
> with a specific degree of analytical truth* (veritas) *and persuasiveness* (efficacia).

The interpretation of loci as ontological relations (*habitudines*) generating argument schemes entails the task of deriving each argument scheme from the respective topical relation. In the mentioned authors this derivation shows to work as an implication of the ontology of the locus. For example, the species-to-genus relation entails that "if something is truly stated of an individual of a species, it is truly stated of an individual of the genus too" and this is so because any individual of a species is an individual of the corresponding genus too (e.g. " if a man runs, then it is true that an animal runs" or "if someone corrupted a policeman, he corrupted a public officer"). The same locus generates also other maxims, like "if the genus is truly negated of something, the species is too", because the set of properties required for belonging to a genus are presupposed by belonging to all its species ("an angel

cannot be a human, as it is not an animal"; "he cannot be a ophthalmologist because he is not a doctor").

All argument schemes, or maxims, related to a locus are validly applied only if the conceptual domain actually involved by the argument really exhibits the logical properties of the locus. Very often, as we saw at the beginning of this paper for the locus from the whole and its parts, a similar linguistic shape hides substantial differences.

Let us compare a sound application of the maxim "whatever is truly said of the genus is truly said of the species" (which is generated by the locus from genus to species), "Italian citizens may migrate in any European country because European citizens can migrate in all European countries", with an unsound one, "In the last year European economy strongly reacted to the financial crisis; therefore, in the last year French economy strongly reacted to the financial crisis". Indeed French economy is not a species, but a part of European economy, which is in turn a whole to which the structure-dependent property of having strongly reacted... is attributed: transferring this property to one of the parts represents a typical fallacy of division.

5. *The locus from final cause*

The locus from final cause belongs to the ontological area of action (see Figure 1), which may be defined in terms of its essential factors (ideally) as an event intentionally caused by a human subject who,

- being aware of the present situation
- and of a new possible comparatively more convenient state of affairs,
  - which is realizable through a causal chain available to her,
- is attracted by this new, possible, state of affairs and,
- taking the decision of applying the causal chain,
- activates it
- thus realizing her purpose.

Often, many different, not strictly constitutive factors become relevant: given the situated nature of decision making, different competitive desires and different costs of the causal chain may induce the agent to abandon or substantially change the purpose; the degree of adequacy of the causal chain may show to be insufficient and transform the action in an unhappy attempt; the possible positive or negative side effects, including the informative and relational implications of action, the possible presence in the causal chain of subservient instrumental actions and the quality of their ends and of their possible side effects turn the action into a complex and hardly manageable process, in which the human subject intensively "negotiates" the realization of its purposes with the surrounding context.

Figure 1: *The ontology of action* (revised and adapted from Rigotti 2003)

Within the ontology of action, our locus from the final cause focuses on the relation connecting the end (goal, purpose) of an action with the action itself. Several maxims are generated by this locus. For example, as the end is a constitutive component of any action, we can derive the maxim "if a behavior has no end, it is not an action", which is very often employed in the juridical domain in establishing the degree of responsibility. The following two maxims could analogously be derived from the notion of action: "if the pursued end is impossible, the decision of achieving the action is irrational" and "if the pursued end is evidently harmful for the agent, the action is unreasonable". Another maxim is close to the basic argument scheme of practical reasoning that has been investigated by Walton in particular in relation to the development of artificial intelligence systems[8]: "if an action is strictly required in order to reach a desired goal, this action should be undertaken". More in general, the same logical principle, bound to the desirability of a certain action which is established in accordance with the desirability of its results, is identified by Garssen (1997: 21,

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[8] Walton's account of practical reasoning focuses on the significant implication that this kind of reasoning may have for setting up artificial intelligent agents. Indeed, artificial intelligence appears to be at the basis of a renewed interest for practical (teleological) reasoning in philosophy (Walton 1990: 3). Walton identifies two basic argument schemes of practical reasoning (Walton 1990: 48 and 2007: 216): the *necessary condition* and the *sufficient condition* schemes. Such schemes allow identifying important elements of practical reasoning, such as the notion of goal, and intriguing problems deriving from the agent's relation with reality (practicality and side effects). Moreover, the author points out that there are some problems to be elaborated in the form of critical questions (Walton 2007: 224), such as the presence of multiple goals (hierarchy of goals) or of conflicting goals and the evaluation of possible future implications of one's action (effects and side effects).

q.td in van Eemeren, Houtlosser & Snoeck Henkemans 2007: 166) as a subtype of the causal argument scheme[9]. Garssen (2001: 92) names this logical principle "'means-end argumentation' or 'pragmatic argumentation'". Already Boethius, who indeed represents the beginner of the medieval tradition of topics, introduced the maxim "cuius finis bonus est, ipsum quoque bonum est" (*De differentiis topicis*, P.L. 64, 1189 D), "if the end is good, the thing is good too". This maxim is confirmed by Abelard (*Dialectica* 416, 436) and by Peter of Spain (*Summulae logicales* 5.2.7), but is questioned by Buridan (*Summulae de dialectica* 6.4.13), who, assuming that no property can inhere to what does not exist (whatever does not exist can be neither good nor bad), excludes for the end the possibility of being good or bad as the end does not yet exist before the fulfillment of the action. In fact, in this approach, the understanding of action seems to be compromised, and, more relevantly, this approach does not consider that possible properties do inhere to possible things.

Now, I want to focus on a certain fuzziness and even a certain ambiguity that characterizes the statement of Boethius's maxim. First of all, the second extreme of the concerned relation, being referred to by *ipsum*, is not explicitly identified. It could refer both to the action and to the means[10]. However, a specific maxim, which will be tackled later, is devoted to means in relation to their use ("cuius usus bonus est ipsum bonum est"): consequently, we start by focusing on the interpretation where *ipsum* means the action.

Moreover, and more relevantly, the term *end* and the analogous Latin term *finis* cover two distinct meanings – outcome and purpose – and, consequently, each of these meanings generates a different interpretation of the maxim. Two apparent maxims, which we might call *paramaxims*, emerge:

> (1) if the outcome is good, the action is too
> (2) if the purpose is good, the action is too

Unfortunately, the ambiguity of our traditional principle is far from being exhausted as it touches also the third remaining term our maxim consists of: the protheical notion of good. Indeed, the goodness of a chicken does not coincide with the goodness of a cook nor with the goodness of a gourmet nor... However, even though these meanings are different, their difference is not irreducible, since goodness is, in general, attributed to some entity or state of affairs insofar as it discharges a certain function in the due way (see Vendler 1963: 465). Consequently, we could think the polisemy of *good* is solved once we have identified the functions expected from the concerned entities or states of affairs. In paramaxim (1), the goodness of an outcome might be defined as the positive nature or the responding to due expectations of the state of affairs resulting from an action. Now, expectations may be iden-

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[9] Van Eemeren, Houtlosser & Snoeck Henkemans (2007: 174 and ff.) identifies a list of linguistic indicators for the pragmatic argument scheme.

[10] In the example brought by Boethius "si beatum esse bonum est, et iustitia bona est, hic enim est iustitiae finis, ut si quis secundum iustitiam uiuat, ad beatitudinem perducatur", happiness represents the end of justice which is a conduct (as type of life) through which happiness is reached.

tified within a particular perspective or absolutely. The perspective in turn may be more or less wide and refer to a subject (both individual and social) or to a purpose:

> *For me (*or *for Europe), it is now a good thing to devaluate the Euro*
> *For the recover of the European economy, it is now a good thing to devaluate the Euro*

The constituents introduced by *for*, which define the perspectives, should be referred to as *beneficiaries*. The absence of any beneficiary corresponds to the above mentioned notion of absolute expectation where each entity is *per se* conceived of as destined (created in order) to realize a peculiar perfection. In the Western Medieval tradition this type of expectation was identified in relation to a totality-governing order, created by God, possibly mediated by nature. The Greek verb *pephyka*, (translated into Latin through *natus sum*), which represents the perfect of *phyo* "to generate" – whence *physis* "nature" – was often used to expound this type of absolute expectation that is by nature inherent to any entity[11] and generates an ontology-based moral system. In the present day strongly differentiated culture, the moral judgment may refer to other totality-governing principles or simply mirror each person's spontaneous sensibility.

All in all, it is not evident that paramaxim (1) does represent a proper maxim, as even bad actions may cause good outcomes. Let us consider the following, perhaps extravagant, example:

> Action: *X tries to kill Y by shooting her.*
> Outcome: *X misses Y and hits a tire of her car, thus preventing her from reaching the airport and from leaving with a plane which then crashed.*

Indeed, this paramaxim is, in general, an evident *non-sequitur* as it claims that, if two constituents of an event have opposite properties, the one does have the property of the other.

Of course, goodness is very differently attributed to the action in X's and Y's perspectives or in other more specified perspectives (like X's juridical position or Y's physical safety), but in spite of these differences the validity of our paramaxim is excluded: the evident goodness of the outcome does not entail the goodness of the action, neither absolutely (it is not good for anybody to kill other people) nor in Y's perspective. Also another reading of paramaxim (1) that we find in the Shakespearian saying "All's well that ends well" could hardly be accounted for as a proper maxim: it is rather a sort of advice suggesting, on the basis of

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[11] In the world view largely adopted in Medieval culture, nature is conceived of as an order subservient to a Divine plan to which all beings are expected to conform; this expectation is often expounded by *natus sum*: "caecitas non dicitur nisi de his quae sunt nata videre" [blindness is not said but of things that are born to see] (cf. Sancti Thomae Aquinatis *De principiis naturae* II, 8). In Dante's *Divine Comedy* (Inf. XXVI), Ulysses persuades his companions to follow him in the last adventure beyond Pillars of Hercules by arguing that they *had been made* in order to pursue virtue and knowledge: "Considerate la vostra semenza/ fatti non foste a viver come bruti/ ma per seguir virtute e canoscenza" [Consider how your souls were sown:/ you were not made to live like brutes or beasts,/ but to pursue virtue and knowledge].

a proper maxim, the irrelevance of bad actions or events if they do not "succeed" in producing the predictable bad outcomes. The proper maxim onto which this recommendation is based would be "if an event does not cause any relevant effect on me, it should be considered as irrelevant for me", which relies on a largely accepted definition of relevance.

Paramaxim (2), namely "If the purpose is good, the action is too" is likely to be a fair interpretation of the proverb "The end justifies the means", that is in itself ambiguous. In it, in relation to the purpose (understood as the state of affairs at which an action is aimed), goodness denotes a positive nature both as respondence to the actor's expectations and absolutely. Now, like paramaxim (1), also paramaxim (2) is, in general, a *non-sequitur* as it claims that, if two constituents of an event have opposite properties, one has the property of the other. However, if considered in detail, this latter paramaxim might also have reasonable readings when the conditions of three particular scenarios are met:

i. The quality of the possible side effects is considered: following this paramaxim, if an action is aimed at a good effect, it is said to be good even if some non-intended side effects of the causal chain are bad. In this very frequent situation the action may be taken for good in its wholeness if the negative side effects it brings about are, in themselves or compared with the good effects, tolerable or irrelevant. The maxim from the lesser evil is here properly invoked: "if the undesirable side effects are less harmful than the lack of the pursued effects, the action is justified". Of course, in this case, the goodness of the whole action is intended and not the goodness of the side effects, which nevertheless retain their negativity.

ii. The fulfillment of the action requires within its causal chain an instrumental action, i.e. a complex causal chain which is in itself an action: if the final purpose of the global action is good, but the provisional purpose of the instrumental action is bad, this principle, claiming that the provisional purpose of the instrumental action also "becomes" good, is evidently invalid. If there is no reasonable alternative, it might "recover" validity applying once again the maxim from the lesser evil, provided that we are able to show that the realization of the previous action is less harmful than the lack of the results of the final action.

iii. The causal chain entails the adoption of instruments, resources or procedures that are in themselves morally indifferent or exempt from moral evaluation.

This is the only version of our principle (paramaxim) for which it represents a proper maxim.

It is noteworthy that, in this case, the maxim substantially coincides with the above mentioned traditional maxim "cuius usus bonus est ipsum bonum est"; e.g.: "if cutting is good the knife is too". The last scenario we have considered represents the only interpretation for which the very popular proverb "The end justifies the means"[12] may function as a valid

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[12] This proverb occurs in various European languages and cultures with little variations: in Italian, "Il fine giustifica i mezzi"; in Dutch, "Het doel heiligt de middelen"; in French, "Le but justifie les moyens"; in German, "Der

maxim (indeed, the other valid interpretations we have identified properly owe their validity to the maxim from the lesser evil). This maxim presupposes the existence of a class of morally neutral resources (tools, activities, procedures, abilities) having a mere instrumental nature, which are good or bad depending on the goodness or badness of their uses. Let us consider the two following examples:

> *X saves her friend Y from failure with her money*, where money plays a clearly positive role;
> *X corrupts the judge with his money*, where the role of money is clearly negative.

In his *Rhetoric*, Aristotle (1355b 5-8) introduces the notion of instrumental goods (including all goods, but virtue) that are *per se* neutral and may be considered as goods insofar they represent resources necessary to realize truly good ends. Rhetoric is included in this class integrating a small collection of other examples: strength, health, wealth and strategy. Interestingly Aristotle includes rhetoric, which largely coincides for him and the other ancient scholars with the argumentative discourse. In fact, the ancient theoreticians frequently focus on the ambivalence of rhetorical ability, noticing however that, though often being exploited to ignite conflicts and seditions and to perpetrate frauds, it is nevertheless necessary to create the healthy consent generating and preserving all human cultures and institutions (this remark is present in Aristotle, Cicero, Quintilian). Especially Cicero engages in bringing to light an evidently positive balance between good and bad uses of communication and argumentation (see his introduction to the first book of *De inventione*[13]).

6. *Endoxa as complementary soundness conditions of arguments and as clues of cultural belonging*

Considering both the locus from totality (to which the whole-parts argument scheme refers) and the locus from the final cause, two significant considerations emerge:

1. In both cases traditional maxims show to contain ambiguities and, as their validity is restricted to very specific semantic values of the terms that make them up, accurate semantic analyses are needed to ensure their validity; in particular regarding the whole-parts argument scheme, only absolute structure-independent predicates are considered as transferable; regarding our maxim deriving from the locus from final cause (*The end justifies the means*), only an interpretation of *end*

Zweck heiligt die Mittel"; in Russian, "Cel' opravdyvaet sredstva" etc. In general it does not receive the argumentatively correct interpretation we have just brought to light, but an ironic, malicious, reading that recalls the paramaxim (2).

[13] "Saepe et multum hoc mecum cogitavi, bonine an mali plus attulerit hominibus et civitatibus copia dicendi ac summum eloquentiae studium. Nam cum et nostrae rei publicae detrimenta considero et maximarum civitatum veteres animo calamitates colligo, non minimam video per disertissimos homines invectam partem incommodorum; cum autem res ab nostra memoria propter vetustatem remotas ex litterarum monumentis repetere instituo, multas urbes constitutas, plurima bella restincta, firmissimas societates, sanctissimas amicitias intellego cum animi ratione tum facilius eloquentia comparatas".

as "purpose" and of *means* as "morally neutral means" transforms the proverb in an authentic maxim.

2. Invalid principles sometimes seem to recover their validity, as different, valid, maxims are actually invoked. In a particular interpretation of our proverb, an action aiming at a good effect may be considered in its wholeness as good even if some side effects (non-intended effects) are bad, if these side effects are tolerable or irrelevant. Indeed the maxim from the lesser evil, generated by the locus from alternatives, is here properly invoked[14].

In general, it should be emphasized that valid maxims (argument schemes) do not acquire or lose their validity intermittently, depending on their different applications: indeed their argumentative effectiveness, their applicability, is restricted to the scenarios that meet the semantic-ontological conditions required by their right interpretation. The maxim from totality should not be invoked if the properties concerned are structure-dependent; analogously, the maxim of the locus from final cause we considered cannot be applied if the means concerned are not properly neutral[15]. However, in such cases we are not legitimated to state that the considered maxim becomes invalid, but we have to take cognizance that, in the actual context, our valid maxim does not meet the required conditions, i.e. is not applied to the appropriate situation. In fact, the validity of the maxim does not guarantee the soundness of the argument; more precisely, the validity of the maxim is a necessary, not a sufficient condition of the soundness of an argument: another level of premises must be taken into account (Rigotti & Greco 2006; Rigotti 2006; Rigotti 2009). Interestingly, in the theoretical frame of pragma-dialectics, in the opening stage, beyond the procedural starting point, to which argument schemes (maxims) naturally belong, the notion of material starting point is also introduced (see van Eemeren & Houtlosser 2002: 20)[16].

At this point, the question about what other conditions, beyond the validity of the maxim, must be satisfied in order to have a sound argument might be translated as how material starting point should be defined and analysed or what components of an argumentative move are to be identified with the material starting point. In this connection I propose to reconsider the Aristotelian notion of *endoxon* as it is defined in the first Book of *Topics* (100b.21):

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[14] In the considered situation, invoking our maxim of the locus from final cause would represent either a bad interpretation of a maxim, violating rule 8 of critical discussion by the use of an invalid reasoning procedure, or the use of an inappropriate, but in itself valid argument scheme, violating rule 7 of critical discussion (cf. van Eemeren & Grootendorst 1992: 160-161).

[15] In both cases there would be an incorrect use of a valid argument scheme: rule 7 of critical discussion would be violated (cf. *ibidem*).

[16] This subject is analyzed in greater detail in Rigotti & Greco Morasso (forthcoming).

> *Endoxa* are opinions that are accepted by everyone or by the majority, or by
> the wise men (all of them or the majority, or by the most notable and illus-
> trious of them).

An *endoxon* is thus an opinion that is accepted by the relevant audience or by the opinion leaders of the relevant audience. It seems that the tradition of topics indeed neglected this notion, merging it with the notion of maxim (originally, in Boethius, *propositio maxima*) often referred to by Aristotle with *topos*[17]. But it is hard to imagine that Aristotle attributed to all people or to the majority of them or to the wisest ones etc. the shared knowledge (or belief) of topical rules, even though these rules may become part of the acquired outfit of some of them. The cognitive status of the abstract, general inference rules discovered by argumentation theorists cannot be interpreted in terms of the prevailingly shared opinion. The ignorance of this fundamental component of Aristotelian topics is probably due to the fact that Aristotle did not explicitly give any example of what he understood by *endoxon*. Numerous *endoxa* can, however, be reconstructed if we consider the examples often given by the author when listing his *topoi*. Not coincidentally, in my opinion, Braet (see above), aiming to reconstruct an ideal model of an Aristotelian locus, lists as fourth component, beyond the name, the suggestion of a fair procedure for establishing the concerned type of argument and the topical principle involved, an actual example to which Aristotle often applies this principle (Braet 2005: 69).

In relation to one of the maxims of the locus from all the more and all the less "if something is not the case for an entity for which it should be more (plausibly) the case, it is evident that it is not the case for an entity for which it should be less (plausibly) the case", Aristotle gives two interesting examples in *Rhetoric*:

1. "If not even the gods know everything, all the less do humans";
2. "He who even beats his father may well (will all the more) beat his neighbors".

In both examples the same maxim is at work, but it gets hold of a different *endoxon* (of a different shared opinion); this opinion can be brought to light by singling out the presuppositions – the premises – enabling us to activate the maxim. In (1) the gods are presupposed to know more than humans; in (2) it is presupposed that people are less likely to beat their father than their neighbors[18].

However, in order to activate the maxim, another premise (recalling for its epistemic structure Toulmin's notion of *datum*[19]) is required for satisfying the condition established

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[17] The lack of distinction between topos and maxim is particularly evident in Aristotle's *Topica*, where he frequently, in his long undifferentiated list of topoi, starts referring to an ontological domain (for example, in *Topica* 114b.37 Aristotle lists and illustrates four different *topoi* of the *topos* from all the more and all the less) apparently presenting it as the topos in point, and then introduces, often naming them topoi, two or several inferential rules (maxims) entailed by this domain.

[18] This *endoxon* is explicitly expounded by Aristotle (1397b 16-17).

in the *if*-part of the maxim: "something is not the case for an entity for which it should be more (plausibly) the case". Indeed, both examples provide this further premise, which co-incides in (1) with the fact that not even the gods know everything and in (2) with the fact that someone has been beating his father[20]. In the first argument, a syllogistic procedure based on the conjunction of the *endoxon* and this second premise (see Rigotti 2006),

–   the gods know more than humans
–   the gods do not know everything

generates, through the third figure of syllogism (more specifically, the mode Darapti[21]), a provisional conclusion:

–   some entities knowing more than humans do not know everything,

through which, satisfying the *if*-part of the maxim, we activate a *modus ponens* and derive the definitive conclusion:

–   humans do not know everything.

Analogously, in the second argument, combining the *endoxon* with the second premise,

–   people (all humans) are more likely to beat their neighbors than their father
–   someone (some human) has been beating his father

we obtain, through the mode Datisi of the third figure, the provisional conclusion:

–   someone has beaten a person that one might far less likely beat than one's neighbors,

which is applied to the maxim to derive the final conclusion:

–   he may well (all the more will he) beat his neighbors.

The two *endoxa* invoked by Aristotle to support so many arguments show different degrees of culture-dependence, which are worth to be focused on. Starting with the second argument, we indeed perceive in it a certain strangeness: it seems that at those times beating one's neighbors was rather usual, even though we are comforted by the fact that people should only rarely beat their fathers. The present day reader perceives in this *endoxon* a certain cultural distance that can however be filled. On the other hand, the cultural distance of the *endoxon* presupposed by the first argument could neither be easily recovered by an audience of monotheistic believers (because of the polytheism it presupposes and because of the denial of divine omniscience it asserts), nor by an audience of non-believers as it presupposes the existence of the gods.

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[19] Toulmin (1958: 90): "We already have, therefore, one distinction to start with: between the claim or conclusion whose merits we are seeking to establish (C) and the facts we appeal to as a foundation for the claim – what I shall refer to as our data (D)".

[20] The difference in the modal status of the two premises is mirrored by an analogous difference in the respective standpoints: in (1) the standpoint claims that humans cannot know everything; in (2) the standpoint claims that such a person *might* well beat his neighbours (cf. Rocci 2008).

[21] See also Vanni Rovighi (1962: 88-92).

The presuppositional nature of *endoxa* make them unquestionable by definition within the concerned argumentative move, but it does not exclude that they are questioned in other argumentative moves either within the same culture or in an intercultural interaction[22]. The cases in which cultural presuppositions are discussed within the same culture are particularly interesting as they show the capacity of this culture of evolving by means of argumentation. Aristotle's *Rhetoric* gives a fitting example. Illustrating the locus "from the implications" (the fact that "if the implication is the same, the same must be said of the things from which this implication follows"; more explicitly: if an implication of a state of affairs justifies the attribution to it of a certain predicate, this attribution is justified also for the other states of affairs having the same implication) (*Rhetoric* 1399 b 5-9), he mentions a saying of Xenophanes remarking that "people who affirm that the gods are born are as ungodly as people who affirm that the gods die". Both statements, he comments, indeed entail that there is a time in which the gods do not exist. In this argumentation, a vision, that in another argumentation was presupposed as an *endoxon* (the Greek Olympus theogony), becomes a standpoint, that is not only questioned, but also refuted, thus showing a phase of evolution of the Greek culture of the time.

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[22] See also Rocci 2006: 425 ff.

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MODALS AS LEXICAL INDICATORS OF ARGUMENTATION[1].
A STUDY OF ITALIAN ECONOMIC-FINANCIAL NEWS

ANDREA ROCCI

1. *Introduction*

In this paper I will investigate the role of lexical expressions of modality as argumentative indicators[2]. More precisely, I will argue that modal expressions are closely intertwined with the establishment of *argumentative discourse relations* between utterances in discourse, both at a pragmatic and at a logico-semantic level.

The paper constitutes an interim report of a broad ongoing research project investigating the relationship between *argumentation* and the semantic and pragmatic functioning of lexical and grammatical markers of modality in Italian.

The project chose to investigate this relationship within the genre of *economic-financial newspaper articles*, using a large corpus of Italian economic-financial news, consisting of roughly 4 million words collected from three specialized Italian dailies (*Il Sole 24 Ore*, *Italia Oggi* and *MF/Milano Finanza*)[3]. As it will become clear through the following sections, the choice of a corpus from such a specific discourse genre was far from coincidental or merely practical. Rather it was motivated by a series of quite unique semantic-discursive characteristics of this news genre that make it, at the same time, an ideal testbed for studying the relationship between modality and arguments and a promising socially relevant field of application for the findings of such an investigation.

Here I will limit my discussion to the two Italian modal verbs *potere* and *dovere*. I will devote special attention to the role of the latter as an argumentative indicator, looking at its uses both in the indicative and in the conditional mood.

The Italian modal verbs *potere* and *dovere* can contribute to signal *argumentative relations* in discourse, where the modalized proposition is understood as a *standpoint* or *conclusion* (I will consider these terms as equivalents thereafter) presented by the arguer to the

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[2] According to van Eemeren, Houtlosser & Snoeck-Henkemans (2007: 1) an argumentative indicator is "a sign that a particular argumentative move might be in progress, but it does not constitute a decisive pointer".
[3] The qualitative analysis of the corpus examples on which the present paper rests was carried out on a sub-corpus 95 articles from the properly financial sections of the *Il Sole 24 Ore*, extracted from eight April 2006 issues of the daily (about 55.000 words).

addressee as *inferrable* – with a variable degree of certainty – from a set of *premises* that the addressee is invited to supply, recovering them from the preceding or following co-text, or constructing them on-line from the stock of opinion and knowledge, which is assumed to be part of the common ground of the arguer and the addressee. In section 3.1 I will briefly sketch a view argumentative discourse relations based on the notion of *connective predicate* from Congruity Theory (Rigotti 2005).

The role of modals as argumentative indicators has been most often recognized when modals acquire an epistemic reading, and especially for those modals where the epistemic reading is accompanied by an *inferential evidential*[4] specification.

The epistemic-evidential readings that the verb *dovere* can undergo in certain tenses of the indicative mood – mostly in the present, the imperfect, and the remote past – exemplified by (1), represent the paradigmatic case:

> (1) Ratan Tata, presidente del gruppo indiano Tata dal 1991, è noto per aver svecchiato l'impresa di famiglia e per l'affermazione 'Niente mi stimola di più di una sfida'. **Deve** essere stato questo che ha fatto scattare un feeling istintivo tra lo stesso Tata e Sergio Marchionne, a.d. del gruppo torinese, durante le trattative che hanno portato ad un accordo commerciale tra i due gruppi in India. (*Il Sole 24 Ore*, April 19, 2006)
> 'Ratan Tata, chairman of the Indian group Tata since 1991 is known for having renewed this family company and for having declared: "Nothing stimulates me more than a challenge". It **must** have been this that triggered an instinctive feeling between Tata and Sergio Marchionne, CEO of the Turin based group, during the negotiations that lead to a commercial agreement between the two groups in India'.

In (1) the role of the indicative epistemic *dovere* (henceforth $deve_E$) is not limited to expressing – in fact rather vaguely – a certain degree of confidence lower than that of a bare, non modalized, assertion. It also contributes to establishing an argumentative discourse relation between the two utterances. Note that if we eliminate the modal the level of discourse coherence is affected:

> (2) Ratan Tata, presidente del gruppo indiano Tata dal 1991, è noto per aver svecchiato l'impresa di famiglia e per l'affermazione 'Niente mi stimola di più di una sfida'. È stato questo che ha fatto scattare un feeling istintivo tra lo stesso

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[4] The term *evidentiality* refers to "the grammatical encoding of the speaker's (type of) grounds for making a speech act" (Faller 2002: 2). Inferential evidentiality refers to grammatical morphemes marking that the information conveyed by the utterance is the result of reasoning from indirect evidence. The study of evidentiality as a *grammatical-typological* category had been traditionally limited to languages, such as Quechua and several other native American languages, where evidentials correspond to clearly obligatorily manifested morphological categories. However, with Chafe & Nichols (1986) and later Dendale & Tasmowski (1994) evidentiality as a *semantic category* has been increasingly investigated also in languages such as French, Italian or English where it is only intermittently or indirectly manifested by morphology, or relies solely on lexical strategies for its manifestation. For a recent discussion of grammatical and lexical evidentiality in Italian see Squartini (2008).

> Tata e Sergio Marchionne, a.d. del gruppo torinese, durante le trattative che hanno portato ad un accordo commerciale trai due gruppi in India. (*Il Sole 24 Ore*, April 19, 2006)
>
> 'Ratan Tata, chairman of the Indian group Tata since 1991 is known for having renewed this family company and for having declared: "Nothing stimulates me more than a challenge". It was this that triggered an instinctive feeling between Tata and Sergio Marchionne, CEO of the Turin based group, during the negotiations that lead to a commercial agreement between the two groups in India'.

In (2) it is no longer clear that the first utterance functions as a premise supporting an inferred conclusion in a partially manifested argument. In the original version (1), *deve*$_E$ truly functions as an inferential evidential, signaling that the writer is inferring that the reason why Marchionne and Tata get well together *must* be that they both like challenges. This is a complicated abductive inference resting on a number of unstated premises, which notably include the belief that Mr. Marchionne likes challenges (which is, in Aristotelian terms, an *endoxon*[5] with respect to the common ground of the Italian readers of *Il Sole 24 Ore*) and some major premise supporting the inference from similarity to getting together well, which is also easily recoverable as an *endoxon* in the cultural common ground: *Chi si somiglia si piglia* 'Birds of a feather flock together'. In contrast, in the modified version in (2) the writer seems to be just *reporting* that the reason why Marchionne and Tata get well together is their common liking for challenges.

It seems, therefore, that a modal like *deve* can function as an indicator that the propositional content of the utterance is *inferred* by the communicator from evidence available in the context, and not independently known from direct experience or hearsay.

In the case of (1) the premises supporting the inferential operation signalled by the modal are identified in part anaphorically with the content of the preceding utterances in the text and in part with *endoxa* in the cultural common ground.

It is this kind of observations that have lead linguists (cf. Dendale 1994, Squartini 2004, Rocci 2005) to the conclusion that modals like *deve*, in their epistemic readings function as lexical markers of *inferential evidentiality*, much like the grammaticalized evidential morphemes and particles specifying the source of knowledge of the propositional content of the utterance, which are well known from the study of Amerindian languages (cf. Faller 2002) and are indeed found in many languages of the world.

In the following sections of this paper I will show, through a qualitative analysis of a series of examples extracted from the corpus of Italian financial news, that beyond these rel-

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[5] The ancient rhetorical term *endoxon* (pl. *endoxa*) can be used to refer to values and beliefs shared in the communal common ground (Cf. Clark 1996) of some relevant cultural community, especially inasmuch they can be mobilized to serve as premises in an enthymematic argument. In the *Topics*, Aristotle gives an articulated definition of the *endoxa*: "[*endoxa* are those opinions] which commend themselves to all, or to the majority, or to the wise – that is or to all of the wise or to the majority or to the most famous and distinguished of them" (*Topics* I 100b 21-23).

atively well known *epistemic* and *evidential* readings, which I labeled *deve$_E$*, there are many other readings of the modal verb *dovere* in the indicative and in the conditional mood that can contribute to signaling argumentative relations in discourse.

Interestingly, compared with the case of *deve$_E$*, many of the uses that I examine here can be considered *epistemic* only very indirectly. Some of them give rise to an epistemic evaluation only as a highly context dependent implication on the basis of other kinds of modal meanings, such as, for instance, deontic meanings. Similarly, some of these uses can be considered to convey an *evidential* specification only as a contextual effect in discourse. Some of them do not function as evidential at all, and yet they are deeply intertwined with argumentation.

One of the reasons why these findings are worth reporting is that they can contribute to cast a new light on crucial questions concerning the role of modals in arguments that have arisen in argumentation theory since its inception.

2. *Modality in argumentation theory*

2.1 Three takes on the modals in Toulmin

The idea of a close connection between modal meanings and argumentation is not new in argumentation theory. It appears in Stephen Toulmin's (1958) foundational book *The Uses of Argument*, which deals with modals in three separate chapters: the first chapter (*Fields of arguments and modals*), the second (*Probability*) and the third, where he includes the modal qualifier as a component of what was to be known as the "Toulmin model". Rather than building on what precedes, each of the three chapters approaches the issue from a different angle.

In the first chapter, Toulmin suggests that modal terms should be understood in terms of their argumentative functions:

> These terms – 'possible', 'necessary' and the like – are best understood, I shall argue, by examining the functions they have when we come to set out our arguments (Toulmin 1958: 18).

Toulmin argued for an exact parallelism between the semantics of modal words like *may*, *must*, *possible*, *cannot* and discourse moves corresponding to different phases of an argument: taking an hypothesis into consideration (*may*), excluding an hypothesis (*cannot*), and concluding (*must*). He claimed that the modals have an invariant force, to be understood in terms of argumentative moves, and variable "field dependent" *criteria*. This view can be illustrated by the following examples provided by Toulmin:

> (3.a) Under the circumstances, there is only one decision open to us; the child *must* be returned to the custody of its parent.
> (3.b) Considering the dimensions of the sun, moon and earth and their relative positions at the time concerned, we see that the moon *must* be completely obscured at the moment.

According to Toulmin, in both examples the modal *must* signals the speech act of drawing a conclusion. This invariant argumentative function is the *force* of the modal. On the other hand, the logical type both of the conclusion and of the premises varies according to what Toulmin calls the "field of argument". In (3.a) the conclusion is a required course of action, in view of the circumstances of the case and some relevant legal and moral principles to which the author and the addressee abide, while in (3.b) the conclusion is a necessary astronomical fact, in view of other astronomical facts and of the relevant physical laws governing the movement and interactions of those celestial bodies. Toulmin develops this hypothesis through a detailed analysis of the uses of *cannot*, which can be reduced, according to Toulmin, to a common pattern (4.a) expressing an invariant force (ruling out an hypothesis) and a number of open variable slots that are filled differently according to the different fields to which the grounds for ruling out the hypothesis belong. Two of the possible fillings considered by Toulmin are exemplified by (4.b) and (4.c).

> (4.a) 'P being what it is, you must rule out anything involving Q: to do otherwise would be R and would invite S'
> (4.b) "The seating capacity of the Town Hall being what it is, you can't get ten thousand people into it –to attempt to do so would be vain".
> (4.c) "The by-laws being as they are, you can't smoke in this compartment, Sir – to do so would be a contravention of them" (Toulmin, 1958: 24-29)

In Rocci (2008) I have discussed at length the merits of Toulmin's analysis as well its shortcomings and the apories it encounters, tackling a number of specific aspects, including the seemingly bizarre choice of an obviously semantically composite unit (*cannot*) to illustrate a general point on the meaning of the modals.

On the one hand, Toulmin's analysis contains valuable insights: it anticipates later semantic analyses of the modals as context dependent relational predicates characterized by open slots that have to be filled in context, putting us on the right track by inviting us to look for the relationship between the different fillings of these slots and different kinds of propositions used to support a standpoint. On the other hand, his straight identification of the invariant meaning of the modals – the force – with an argumentative speech act is difficult to defend.

Let us consider the case of the English modal *must.* For Toulmin, *must* signals the act of presenting one particular conclusion as unequivocally the one to accept, having ruled out other hypotheses. What changes in the different interpretations of the modals are the grounds, or *criteria*, on which this act of drawing a conclusion is based, as illustrated in his well chosen examples presented as (3.a) and (3.b) above, where conclusions are drawn respectively on legal/moral and on physical grounds. According to this view, the Italian modal *deve* in example (5) below would have to be considered similar in kind to the *must* in (3.a) and signal an act of drawing a conclusion on a required course of action from legal grounds:

> (5) Un aspirante fotografo **dovrà** effettuare 55 passaggi burocratici e bussare
> alla porta di una ventina di uffici [...]

> 'A would-be photographer will have to perform 55 bureaucratic passages and knock at the door of about twenty offices' (*Il Sole 24 Ore,* April 4, 2006).

But certainly this is not the case in example (5). In this text the journalist is indeed *asserting* that the unnamed '55 bureaucratic passages' are *necessarily entailed* by Italian laws and regulations. We cannot say, however, that he is supporting the standpoint that a certain course of action is legally required for photographers by presenting Italian laws and regulations as an argument for drawing this conclusion. If anything because the specific laws and regulations remain unanalyzed and textually inaccessible, just as the modalized proposition is utterly uninformative about the specifics of the entailed action.

We can say that the modals do indeed point to a variable set of "grounds" or "criteria", as Toulmin surmised, but the relation they establish between this implicit background and the underlying modalized proposition is not always an argumentative one. Consider, for instance, the following English example:

> (6) If someone wants, for instance, to buy clothes, he must know where to buy them. He must go to different shops. *Maybe* he *must* negotiate with the sales-person (example retrieved through *Google*).

In (6) the modal *must* falls within the scope of another modal (*maybe*) and thus, to paraphrase Toulmin, we find it embedded as the *content* of an hypothesis worth considering. Clearly, *must* in (6) does not indicate an act of conclusion, nor any other kind of speech act.

The second chapter of Toulmin's book is devoted to defending an interpretation of the modal adverb *probably* and other probability idioms as speech-act markers of "guarded assertion" as more fitting to their actual use than the traditional statistical interpretation. In his analysis of *probably* Toulmin compares the adverb to illocutionary markers modifying the degree of commitment in a speech act, citing early speech-act theoretic work by Austin on the differences between saying *I shall do A* and *'I promise I shall do A'*, or between simply asserting a proposition p and saying *I know that p*.

According to Toulmin, a modal like *probably* can be similarly used to modify my commitment to a prediction – Toulmin takes the example of a meteorological forecast – limiting our answerability and shielding us from "some of the consequences of failure" (Toulmin 1958: 51). In other words, the basic meaning of *probably* is seen as a pragmatic function, which linguists would now call *hedging*[6], which limits the responsibility of the speaker with respect to an assertive speech act.

Finally, in presenting what was to be known as the "Toulmin model" of argument structure (Chapter 3), Toulmin introduces the *modal qualifier* as a distinct category in the argument layout, separate from the claim, and meant to provide an "explicit reference to the degree of force which our data confer to our claim in virtue of our warrant" (Toulmin

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[6] On *hedging* as a semantic-pragmatic category, see Lakoff (1973). Toulmin himself uses the word *hedging*, but only non-terminologically to refer in a derogatory way to the abuse of the shield provided by *probably*.

1958: 101). This analysis can be seen in the light of the analysis of *probably* in the previous chapter: modal qualifiers modify the claim of the argument expressing its *force*, again at a pragmatic level.

There is a certain feeling of disconnect between the treatment of modality in the different chapters of *The Uses of Argument*, which betrays their different origin and time of composition. The first chapter, in particular, offers a view of modality which is different than the one proposed in the subsequent chapters. In the first chapter modal are – so-to-say[7] – *illocutionary markers* signaling different relevant moves in argumentation (considering an hypothesis, ruling out an hypothesis, concluding), while later they become *illocutionary force modifiers* quantifying the strength of the act of concluding. Moreover, the emphasis on the *relational* meaning of the modal and on the different kinds of reasons that can saturate the "criteria" largely disappears in the subsequent chapters as the modal qualifier becomes closer to a one-place modifier of the force of conclusion.

2.2 Developments in argumentation theory

Given the important place that modality occupies in Toulmin's book, it's somewhat surprising that there has been comparatively little attention to the problem of modality by subsequent argumentation scholars. Among those who do discuss the role of modals in some detail, the contributions of James Freeman and Francisca Snoeck-Henkemans are certainly worth mentioning. These two authors provide emendations of roughly the same perceived shortcomings in Toulmin's view, but do so in different ways.

Freeman's (1991) account of modalities incorporates two Toulminian ideas: (1) that the modal should be treated as a distinct element in the "macrostructure" of arguments – as opposed to elements of the semantic microstructure of the propositions making up the argument – and (2) that the semantics of the modals is basically relational.

At the same time, Freeman rejects two other features of Toulmin's account: that the modals' force operates at the illocutionary level, and that it modifies directly the claim.

Focusing, in particular, on the analysis of probability expressions, Freeman argues that modals are always relative to an explicit or implicit body of background evidence so that they have the underlying relational form '*Given evidence* E, *probably* p' rather than the form of an unary operator '*Probably* p'. He follows Black's (1967) idea that the "absolute" reading of *probably* emerges from the identification of E with "the relevant features of the state of the world at the moment of utterance". Freeman (1991: 123-124) identifies "absolute" probability with *epistemic probability* "probability given all the known relevant evidence". This is the kind of probability that "involves" assertion. In their non-epistemic uses, probability expressions are akin to conditional structures and are not assertive.

According to this view, the pragmatic role of '*Probably* p' as a way of hedging the assertion of 'p' is rather an "emotive meaning" – I would rather say *implicature* – emerging

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[7] Referred to Toulmin (1958) this terminology is obviously an anachronism.

from their "literal" relational meaning, when E is identified with all the known relevant evidence at the moment of utterance. What the literal meaning of the modal qualifier directly expresses is a description of "how weighty a case the premise or premises of an argument make for the conclusions they support" (Freeman 1991: 112). Consequently, Freeman argues, with respect to their role in arguments, modals are better treated as similar to *argumentative connectives* such as *therefore* or *because*, rather than to operators like negation, which take scope over a single proposition.

Francisca Snoeck-Henkemans (1997: 108-117) addresses linguistic expressions of modality as *indicators* in the task of argumentative reconstruction within the Pragma-Dialectic framework. In Pragma-Dialectics argumentative indicators are linguistic expressions, textual features or behavioral cues that "point to speech acts that are instrumental in the various stages of dispute resolution. Argumentative indicators may make it clear that argumentation has been advanced and how this argumentation is structured" (Houtlosser 2002: 169-170). More precisely, they point to a number of aspects of the argumentative discourse that are relevant for evaluating the soundness of the argument. As observed by Houtlosser (2002: 169), this information includes, at least[8]:

a) What is the standpoint (conclusion) that is argued for, what is its precise content;
b) What is the *force* of conviction with which the standpoint is presented;
c) What statements are presented as arguments (or premises) supporting the standpoint;
d) What is the nature of the inferential link that is established between the arguments/premises and the standpoint, that is what kind of *deductive rule* or *argumentation scheme* is applied;
e) What implicit premises need to be supplied by the audience in order to saturate the requirements of the *argumentation scheme*.

For Snoeck-Henkemans (1997: 109) modal words "can be used to indicate the extent to which the speaker is prepared to commit himself to the truth or acceptability of the propositional content of his standpoint". This expression of the degree of commitment "enables the analyst to determine what degree of justificatory or refutatory potential the argumentation should have, in order to lend sufficient support to the standpoint" (Snoeck-Henkemans 1997: 113)[9].

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[8] Van Eemeren, Houtlosser & Snoeck Henkemans (2007) propose a more comprehensive list of relevant kinds of information, which follows systematically from the stages of the model of critical discussion. For the purposes of the present article it is not strictly necessary to consider this broader list.

[9] In Houtlosser (2002) and van Eemeren, Houtlosser & Snoeck-Henkemans (2007) epistemic expressions modifying the force of the assertion are discussed in relation to the *confrontation stage* also as (indirect) indicators of the act itself of putting forth a standpoint in the confrontation. For instance, a weak assertive expression such as *I believe* can be used "to convey the speaker's expectation that his assertive will not be immediately accepted by the interlocutor" (Houtlosser 2002: 174), at least, not without supporting arguments.

This equivalence between the expression of the "degree of certainty with which the standpoint is advanced" and the indication of the "degree of justificatory potential" can be established if we analyze the pragmatics of argumentation using the speech-act theoretic framework provided by Pragma-Dialectics. By advancing a standpoint an arguer commits himself to presenting adequate evidence in support of it in face of the expressed or implicit doubt of another party. By advancing a standpoint *with a certain degree of confidence*, the arguer *ipso facto* commits himself to providing evidence supporting the standpoint with a *matching degree of force or weight* (cf. Snoeck-Henkemans 1997: 112-113). In fact, this commitment to the proportionate matching of certainty and weight of evidence, can be considered part and parcel of the commitment to a critical discussion[10].

Contrary to what is suggested in Toulmin's first chapter, for Snoeck-Henkemans (1997: 109), only *epistemic modalities* are used to indicate degree of commitment to the truth or acceptability of a standpoint. Only these modalities are not "part of the proposition towards which the speaker has put forward a standpoint" (*ibid.*), while other kinds of modality, like deontic modality, are indeed *part of the proposition* and thus cannot play the role of *force* indicators.

In the following sections we will devote particular attention to non epistemic uses of the Italian modal *dovere* attested in the financial news corpus, including both deontic uses and what I will call "ontological causal" uses, examining their potential as argumentative indicators. The findings will confirm, on the one hand, that only truly epistemic uses can act as direct *force* indicators – an indication that does not exhaust, however, their meaning. On the other hand, it will turn out that non-epistemic modals do convey argumentatively relevant information but of a different kind.

3. *A basic framework for investigating the relationship between argumentation and modality*

Before proceeding with the analysis of the uses of the modals found in financial news articles, I need here to pick up some minimal theoretical baggage explaining what I mean by an argumentative discourse relation and presenting the general approach I follow in dealing with the semantics of the modals.

3.1 A stratified account of arguing

In this paper I will deal with argumentative discourse relations following the general approach proposed by Congruity Theory, which is presented in detail in Rigotti (2005) and

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[10] This is not made, however, entirely explicit in the rules and commandments for the critical discussion (cf. van Eemeren & Grootendorst 2004). *Commandment 7*, in fact, only deals with one limit case of this matching, which concerns arguments presented as deductively conclusive, which need to be formally valid, without proposing an analogous matching justificatory force for lower levels of commitment.

in Rocci (2005). Argumentation, like other discourse relations, is represented as an abstract pragmatic predicate, also called *connective predicate*. A pragmatic predicate is an action predicate saying what the speaker does to the addressee with the utterance. Like ordinary predicates in Congruity Theory, pragmatic predicates are analysed in term of the presuppositions they impose on their argument frame and of the conditions (entailments) with which they update the common ground. Since pragmatic predicates not only represent but also realize social actions, their update conditions are *pragmatic effects*, involving the creation of commitments of the participants which become part of the common ground. A pragmatic predicate is thus a relational predicate which minimally takes as its arguments the speaker (Spk), the hearer (Hr) and an utterance (U_0):

$$P\,(Spk, Hr, U_0)$$

Since many pragmatic predicates, including *arguing*, are relational also in the sense that they are logically dependent from the content of another utterance, the argument frame of the pragmatic predicate can also include other anaphorically recovered utterances (U_{-n}) or inferred contextual propositions (X) as arguments – hence the term *connective predicate*:

$$C\,(Spk, Hr, X, U_{-n}, U_0)$$

An argumentative discourse relation can be thus represented as a connective predicate frame where a Spk presents a standpoint U_0 as supported by one or more co-textual arguments $U_{-1}...U_{-n}$, and unexpressed premises ($X_1...X_n$). In this framework the felicity conditions imposed by Searlian illocutions (Searle 1969) – which typically involve the speaker and hearer – are reinterpreted either as presuppositions imposed by the connective predicate on n-uples of argument places including for instance the speaker (*Spk*), the hearer (*Hr*) and the utterance U_0 or as pragmatic effects of the predicate[11]. *Rhetorical relations* defined, as in Mann & Thompson (1987), in terms of conditions on the utterances involved, conditions on their combination, and effects of the combination are even more straightforwardly rendered in terms of presuppositions and effects of the pragmatic predicate.

Often pragmatic predicates receive little or no linguistic manifestation, and hearers have to infer them, in order to make sense of an utterance or discourse. There are however a number of linguistic items whose business is to impose quite detailed constraints on the pragmatic predicates to be established; discourse connectives such as *therefore, but* or *in fact* are perhaps among the most obvious candidates to this role. One of the guiding hypotheses of the present work, which is shared by Freeman (1991) is that modals behave similarly to connectives and impose constraints on the interpretation of argumentative pragmatic predicates at different levels.

In an insightful review of current linguistic approaches to discourse relations conducted from the viewpoint of argumentation theory Snoeck-Henkemans (2001) criticizes

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[11] Consider, for instance, the preparatory conditions of the assertion as formulated by Searle (1969). One of them states that 'It is not obvious to the *Speaker* that the *Hearer* knows (does not need to be reminded of) *p*'. This type of condition is treated as a (relational) presupposition imposed by any 'assertive' connective predicate on the argument places characterized by the roles of the *Speaker*, the *Hearer* and the asserted proposition.

theories such as Mann & Thompson (1987) or Sweetser (1990) for positing that discourse relations hold *either* at the pragmatic/epistemic level *or* at the propositional level. According to Snoeck-Henkemans (2001: 237) these theories do not recognize that "every illocutionary relation is by definition based on a subject matter (or 'propositional') relation. This recognition, she argues, is particularly important if we want to account for argumentation which holds at the speech act level, but inevitably rests on relations such as *causality*, *concomitance,* and *comparison* holding between the propositional contents of the standpoint and of the arguments.

In fact, an account of inference in ordinary discourse cannot just rest on a notion of *logical form* – which remains hollow until it is associated to a semantic interpretation – or worse be content of conceiving epistemic relations as *alternative* to content-level relations, as Sweetser (1990) does, holding in a world of belief objects whose relationship with real world causality is simply "metaphorical".

The idea is that when I infer a proposition q from a set of propositions (premises) p_1 ... p_n I do that thanks to some conceptual – semantico-ontological – relationship between q and these other propositions. The Ancient and Medieval rhetorical and dialectical tradition of the *Topics* called *topos* or *locus* a class of such content-level relationships. In the traditional view inferences in natural discourse are based on a variety of *loci* or *topoi* including relations such as *cause/effect, part/whole, genus/species*, as well as *means/ends* relations, *similarity* relations, and so on. Rigotti (forth. 2009) presents a detailed theory of argumentative *loci*, which, drawing on the *Topics* tradition, conceives a *locus* as a semantico-ontological relation[12] binding the propositional content of the standpoint to the propositional content of the premises[13], in a way that warrants an implicative relation at the logical level. As we will see in the following sections, considering the specific *locus* supporting an argumentation will help us better understand the role of non-epistemic modals in arguments.

Congruity Theory (Rigotti 2005: 85-86) implements this stratified conception of the argumentative discourse relation by considering the propositional level relation of the *locus* as a presupposition of the pragmatic predicate. The inventory of *loci* includes ontological relations such as cause-effect, part-whole, genus-species, means-ends, etc.

The stratified structure of an argumentative discourse relation can be therefore represented as follow:

$$C (Spk, Hr, X, U_{-n}, U_0):$$

Presuppositions:

– p_1 ... p_n being the propositional contents of U_{-1} ...U_{-n} (and $X_1...X_n$), p_1 ... $p_n \in$ $CG_{Spk,Hr}$ – that is belong to the common ground between Spk and Hr;

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[12] Other authors that adopt a somewhat similar semantico-ontological take on argument schemes speak of "relations of conveyance" (Katzav & Reed 2004).

[13] Note that Rigotti (forth. 2009) presents a much more detailed internal analysis of the functioning of a *locus* in the inferential structure of an argument than what is retained for the purposes of this paper.

– q being the propositional content of U_0, q $\notin$ $CG_{Spk,Hr}$; $\neg$ q $\notin$ $CG_{Spk,Hr}$
– There is some ontological-semantic relation L ($\{p_1 ... p_n\}$, q) warranting $\{p_1 ... p_n\}$ $\rightarrow$ q

Pragmatic effects:

– With U_0, Spk presents q as *reasonably acceptable* by Hr thanks to the premises $p_1 ... p_n$ presented in $U_{-1} ... U_{-n}$ (and $X_1...X_n$).

A final remark needs to be made here on the relationship between pragmatic effects of the argumentative connective predicate as outlined above and the mental act of drawing an inference. Not every attempt to persuade the addressee counts as argumentation, arguments are appeals to reason, attempts at persuading of the standpoint *because* of the support offered by the premises. We can see arguing as trying to lead somebody to assent to a standpoint q, making it follow inferentially from arguments $p_1 ... p_n$ he/she already accepts. A similar approach is proposed by Pinto (1996), who treats arguments as "invitations to inference" and emphasizes that the specific goal of argumentation is "to effect an *inference* in the person to whom it's addressed" and not simply "to effect acceptance of its conclusion" (Pinto 1996: 168).

Looking at the relationship between argumentation and inference helps us also to understand the relationship between *argumentation* and *inferential evidentiality*. Argumentation proposes an *inference to the addressee*, while inferential evidentiality signals an *inference of the speaker* as the source of knowledge of the utterance. The two may well go together – such as in example (1) – but we can also have evidentiality without argumentation (when the private premises of the speaker are not made available to the hearer) and argumentation without evidentiality. Consider, for instance, the classic alibi example. Suppose I say to the investigators: *Wednesday I was in Milan giving a talk. I couldn't possibly rob a bank in Lugano on that day.* Here I am certainly trying to get the hearer to infer my innocence, but we cannot say that I am signaling that the source of *my own knowledge* of not having robbed a bank in Lugano is inferential! This distinction is relevant for some of the uses of the modals I will examine here.

3.2 A relational analysis of the semantics of the modals

As a conceptual category, modality relates to the very basic human cognitive ability of thinking that *things might be otherwise*, that is thinking of *alternatives*: states of affairs other than what is the case. The logico-philosophical tradition developed the theoretical notion of *possible worlds* to deal with reasoning about alternatives[14] (or different *possibilities*). Modality

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[14] David Lewis (1973) work on counterfactuals is one of the most influential in-depth discussions of possible worlds in modern philosophical logic. The book is also noteworthy for the impact it had on the linguistic semantic analysis of modality and conditional constructions. An accessible introduction to possible worlds is Girle (2003). This work is recommended for its focus on the broader philosophical significance of possible worlds rather than on the technical details of their implementation in modal logic.

concerns, in a more restricted sense, a class of semantic notions – which include *possibility*, *necessity* and *probability* – involving the quantification over alternatives of a certain kind[15].

The following sections will show how it is possible to claim, on the one side, that the semantics of Italian modal verbs *potere* and *dovere* is similar in important ways to that of discourse connectives and, on the other side, advocate a semantics of the modals that does not make the inherently tied to different kinds of argumentative speech acts, as originally suggested by Toulmin for the English modal verbs and the adverb *probably*.

Two key elements of the semantic analysis proposed that contribute to make modal verbs similar to connectives are (a) that modal verbs are seen as *relational* predicates, and (b) that their semantic structure is seen as structurally *context-dependent* and involving a *procedural* component.

A rich and flexible analysis of Italian modal verbs as *relational* and *context dependent* can be worked out building on the Theory of Relative Modality, a theory which was first introduced in formal linguistic semantics in the late 1970s.

3.2.1 Modal meanings are relational

The fundamentals of the theory stem from seminal papers by German linguist Angelika Kratzer (1977, 1981, 1991)[16]. Kratzer showed that, in natural language, *necessity* is to be understood in terms of *logical consequence* of the modalized proposition from a presupposed *conversational background* of propositions belonging to a certain logico-ontological type, while natural language *possibility* is to be conceived in terms of logical compatibility with the conversational background.

In other words, modal meanings in the theory of Relative Modality are treated as relations of the form R (B, p) that have two arguments, corresponding respectively to the proposition p falling in the scope of the modality and to a set of propositions, called the conversational background (B) that is to be saturated in the context of utterance. Thus modal markers encode *invariant logical relations* but are context dependent for the saturation of the conversational backgrounds.

Medieval philosophers had already observed that modal words like *necessarily* are often used not in an absolute but in a relative way, to convey the necessity of an entailment (*necessitas consequentiae*) and they guarded against confusing it with *necessitas consequentis*, that is with the absolute necessity of the consequent.

The distinction between *necessitas consequentiae* (or *necessitas conditionata*) and *necessitas consequentis* (or *necessitas absoluta*) is discussed in several passages of the works of St.

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[15] "At the heart of the technical and the philosophical use of possible worlds is the simple idea that something is possible if it is so in at least one possible world and something is necessary if it is so in all possible worlds" (Girle 2003: 3).

[16] Earlier, more informal, approaches to the semantics of the modals that have several points of similarity with Kratzer's are Wertheimer (1972) and White (1975). For a fairly comprehensive and technical account of the current state of the art in the theory of Relative Modality see Kaufmann *et al.* (2006).

Thomas Aquinas. One well known instance is the passage of the *Summa contra gentiles* (lib. 1 cap. 67 n. 10) where Aquinas discusses whether God's foreknowledge entails that every action happens *necessarily*, and therefore excludes human freedom. Aquinas argues that there is a necessity of the consequence from God's foreknowledge of an action to the future happening of said action but this does not mean that the action becomes *absolutely* necessary. Aquinas uses perceptual evidence as an analogy: if I see that Socrates is sitting, then I must necessarily conclude that he is sitting, but my seeing does not make Socrate's sitting an *absolute* necessity:

> sicut necessarium est Socratem sedere ex hoc quod sedere videtur. Hoc autem non necessarium est absolute, vel, ut a quibusdam dicitur, necessitate consequentis: sed sub conditione, vel necessitate consequentiae. Haec enim conditionalis est necessaria: si videtur sedere, sedet (*Summa contra gentiles* lib. 1 cap. 67 n. 10, in Busa 2005).

We can represent the two readings respectively as (7) and as (8):

> (7) Necessitas consequentiae: $\Box(p \rightarrow q)$
> (8) Necessitas consequentis: $p \rightarrow \Box\, q$

Let us consider the use of the English modal *must* in the following utterances:

> (9.a) If Alfred is a bachelor, he *must* be unmarried.
> (9.b) Alfred is a bachelor. He *must* be unmarried.

Superficially in (9.a) the modal is syntactically embedded in the consequent of the conditional, but its semantic interpretation does not correspond to the logical form of the *necessitas consequentis* shown in (8). In other words (9.a) does not mean that if Alfred happens to be a bachelor in the actual world then he will be unmarried no matter what the world turns out to be like (i.e. in all possible worlds). In fact, the interpretation of (9.a) corresponds to the logical form in (7) where the necessity operator takes scope over the conditional (*necessitas consequentiae*): 'no matter what the world turns out to be like, if Alfred is a bachelor he will be unmarried'. Interestingly, in (9.b), where instead of a syntactic conditional we have two syntactically autonomous discourse units, we obtain the same interpretation corresponding to the *necessitas consequentiae*. Here the restriction of the necessity operator by the antecedent proposition seems to be realized *anaphorically* in discourse by the *premise* presented in the preceding unit.

In the view espoused by the Relative Modality approach the restrictions on modality manifested by conditional syntax or recovered through anaphora in discourse can be seen as a partial manifestations of a more general contextual restriction which characterizes the semantics of the modals. Sometimes, the conversational background may be expressed, as Kratzer remarks, by adverbial prepositional phrases such as *in view of NP* – as in (10),

> (10) In view of the laws of our country, you must pay taxes

which are quite similar to the phrases used by Toulmin to make explicit what he calls the "criteria" of the modal. But most of the times the hearer has to infer the conversational background of the modal from the context and the co-text of the utterance.

Necessity modals are taken to indicate that the argument proposition is *necessarily entailed* by (that is *logically follows* from) the *conversational background* (B) of the modal:

(11) *Must/ Necessarily* $(B, \varphi) \Leftrightarrow \Box \, (B \rightarrow \varphi)$[17]

Or, alternatively:

(12) $[[must/ necessarily \, (B, \varphi)]] \Leftrightarrow [[\varphi]]$ is a logical consequence of B

Likewise, the basic structure of relative possibility can be defined by (13) or (14) :

(13) *May/ Can/ Possibly* $(B, \varphi) \Leftrightarrow \neg \, \Box(B \rightarrow \neg\varphi) \Leftrightarrow \Diamond \, (B \wedge \varphi)$
(14) $[[Can/May/Possibly \, (B,\varphi)]] \Leftrightarrow [[\varphi]]$ is logically compatible with B

A proposition is a possibility relative to a given conversational background B, if and only if the proposition is logically compatible with B – that is if $\{B \cup \varphi\}$ is a *consistent* set of propositions.

3.2.2 Context dependency and procedurality of modal meanings

The multifarious interpretations of the modals and their finer nuances can be expressed in terms of the different conversational backgrounds restricting the modal operator. The major distinctions traditionally recognized in the realm of modality can be seen as broad classes of conversational backgrounds. I adopt here a tripartite distinction between *ontological*, *deontic* and *epistemic* conversational backgrounds, which is inspired, in part, by Kronning (1996, 2001). Portner (forth. 2009: 140 ff.) proposes a partially overlapping tripartite classification.

– An *ontological* conversational background is composed of propositions that are *facts* of a certain kind. Kratzer (1981) calls these conversational backgrounds *realistic*[18]. These "facts" can range from the basic ontology of the universe, both

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[17] Actually, the formulas in (11) and (13) provide the semantics of the relative modal operators indirectly, by translating them in terms of an absolute modal quantifier ($\Box$ and $\Diamond$ respectively) and of a truth-conditional connective ($\rightarrow$ and $\wedge$ respectively), for which a standard semantics is assumed. The semantic clauses in (12) and (14), on the other hand, define the semantics of the modals equivalently, through the relations of *logical consequence*, and *logical compatibility*, for which a possible world semantics can be given as in Kratzer (1991, p.: 641): a proposition p is a logical consequence of a set of propositions A, if and only if p is true in all the worlds of the "universe" W in which all the propositions belonging to A are true; and analogously a proposition p is logically compatible with A, if and only if there is at least a world in W, where all the propositions of A *and* the proposition p are true.

[18] For Kratzer (1981) a conversational background is realistic when there is no proposition in B which is false in the actual world *w*. That is: B is a set of facts in *w*. It may not be the set of *all* facts in B, but it does not con-

metaphysical and physical (*All humans **must** die*) to very specific sets circumstances, including both the external circumstances (*Even from city water sources,[…], the water **must** flow through miles of piping and **can** pick up dirt, chemicals, ...*) and the internal features of an agent (*John **can** lift 100 kg singlehandedly*). Interestingly, social reality can be treated much in the same way as physical reality and backgrounds including institutional facts or economic laws function largely in the same way as an ontological background. This class of conversational backgrounds corresponds only in part to what Kronning (2001) call *alethic* modalities. A closer match is represented by Lycan's (1994) notion of *restricted alethic modalities*.

–   A *deontic* conversational background is composed of propositions corresponding to some sort of norm or ideal – states of affairs that are "good" with respect to some normative system or system of preferences. It can include values, laws and regulations, contracts, commitments as well as the simple desires, preferences and goals of an agent. This admittedly is a very extended sense of the term *deontic*. Portner (forth. 2009: 139) prefers to refer to this range with the term *priority modals*.

–   Finally, an *epistemic* conversational background is composed by a set of beliefs of a subject. The proper term for this kind of background should be *doxastic*, as the term *epistemic* refers to knowledge rather than belief. I keep the term *epistemic* because its widespread use in linguistics. Often an epistemic background is interpreted deictically as referring to the belief set of the speaker at the moment of utterance. As observed by Papafragou (2000) epistemic uses of the modals involve the cognitive operation of *metarepresentation*, the speaker's own representation of the world is considered *qua* representation, and not simply as a set of facts.

These three broad categories can help defining the coordinates of range of interpretations that the modals acquire in context, but they are not to be considered as linguistically encoded distinct "meanings" of the modals. As we will see in the following pages, the contextual readings of the modals refer back to very specific sets of propositions as their backgrounds. These sets are often highly salient in the context and it is doubtful that the addressee must always pass through the quite abstract categories involved above in order to reconstruct them. Rather it seems appropriate to consider B as a sort of empty slot to be saturated in context (cf. Papafragou 2000: 43-47).

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tain propositions that are not facts in *w*. So, when I say that *John **can** lift 100 kg singlehandedly* I select as B a very specific set of facts in *w*: the physique of John, abstracting from external circumstances. Note that realism is a formal property and corresponds to the property of *reflexivity* in possible world semantics and to the axiom $\Box\varphi \rightarrow \varphi$ in the syntactical characterization of a system of modal logic (cf. Kaufmann *et al.* 2006: 82-86). The fact that this axiom holds for ontological modalities plays an important role in determining their relationship with epistemic attitudes and with argumentation.

In the approach adopted here the linguistically encoded meaning of the modals is partly *procedural* or *instructional* in nature. Modals belong to a broader category of words and constructions "whose job is to characterize and index sometimes quite finely structured features of context and to bring those features formally into the interpretation process" (Charles Fillmore, preface to Kay 1997). These linguistic units behave like "a virtual instruction to the addressee to examine the common ground of the conversation (along with other interpretive content of the sentence) to fill in some partially specified part of the intended interpretation" (Kay 2003).

By treating the modals as context dependent allows us to account both for very specific interpretations of the modals, when the propositions that make up the conversational background are precisely identified, and for vague uses of the modals where the composition of the background remains underspecified. At the same time, this approach provides a framework for accounting for discourse relations associated with the use of modals, as one possible way of saturating the conversational background is identifying it anaphorically with propositions in the preceding co-text.

The linguistically encoded instruction associated with the different modal lexemes and constructions is not limited, however, to asking to the addressee to saturate B in context. The instructional component of a specific modal marker might include, for instance, restrictions on the types of admissible conversational backgrounds, default or preferential paths of saturation, and, in certain cases, additional semantic or pragmatic features conventionally associated with certain a given saturation of the background. In the following sections these additional instructional components will be examined for the modal construction formed by the combination of the modal verb *dovere* and the morpheme of the conditional mood.

3.3 Investigating the role of modality in arguments

With this double theoretical framework in place, consisting in the stratified account of argumentative discourse relations (§ 3.1) and of the relational and context dependent semantic analysis of the modals (§ 3.2), the central questions concerning the relationship between argumentation and modality can be formulated in a very straightforward manner, in terms of the approaches to modality and argumentation sketched above. These questions can be formulated in terms of a "mapping" between the two analyses, as shown diagrammatically in Figure 1, below:

a) How do the logical relations expressed by modals relate to argumentative relations, considered at the 3 levels of the speech act of the arguer, of the inferential path proposed to the addressee, and of the *locus* relying premises and standpoint at the content level?

b) To what extent, and under which conditions do modal conversational backgrounds map onto the set of premises supporting the standpoint?

c)   When does the content of the modalized, prejacent, proposition count as an expressed standpoint?

Figure 1: *Mapping between the structure of argumentative discourse relations and the structure of modal meanings*

With the help of this general framework, the second half of this paper will investigate the relationship between the semantics of the Italian modal verb *dovere* and the expression of argumentation in a corpus of Italian financial news articles.

4. *Modality and argumentation in financial news*

There are certain striking socio-pragmatic features of the discourse genre of financial news that contribute to make it an ideal test bed for our investigation. It is worth devoting some space to illustrate them.

Finance has often made the headlines lately, and for all the wrong reasons. But even before the present crisis, the relatively few students of discourse that approached this sphere of human activity found much that goes far beyond the numbers: articles in financial newspapers are placed in a lush and tightly knit *genre system* (Bazerman 1994) of interrelated written and spoken financial discourse genres:

corporate annual reports, analysts' recommendations and notes, quarterly earnings announcements… … and other price sensitive press releases analysts' and investors' conference calls,	shareholder meetings, Internet shareholder forums, letters to investors, other kinds of financial newsletters, open letters of activist shareholders, prospectuses produced by bidders in takeover attempts, …

Financial discourse, being oriented towards the decision making of investors, is, for the most part, overtly or covertly argumentative. Moreover, certain fundamental characteristics of the investment activity are reflected in the financial news genre in a way that places modality at the centre of its pragmatic and semantic functioning. It can be said that financial com-

munication is driven by the demand of information from investors who need to reduce the uncertainty surrounding investment opportunities – the uncertainty being due both to the intrinsic incompleteness of information concerning the occurrence of future events, and to private, undisclosed, information available only to "insiders".

As a consequence, financial news – in contrast with other news genres – are as much about predicting the future and evaluating possible outcomes than about reporting past events. Indeed we can say that the investor is interested in learning what happened yesterday only inasmuch it can help him shape his vision of the future where the possibility of profit lies.

The economic-financial press displays a rich variety of predictive speech acts[19]. These obviously include *economic forecasting* proper (Coyle 2001) – that is the systematic, quantitative, model based extrapolations from the present situation and past events to future trends of the economy – but they are not limited to it. They also include particular forecasts concerning the stock market (and sometimes the value of individual stocks) apparently based on a variety of much less systematic and scientifically established techniques (including the various forms of *chartism* or *technical analysis*), as well as a large number of wholly unsystematic, largely qualitative, predictive statements inferring, the intentions and future behavior of companies or individual managers or investors from a variety of behavioral signs, or *signals* – as they are called in finance according to a loose use of the term introduced in economic theory (cf. Spence 2002) – from partial disclosures by corporations and rumors *Heard on the Street* – as the title of a regular feature in the *Wall Street Journal* testifies (cf. Pound & Zeckhauser 1990). In the newspapers the discussion of signals takes the form open-ended guesswork often contemplating alternative conditional scenarios.

The discourse community of the financial industry has created its own indigenous speech act label to deal with the pervasiveness of the reference to the future in financial discourse: the term *forward-looking statements* is routinely used by finance professionals to deal with all the above kinds of prediction and, additionally, to statements referring to the corporate plans, strategies and more or less generic *expectations*. One notable use of the meta-linguistic term *forward-looking statements*, which has attracted the attention of discourse analysts (McLaren-Hankin 2008), is represented by corporate press releases containing quarterly earnings announcements and other kinds of financially sensitive information. These texts are invariably appended by a legal disclaimer (Safe Harbour Statement) liberating the issuers from most of the commitments incurred in by performing the "forward-looking" speech-acts, as in the following example:

> This press release contains statements that constitute forward-looking statements [...] Words such as "believes," "anticipates," "expects," "intends" and "plans" and similar expressions are intended to identify forward-looking state-

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[19] Here I assume the speech-act theoretic definition of *prediction* provided by Searle and Vanderveken. Searle & Vanderveken (1985): "To predict is to assert with the propositional content condition that the propositional content is future with respect to the time of the utterance and the preparatory condition that the speaker has evidence in support of the proposition. Evidence is a special kind of reason."

ments but are not the exclusive means of identifying such statements. [...] By their very nature, forward-looking statements involve inherent risks and uncertainties, both general and specific, and risks exist that predictions, forecasts, projections and other outcomes described or implied in forward-looking statements will not be achieved. [...] (Excerpt from Safe Harbour statement accompanying a *Credit Suisse* press release.)

The predictive statements as they appear in the texts of the press-releases are themselves accompanied by a variety of "hedging" devices, which act as "linguistic disclaimers", as noted by McLaren-Hankin (2008). These hedges include a variety of modal expressions (*should, could, possibly, potentially, likely*) as well as propositional attitude predicates such as *to expect, to believe, to feel, to hope, to be optimistic about*.

One can wonder whether journalistic predictions have any actual value for investors and, more generally, whether financial news media have an effect on the financial markets (cf. Dyck and Zingales 2003) or are merely a sideshow with no relationship to financial markets. Given the social prominence of this predictive activity these questions are far from irrelevant, and, in fact, they are deeply intertwined with fundamental issues in financial theory. The efficient market hypothesis predicts that new information relevant economic events is quickly incorporated into stock price. This makes predictions read in newspapers hardly profitable for investors. But the simplest and most devastating criticism of the idea of (freely available) profitable prediction is perhaps the one delivered by Mc Closkey (1990: 3):

The customer wants the economist to be an expert forecaster, telling that simplest and most charming of economic stories: Once upon a time there was a newspaper reader who was poor; then she read a column by a wise economist, who for some reason was giving his valuable advice to her and two million other readers; and now as a result she is rich.

But do financial news have any effect on the markets? Here some insights come from the camp of "behavioral finance". These researchers find that the "efficient market hypothesis" underestimates the role of collective investor psychology in producing what they call "market sentiment". They observed that reactions to news are not limited to instant adjustments to new hard information emerging and that price movement, downward or upward, may continue in the absence of new information when the investors get carried away by enthusiasm or stampede in a panic. Market sentiment seems to be determined, at least in part, by spin put on by the media, which, in turn, tends to follow the spin promoted by companies, which seem to reward friendly journalists with private information. So, predictions found in financial news may still be relevant to financial markets in the end, not because of their (dubious) intrinsic value but because of the effect they can have on "market sentiment".

As for the predictions appearing in the financial news proper, they also typically take the form of modalized utterances. Contrary to the received self-portrait of journalists as eschewing uncertainty in the pursuit of newsworthiness (cf. the saying *If it's only worth a might, it probably isn't a story* quoted in Coyle 2001) bare possibility and "conditional" possibility modals are the most frequent.

Explicit argumentation supporting acts of prediction[20], is also much more prominent than in other news genres. This supporting argumentation is largely attributed to expert sources (e.g. financial analysts) and sometimes accompanied by further indirect argumentation on the source's credibility. The (often reported) arguments on which the prediction is based can invoke different *loci*, but one can notice a certain prominence of *causal loci*, and in particular those *from cause to effect*. Predictions and causal relations are often expressed in *conditional* terms, relativized to plausible or merely possible scenarios (See Mc Closkey 1990 on conditional predictions in the discourse of economics). Consider, as a partial illustration of the features discussed above, the following English examples, taken from an article appearing in the *Wall Journal Europe* (WSJE) on September 14, 2006[21]:

> (15.a) Firm's fortunes **may** rise as commodity prices fall (Headline)
> (15.b) Major airlines around the globe continue to see strong passenger demand, so profit **could** climb **if** they are able to raise prices while their own costs drop as fuel prices fall. (From the body text)

The headline in (15.a) consists of a modalized conclusion supported by an argument based on a form of "economic causality", while the passage in (15.b) presents a more developed form of the same argument where the modalized conclusion introduced by *could* holds only within a conditional frame (*if they are able to raise prices*). Explicit attribution to sources (financial analysts, rating agencies, etc.) creates another kind of shifted discourse domain, which interacts with conditional structures and epistemic modals, as illustrated by (16):

> (16) A reduction of that percentage to 30% **would likely** lead Standard & Poor's to raise the company's corporate credit rating to "stable" from "negative," **according to** primary credit analyst Mary Ellen Olson. (WSJE, February 13, 2007)

The above semantic features make this discourse genre an ideal – and largely unexploited – environment to explore the interaction between modals, evidentials and conditional structures and to evaluate the role of these structures as argumentative indicators. It is the latter issue, in particular, that I would like to explore here with respect to the Italian modal verb *dovere*.

5. *Modal verbs and predictions in Italian financial news*

As we have seen in the previous section, prediction statements appearing in economic financial news are regularly modalized; and the genre appears to be particularly rich in modal

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[20] Merlini (1983) addresses predictions in economics papers from the viewpoints of Searlean Speech Act Theory. The analysis reveals an intimate connection between the nature of the illocutionary force of prediction and its role in argumentation. Merlini (1983) devotes particular attention to the *conditional* nature of predictions and the role of *epistemic modalities* in modifying the prediction along an epistemic gradient and an evidential-inferential one.

[21] The whole article contains 12 modal expressions (modal auxiliaries and modal adverbs).

words. Some quantitative data can be suggestive. For instance, in our large sample of the financial sections of the *Il Sole 24 Ore* the frequency the conditional forms of the modals *dovrebbe* (0.05%) and *potrebbe* (0.08%) is *more than double* than the frequency in a comparable reference corpus of generalist newspaper articles (*dovrebbe*: 0.02% and *potrebbe* 0.03%). But a qualitative examination of some representative texts is perhaps more revealing of their tone. Consider the following extract from an article dealing with the possible financial consequences of the indecisive outcome of the 2006 Italian political election:

> (17) **Forse** qualche hedge fund che si muove sui dati macroeconomici **potrebbe** decidere di mettersi "corto" (vendere, anche allo scoperto) sui titoli del debito italiano. '**Forse** – aggiunge Ragazzi – perché le finanze italiane sono peggiorate e il prossimo Governo **potrebbe** trovarsi un buco peggiore di quello che è stato prospettato'. L'**ipotesi** che i nostri titoli di Stato **possano** essere messi sotto pressione non è infatti esclusa da Mattia Nocera, a.d. di Belgrave Capital. Ma sulla Borsa non **dovrebbe** succedere nulla di strano: né per l'**incertezza** legata a una maggioranza risicata, né a causa di un Governo di centro sinistra.
> '**Semmai** la maggior apertura di Prodi all'Europa **potrebbe** in qualche modo favorire il processo di aggregazione tra le banche e anche difendere gli interessi italiani nel Continente', sottolinea Nocera.
>
> Maybe some hedge fund that moves on the basis of macroeconomic data might decide to "go short" (to practice shortselling) on Italian debt securities. "Maybe – Ragazzi adds – since the finances have worsened and the next government might find a hole worse that what has been foreseen." The hypothesis that our government bonds might be put under pressure is not, in fact, excluded by Mattia Nocera, CEO of Belgrave Capital.
> But, as far as the Stock Exchange is concerned, nothing strange should happen: nor because of the uncertainty due to its very narrow majority, nor because of a Center-Left government.
> "If anything, the greater openness of Prodi towards Europe could, in some way, favour the process of consolidation among the banks and also defend Italian interests in the Continent" Nocera stresses.

The passage is notable not only because of the abundance of modal verbs and adverbs, but also for the presence of nouns such as *incertezza* "uncertainty" and *ipotesi* "hypothesis", which denounce, so to say, the embedded modality of the subject matter this passage is about. Epistemic concepts such as *uncertainty* and modal notions in general (*risk, opportunity, expectation*) become discourse topics commented upon. The reflexive nature of finance has much to do with this discourse phenomenon: the beliefs of the market, including those that are apparently not anchored to hard information ("market sentiment") *do shape* the financial realities in the markets. So, the question of what the market believes may appear at times just as important as the question of how things are "in reality". The English example reproduced below from the *Wall Street Journal* is particularly telling in this respect:

(18) Such concerns have helped limit the dollar's losses against the euro, despite the Fed's recent moves – which once might have produced a dramatic fall in the dollar. The euro is "still essentially where we were at the start of December," *says* Simon Derrick, the London-based chief currency strategist for the Bank of New York Mellon. "That I find absolutely remarkable."
Mr. Derrick believes investors may be focused more on the risks to growth than on those posed by inflation. They "may well believe that the ECB is not being reactive enough and the euro is too highly valued," he says. ("Rate-policy shift could sap Euro", *WSJ Europe* February 1, 2008).

(18.a) BELIEVE (Derrick, MAY (FOCUS (Investors, RISK ('Economy does not grow'))))
(18.b) BELIEVE (Derrick, MAY (BELIEVE (Investors, 'The Euro is too highly valued')))

The triple or quadruple embedding of modalities and epistemic attitudes displayed in (18.a,b) is "absolutely remarkable", especially if one considers that the also the deeply embedded predicate *to be valued* in (18.b) can be analyzed in terms of a modal structure involving the "*willingness* to pay a certain sum for something".

6. *The predictive implications of future-oriented non-epistemic uses of Italian modal verbs*

The kind of modalities one finds in financial news is also shaped by the interaction between modality and future reference. As noted above, in financial decisions the *inherent uncertainty* of the future overlaps with the *uncertainty* due to incomplete knowledge[22]. According to a certain commonsense metaphysics we conceive of the future as not only epistemically uncertain, but also ontologically open, unsettled. Medieval philosophers (cf. Knuuttila 2008) reserved the term *real possibility* (*possibilitas realis*) for future possibilities, distinguishing them from the purely metaphysical, logical or epistemic possibilities – the latter, in particular, were possibilities only *a parte nostra* "from our viewpoint"(cf. Rocci 2005a, p. 79). With respect to the settled past no real possibilities are open: only epistemic possibilities remain open due to the incompleteness of our knowledge. This experiential asymmetry is reflected linguistically in the functioning of modal verbs. With respect to the ontologically settled past, where only epistemic possibilities are open: modal verbs show a very clear cut distinction between epistemic readings and non epistemic ones, and a second clear cut distinction within the non-epistemic area between factual and counterfactual readings. With the verb *potere* this threefold distinction is marked formally by the use of tenses:

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[22] Interestingly, the two sources of uncertainty in investment activities – the inherent uncertainty of future events and the incompleteness of the information on the current situation – correspond to a distinction which is well known by semanticists working on the interaction between time and modality: namely the distinction between the ontological "unsettledness" of future events and the epistemic / doxastic uncertainty which characterizes our mental representations of events, be they past, present or future (Cf. Kaufmann *et al.* 2006: 99-100).

(19.a) *Può aver visto.* 'She may have seen' (epistemic uses only)
(19.b) *Potrebbe aver visto* 'She might have seen' (epistemic uses only)
(19.c) *Ha potuto vedere* 'She was able to see / It was possible for her to see'
(factual non epistemic uses only)
(19.d) *Avrebbe potuto vedere* 'She could have seen' (counterfactual epistemic
uses only)

In the area of the future, where epistemic uncertainty overlaps with ontological openness, the distinction between epistemic and non epistemic readings becomes much less clear cut. This is particularly evident in the area of possibility, where so-called cases of *merger* (Coates 1983, 1995) between ontological or deontic possibility and epistemic possibility abound:

(20) Gli altri rischi che gravano sull'evoluzione del commercio internazionale
sono di natura macroeconomica: prezzo del petrolio e rialzo dei tassi d'inte-
resse **possono** influire sui consumi. (*Il Sole-24 Ore*, April 12, 2006).
"The other risks that loom on the evolution of International trade are macro-
economic in nature: oil price and rising interest rates can influence consumer
spending".

In (20) *potere* selects an ontological conversational background of economic facts includ-ing *oil price* and *rising interest rates* and relates them with *consumer spending* in a temporally generic statement. The reading is close to the so-called "sporadic" reading of possibility modals (Kleiber 1983) and not directly an epistemic one. It expresses an inductive gener-alization over similar cases (*Lions can be dangerous* or *This lion can be dangerous (on occa-sion)*) and not an epistemic evaluation of a single case (*This lion may be dangerous (in the context of utterance)*). The epistemic evaluation that interest rates and oil price may well in-fluence consumer spending in the immediate future is made available as a very strong im-plicature, based on Grice's maxim of quantity (had the author known about present circumstances ruling out this general possibility she would have been more informative) and helped by the context provided by the immediately preceding clause.

The derivation of epistemic implications from a non epistemic modality with respect to a future event is possible also with the necessity modal *dovere*. Here, however, the term *merger* seems less appropriate as one can perceive a clear cut distinction between the non-epistemic meaning of the modal and the epistemic implicatures that arise from it in context. In the corpus one finds two different readings of *dovere* that are not based on an epistemic conversational background but give rise to the implicature that the future event in the sub-jacent proposition is predictable with a certain degree of confidence. I will first examine these readings when they arise in the indicative forms of *dovere* – in the present tense and, more often, in the future. In both cases one can find a closely related corresponding read-ings in the *conditional* mood. I will discuss the conditional versions separately in the fol-lowing sections (§ 8 and § 9).

The first group of uses of *dovere* which gives rise to an epistemic implicature of pre-diction consists of occurrences where the modal selects different kinds of *deontic* conversa-tional backgrounds. Consider examples (21), (22) and (23) below:

(21) Slovenske Elektrarne dispone di 7 mila MW fra centrali idroelettriche, a carbone e nucleari; in tutto si tratta di sei reattori dei quali due – Mochovce e Bohunice – sono stati al centro di molte denunce delle associazioni ambientaliste e ***devono*** essere spenti per motivi di sicurezza, nell'ambito degli accordi per l'ingresso della Slovacchia nella Ue.
'Slovenske Elektrarne disposes of 7 thousand MW from hydroelectric, coal and nuclear power plants; there are in all six reactors, two of which – Mochovce and Bohunice –have been at the center of many complaints of environmentalist associations and must be turned off because of security concerns, in the context of the agreements for the admission of Slovakia in the EU'
{'agreements for the admission of Slovakia in the EU'} ⟹ 'Mochovce and Bohunice reactors are turned off'

(22) Gli statunitensi posseggono il 15% di Lukoil, precisa il gestore, e in base agli accordi con i russi ***devono*** salire al 20% acquistando titoli sul mercato.
'The Americans hold 15% of Lukoil – the money manager elaborates – and according to the agreement with the Russians they are to climb up to 20% buying stocks on the market'
{'agreement with the Russians'} ⟹ 'Americans buy up to 20% of Lukoil'

(23) Il prossimo 20 aprile gli azionisti ***dovranno*** votare sul fatto che sussistano ancora o meno i requisiti di onorabilità richiesti al manager per presiedere una banca.
'On April 20 the shareholders are to vote on whether the manager still satisfies the requirements of honorability necessary to chair a bank'
{'the scheduling of an extraordinary shareholder meeting'} ⟹ 'Shareholders vote on honorability on April 20'

In (21) and (22) the deontic conversational background of the modal is easily identified with different legally binding agreements mentioned in the co-text (an international treaty and a contract, respectively). In (23) the deontic conversational background is not mentioned in the co-text but it seems to coincide simply with the decision by the board of scheduling a shareholder meeting. In the three examples the backgrounds contain an element of *scheduling*, which allows the reader to infer that the scheduled events will quite probably take place. Such a background does not warrant an attitude of absolute certainty: Slovakia might denounce the treaty with the EU, the Americans might pull out from the deal with the Russians by paying a penalty, the board of the Bank might just cancel the shareholder meeting. Interestingly, while the addressee may well assess the degree of certainty of the prediction on the basis of the nature of the deontic background involved, the writer, by using a deontic modality, does not commit himself directly to a given degree of epistemic certainty towards the prediction. Should the implicated prediction turn out to be false, the speaker could always claim that the deontic modality was correct.

Indicative *dovere* can give rise to an epistemic implication also when the modal selects an *ontological background* consisting of facts of a certain kind that necessitate causally the occurrence of a future event. In our discourse genre the causality involved is seldom purely

physical. Most of the times we have economic events that exert their causal power on other events in the economic realm. Examples (24) and (25) from the same article in my sample are clear instances of this phenomenon. When a proposition is presented as a necessary consequence of a factual background, the epistemic evaluation indirectly conveyed through the modal is one of *certainty*[23]:

(24) Giovedì si è passata per la prima volta in quattro anni la soglia del 5% per i tassi a dieci anni. La conseguenza più immediata di questo aumento ricade sui tassi per i mutui immobiliari. Chi aveva contratto mutui a tassi variabili – e sono stati in molti – si trova alla scadenza del primo periodo e ***dovrà*** rinegoziare tassi di 200 o 300 punti superiori a quelli di un paio di anni fa. Questo significa che una famiglia media con un mutuo di 400mila dollari potrebbe trovarsi a dover pagare anche fino a mille dollari in più al mese.
'On Tuesday the threshold of 5% for ten years interest rates was passed for the first time in four years. The most immediate consequence of this increase will fall on mortgage rates. Those who had subscribed adjustable-rate mortgages – and there are many – are at the end of the first period and will have to renegotiate rates of 200 or 300 points higher than a couple of years ago. This means that an average family with a loan of 400 thousand U.S. dollars could have to pay even up to a thousand dollars more a month.'
{'Ten years interest rates have climbed over the 5% threshold', 'Those who had subscribed adjustable-rate mortgages are at the end of the first period'} $\Rightarrow$ 'They renegotiate rates of 200 or 300 points higher than a couple of years ago'

(25) Un aumento dei tassi a lunga inoltre potrebbe scoraggiare gli investimenti, l'unico vero supporto alla crescita rimasto nel contesto macroeconomico americano. Il mercato immobiliare che negli ultimi anni ha offerto performance stellari, si e già leggermente indebolito. Ma il cuore del problema è il pericolo di un indebolimento della domanda interna. Questo capiterà nel momento in cui il consumatore dovrà già destinare una parte crescente del suo reddito disponibile alla copertura degli aumenti del prezzo del greggio. Le stime per il costo della benzina nel corso dell'estate sono di circa il 20% superiori rispetto all'estate dell'anno scorso. L'auspicio è che l'aumento dell'occupazione compenserà le diminuzioni dei consumi.
'A raise in long term interest rates, moreover, might discourage investments, the only true support to growth left in the American macro-economic context. The real estate market, which offered stellar performances during the last few years, is already slightly weakened. But the heart of the matter is the danger of a weakening of internal demand. This will happen when consumers ***will have to*** devote an increasing share of their available income to cover raising [crude] oil prices. The estimates for the cost of gasoline are about 20% higher

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[23] This is a direct consequence of the axiom $\Box\varphi \rightarrow\varphi$, which applies to all *realistic* conversational backgrounds. See note n. 18 above.

compared to the summer of last year. The hope is that the increase in the rate of employment will compensate the decrease in consumption'.
{'The estimates for the cost of gasoline are about 20% higher compared to the summer of last year.'} ⇒ 'Americans devote an increasing share of their available income to buying fuel'

As shown in the analyses in both examples the factual conversational background causally necessitating the subjacent proposition is easily recoverable and identifiable with propositions in the preceding or following co-text. Even more clearly than in the case of the deontic readings above, the relation between the subjacent proposition p and the background B maps onto an actual discourse relation in the text. In the following section we will further explore the nature of this relation.

Examples like (24) and (25), with indicative *dovere* acquiring an ontological, circumstantial, reading, are not frequent in our sample. It is however important to discuss them because their conditional counterpart plays a prominent role in these texts.

To conclude our discussion it is important to say that in the sample there aren't other future oriented uses of indicative *dovere* with epistemic implications apart from the two types discussed above. In particular, there isn't anything resembling the epistemic-inferential reading of *dovere* and referring to future events. As I have shown elsewhere (Rocci 2005 a,b), the epistemic-inferential reading of indicative *dovere* and future reference of the modalized proposition are mutually exclusive.

The few instance of epistemic-inferential *dovere* in the indicative that are found in the sample refer firmly either to past events (26) or to present stative eventualities (27):

> (26) Ritirata strategica prima di un nuovo attacco. Il management del Nasdaq **deve** aver trovato spunto nell'*Arte della Guerra* di Sun Tzu per la strategia di conquista del London Stock Exchange (Lse). A fine marzo la società, che gestisce la Borsa americana dei titoli ad alta tecnologia, ha ritirato l'offerta da 950 pence per azione sull'Lse senza tante spiegazioni. Ieri la notizia che il Nasdaq controlla una quota pari al 14,99% della società-mercato britannica. (*Il Sole 24 Ore*, 12/4/2006).
>
> 'A strategic retreat before a new attack. The management of the Nasdaq must have found inspiration in the *Art of War* by Sun Tzu for their strategy for conquering the London Stock Exchange (LSE). In late March, the company, which operates the American Stock Exchange of high-tech securities, has withdrawn its bid of 950 pence per share on LSA without much of an explanation. Yesterday the news that the Nasdaq owns a share of 14.99% in the UK market-company.'
>
> (27) Bravo e capace, Massimo Faenza, lo **deve** essere senz'altro. In fondo, si deve a lui la profonda metamorfosi di Banca Italease. Ieri sonnacchiosa e negletta compagnia di leasing, oggi una delle stelle del listino con quel poderoso rialzo di oltre il 400% in soli dieci mesi di Borsa. (*Il Sole 24 Ore*, 13/4/2006).

'Talented and skilled, Massimo Faenza must be for sure. After all, the pro-
found transformation of Banca Italease is due to him. Yesterday sleepy and
neglected leasing company, today one of the stars of the list with that massive
rise of more than 400% in just ten months in the stock market.'

7. *Non-epistemic uses of dovere and argumentative loci in Italian financial news*

The ontological uses of indicative *dovere* in (24) and (25) are particularly interesting be-
cause in these examples the causal relationship between the facts in the conversational back-
ground and the prejacent proposition is clearly matched by an argumentative relation. The
reader is implicitly invited to assent to the predicted proposition because the event is in-
ferable from co-textually and contextually available premises. The inferential relationship is
parallel here to the causal one. We have here a causal *locus*, with an inference *from the cause
to the effect*.

The examples (1), (26) and (27) with epistemic-inferential *deve* are also clearly argu-
mentative, but they are very different. If we look at (1), (26) and (27) in the context of the
article in which they appear we find that they have a peripheral role in their prediction cen-
tered argumentation. Examples such as (26) and (27) are attention catching *exordia* writ-
ten in a lighthearted tone, where the journalist takes the liberty of drawing *subjective*
non-predictive inferences on matters of marginal import, which do not lend themselves to
future verification (who's going to check whether Nasdaq's managers took inspiration from
Sun Tzu?). This impression of relatively high subjectivity is consistent with the analysis of
epistemic-inferential *deve* as based on a form of "doxastic deixis", where the conversational
background is taken to refer to *a set of relevant beliefs of the speaker at the moment of utter-
ance*[24], which I have defended elsewhere (Rocci 2005b).

A second consideration concern the kinds of *loci* that underlie the argumentative re-
lations expressed by indicative epistemic-inferential *dovere*. In (26) the inference goes from
a behavior to the philosophy that *must* (at least in the writer's pretence) have inspired it, in
(27) the inference goes from the quality of the results of the activity to the capability of the
agent. These inferences belong too to the broad family of causal *loci*, but work *from the effect
to the cause*. Inferences *from the effect to the cause* and the related *symptomatic* inferences

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[24] Epistemic-inferential *dovere* is subjective if compared with the other uses of *dovere* in the indicative and in the
conditional that lend themselves expressing argumentative links and (indirectly) epistemic probability. It should
be noted that this is not in contradiction with analyses, such as the one proposed by Nuyts (2001 a,b), were the
inferential readings of the modals are considered to have a greater degree of objectivity, or better *intersubjectiv-
ity* if compared with mental predicates constructions such as *I think / I believe*. In epistemic-inferential *dovere*
the instructional part of the meaning of the modal invites us to examine the context and co-text to saturate the
conversational background, which often leads to locating co-textual premises and establishing argumentative dis-
course relations. Nothing similar happens with the more conceptual mental predicates, which lack this in-
structional component and refer to the thoughts of the speaker as an unanalyzed whole.

seem to be particularly favored *loci* with epistemic-inferential *deve*, as observed also with similar modals in other languages (cf. French epistemic *devoir*, or English *must*). Only an extensive investigation could ascertain the extent of this preference. In the meantime, however, it is important to stress that this is just a preference. Epistemic *deve* is possible both with inferences from *effect to cause*, with inferences from *cause to effect*, as shown in (28 a-b):

> (28.a) Giovanni ha lavorato molto. **Dev**'essere stanco.
> 'John worked a lot. He **must** be tired'
> (28.b) Giovanni è stanco. **Deve** aver lavorato molto.
> 'John is tired. He **must** have worked a lot.'

It is also possible with inferences that involve no causality at all, such as those from a distinctive feature to a species or class:

> (29) Bella la prima, ma non è una vipera, giusto? La vipera ha una testa triangolare, questo **dev**'essere un serpentello data la forma tondeggiante del musetto.
> 'Nice the first one, but it isn't a viper. The viper has a triangular head, this must be a grass snake because of the rounded shape of the nose.' (Forum post recovered through *Google*. The poster is commenting a photograph.)

The deontic uses considered such as those in (21), (22) and (23) can be also considered argumentative: the prediction that an action will occur is supported by the existence of agreements, commitments, plans or schedules involving the occurrence of such an action. Interestingly, since agreements, commitments, plans or schedules enter social reality as written or oral discourses this kind of modality has an affinity with reportive evidentiality. Predictions based on the authority of plans of action to which certain individual or corporate agents are committed, are *ipso facto* predictions based on the authority of the documents or discourses that realize these commitments. It is this kind of affinity, I believe, that led some researchers (cf. Squartini 2004) to postulate the existence of a reportive evidential reading of *dovere* both in the indicative and in the conditional, on the basis of similar examples. Here I maintain that indicative occurrences are fundamentally deontic in nature. Conditional occurrences, discussed below, present a more complex situation.

8. *The conditional form of* dovere *and the expression of argumentative discourse relations in financial news*

Several students of economic discourse have observed that most often the predictions that economists formulate are conditional ones (See, for instance, Merlini 1983, Mc Closkey 1990, Walsh 2006). It often happens, like in (30), that the proposition p is predicted to turn out to be true only if certain conditions or antecedents are met. Alternatively, the author might just envisage possibilities, that become relevant only in case certain possible scenarios are realized, as it happens in (31):

(30) E per quanto riguarda i rapporti con Finmeccanica? Niente paura. Il gruppo italiano, forte della sua sofisticata tecnologia, ha da sempre eccellenti relazioni e stretti contatti di lavoro sia con Alcatel, sia con Thales. Questo nuovo assetto nei satelliti non *dovrebbe* dunque cambiare il quadro generale degli accordi, sempre che naturalmente la quota e la posizione di Finmeccanica non vengano diluite o messe in secondo piano. Uno scenario, quest'ultimo, che il gruppo italiano non potrebbe certo accettare. (*Il Sole 24 Ore*, 5/04/2006)

'What about the relationship with Finmeccanica? Nothing to fear. The Italian group, thanks to its sophisticated technology, has always had excellent relations and close working contacts with both Alcatel and with Thales. The new arrangement in satellites should not therefore change the broad framework of the agreement, provided, of course, that the share and the position of Finmeccanica will not be diluted or overshadowed. But this is a scenario that the Italian group could never accept.'

(31) Sul mercato, tuttavia, sono corse voci che hanno messo in chiaro come la riscossa di Citigroup possa far tremare anche mercati più maturi: in Francia potrebbero affiorare "avance" per Société Générale o Bnp Paribas. Simili offerte, qualora avvenissero, *potrebbero* essere difficili da respingere, dopo che gli Usa non hanno obiettato alla fusione nelle tlc della Lucent con la transalpina Alcatel. (*Il Sole 24 Ore* 5/4/2006).

'In the market, however, there are rumors circulating that have made it clear that the comeback of Citigroup can shake even the more mature markets: in France approaches could emerge to Societe Generale and BNP Paribas. Such offers, if they were to happen, could be difficult to reject, after the U.S. did not object to the merger of French Alcatel with Lucent in the telecom industry.'

In fact, financial news seem a privileged vantage point to observe the interaction of basic conditional constructions, modal lexicon and tense-mood morphology to give rise to complex conditional semantic structures, often spanning several sentences in discourse. A full discussion of the semantics of conditionals is well beyond the limits of this paper[25]. I will limit myself to mentioning two semantic features of natural language conditional constructions that are relevant for understanding their interaction with modal verbs and with argumentative discourse relations.

A. *Conditionals have conversational backgrounds like modals.* In ordinary discourse the protasis of a conditional is actually added to a conversational background, which, in indicative conditionals, is often identified with normal, or expected conditions. An sentence like (32):

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[25] That a purely extensional account of conditionals based on material implication (entailment) cannot explain how conditional construction work in natural language is rather uncontroversial, and most analysis of conditionals treat them as inherently modal, assigning them an analysis which is very close to the one proposed for necessity modals.

> (32) If you show up on time, you will find plenty of room to park near the
> hotel.

is usually uttered on an assumed and *vague* backdrop of *normal conditions*, and it is not
meant as stating that the condition of showing up on time is sufficient for finding parking
no matter what else could happen in the world, but only *under normal conditions*. Truly exceptional situations – like those where an old Russian space station has just crashed on the
hotel parking lot destroying it – are not considered in evaluating the conditionals. Counterfactual conditionals pose more complex problems, but they also involve conversational
backgrounds approximating normal conditions.

B. *Antecedents are epistemically evaluated.* According to the classic logical interpretation of
conditionals, someone asserting a conditional of the form *if p then q* commits to the truth
of the conditional but remains uncommitted with respect of the truth of the propositions
p and *q*. The various natural language conditional construction differ, however, in that they
typically convey an epistemic evaluation of the antecedent, which may be further enriched
pragmatically in context. The epistemic evaluation of the antecedent provides a minor premise that allows the conditional construction to function as an argument from which a certain evaluation of the consequent can be derived. This happens, for instance, in the so-called
"epistemic conditionals" studied by Sweetser (1990), where it is clear from the context that
the antecedent is a fact, and the conditional functions as an argument supporting a certain
conclusion:

> (33) If he was a bad governor, he'll be a worse president.

In the proper context a sentence like (33) can function as an argument:

> Major premise: If he was a bad governor, he'll be a worse president. (from the
> conditional)
> Minor premise: He was a bad governor (from the epistemic evaluation of the
> antecedent)
> Conclusion: He will be a worse president.

What is interesting for the present discussion is that conditionals can function as arguments
also with weaker epistemic evaluations (for instance one of mere possibility) of the antecedent, giving rise to epistemically weak conclusions. This happens both in example (32)
and (33). Where the reader can infer that the writer draws a conclusion to which he commits with a weak degree of certainty depending on the weak epistemic evaluation of the antecedent. Interestingly, while the use of tense-mood in the construction and various
contextual cues can contribute to expressing the epistemic evaluation of the protasis, such
an evaluation remains most of the times considerably vague.

   Thus, from an argumentative point of view, antecedents in conditional structures often
remain ambiguous between two different discursive roles: (A) the role of an epistemically

weak premise or (B) the role that Stephen Toulmin (1958) called of "rebuttal", that is of specifying the limits of validity of a non demonstrative argument.

This ambiguous relationship between conditionality and argumentation plays an important role also in understanding the role of modal verbs in the conditional mood in argumentation. The conditional form of *dovere* (henceforth *dovrebbe*) – found in example (30) – is much more frequent than its indicative counterpart in financial news articles. Together with the even more frequent conditional form of *potere* (*potrebbe*), it greatly outnumbers the all the other lexical markers of modality in financial news articles, where it is regularly used to introduce predictions and it is interpreted as conveying an epistemic evaluation. By looking closely at a sample of the corpus one can recognize two rather distinct uses of *dovrebbe* where the modal conveys an epistemic evaluation of a prediction. In the following pages I will argue that these two uses are not directly related to indicative epistemic *dovere* but represent "conditional versions" of the two non-epistemic uses of future reference indicative *dovere* which we have examined in the preceding sections. Consider example (30) above, together with the example (34) below:

> (34) Il dato relativo alla vendita di nuove case negli Usa a febbraio ha fatto registrare un vero e proprio crollo (−10,5%, a 1,08 milioni di unita), il calo più forte da nove anni. Aumenta anche il numero degli alloggi invenduti, un fatto che – se confermato in futuro – **dovrebbe** riflettersi in una riduzione dei prezzi degli immobili, con effetti di raffreddamento sulla crescita dell'inflazione. Questa statistica ha sostanzialmente ribaltato quella relativa alle case esistenti, che aveva messo in mostra una crescita del 5,2% a febbraio. (*Il Sole 24 Ore* 3/4/2006)
> 'The sale figures new homes in the U.S. in February showed a real slump (−10.5% to 1.08 million units), the strongest decline in nine years. The number of unsold housing increases, a fact that – if confirmed in the future – should be reflected in reduced house prices, with cooling effect on the growth of inflation. This statistic has essentially reversed that relating to existing homes, which had exposed a growth of 5.2% in February.'

In (34) *dovrebbe* signals a consequence based on economic causality, and can be therefore interpreted as based on an ontological conversational background similar to the causal uses of *dovere* in the indicative examined in the previous section. Here, however, the causal necessity is conditional to the continuation of the slump – which would be, by the way, normal, or expected. In (30) *dovrebbe* signals again a causal consequence: Finmeccanica's sophisticated technology, long standing excellent relations and close working contacts with Alcatel and Thales are enough to ensure that nothing substantial changes in the relationship between Finmeccanica and Thales when Thales increases its participation in Alcatel's satellite business, *unless* Finmeccanica's share in the same business is "diluted or overshadowed". The latter possibility is explicitly considered exceptional in the following co-text.

In Rocci (2006a) I have defended the idea that the conditional of *dovere* is to be understood as a partially non-compositional construction, whose semantics – motivated by the modal semantics of the conditional mood[26] and by the semantics of *dovere* – involves a double conversational background consisting of the conjunction – in more precise set theoretic terms the "compatibility restricted union" – of a *modal base* (M) and a *conditional restriction* (R). The procedural component of the meaning of *dovrebbe* selects *deontic* or *ontologic* backgrounds for M and indicates that the conditional restriction is to be saturated by a set of *non-factual propositions*, which can be partially identified with a protasis or with other syntactic or discursive elements. The semantics of *dovrebbe* seems to contain also a further procedural element indicating a preference for identifying the restriction with a set of *normal conditions* in the absence of prominent sets of conditions recoverable from the co-text or context. The linguistic semantics of the *dovrebbe* construction can be summarized as follows:

> *dovrebbe* (B, p):
> p *is a logical consequence of* B
> where
> B = { M ∪! R}

Procedural restrictions:

- – Identify M with an *ontological* (facts) or *deontic* (norms) background
- – Identify R with a set of salient *non-factual propositions*;
- – By default, identify R with *normal conditions*.

According to this analysis, *dovrebbe* in examples such as (30) and (34) works indirectly as an indicator of an argumentative discourse relation by manifesting the underlying causal relation providing the *locus* for the argument. Moreover, it indirectly expresses *epistemic probability* thanks to the conditional restriction. Such a condition is *non factual*, but *normal* and then expected to hold true most of the times. Interestingly, we can find counterfactual uses of *dovrebbe* in the corpus, where the co-text makes it explicit that the real situation is *non normal*:

> (35) Quanto inciderà l'esito delle elezioni politiche di domani e lunedì sul prossimo risiko bancario? In un sistema totalmente privatizzato come quello italiano (a differenza degli altri Paesi europei), in teoria la politica non **dovrebbe** avere alcuna influenza. La realtà, malgrado la crescente spinta del mercato, è ben diversa. Tanto che tutte le partite finanziarie di rilievo sono rimaste in sospeso, a partire dal dossier Intesa-Capitalia, proprio in attesa del voto. (*Il Sole 24 Ore*, 8/4/2006)
> 'How much will the outcome of tomorrow's and Monday's polls affect the incoming "banking Risiko"? In a completely privatized such as the Italian

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[26] On the partially non-compositional semantics of the conditional see also Miecznikowski and Bazzanella (2007), who propose a semantic analysis which is largely compatible with the one presented in Rocci (2006a).

one(unlike other European countries), *in theory*, politics should not have any influence. Reality, despite the increasing pressure of the market, is very different. So much that all significant financial matches – starting with the Intesa-Capitalia affair – are on hold waiting for election results.'

Here the modality expresses a causal relation between the private property of a banking system and its independence from politics, R is identified with the prepositional phrase *in teoria* "in theory". But the following co-text makes it clear that the reality in Italy does not obey to theory, so that the conditional restriction is interpreted as counterfactual. As a consequence *dovrebbe* does not convey anymore an implication of epistemic probability. Yet, it expresses polyphonically a possible argumentation that someone – not well acquainted with Italy's strange realities – could put forth.

These causal argumentative uses of *dovrebbe* always appear to follow the direction of causation. Unlike epistemic *deve*, *dovrebbe* is extremely awkward in arguments based on inferences from the effect to the cause.

> Consider the following examples:
> (36.a) Giovanni ha lavorato molto. **Dev'**essere stanco.
> 'John worked a lot. He **must** be tired'
> (36.b) Giovanni è stanco. **Deve** aver lavorato molto.
> 'John is tired. He **must** have worked a lot.'
> (36.c) È tutto rosso in faccia. **Deve** essere fuori di sé.
> 'He's all red on his face. He **must** be out of his mind'

Epistemic *deve* can be used to manifest inferential relations both co-oriented with the direction of time-causation (inference from cause to effect), as in (36.a), and anti-oriented (inference from effect to cause) as in (36.b). It can also be employed to manifest inferences corresponding to temporal concomitance, like (36.c). As we have seen in (29) above, epistemic *deve* is also possible where temporality and causality are not at issue. Let us compare these sentences with their equivalents containing the conditional *dovrebbe* in (37):

> (37.a) Giovanni ha lavorato molto. **Dovrebbe** essere stanco.
> 'John worked a lot. He **should** be tired'
> (37.b) Giovanni è stanco. *__Dovrebbe__ aver lavorato molto.
> 'John is tired. He **should** have worked a lot'
> (37.c) È tutto rosso in faccia. *__Dovrebbe__ essere fuori di sé.
> 'He's all red on his face. He should be out of his mind'.

We find that *dovrebbe* cannot occur in temporally anti-oriented inferences from the effect to the cause (37.b), and is also clearly excluded in certain cases of concomitance like, for instance the symptomatic argument in (37.c).

The diverging behaviour of *deve* and *dovrebbe* with respect to argumentative discourse relations can find an explanation in the context of the hypothesis I have been progressively developing in the previous sections.

Epistemic *deve*, selecting a meta-representational epistemic-doxastic conversational background – corresponding to *a set of beliefs held by the speaker at the moment of utterance* – concerns the properly argumentative level, the *form* of argumentation, and can convey any kind of deduction (from cause to effect, from effect to cause, and many non-causal schemes): it is sensitive only to the *form* of the major premise that supports the deduction, and disregards its specific contents.

In the examples considered above *dovrebbe,* on the other hand, primarily conveys a *causal* relationship of a *natural* or *social* kind. As a further implicature, the assertion of this relationship may be taken as manifesting the major premise of an argument based on direct causality.

9. *The interaction between deontic modality and reportative evidentiality with dovrebbe*

Not all epistemic uses of *dovrebbe* found in financial news, however, seem to correspond to hypothetical causal arguments. Some uses of *dovrebbe* appear in contexts where reportative evidentiality would be expected.

In financial news the predictions and their supporting arguments are routinely attributed to expert sources – sometimes named, sometimes unnamed – giving rise to complex combinations of inferential and reportative evidentiality. Unnamed insider sources and simple *rumors* (Pound & Zeckhauser 1990) also feature prominently in financial news providing contexts where hearsay evidentiality would be relevant – see, for instance, example (31) above.

A first remark with respect to these reportative or hearsay contexts is that they often embed whole stretches of argumentation. Sometimes the whole reasoning is clearly attributed through (free) indirect speech to experts such as bankers, economists, financial analysts, while in other cases such as (30) the reasoning is not attributed but presented through polyphonic devices, such as the dialogue pretense (*sermocinatio*) in (30) – *What about...? Nothing to fear* – in an article where the main source of the news is identified at the beginning to the text with an anonymous insider ("secondo fonti vicine alla società" *according to sources close to the firm*). These phenomena of global reportative embedding or polyphony contribute to distinguish these argumentative uses of *dovrebbe* from the epistemic-inferential indicative *dovere*, which is used to point to a sort of "on-line" inference of the speaker. According to my analysis, ontological circumstantial *dovrebbe* tolerates well this embedding because it refers first of all to the underlying causal relation and not directly to an inferential operation of the subject. Sometimes, like in (38) the structure of the reasoning of the experts is only hinted at, so that the addressee cannot really follow the inferential path. In this case the modality remains causal and ontological, but the argumentation proposed to the addressee changes in nature: it becomes an argument from expert opinion (*argumentum ex auctoritate*).

(38) Al momento gli analisti non vedono catalizzatori di crescita: nel triennio 2006-2008 il mercato pubblicitario, secondo Zenith, ***dovrebbe*** crescere nel nostro Paese a un tasso medio annuo composto del 2,7% contro una media europea del 4,4 per cento. Con la stasi perdurante dell'economia italiana e con le Tv che si ritagliano una fetta (circa il 55%) crescente della torta pubblicitaria, gli analisti ritengono che le prospettive di sviluppo su media come le radio e Internet siano insufficienti e che gli editori della carta stampata debbano puntare di più sull'integrazione multimediale. In particolare sulle televisioni, il cui assetto potrebbe essere rimesso in discussione da un'eventuale riforma del governo di Centro-sinistra, qualora vincesse le elezioni. (*Il Sole 24 Ore* 3/4/2006)

'Currently, analysts see no catalysts for growth: in the 2006-2008 period the advertising market, according to Zenith, is expected to grow in our country at a compound annual average rate of 2.7% against a European average of 4.4 percent. With the continuing stagnation of the Italian economy and the TVs that carve out an increasing a slice (about 55%) of the advertising pie, analysts believe that the prospects of development on media such as radio and Internet services are insufficient and that the publishers of print media should focus more on multimedia integration. Particularly with respect to televisions, whose arrangement could be reshaped by a possible reform by the Center-Left coalition, should they win the election.'

When we move to the deontic uses of *dovrebbe* – which are typically based, like their indicative counterparts, on agreements, commitments, plans and schedules – the relationship between the modal and the reportative environment is not one of simple embedding, but rather of integration. Consider examples such as (39) and (40).

(39) Stando a quanto emerso ieri nella riunione del cda Bnl, Bnp ***sarebbe*** orientata a lanciare la prossima settimana l'Opa, che ***dovrebbe*** concludersi tra il 15 e il 20 maggio. Secondo indiscrezioni la banca di Parigi ***avrebbe predisposto*** tutto per annunciare già stasera l'ok della Consob e i dettagli dell'operazione, con le date di inizio e di conclusione. (*Il Sole 24 Ore*, 13/4/2006)

'According to what transpired from yesterday's meeting of the board of BNL, BNP would be inclined to launch next week the takeover bid, to be completed between the 15th and 20th of May. According to rumors, the Paris bank prepared everything to announce this evening the OK of Consob and the details of the transaction, with the dates of commencement and conclusion.'

(40) La situazione appare comunque fluida, tanto più che il presidente di Euronext, Jean-François Theodore, non ha ancora preso alcuna decisione e "gioca" su questa suspence per tenere gli azionisti della Borsa e i concorrenti sulla corda. Ad ogni modo qualche dettaglio in più si ***dovrebbe*** avere già con il 23 di maggio, giorno in cui e stata convocata l'assemblea dei soci di Euronext e ***dovrebbe*** essere fatto il punto sulla vicenda. Soprattutto si ***dovrebbe*** sapere se la soluzione Deutsche Börse è quella valida o meno. (*Il Sole 24 Ore,* 13/4/2006)

'The situation is still fluid, especially as the chairman of Euronext, Jean-François Theodore, has not yet taken any decision and "plays" on this suspense to keep the shareholders of the stock market and the competitors on their toes. Anyway, a few more details should already be available on May 23, when the shareholder meeting of Euronext is convened and the matter should be discussed. In particular, we should get to know if the Deutsche Börse solution is the valid one or not.'

These uses can be accounted for by considering them as a merger of the *dovrebbe* construction analysed above and of the reportative conditional construction. Basically, they inherit all the semantic features of the *dovrebbe* construction, saturate M with a deontic background of the scheduling or planning type, identify the non-factual conditional restriction R with "if what sources/ rumors say is true" and considering the truthfulness of what is said the (Gricean) *normal* condition of communication.

However, by looking at examples such as (39) – and, even more – (40) one has the impression that the deontic origin of these uses has been considerably "bleached" and that this *dovrebbe* is undergoing a process of grammaticalization, perhaps limited to the genre of financial news, where the modal verb is assuming purely the function of a futurity marker of the evidential conditional. This would compare with the fully grammaticalized use of subjunctive *dovere* as a pure futurity marker in the protasis of weak possibility conditionals:

(41) In precedenza era entrata in sciopero la miniera messicana La Caridad, la cui proprietà sta chiedendo al governo locale di dichiarare illegali i picchetti che impediscono l'ingresso ai lavoratori che potrebbero voler entrare, mentre la produzione di rame raffinato dovrebbe cominciare a essere ridotta da oggi se l'interruzione **dovesse** continuare.
'Previously, La Caridad mine in Mexico had gone on strike. The owners are asking the Government to outlaw the blockade that prevents entry to workers who may wish to enter, while production of refined copper should begin to be reduced from today, should the disruption persist.'

10. *Conclusions*

It is now time to make a provisional inventory of the findings of this investigation of epistemic and non-epistemic modals as possible argumentative indicators.

Certain general findings appear *prima facie* to be safely extensible to a plethora of relational, context-dependent markers of modality that are found in several languages. Other argumentatively relevant results, however, concern specifically the interpretation of the Italian modal verb *dovere* and may or may not be extended to similar linguistic structures in other languages.

It has to be said, however, that both the general results and those specific to *dovere* seem to confirm the productivity of investigating the mapping between a relational and

context dependent semantic analysis of the modals and a layered account of the argumentative discourse relations considering the properly pragmatic level, the inferential processes attached to it and the content-level relations (*loci*) warranting the inferential step.

As far as the general results are concerned, it is useful to go back to the list of types of information needed for reconstruction, which I reproduced from Houtlosser (2002) in § 2.2.

We can conclude that epistemically interpreted context-dependent modals help us (a) to recognize the standpoints being advanced, (b) to make (to some extent) explicit the force of the commitment towards the standpoints, but also, at the same time, they prompt the anaphorical recovery of premises from the co-text or situational context (c).

This function of pointers to premises seems to be associated both to the context dependent nature of the modals, and to the *evidential* meaning they may acquire when interpreted epistemically: in this case they become signals of acts of inferences on the part of the speaker (§ 3.1).

Non-epistemic modals, on the other hand, refer to content level relations (such as for instance *causality*) and therefore can convey information on the *loci*, or argumentation schemes, being used (d). Being themselves context-dependent they too can act as pointers in the cotextual or contextual recovery of premises, even if they do not directly signal an act of inference of the speaker.

With respect to the case study of the argumentatively relevant uses of *dovere* in the corpus of Italian financial news my findings can be summarized as follows.

The epistemic use of indicative *dovere* ($deve_E$) behaves as an inferential evidential directly indicating an act of inference of the speaker and pointing to co-textual or contextual premises. $Deve_E$, referring deictically to the on-line inferential processes of the arguer conveys a relatively high level of subjectivity. It can introduce standpoints whose propositional content refers past events or present eventualities, but it cannot be used to introduce predictive standpoints. While it appears to be compatible with a wide variety of *loci*, $deve_E$ seems to manifest a preference for inferences *from the effect to the cause*, and for symptomatic arguments in general.

Future oriented *ontologic* and *deontic* uses of indicative *dovere* can introduce predictive standpoints *indirectly*. When they do that, they manifest arguments *from causes to effects* or, weaker ones, from the existence of an obligation to its probable fulfillment. Being indirect means of presenting a standpoint and of qualifying its epistemic probability, they present a low level of subjectivity and speaker involvement.

Finally, conditional mood *dovrebbe* presents conditional variants of *ontologic* and *deontic* uses of dovere, which are connected to the same *loci* of their indicative counterparts. The inference, however, is dependent from an additional explicit or implicit premise, corresponding to the conditional restriction. This premise is conventionally associated with a weak positive presumption, corresponding to what is *normally* the case, or what is to be expected as a default (that a trend continues, that a general tendency is verified, that a theory corresponds to fact, that agents fulfill their obligations/commitments/plans, that what is as-

serted is true, etc.). These weakly plausible premises, however, aren't directly associated with an epistemic evaluation of the arguer, and on occasion they can be implicitly associated with the voice of a real or virtual antagonist in the discussion. Furthermore, certain deontic uses of *dovrebbe* have begun evolving towards a form of reportative evidentiality, bringing the issue of testimony and authority into the epistemic evaluation of the standpoint expressed.

Many of these conclusions are still tentative and would require to be substantiated by a broader corpus investigation, but the overall picture emerging from them looks promising, so that it casts a new light on Toulmin's orginal intution of the centrality of modality in the structure of arguments.

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REASONABLE EMOTIONS AND ARGUMENTATION

USING KEYWORDS TO ANALYZE CONFLICTS IN DOCTOR-PATIENT CONSULTATIONS*

SARAH BIGI

Introduction

The present paper tackles the challenge posed by conflicts emerging in doctor-patient consultations.

Communicative exchanges situated in the medical setting – consultations in particular – have been closely studied in the last thirty years from many points of view. One of the most important issues in the study of these communicative exchanges has been the asymmetry of roles between patients and doctors, which often causes misunderstandings, incomprehension, poor patient compliance and low satisfaction on both sides.

Such conflicts have often been studied from the point of view of the power relations generating them, more seldom looking at the communicative structure of the interaction itself and at its internal dynamics. The present paper focuses in particular on the argumentative structure of certain crucial parts of the consultation – namely the ones of patient education and counseling (Roter & Hall 2006) – in order to describe a heuristic strategy – keywords and key expressions – that can be used to understand the origin of the conflict[1].

The paper is structured as follows: the first paragraph presents a description of the communication context of doctor-patient consultations along the lines of the model of communication contexts proposed in Rigotti & Rocci (2006a). This is functional to the identification of the relevant factors influencing the communicative exchanges between doctors and patients during the consultation. The second paragraph focuses on the notion of conflict, describing the types of conflicts that can arise during a medical consultation. Building on the first two paragraphs, the third one discusses in which sense keywords and key expressions can be viewed as strategies of conflict detection and management. The fourth paragraph offers an example of analysis from a real life consultation. The last paragraph is devoted to some concluding remarks.

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[1] The concept of *conflict* in this context is not intended in the common sense of *argument*, but of difference of opinion, which is not disruptive *per se* but can become so if it is not properly managed (Greco-Morasso 2008).

1. *The communication context of doctor-patient consultations*

In order to better understand the strategies used in certain verbal interactions, it is most useful to view the interaction in its specific context.

The communication context of a medical consultation can be fruitfully described by following the model proposed in Rigotti & Rocci (2006a)[2]. This model foresees two main components in any context of communication: an institutional and an interpersonal one.

As for the institutional component, any interaction needs to be observed in its *interaction field*, "the place of *social reality* where the interaction takes place" (Rigotti & Rocci 2006a: 172).

An interaction field is defined by the goal the participants in the interaction share: in the medical setting, the main shared goals are to understand what kind of illness affects the patient, to find a solution for it, and to involve the patient in the therapeutic process[3]. The shared goal is also what defines commitments and social roles of both subjects. In the case of the medical setting: it is in order to achieve the shared goals that subjects "play the roles" of patients, doctors or other personnel. A role carries with it commitments which may be more or less codified. In the case of doctors, the basic commitments are often explicitly stated in a deontological code whereas patients' commitments are more implicit, the basic one being to cooperate with doctors, i.e. follow their lead. Whether this had better be a passive or active obedience is what is being discussed in the contemporary debate on doctor-patient relationship.

Within an interaction field, it is also relevant to identify the *interaction schemes*, which are more or less conventionalized "scripts" that need to be followed in order to interact in a specific field. These interaction schemes "select" the dialogue games relevant to the goal, they determine the speech acts chosen and their arrangement. The typical interaction schemes enacted during doctor-patient consultations are *problem-solving* and *decision making*, but also, among others, *advisory*, *negotiation*, *mediation*.

The description given so far of the communication context needs to be implemented by real subjects in order for it to generate actual roles and *communicative flows* connecting them. The literature on doctor-patient consultations has identified the main communicative flows present in this kind of interaction: question asking, information giving, suggest-

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[2] On the relevance of this model for the description and analysis of interactions in the medical setting, see also Bigi (forthcoming).

[3] "Solution" is intended here in a broad sense, including the cases of chronic illnesses for which no cure is possible and a doctor's role is mainly to make the patient's life bearable. In the words of one of the first advocates of "patient-centered medicine": "In practical terms the doctor's tasks are, first, to find out *how* and *what* the patient is or has been feeling and experiencing; then to formulate explanations (hypotheses) for the patient's feelings and experiences (the "why" and the "what for"); to engage the patient's participation in further clinical and laboratory studies to test such hypotheses; and, finally, to elicit the patient's cooperation in activities aimed to alleviate distress and/or correct underlying derangements that may be contributing to distress or disability. The patient's tasks and responsibilities complement those of the physician." (Engel 1980: 536).

ing, giving opinion, showing solidarity (Roter & Hall 2006: 118). Once more it is the shared goal that contributes to the organization of the communicative flows in more or less institutionalized structures. The medical consultation has been shown to display certain recurrent phases, which are functional to the attainment of the shared goal. They are: the opening, the history, the physical examination, patient education and counseling, and the closing. The main purpose of the opening is the expression of the chief complaint and of the reason for the patient going to see the doctor. This phase is concluded when the doctor directs the patient toward the history segment. The physical examination phase is followed by the moment of patient education and counseling, in which explanation of the symptoms is given and suggestions for treatment are put forward. The closing has been shown to be the moment when patients tend to express more emotionally charged concerns, if they haven't been given time enough to express them during the opening. This phase appears to be revealing of the general quality of the interaction: if the physician has been responsive from the very beginning, no new concerns are brought up in the closing phase (Roter & Hall 2006: 113-116).

With regard to the interpersonal component of context, it is particularly relevant for doctor-patient consultations, as it can have a very strong influence on the attainment of the shared goal. Numerous studies claim that there exists a direct relation between the quality of the relationship between doctor and patient and patients' outcomes and satisfaction. The construction of a good relationship is also acknowledged among the aims of the medical consultation (Moja & Vegni 2000). The ways through which this good relationship should be constructed are often made to coincide with various communication skills, aimed at putting the patient at ease, making them feel cared for and listened to. In Rigotti & Rocci (2006a) this level of the interaction is described within the interpersonal dimension of the context and referred to as *solidarity*, which can be of two types. One type is the solidarity achieved within personal relations, the other is the one obtained in goal-oriented interactions, and which is functional to achieving the shared goal of the interagents. A feature that characterizes medical consultations is the intertwining of the two types of solidarity: actual trust between doctors and patients has been shown to deeply affect the quality of the goal-oriented level of their relationship.

One of the most effective ways of achieving both types of solidarity is the sharing of a *common ground*. Following Clark (1996), common ground corresponds to what is thought to be shared knowledge by two or more participants in a joint activity. This approach to common ground is embedded within a theory of joint activities and joint actions, in which one crucial point is the achievement of coordination among the expectations of the participants in the interaction. The participants assume the existence of a certain common ground between them on the grounds of certain shared bases; of course, if their assumptions are wrong and there is no actual common ground between them, coordination problems may arise. In other words, the expectations of the participants regarding the actions that will be taken by the others are not coordinated (Clark 1996: 62-81).

A medical consultation may well be considered a joint activity composed of single joint actions, which need to be coordinated in order to attain the final shared goal. Generally, there is one participant (the doctor) who is leading the interaction as for the phases it is composed of. The patient usually follows the doctor's lead regarding "what to do next" in terms of opening, history, physical examination, patient education and counselling, closing (Roter & Hall 2006: 112)[4]. In this sense, the medical consultation is a quite conventionalised joint activity.

Still, it is often the case that during a consultation there happen to be no shared bases, i.e. the participants have different assumptions on what is common ground between them. The patient may not be expecting the doctor to formulate a certain diagnosis or to suggest a certain kind of therapy; the patient may also be scared or worried by what the doctor tells him and imagine a scenario that is distant both from actual reality and from what the doctor had in mind. The doctor may expect the patient to know things he actually doesn't know (Levenstein *et al.* 1986).

If these situations occur, the consequences are most generally misunderstandings, poor compliance, low patient satisfaction, and, in the worst cases, the interruption of the relationship[5].

2. *Conflicts in doctor-patient consultations*

As shown in Greco-Morasso (2008), conflicts can be of two types. Conflicts of the first type (C1) occur when the struggle between two or more human subjects is characterized by hostility and by the attempt to eliminate one's adversary. Conflicts of the second type instead (C2) are defined as propositional incompatibilities, i.e. as incompatibilities of positions or goals.

C2 conflicts are the ones that may arise within any interaction, due to the differences and asymmetries which lie at the origin of any communicative interaction. In doctor-patient consultations, conflicts of this kind may occur especially because of the relevant asymmetry characterizing the relationship between the two. This asymmetry can be of two types:

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[4] It is necessary to draw a distinction between *communicative flows* and *phases* of the consultation. Whereas the communicative flows depend on "what the speaker wants to do to the addressee with his/her utterances" according to the different roles of the participants in the interaction and consist in the verbal side of the joint actions which are building up to form the joint activity, the phases of the consultation correspond to the conventional steps taken together by doctor and patient in order to achieve the shared goal (which is not communicative in nature, but consists of an action). So phases include communicative flows, but not vice versa. Byrne & Long's (1976) famous classification used to distinguish six main phases: 1. relating to the patient; 2. discovering the reason for attendance; 3. conducting a verbal or physical examination or both; 4. consideration of the patient's condition; 5. detailing treatment or further investigation; 6. terminating.

[5] With regard to the issue of knowledge and power asymmetry in the medical consultation as the cause of conflicts and misunderstandings, see among others: Todd (1989); Beisecker (1990); Beisecker & Beisecker (1993); Ainsworth-Vaugh (1998); Thesen (2005); Irwin & Richardson (2006) and the references therein cited.

of knowledge or of skills and competences. The most recent literature on doctor-patient consultations tends to consider this asymmetry both from the point of view of the doctor and of the patient. In other words, while the doctor is the expert in the medical field and has the skills to solve health problems, patients are considered to be experts "of themselves", i.e. they are the only ones to know their own feelings, perceptions, fears regarding the illness (Stewart *et al.* 2003)[6].

Within the consultation, conflicts tend to arise basically for two reasons: doctor and patient do not agree on the diagnosis, i.e. they do not share the same beliefs regarding a certain part of reality; doctor and patient do not agree on the therapy, i.e. they do not share the same opinion on the course of action to take. The assumption regarding doctor-patient consultations is that in any case the participants share at least the main goal, i.e. to agree on a solution to the patient's health problem.

Table I shows the basic types of conflicts that can arise during doctor-patient consultations, related to the diagnosis or to the therapy.

Diagnosis-related conflicts (conflicting beliefs regarding a certain part of reality)	1. incompatibility of beliefs (lay diagnosis: patients' beliefs derive from non-expert ideas on the disease and may be incompatible with doctors' beliefs); 2. difference of beliefs (alternative diagnosis: patients' beliefs derive from their personal experience and may be integrated with doctors' beliefs); 3. no coordination of expectations (patients do not accept the diagnosis).
Therapy-related conflicts (conflicting beliefs regarding the course of action to take)	1. patients put forward an alternative therapy because of: a) distrust for certain treatments (health (il)literacy); b) personal history of negative side-effects (patient "expert of himself"); 2. non acceptance of therapy (non compliance).

Table I: *Basic types of conflicts in doctor-patient interactions*

In order for conflicts not to escalate and reach the point of jeopardizing the existence of the relationship itself, the participants are faced with the problem of coordinating their mutual expectations. Expectations reside in the common ground, i.e. they depend on the participants' knowledge of reality, and are influenced by a subject's interests and desires. In order to coordinate them and prevent them from clashing, there is the need for a coordination device able to operate at these different levels: interpersonal and institutional.

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[6] This reading of the situation solves the problem only partially as the challenges posed by asymmetry are set momentarily aside. The idea of an encounter between peers though may entail a risk, i.e. to overlook the fact that the asymmetry derives not only from doctors' competences, but also from the social role "designed" for them by the institutional structure in which the encounter is set. From this point of view, the patient can hardly be considered the doctor's peer, and in order to level this asymmetry the creation of a whole new institutional framework should be considered. An alternative way might be to reconsider the assumption that interpersonal or social asymmetry is intrinsically negative.

Also the phase of the consultation in which conflicts are more likely to emerge is important. Following the classification of phases within the consultation in Roter & Hall (2006), "patient education and counseling" is the moment when conflicts that are most difficult to manage generally arise. In fact, it is in this phase that doctors express their opinion both on diagnosis and therapy, and the moment when different expectations or gaps in the participants' common ground are more likely to come to light.

It is important to keep in mind the essentially argumentative nature of this phase of the consultation: any strategy devised to cope with conflicts at this stage of the interaction will have to be attuned to the persuasive dynamics underlying the discourse.

3. *Keywords and key expressions as conflict indicators*

In what could be defined as the core description of keywords and key expressions, they are considered as *relevant* and *pivotal* words within texts, words that reveal certain ideas, values, ways of thinking, and that are emotionally *loaded* (Firth 1958; Williams 1985; Wierzbicka 1997; Bennet et al. 2005; Bigi 2006).

The first two features – relevance and the property of being pivotal – usually indicate words that occupy a central position within the lexical fields present in the text. The latter features – the property of being revealing and loaded – are suggestive of words carrying particular connotations.

In the context of the present paper, the notion of connotation can be understood as the property of triggering inferences linked to premises (values or ideas) that are relevant for the participants in the interaction[7].

The idea of *relevant premises* refers to sets of information present in the common ground that are felt as *interesting* by the subjects involved in the communication. The dimension of interest involves both the personal common ground of the interagents (*interesting*, in the sense of something that has to do with one's life and that can influence it), and the attainment of the shared goal that defines the joint activity in which the subjects are participants (*interesting*, in the sense of something that allows someone to attain the goal that led them into the interaction in the first place).

The ability to *trigger inferences* means that, by referring to relevant premises in the interagents' common ground, keywords and key expressions evoke certain scenarios or frames, which can be considered as cognitive resources through which people interpret and organise reality (Fillmore 2006). They are also the structures through which the interagents' deepest premises are categorized (Greco-Morasso, forthcoming).

In this context, it is possible to understand keywords as words or expressions having the main property of triggering inferences from sets of information present in the common ground that 1. interest the subjects involved in the communication and 2. are relevant for

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[7] On connotation, see Rigotti & Rocci (2005).

the achievement of the shared goal that defines the joint activity in which the subjects are participants.

It is in this sense that they can become *conflict-indicators*: by their identification it is possible to outline the frame or scenario they evoke. When the outlined scenarios appear to be incompatible, then it will be easier to understand the origin of the conflict.

4. *An example from a real life consultation*

In this paragraph, the hypothesis outlined this far is tested on a consultation in the onco-logical setting[8]. The chosen medical consultation takes place in the oncologist's office, set within the structure of an Italian public hospital. The participants in the consultation are two women doctors, and a married couple. The patient is the husband and both he and his wife – who is accompanying him – are in their seventies.

The patient has come to see the doctor three months after undergoing a biopsy to as-certain the nature of a lump growing close to his lungs. What he needs to discuss with the doctors are the results of the new exams he has had, which were supposed to show more clearly the nature of the lump. Unfortunately it is still unclear whether the lump is a malig-nant tumor or not. However it has grown a little and the doctors argue in favour of doing more exams at once instead of waiting another three months.

The *shared goal* between the participants in the interaction is to understand precisely what the patient is affected by in order to suggest a proper treatment. Accordingly, the main *interaction scheme* is problem solving, which is argumentative in nature. A subordinate inter-action scheme is decision making.

The analysis focuses on the part of the consultation in which the doctor argues for the necessity of having more exams done immediately.

The coordination problem the doctor is faced with is to obtain the patient's agreement on this course of action without scaring him and making it acceptable to him that the di-agnosis is still not clear.

First of all, the relevant extract from the analyzed consultation is presented[9]:

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[8] This consultation was taken from the Archive of Videorecordings of Medical Consultations of the Università degli Studi in Milan.

[9] M = doctor; P1 = husband (the patient); P2 = the wife. The conventions for the transcription follow Traverso (1999):

[interruption and overlapping;

= turns following one another with no interruption;

(.) pause of one second or less;

↑ rising intonation (questions);

/ slightly rising intonation (suspension);

↓ falling intonation (exclamations).

[…]

46 M: vediamo un attimo questa TAC perché lei avrà letto il referto: magari non ha capito perché
    let's have a look at this CAT scan because you may have read the report. Maybe you didn't understand it because

47 c'erano delle parole un po' difficili (.) però: quello che si vede: sa che [dovevamo ricontrollare
    there were some difficult terms. Anyway what can be seen… you know we had to check again

48 P2:   [sì sì
                                                                            yes, yes

49 M: quel chiamiamolo nodulino che c'era qui in mezzo nello spazio [tra i due polmoni
    that, let's call it a little lump, that was here in the middle in between… between the lungs

50 P2:   [sì quello me lo ricordo/
                                                                  yes I do remember that

51 M: e dove non abbiam/ non si è mai capito bene: da che cosa è fatto quel nodulo tant'è che ha
    and where we didn't… we never really understood what that lump was made of and that's why you

52 provato a fare anche la broncoscopia per prenderne un pezzo e [farlo analizzare
    had to undergo bronchoscopy to take a sample from it and have it analyzed

53 P1:   [sì sì
                                                                  yes, yes

54 M: però quel campione lì tirato via non ha trovato cellule cattive non ha trovato cellule tumorali
    but that sample didn't show any bad guys, didn't show any cancer cells

55 per cui anche d'accordo con i chirurghi toracici cioè quelli che tagliano s'era detto facciamo un
    so in agreement with our thoracic surgeons, the people who operate, we said let's have

56 controllo della TAC a tre mesi [e vediamo/
    a look at the CAT scan after three months and we'll see

57 P1, P2:   [sì sì
                                  yes, yes

58 M: visto anche il suo impegno con il cuore queste cose: se è indispensabile fare altri
    considered your heart condition, these things… if it's really necessary to have other

59 accertamenti [o basta
    exams or if it's enough

60 P1, P2:[sì sì
            yes, yes

61 M: questa TAC fa vedere che **è un po' cresciuto** quel nodulo lì (.) non tantissimo: vuol dire che
    *this CAT scan shows that lump **has grown a bit**. Not that much, which means*

62 prima misurava due centimetri e mezzo per un centimetro e mezzo (.) adesso è due centimetri e
    it used to be 2.5 by 1.5 centimetres, now it's 2.5,

63 mezzo è sempre uguale per tre (.) cioè nell'altra dimensione **è un po' cresciuto** (.) questa è una
    *the same, by 3… that it **has grown a bit** on one side… this is something*

64 cosa che tanto tanto tranquilli non ci lascia il fatto che **sia cresciuto un po'** […] è questa pallina
    *slightly bothering for us… the fact that it **has grown a little** […] it's this little*

65 grigia qua vede↑
    grey spot here see?

66 P1:   sì
            yes

67 M: questo nodulino qua più grigio rispetto a=
     this little lump here a little darker than...
68 P1: =vicino a dov'è↑
     and it is close to what?
69 M: è vicino: al [cuore
     it's close to the heart
70 P1:   [ah/
                    oh
71 M: non non così non è attaccato al cuore però come zona è qua in mezzo vicino a dove ci sono le
     not, not that very close to the heart, but the area is the one close to the
72 arterie che vanno ai polmoni (.) che poi hanno fatto anche qua: l'ingrandimento
     arteries going to the lungs. You see, they also made an enlargement here...
73 (*i medici parlano tra loro sottovoce*)
     (doctors whisper something to each other)
74 M: stiamo [ragionando perché
     we are thinking about it because...
75 P1, P2: [sì sì sì
                yes yes
76 M: così come non abbiam capito l'altra volta che cos'era questo tessuto non è che adesso: sia
     same as last time when we didn't understand what this tissue was, this time it still isn't
77 chiaro=
     clear
78 P2: =non è chiaro ancora↑
     it's not clear yet?
79 M: no (.) però quello che è più chiaro rispetto a prima è che è una cosa che **è cresciuta** e che
     *no, but it is clear that since last time this thing **has grown** and this*
80 quindi ci motiva di più nel fare altri accertamenti (.) che **se fosse rimasto uguale** uno avrebbe
     *gives us more reasons to further examine it. **If it had been the same** we would*
81 detto/ [va bè
            have said... well...
82 P2: [sì
           yes
83 M: lo ricontrolliamo tra sei mesi: niente/ siccome **è ulteriormente cresciuto** rispetto a novembre
     *we can check it in six months, ok. since **it's grown** since November,*
84 **non cose catastrofiche** eh: per carità però: **è comunque un po' cresciuto** (.) per cui questo
     ***nothing alarming,** I mean... but **anyway it has grown a little**... so this*
85 merita di fare qualche piccolo accertamentino in più (.)
     deserves some little examination still

[...]

The argumentation stage (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 2004), in which arguments are put forward supporting or casting doubt on a standpoint, begins at line 61, when the doctor puts forward her first and strongest argument: the lump has grown a bit (*il nodulo è un po' cresciuto*). This argument is repeated at lines 63, 64, 79, 80, 83, 84.

The doctor's standpoint appears at lines 80 and 85: we have reasons to further analyze this lump (*ci motiva di più nel fare altri accertamenti; questo merita qualche altro accertamentino in più*). Only once does the doctor express the second reason for having further exams: we still don't know what the lump is (*non è che adesso sia chiaro*) (lines 76-77).

The conflict the doctor needs to prevent is at the same time on the level of the interpersonal relation and related to the achievement of the shared goal. On the one hand, the fact of not being able to formulate a precise diagnosis could diminish the patient's trust in the doctor's abilities. The patient could begin to feel unsure, not trust the doctor anymore and perhaps not follow her therapeutic suggestions. What is more, the patient could start focusing on the uncertainty of the situation, which would be likely to induce him to think of the terrible implications of a cancer diagnosis. In such a context, an uncertain diagnosis is more likely to leave room for despair than for hope. On the other hand, it is necessary for the patient to agree with the doctor's suggestion to have further exams, thus he must somehow perceive the urgency of the situation.

In the previous paragraph keywords have been described as words or expressions having the main property of triggering inferences from sets of information present in the common ground that 1. interest the subjects involved in the communication and 2. are relevant for the achievement of the shared goal that defines the joint activity in which the subjects are participants.

The key expressions (in bold in the text) reword in different ways the fact that the lump has grown, at the same time mitigating this information by the use of adverbs (*ulteriormente*), adverbial phrases (*un po'*) and a diminutive (*accertamentino*) (Caffi 2007). According to the description given in the previous paragraph, the ones in bold can be considered as key expressions for the relevance of the inferences they trigger – or of the scenarios they evoke – both at the interpersonal and institutional level. The scenario evoked by the doctor is one in which an (unknown) object has unexpectedly grown. This image is implicitly linked to the following argument: tumors generally grow, this lump has grown, this could be a tumor. In order to prevent the patient from panicking (coordination at the institutional level: to achieve the shared goal the patient's cooperation is needed), the doctor's words merely evoke this reasoning focusing only on the concept of *unexpected growth*. For the same reason this concept is expressed with mitigated forms. The second, but more relevant, reason for doing more exams is that the nature of the lump is still unknown. Stressing this could impinge on the patient's perception of the doctor's authority, thus affecting the interpersonal level of the interaction. For this reason the doctor only briefly mentions the fact once and does not come back to it during the course of the whole consultation.

This strategy aims at coordinating the patient's expectations with the doctor's, by finding a balance between the need to tell the truth and the need to prevent the patient from panicking. Also, it is likely that the patient would have come to the doctor expecting to have a diagnosis and a therapy. This expectation needs to be adjusted to the fact that no certain diagnosis is possible yet.

The chosen keywords evoke a scenario in which something unknown is growing and this is referred to as a risk, thus the nature of the growing object must be ascertained. This scenario is likely to belong to the common ground of both doctor and patient, to interest both doctor and patient and to be relevant for the achievement of the shared goal of finding a solution for the patient's illness[10].

It is not by accident that in this passage the keywords and key expressions coincide with the wording of the argument used to support the doctor's standpoint. This is due to the persuasive aim and argumentative structure of the passage. The way keywords and key expressions evoke scenarios or frames is closely linked to the kind of text they appear in. In a persuasive text, this will happen in accordance with the text's argumentative structure, which originates from the relations between a standpoint and the arguments used to support (or cast doubt on) it. The arguments are generated by corresponding argumentative *loci*, "templates" providing the general inferential structure of which each specific argument is an instantiation (Rigotti 2006). Each *locus* predefines certain possible inferential relations between standpoints and arguments. Thus each *locus* can be seen as representing reality in a certain way. In other words, *loci* can be considered too as frames, of an inferential kind. It is likely that keywords in a persuasive text, as is the passage analyzed in this paper, will coincide with the words evoking these frames, i.e. with the words referring to the *locus* the argument is generated by.

5. *Concluding remarks*

This paper addressed the issue of the analysis of conflicts in doctor-patient consultations by means of the identification of keywords and key expressions. This perspective seems to offer insights at various levels.

The description of the types of conflicts that can arise during doctor-patient interactions, merely drafted in the second paragraph, surely deserves further study. Indeed among the most problematic issues regarding doctor-patient interactions, noncompliance remains one of the most difficult to clarify. To interpret it as a latent conflict of beliefs opens up new possible lines of research that can be followed in order to understand this phenomenon. One of these lines is the one adopted in this paper, where keywords are used as conflict indicators pointing at implicit conceptual frames. The analysis proposed here is simply meant to exemplify this hypothesis; a larger research project is underway to test it on a much bigger number of consultations.

The use of keywords and key expressions is not a matter of lexical choice simply at a stylistic level: rather it has to do with the choice of particular lexical items that closely relate

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[10] It is also interesting to observe here that the use of keywords as coordinating devices in the argumentative phase of the consultation leads to an explicit agreement in the concluding phase, thus constituting an example of synergy between different coordination devices (Clark 1996).

to the institutional setting of the interaction, to the common ground between the participants, to their mutual commitments and expectations, and to the shared goal in the interaction. If considered in a cognitive perspective, a further line of research could inquire more deeply into the connections between keywords and semantic frames (Fillmore 2006); the same could be done from an argumentative perspective, verifying the possibility to consider keywords and key expressions as cases of strategic manoeuvering (van Eemeren & Houtlosser 2006).

The description of the communication context along the lines of the model designed in Rigotti & Rocci (2006a) allows to account for features described in studies conducted within the medical sciences. Thus it appears to be a sufficiently flexible model, and one that could be fruitfully employed to integrate in a coherent framework the various features characterizing interactions in the medical setting.

Also the connection between keywords and argumentative *loci* deserves to be further pursued. Explaining its dynamics in more detail could benefit current research on keywords by providing an objective method for the identification of keywords at the textual level. Moreover, it could yield useful observations for the training of clinicians: which are the most adequate *loci* to use in relation to certain typical issues emerging during a consultation? is there any correlation between certain *loci* and the phases of consultations? which are the margins for non-institutionalized talk in doctor-patient interactions? can the use of keywords be turned into a tool that can be taught to clinicians during their training?

These questions also pave the way for issues of a completely different nature: should clinicians' training in communication only be focused on skills, or should communication skills be set within a broader perspective on doctor-patient relationship? This leads to the problem of asymmetry, briefly touched upon in this paper, but deserving to be discussed more thoroughly: is it possible (or necessary) to balance social asymmetry? is it possible to do so merely by exploiting certain abilities in verbal communication? Teaching clinicians to give patients the impression of being empathic with them, but not training them to consider their social role properly hides a very dangerous risk: that clinicians will learn the 'tricks' of empathic communication, but maintain the asymmetric attitude in their behavior. This is sure to jeopardize the construction of solidarity between doctors and patients, as the latter realize the lack of consistency between clinicians' words and their actions. Therefore, a further point on which communication sciences could integrate research on communication in the medical setting is the construction of *ethos* in discourse.

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La Rhétorique du désintérêt dans le discours de Robespierre

Sara Cigada

> «*Ils nous accusent de marcher à la dictature,*
> *nous, qui n'avons ni armée, ni trésor, ni places, ni parti;*
> *nous, qui sommes intraitables comme la vérité, inflexibles, uniformes,*
> *j'ai presque dit insupportables, comme les principes*»
> (M. de Robespierre, Discours, 28 octobre 1792)[1]

Introduction

Dans les discours de Robespierre qui constituent le corpus «Liberté de la presse» (cf. Cigada *à par.*), nous retrouvons une vingtaine d'occurrences du lexème *intérêt* avec son dérivé *intéresser* et son composé *désintéressé*.

Le but de l'analyse de ces occurrences est de vérifier la sémantique de ce lexème dans le discours de l'Incorruptible, pour saisir dans son argumentation un élément significatif du point de vue de l'éthos.

Nous avons organisé nos remarques en suivant un parcours idéal qui utilise les extraits du corpus en diachronie, en soulignant tout d'abord (A) la dimension ontologique (on pourrait presque dire «métaphysique») de la notion d'«intérêt» dans le discours de Robespierre et le côté moral qu'elle acquiert par rapport à la liberté de la presse, dans l'argumentation sur les droits de l'homme. Ensuite (B), nous parcourons les passages où Robespierre construit et exploite la dialectique entre «l'intérêt général» et «l'intérêt particulier». A partir de cette opposition, il a été possible de décrire en (C) l'éthos que Robespierre affiche et son fondement discursif. Paradoxalement cet éthos ne se modifie pas dans sa substance au moment où, le contexte politique étant changé, Robespierre propose

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[1] Pour citer le corpus, nous utilisons une triple numérotation. La première obéit aux conventions d'édition de ces volumes en indiquant les éditeurs des œuvres de Robespierre (Marc Bouloiseau *et al.*), l'année de parution du tome où le discours que l'on est en train de citer est publié – date récupérée parfois à partir de l'Introduction aux volumes – et la page de l'extrait. Suivant les normes adoptées, les références concernant l'ouvrage se trouvent à la fin de l'article. La deuxième numérotation, faisant référence au corpus «Liberté de la presse», renvoie aux discours de Robespierre (depuis 1 jusqu'à 7) et aux lignes à l'intérieur de chaque discours: la numérotation des lignes n'apparaissant pas dans l'édition de Bouloiseau, nous l'avons idéalement ajoutée et déjà utilisée dans d'autres travaux qui étudient ce corpus (cf. Cigada 1999 et Cigada *à par.*). Toutefois, nous avons cru nécessaire de marquer aussi la date de la prononciation des discours cités, comme élément pertinent de l'analyse que nous proposons. La citation en *ex-ergo*, tirée d'un discours de 1792, serait donc: 'Bouloiseau 1958: 59. 4/517-520. Discours prononcé le 28 octobre 1792'.

de limiter de manière très sévère (c'est-à-dire par la peine capitale) la liberté de la presse au cas où elle s'identifierait à un intérêt particulier contre l'intérêt général (D). Dans le discours d'un locuteur particulier (tel Robespierre), l'affichage d'un éthos désintéressé cause donc la survenue d'un paradoxe dans le discours.

A. *L'intérêt et la liberté de la presse dans le discours sur les droits de l'homme*

Nous signalons tout d'abord que, dans notre corpus, toute référence à l'«intérêt social» (ou «public») comporte des stratégies rhétoriques soulignant l'objectivité, la moralité et même la sacralité de cette dimension. Dans le premier extrait que nous allons proposer ci-dessous, par exemple, Robespierre argumente à l'encontre de la pénibilité de la calomnie, en tant qu'expression extrême de la liberté de la presse, même quand elle est dirigée contre des personnes publiques:

> Mais une autre raison sans réplique semble achever de mettre cette vérité dans tout son jour. Rendre les citoyens responsables de ce qu'ils peuvent écrire contre les personnes publiques, ce seroit nécessairement supposer qu'il ne leur seroit pas permis de les blâmer, sans pouvoir appuyer leurs inculpations par des preuves juridiques. Or, qui ne voit pas combien une pareille supposition répugne à la nature même de la chose, et aux premiers principes de l'*intérêt* social? (Bouloiseau 1950: 329. 1/396-402. Discours prononcé le 11 mai 1791)

La nécessité de présenter les preuves appuyant des accusations serait contraire aux «premiers principes» de l'intérêt social, en ce que souvent un simple citoyen ne pourrait s'en emparer qu'en s'opposant aux puissants ou encore au système de la justice, corrompu la plupart du temps (la corruption n'est pas affirmée, elle demeure dans l'implicite, présupposée). La référence aux «premiers principes de l'intérêt social» présuppose en outre *l'existence* d'un tel intérêt social et de ses «premiers principes», auxquels il n'est pas permis de se soustraire[2].

La mention de la «nature même de la chose» renvoie elle aussi à une structure objective de la réalité, comportant la distinction morale entre le bien (l'intérêt social), et le mal:

> Obéir aux lois est le devoir de tout citoyen: publier librement ses pensées sur les vices ou sur la bonté des lois, est le droit de tout homme et l'*intérêt* de la société entière; c'est le plus digne et le plus salutaire usage que l'homme puisse faire de sa raison; c'est le plus saint des devoirs que puisse remplir, envers les autres hommes, celui qui est doué des talens nécessaires pour les éclairer (Bouloiseau 1950: 326. 1/247. Discours prononcé le 11 mai 1791)

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[2] Nous n'avons repéré dans le corpus qu'une occurrence du verbe *intéresser* dans le sens courant de *concerner*: «Si vous êtes de mauvaise foi, je vous récuse; ce que je vais dire vous *intéresse*» (Bouloiseau 1958: 51. 4/264. Discours prononcé le 28 octobre 1792).

Remarquons en passant la distinction entre «les autres hommes» et «celui qui est doué des talens nécessaires pour les éclairer». La description du «plus saint des devoirs» présuppose en effet une toute petite rupture avec le principe d'égalité, en distinguant les citoyens «éclairés» de tous les autres.

L'intérêt de la société entière est aussi l'«intérêt des nations», qui a encore un fondement absolu dans le trinôme *raison-justice-nature*:

> Les lois, que sont-elles? l'expression libre de la volonté générale, plus ou moins conforme aux droits et à l'*intérêt* des nations, selon le degré de conformité qu'elles ont aux lois éternelles de la raison, de la justice et de la nature (Bouloiseau 1950: 326. 1/252. Discours prononcé le 11 mai 1791)

«Les nations»: cette expression peut indiquer l'universalité de la Révolution (Robespierre en parle plus loin dans ce même discours, lignes 513 et suivantes, «Enfin faisons des loix, non pour un moment, mais pour les siècles; non pour nous, mais pour l'univers; montrons-nous dignes de fonder la liberté en nous attachant invariablement à ce grand principe, qu'elle ne peut exister là où elle ne peut s'exercer avec une étendue illimitée sur la conduite de ceux que le peuple a armés de son autorité»). Mais la mention des «lois éternelles» nous fait percevoir dans cette dernière occurrence un effet de sens différent, parce que les nations peuvent en principe faire une application «libre» (différente pour chacune d'entre elles) des mêmes lois éternelles[3]. Les lois des nations ne coïncident pas exactement avec les lois éternelles de la nature et de la raison, elles les reflètent plutôt, de manière plus ou moins fidèle.

La liberté est donc un principe de détachement séparant les applications (les lois des nations) du principe éternel (objectif, absolu), par l'action de l'homme «général»[4].

Le principe d'intérêt général joue toutefois son rôle en tant que point de repère de la liberté humaine.

Dans l'extrait qui suit, Robespierre utilise le mot *intérêts* pour faire référence aux grands thèmes «objectifs» de la vie de l'homme individuel et de l'homme en société:

> La liberté d'écrire peut s'exercer sur deux objets, les choses et les personnes.
> Le premier de ces objets renferme tout ce qui touche aux plus grands *intérêts* de l'homme et de la société, tels que la morale, la législation, la politique, la religion (Bouloiseau 1950: 322. 1/90. Discours prononcé le 11 mai 1791)

En conséquence, la loi et la morale ne sont pas le domaine où la liberté s'exerce de la manière la plus naturelle, mais, un peu paradoxalement, le domaine de la nécessité absolue, duquel la liberté de l'homme se détache par un choix plus ou moins conforme aux droits et aux intérêts.

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[3] En effet: «Le but et la mesure des peines est l'intérêt de la société» (Bouloiseau 1950: 328. 1/336. Discours prononcé le 11 mai 1791).
[4] Cf. aussi Bouloiseau 1950: 328. 1/351: «... les écrits qui inculpent les personnes publiques, peuvent-ils être punis par les lois? C'est l'intérêt général qui doit la décider».

Parmi les droits de l'homme, le sujet dont il est question dans notre corpus est la liberté de la presse. Toute limitation imposée à la liberté d'expression constitue selon Robespierre un outrage à la liberté absolue, ce qui ne peut être accepté que par des ennemis, aristocrates et antirévolutionnaires. L'argumentation est donc typiquement totalitaire: Robespierre applique la dichotomie entre les bons et les autres. La liberté d'opinion est effectivement bannie parce que le fait de ne pas partager de manière totale toute position officielle constitue *ipso facto* une trahison (cf. Cigada 1998: 163 et Rigotti 2005).

B. *Intérêt général et intérêts particuliers*

C'est exactement ici que la dialectique entre intérêt général et intérêt particulier trouve sa collocation. A l'intérêt public s'oppose en effet un «intérêt» (au singulier), dans le sens négatif de «attention exclusive à son propre bien, qui s'oppose par définition à l'avantage des autres»:

> C'est ainsi que toute entrave mise à la liberté de la presse est entre leurs mains un moyen de diriger l'opinion publique au gré de leur *intérêt* personnel, et de fonder leur empire sur l'ignorance et sur la dépravation générale (Bouloiseau 1950: 325. 1/203. Discours prononcé le 11 mai 1791)

Dans le passage que nous venons de lire, le jacobin argumente la liberté de la presse en accusant ses détracteurs de vouloir manipuler l'opinion publique. Dans un contexte semblable, nous retrouvons l'opposition explicite entre l'«intérêt particulier» et l'«intérêt public» (cf. extrait suivant). L'évaluation morale qui accompagne les deux positions opposées est tranchante, manifestée par les parallélismes entre l'«intérêt particulier» et l'esprit d'intrigue d'une part et, d'autre part, entre l'«intérêt public» et l'esprit général:

> Il sera donc désormais impossible d'élever la voix en faveur de la liberté, s'il est permis à quelques individus de substituer l'*intérêt* particulier à l'*intérêt* public et l'esprit d'intrigue à l'esprit général (Bouloiseau 1953: 323. 2/3. Discours prononcé le 30 avril 1792)

Tout en étudiant la notion contemporaine d'intérêt, Marianne Doury décrit une telle attitude morale comme tout à fait typique de la tradition politique française qui, «inspirée de l'idéalisme républicain et empreinte de jacobinisme, établit comme une évidence partagée que l'intérêt général ne peut se construire qu'*en rupture* avec les intérêts particuliers» (Doury 2006: 57). On dirait presque que cette remarque de Doury trouve dans les discours de notre corpus son origine et sa fondation argumentative. C'est dans ces discours de Robespierre, en effet, que l'idéologie de Rousseau (mentionné par ailleurs dans le discours du 11 mai 1791), par exemple, est appliquée de manière systématique par l'opposition des intérêts à l'intérêt.

La valeur négative du terme est également bien perceptible dans le passage suivant, qui réaffirme l'identification négative entre autorité et intérêt particulier (cf. quantificateur de «*quelques* hommes»), considérés tous les deux comme entraves au progrès humain. Par ail-

leurs, on remarque l'identification positive entre «la marche de l'esprit humain» et la nature (et nous observons encore ce côtoiement bizarre de nécessité et de progrès spirituel, d'où l'impression inquiétante d'un déroulement obligatoire et obligeant, qui tend à l'anéantissent de tout ce qui s'y opposerait):

> Avez-vous plus de confiance dans l'autorité, dans la vertu de quelques hommes, *intéressés* à arrêter la marche de l'esprit humain, que dans la nature même? (Bouloiseau 1950: 326. 1/226. Discours prononcé le 11 mai 1791)

Dans l'extrait qui suit, Robespierre emploie de nouveau le mot «intérêt» au pluriel dans son sens négatif, en le spécifiant par le complément «de la cour». Le parallélisme entre «leurs vues ambitieuses» et «les intérêts de la cour» souligne l'évaluation négative: dans le contexte du discours et de l'époque, l'ambition est un vice typique de l'intérêt particulier.

> Tandis qu'il [Lafayette] mettoit tout en œuvre pour la [la Constitution] modifier, selon leurs vues ambitieuses et les *intérêts* de la cour, il s'attachoit à persuader que les amis de la liberté, dont le seul vœu étoit alors de la voir exécuter d'une manière loyale et populaire, n'avoient d'autre but que de la détruire (Bouloiseau 1958: 46. 4/101. Discours prononcé le 28 octobre 1792)

Les amis de la liberté, par contre, agissent d'une manière «loyale et populaire». En nous rattachant à ce que nous avons dit à propos de la liberté, nous remarquons que discursivement «les amis de la liberté» se trouvent en quelque sorte «du bon côté»: du côté du peuple, mais aussi du côté de la nature et de ses lois, du côté de la vertu et au tout premier plan de la justice, du côté finalement de l'homme et de la société. Les autres, ceux qui ne partagent pas les vues jacobines, «déchirent le sein de la république», dans l'image proposée dans l'extrait suivant:

> Comment oserois-je dévoiler les desseins perfides de tous ces chefs de parti, qui s'apprêtent à déchirer le sein de la république, qui tous se couvrent du voile du bien public et de l'*intérêt* du peuple, et qui ne cherchent qu'à l'asservir et le vendre[5] au despotisme? (Bouloiseau 1950: 329. 1/381. Discours prononcé le 11 mai 1791)

Les «chefs de parti» se rendent coupables de la faute la plus grave: «perfide» est celui qui brise la *fides*, la confiance mutuelle qui constitue l'unité. Le «perfide» est censé être ami et trahit l'amitié. C'est pourquoi dans cet extrait, comme dans le passage suivant, les ennemis sont accusés de se donner les apparences de partisans de l'intérêt général pour mieux manipuler le peuple:

> Chez un peuple où l'égoïsme a toujours régné, où ceux qui gouvernent, où la plupart des citoyens qui ont usurpé une espèce de considération ou de crédit,

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[5] Le verbe *vendre* utilisé à coté de la métaphore du *sein de la république* rappelle l'expression «prostitution nationale», dont *L'Humanité* qualifie en 1950 la proposition de Robert Schuman d'associer la production franco-allemande du charbon et de l'acier (cf. Cigada 2008: 55 et 105-106).

sont forcés de s'avouer intérieurement à eux-mêmes qu'ils ont besoin non seulement de l'indulgence, mais de la clémence publique, la liberté de la presse doit nécessairement inspirer une certaine terreur, et tout système qui tend à la gêner, trouve une foule de partisans qui ne manquent pas de le présenter sous les dehors spécieux du bon ordre et de l'*intérêt* public (Bouloiseau 1950: 331. 1/481. Discours prononcé le 11 mai 1791)

Le couple «bon ordre» et «intérêt public» représente ici le déguisement positif de tout système contraire à la liberté de la presse.

Remarquons d'ailleurs la métonymie «égoïsme» utilisée par Robespierre pour faire référence à la monarchie: elle établit de manière très directe l'identité entre l'intérêt particulier et ce vice, particulièrement odieux dans le contexte des valeurs républicaines.

Très expressif aussi, dans le passage qui suit, est le recours au parallélisme «enchaîné par la crainte, ou séduit par l'intérêt»: l'intérêt est présenté comme une passion, à l'instar de la crainte, tous les deux empêchant l'homme (le juge plus précisément) de bien appliquer la loi à cause d'un lien qui lui ôte la liberté de jugement (métaphore de l'enchaînement), ou bien qui le distrait de son devoir (métaphore de la séduction).

Eh! Devant quel tribunal voulez-vous que je lutte contre lui? Sera-ce devant le Préteur? Mais s'il est enchaîné par la crainte, ou séduit par l'*intérêt*? (Bouloiseau 1950: 329. 1/390. Discours prononcé le 11 mai 1791)

Par ailleurs, l'interprétation de la sémantique d'intérêt comme une des passions se trouve confirmée par le climax dans cet extrait:

Or, que deviendroit la liberté de la presse, si chacun ne pouvoit l'exercer qu'à peine de voir son repos et ses droits les plus sacrés livrés à tous les préjugés, à toutes les passions, à tous les *intérêts*?[6] (Bouloiseau 1950: 324. 1/158. Discours prononcé le 11 mai 1791)

Préjugés, passions, intérêts s'opposent à l'exercice de la liberté. Le renvoi aux préjugés rappelle, en outre, que les passions s'opposent presque par définition à la raison.

Mais nous retrouvons aussi, dans le corpus, un usage d'*intérêt* différent de ceux que nous avons répertoriés jusqu'ici:

Chaque citoyen a sa part et son *intérêt* dans cette volonté générale; il peut donc, il doit même déployer tout ce qu'il a de lumières et d'énergie pour l'éclairer, pour la réformer, pour la perfectionner (Bouloiseau 1950: 326. 1/254. Discours prononcé le 11 mai 1791)

Ici, la volonté générale (qui coïncide en principe avec l'intérêt public) est morcelée en plusieurs volontés particulières qui peuvent, qui doivent même, participer activement à la vie publique. Ce passage appartient toutefois à un moment paradoxal de l'argumentation en

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[6] Remarquer la fréquence des questions rhétoriques employées par Robespierre, qu'il serait très pertinent d'étudier du point de vue fonctionnel.

faveur de la liberté de la presse. D'emblée, Robespierre affirme en effet que chaque citoyen a le devoir de faire tout ce qu'il peut, pour «déterminer» ses concitoyens à faire ce qu'il estime juste par rapport au bien de la société politique. En quelque sorte, c'est l'expression la plus explicite et violente que nous trouvons dans cette première partie du corpus, du droit que Robespierre réclame pour lui-même: le droit illimité à l'expression de son opinion mais aussi le droit de «faire tout ce qui est en lui, pour déterminer les autres membres de la cité à adopter les dispositions qui lui paroissent les plus conformes à l'avantage commun» (*ibidem*, lignes 260-262).

Dans ce contexte Robespierre semble exprimer une distance entre l'intérêt public, qu'il nomme ici «l'avantage commun», et l'opinion subjective que chacun peut avoir de cet intérêt («les dispositions qui lui *paroissent* les plus conformes»), d'où l'espace ouvert à la violence comme moyen d'action. En effet Robespierre affirme que chacun a le devoir de «déterminer» les autres à adopter ces dispositions: comme nous venons de le lire dans le dernier extrait cité, chaque citoyen «doit déployer tout ce qu'il a de lumières et d'énergie» pour éclairer, réformer, perfectionner…, à partir de son opinion personnelle.

Certes, Robespierre est convaincu que l'ordre général ne sera pas compromis par le déploiement énergique des volontés particulières, parce que la lutte génère finalement, de manière nécessaire, l'ordre. L'erreur n'est jamais définitive, elle constitue plutôt un moment de passage, obligatoire (du fait de la liberté de s'exprimer), et toujours soutenable, comme il l'explique à foison dans le Discours du 11 mai 1791 (Boiloiseau 1950: 325 et *passim*). A partir des réflexions menées par Rigotti (cf. Rigotti 2008 dans ce volume) sur les *side effects*, nous observons que la para-maxime de justification des moyens par la justice de la finalité de l'action («La fin justifie les moyens») devient intrinsèquement manipulatoire du fait que la finalité de l'action n'est pas en elle-même un paramètre suffisant pour évaluer la bonté d'une action.

C. *L'éthos de Robespierre*

Dans le corpus, la voix de Robespierre s'identifie en fait à la voix de la Révolution. Comme nous l'avons remarqué ailleurs (Cigada 2009 à par.), son éthos coïncide de manière systématique avec «la» partie qui n'est pas une partie quelconque, mais la seule partie exprimant véritablement la totalité, la société, l'intérêt public, le peuple. Quand il est obligé de présenter sa propre position, il s'exprime de la manière suivante:

> Aristide banni par l'ostracisme, n'accusoit pas cette jalousie ombrageuse qui l'envoyoit à un glorieux exil. Il n'eût point voulu que le peuple Athénien fût privé du pouvoir de lui faire une injustice. Il savoit que la même loi qui eût mis le magistrat vertueux à couvert d'une téméraire accusation, auroit protégé l'adroite tyrannie de la foule des magistrats corrompus. Ce ne sont pas ces hommes incorruptibles, qui n'ont d'autre passion que celle de faire le bonheur et la gloire de leur patrie, qui redoutent l'expression publique des sentimens de leurs concitoyens. Ils sentent bien qu'il n'est pas si facile de perdre leur estime,

> lorsqu'on peut opposer à la calomnie une vie irréprochable et les preuves d'un
> zèle pur et *désintéressé*; s'ils éprouvent quelquefois une persécution passagère,
> elle est pour eux le sceau de leur gloire et le témoignage éclatant de leur vertu;
> ils se reposent, avec une douce confiance, sur le suffrage d'une conscience pure
> et sur la force de la vérité qui leur ramène bientôt ceux de leurs concitoyens
> (Bouloiseau 1950: 330. 1/416-430. Discours prononcé le 11 mai 1791)

«Hommes incorruptibles», les vrais amis de la Liberté servent la patrie par «une vie irré-prochable» et par «un zèle pur et désintéressé»: en effet le désintérêt représente, dans l'interdiscours de Robespierre, la seule garantie d'un éthos acceptable. Toute manifestation d'intérêt, par contre, disqualifie irrémédiablement celui-ci.

D. *Les intérêts particuliers et la presse*

Toutefois, l'argumentation renvoie à bien d'autres implications en 1793, quand Robespierre peut disposer, parmi «tout ce qu'il a de lumières et d'énergie», du pouvoir. A ce moment, le principe selon lequel chaque citoyen a le devoir de défendre la Révolution l'amène à conclure qu'il est nécessaire de limiter la liberté de la presse, afin de garantir les droits de l'homme.

La conséquence la plus logique des prémisses évoquées par le texte, «chaque citoyen a sa part et son *intérêt* dans cette volonté générale; il peut donc, il doit même déployer tout ce qu'il a de lumières et d'énergie pour l'éclairer, pour la réformer, pour la perfectionner», apparaît en effet au cours d'une intervention de Robespierre dans laquelle l'«intérêt général» a évolué en se transformant en «intérêt de la Révolution»:

> Il faut même, pour l'*intérêt* de ces droits [les droits de l'homme], prendre tous
> les moyens nécessaires pour le succès des Révolutions. Or, l'*intérêt* de la Ré-
> volution peut exiger certaines mesures qui répriment une conspiration fondée
> sur la liberté de la presse (Bouloiseau 1958: 452. 6/6-7. Intervention pro-
> noncée le 19 avril 1793)

La faiblesse argumentative de ce passage est partiellement dissimulée par l'abondance des modalisateurs (*il faut, nécessairement, peut exiger*). Du point de vue des conclusions, en effet, Robespierre est en train de nier le droit à la liberté absolue de la presse qu'il a jusqu'ici soutenue de toutes ses forces. Paradoxalement, par contre, la *manière* d'agir doit présenter les mêmes traits vertueux qu'auparavant: immédiate, énergique, fondée sur la force de la vérité. «Cette confédération de tant d'écrivains perfides», «plus redoutable à la liberté que toutes les conspirations de la cour» (Bouloiseau 1958: 60. 4/564. Discours prononcé le 28 octobre 1792), devient dans le discours de Robespierre une des factions, c'est-à-dire un intérêt particulier qui s'oppose à l'intérêt général, à l'intérêt de la Révolution. «Jusqu'à ce que cette faction soit écrasée, anéantie, nul homme ne pourra être impunément vertueux. Sortez de la léthargie où vous êtes. Ecrasons tous nos ennemis» (Bouloiseau 1958: 571. 7/11. Intervention prononcée le 16 juin 1793). «Que le Comité de salut public prenne les mesures

les plus sévères pour arrêter ces journalistes infidelles qui sont les plus dangereux ennemis de la liberté » (*Ibidem*. 7/17).

En guise de conclusion

L'éthos totalement positif du locuteur coïncide donc avec l'absence d'intérêt (désintérêt absolu): il n'est pas du tout piégé par la passion, son attitude est exclusivement dictée par la raison. Tout en excluant le contenu effectif des arguments, c'est l'opposition formelle entre l'intérêt particulier et l'intérêt général qui garantit finalement la bonté de la position du locuteur.

Par ailleurs, nous remarquons que l'attitude de Robespierre se caractérise discursivement de manière très émotionnelle (cf. Cigada *à par.*). Il affirme même explicitement que son attitude est une attitude passionnée (comme nous l'avons vu tout à l'heure, les hommes incorruptibles «n'ont d'autre *passion* que celle de faire le bonheur et la gloire de leur patrie», c'est nous qui soulignons), ce qui semble, à nouveau, plutôt paradoxal: les passions s'opposent à la raison et l'intérêt est une passion pernicieuse.

Nous arrêtons ici notre analyse en signalant deux pistes à suivre, qui se complètent peut-être l'une l'autre. La première concerne la formation rhétorique des avocats de l'époque, qui n'exclut pas, bien au contraire, les stratégies émotives pour persuader l'auditoire (cf., par exemple, la partie de l'article de l'*Encyclopédie* consacrée aux passions, justement dans ce sens). La deuxième hypothèse serait plus théorique et consisterait à vérifier si, selon Robespierre, la position exprimant l'intérêt public est la seule autorisée à parler de manière passionnée tout en gardant son éthos – du fait qu'elle exprime la vérité –, tandis que les autres en seraient nécessairement corrompues.

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ARGUING FOR LOVE

FEDERICA FERRARI

1. *Introduction*

'Dialogic argumentation theory – research trends – our claim and methodology'

The rise of interest in the importance of emotion in argumentation over the last decade, has certainly thrown into question the once widespread myth that argumentation is in its essence rational. Within Argumentation Theory, the importance of emotion in argument is highly acknowledged (Walton 1992, 1996, 2000; Plantin 1998; Van Eemeren & Grootendorst 2003). More generally, if we look at communication processes, the importance and role of emotive dimensions in discourse practice (Lupton 1998) and more specifically in dialogue (Weigand 1998, 2003) is also claimed.

Whereof a first claim (emotion vs. rationality) can be identified within contemporary research trends on argumentation fostering emotions in spite of the classical prejudice against them (cf. Sapir 1921 as acknowledged in Kerbrat-Orecchioni 2000).

Following Catherine Kerbrat-Orecchioni's (2000) overview, within the foundations of modern linguistics a classical prejudice against emotions can be identified, cf. Sapir's line (1921). According to Sapir, emotional expressions are of no interest from the point of view of linguistics ("d'aucune intérêt au point de vue de la science linguistique") because they are shared by men and animals ("partagées par l'homme avec les animaux"), instinctive and individual and therefore not communicable (2000: 34). This position is largely supported at the time, although some exceptions can be found, such as within Saussure's structuralism, as in the case of Charles Bally, for the importance given to expressive language in so far as it conduits affectional thoughts. According to Bally, natural language is expression of life, life is characterized by emotions and emotions are therefore crucial in language. Consequently, emotions are to be accounted for in linguistics, whose goal is to reveal the natural nature of language, which is at the service of life, not aimed to build syllogisms, round periods, or to bend to the low of alexandrine. Another exception with respect to the general prejudice against emotions is represented by the Prague's functionalists, see Jakobson's expressive function and the idea of gradualism of expressive phenomena. They agree on the distinction between affection vs. emotion and on the tripartition between ideational, volitive and emotional elements. What changes is the importance given to each of these aspects (Kerbrat-Orecchioni 2000: 35-37). There are those who like Jakobson affirm the supremacy of the cognitive element, those who like Ullmann (1952) refuse to put the different func-

tions of language into hierarchy, and those, the minority, who give a central importance to the affective phenomenon (Van Ginneken 1907; Bally 1935 [1913] and Bréal 1976 [1897]).

Things begin to change in what Kerbrat-Orecchioni refers to as the "medium period": from the 50s, a certain empowerment of stylistics can be identified, together with the distinction between "intellectual meaning" ("sens intellectuel") and "affective meaning" ("sens affective", 2000: 40), the "connotation" and the roots for evaluation. As far as the study on emotional language is concerned, this intermediate period is characterized by developments within the domains of semiotics (see "les passions" of Parret 1986, and the linguistic acts theory). What is referred to as the "contemporary period" is instead characterized by an interactive perspective focussed less on the expression of emotions than on their communication. Excluding the realms of figures and tropes and of the paraverbal semiotic units (elements vocal and prosodic and gestual), research on emotions is nowadays divided into "lexical approaches" (cf. "grammar of feelings", and Ortony's perspective in Kerbrat-Orecchioni 2000: 45), "morpho-syntaxical approaches" (cf. Communicative Grammar, cf. Leech and Swartik 1976), "expressive syntax" (cf. diminutive suffixes with affective value, cf. Wierzbicka in Kerbrat-Orecchioni 2000: 46), exclamations, and so on and so forth; then we have "pragmatic approaches" (cf. Searle 1979) and finally "interactional approaches" (cf. notion of empathy and the principle of "reciprocity of perspectives", the notion of "involvement", "conflict", and its opposite: the notion of "conversational pleasure" ["bonheur conversationnel", 2000: 51]). This last trend of linguistics on emotions is the one where we collocate our case study here, and it can be furthermore subdivided into cultural variation research, cf. Wierzbicka, and the new interactive rhetoric and the question of politeness, cf. Goffman and Brown and Levinson (Kerbrat-Orecchioni 2000: 51-53).

In this respect, claims are also there now against the classical "strong presumption of the essential [...] rationality of human behaviour" and Grice's (1975) Co-operative Principle (Daneš 2003: 10).

More specifically, contemporary researchers on argumentation divide into those who strongly promote the "essential, if not unexceptional rationality of human behaviour" (Daneš 2000: 10), as it is highly represented by Grice's Co-operative principle and the conversational maxims (Quality, Quantity, Relevance and Manners), and those who, starting from empirical research, claim that "it is no longer feasible to base one's theory of communication [and as a consequence one's description of argumentation] upon unexamined principles of instrumental rationality" (Daneš 2000: 10, also in reference to Marcelo Dascal's work).

Focussing on dialogic argumentation, a similar argument has been also formulated by Weigand, claiming that "[h]uman beings are not only rationally and conventionally acting human beings: [...] amongst the principles guiding action games there are the Principles of Emotion" (1998: 39). For the first claim we have above identified within contemporary research trends on (dialogic) argumentation (emotion vs. rationality, *claim 1*), it can be implemented and specified into a second correlated claim that is: emotion vs. rationality and essential co-operation (rationality ~ co-operation, *claim 2*).

Following this short discussion, a chasm could be drawn for visualizing the variation in the definition of dialogic argumentation along the decades and according to different perspectives, ranging from rational to (vs.) emotional and from co-operative to (vs.) non (forcedly) co-operative, as follows:

(*claim 1*)   rational   non (forcedly) co-operative

(*claim 2*)   co-operative   emotional

Figure I

As it might be evident from the chasm, what appeared to be rigid theoretical positions are in fact instances of variation within a continuum. And in fact, as Walton (2000) points out, emotional thinking is no longer considered as the opposite of rational thinking, as well as, we would say, non (forcedly) co-operative behaviour does not exclude the possibility of a co-operative behaviour.

In light of the chasm, we claim that the issue has to be reformulated, as it cannot be addressed productively without considering the specific variation characterising the singular case, or action game, at issue. In fact, following Weigand (1998: 37):

> We do not communicate with single speech acts [...] Actions are always actions of human beings, i.e. they are not independent from the acting person. As such they include not only speech acts but also practical actions, not only linguistic but also visual and cognitive means like inferences. The minimal unit therefore has to comprise the complex whole of the acting of human beings who use all their abilities together in order to come [or not, we would say] to an understanding. This whole can only be the dialogic action game with human beings at the centre, which in its minimal form is based on a two-part sequence of action and reaction. [...] The unit of the action game rests on two major principles: the Action Principle and the Dialogic Principle. [...] The AP means that we communicate because we have specific communicative purposes that can all be derived from the general purpose to coming [or not, we would say] to an understanding. Action consists in pursuing purposes by specific means. Communicative action consists in pursuing communicative, i.e. dialogic purposes by communicative means.

In other words, shifting from theory to practice, in order to come to an understanding of the specific argumentative dialogue case at issue, or "dialogic action game" (as described in

Weigand, with the human being at the centre, which in its minimal form is based on a two-part sequence of action and reaction and reflecting both the Action Principle, and the Dialogic Principle), the question has to be reformulated.

More specifically, we claim that dialogic argumentation cannot be defined as essentially co-operative or not, but the chasm between rational vs. emotional and co-operative vs. non co-operative argumentation has to be reconsidered in light of criteria such as genre and context of the communicative setting (*our claim*)[1].

Having exposed our theoretical position, the question raises as to 'Where to look at' in order to better cast light on it. For we take the most representative, and yet the most unexpected case for argumentative dialogue and emotion: if there is a communicative space which is typically emotive, albeit not normally meant to be argumentative, that is 'lovers'[2] discourse', which we shall observe in the American Comedy of Love.

According to criteria of Genre (Swales 1990 and Giannetti 1990), we are then taking as our representative case a specific genre of dialogue, as lovers', within a specific genre of film (the American Comedy of Love), obviously considering film dialogues as a likely representation of real dialogues.

In order to provide quite an extensive account for the Context, we make reference to an integrated framework for analysis contemporarily accounting for the dimensions of dialogue, its participants, their relationship, their goals (action game with respect to the plot and characters' psychological developments).

This integrated framework, at least intentionally inspires our methodology, potentially implying various guidelines for dialogue analysis such as:

a)   semantic analysis, which we refer to as '*word and beyond*' level, accounting for keywords and metaphors;[3]

b)   pragmatic analysis ('*word and behind*' level), delving into features like assertiveness, implicitness, indirectness and ulterior levels of communication cf. Watzlawick (1967); transactional analysis is also referred to here, for the reference to notions such as 'stroke' (Berne 1964);

c)   social interaction analysis ('*dialogue as interaction*'), with reference to various theoretical frameworks, as for instance Goffman's (1967), or the dialogic action game (Weigand 1998), as well as various categories for analysis, cf. proxemic patterns (Giannetti 1990) etc... In other words, here the point at issue is generally revolving around the following question: 'do the characters want to cooperate or not?';

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[1] In this regard, also cf. Ponterotto's definition of conversation (2003): "conversation is a fleeting encounter of multiple perspectives, a fast negotiation of competing goals, a rapid matching of complex positions. Conversation is after all a subtle meeting of minds" (2003: 297).

[2] By 'lovers' we refer here to quite an extensive category of emotionally charged players, who potentially or actually are in some sort of relationship.

[3] For the use of metaphor in film dialogue analysis see Ponterotto (2003, 2005).

d)   plot analysis, or <u>*structural level*</u> cf. film genre. More specifically, for the genre at issue here, which we refer to as "American Comedy of Love", we have identified as characteristic of the genre three stages, such as preconditions, development, solution;

e)   <u>*psychological perspective*</u>, questioning hidden or unconscious desires, identifiable in light of freudian lapses, metaphors, proxemic patterns, eye contact, body language, plot development, cf. semantic, pragmatic, social interaction and plot levels of analysis.

A complete account of the framework we have just outlined is beyond the scope of the present article, and yet we hope that the analysis which follows, albeit limited and not exhaustive, can provide some evidence of the potential of such an integrated methodological framework and possibly cast a bit of light on our main theoretical claim.

2. *Two dialogic cases: analysis and evidence*

We are now going to take two lovers' dialogues between the same characters and within the same film (*The Philadelphia Story*, George Cukor 1940) taken at two very different stages of the plot. As we have already suggested, in the chosen film genre (American Comedy of Love), three plot stages or steps can be identified as characterizing it such as:

1)   preconditions (characters' description, situation description): 'Love' is hidden, characters' desires are unconscious, and their declared goal is another, not Love;

2)   development (action, characters development, characters relations): 'Love' begins to emerge, confusion, difficulties, eventually also discrepancy between goals and desires;

3)   solution and end: 'Love' triumphs, difficulties are over, love and desire find a perfect coincidence, harmony.

Not by chance, the two dialogic cases have been taken respectively from the 'development' and the 'solution and end'. A brief synopsis will precede each case.

As for the first case, evidence of the analysis will be provided through a parallel prospect table (Table I), accounting both for the dialogues extracts (left side) and the analysis evidence (right side). Capital letters and arrows are also used, in the analysis column, referring to the characters' names initials, and their communicative relations. More specifically, straight arrows indicate any sort of relation, where the sense of the arrow refers to who is the sender and who is the receiver of the singular communicative act, when it is identifiable. Diagonal arrows stand for ulterior levels of communication, in correspondence with implicitness. The various moments of the dialogic case at issue have been indicated as 'rounds', which not by chance remind of a boxing match, as this seems to be the communication style of the two main characters here, dialogising one another as two adversaries in a ring.

The scene is dominated by a triangle amongst three characters: Tracy, Dexter and Mike, who are related as follows (synopsis to the first dialogic case – plot stage: development).

The eldest daughter of a socially prominent family of Philadelphia, Tracy Lord, having divorced two years before from her first husband C. K. Dexter Heaven, is going to be married for the second time with the self made man George Kittredge.

Her childhood sweetheart, sportsman and alcoholic recovering ex husband Dexter returns after an extended absence, accompanied by scandal sheet reporters Macauley "Mike" Connor and Elisabeth Imbrey, who he agreed to accompany 'in disguise' to Tracy's house to prevent Spy magazine to publish some embarrassing information on Tracy's father Seth.

Tracy, though at first has nothing but contempt for Mike, gradually comes to admire him, and the same does Mike, realizing that she is more than just a superficial society girl. After a walk Tracy and Mike are going to have a swim in the pool when Dexter arrives...

Table I – *First dialogic case and analysis*

13 scene dialogue between Tracy and Dexter (and Mike)	argumentation: non co-operativeness Interlocutors: adversaries Indirectness (x says st. to z, which is instead for y) & implicitness (I say something to mean st. else) vs. assertiveness
D-Hello. T-Hello. Fancy seeing you here. D-Orange juice? Certainly. T Don't tell me you've forsaken your beloved whiskey and whiskeys. D-No, I've just changed their color. I'm going for the pale pastel shades. They're more becoming to me. How about you, Mr. Connor? You drink, don't you? - Alcohol, I mean. M- A little. D- A little? And you're a writer? Tsk, tsk, tsk. I thought all writers drank to excess and beat their wives. You know, at one time I think I secretly wanted to be a writer. [...]	1° 'round' T vs. D Supposed to be the subject of the conversation: drinking But the argument is taken from Tracy to hit the adversary on another level T ⟶ D How does Dexter answer to this? By hitting Mike[4] (indirectness: another character is taken as to hit Tracy, Mike, who functions as a metonymy for Tracy – structural analysis) T ⟶ D ⟶ M

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[4] Having realized that Tracy feels st. for Mike, Dexter answers to Tracy's stroke by hitting Mike.

D-I never saw you looking better, Red. You're getting that fine, tawny look. T- Oh, we're going to talk about me, are we? Goody. D- It's astonishing what money can do for people, don't you agree, Mr. Connor? Not too much, you know. Just more than enough. Take Tracy, for example. There was never a blow that hasn't been softened for her. Never a blow that won't be softened. It's even changed her shape. -She was once a dumpy little thing. T- I'm not interested in myself now. D- Not interested in yourself? You're fascinated, Red. You're far and away your favorite person in the world. T- In case you don't know - D-Of course, Mr. Connor... she's a girl who's generous to a fault. T- To a fault, Mr. Connor. D- Except to other people's faults. For instance, **she never had any understanding... of my deep and gorgeous thirst.** T-That was your problem. D-Granted. But you took on that problem with me when you took me, Red. You were no helpmate there. You were a scold. [...] T- Stop using those foul words. What are you trying to make me out as? D-What do you fancy yourself as? T-I don't know that I fancy myself- D- When I read you're gonna marry Kittredge I couldn't believe it.	2° 'round' D　⟶　T　　　M Supposed to be the subject: Tracy's look Indirectness: taking also Mike as an addressee; metaphorical meaning: soft vs. harsh. Ulterior level of communication: I say something to mean something else; Starting talking about Tracy's good look, Dexter wants to complain about her harshness in spirit: D　⟶　T　　　M Tracy's answer is taken by Dexter to hit her again Back to the first subject: drinking, metaphorically standing for something other than just thirst 2.2° 'round': Dexter 'goes to the point' D　⟶　T

That's why I'm here.
How could he even think of it?

T- Because he's everything you're not.

He's been poor, he's had to work, and he's had to fight for everything...

and I love him as I never even began to love you.

Tracy reacts by under-evaluating and criticizing Dexter

And then again by hitting him

D- Maybe so, but I doubt it.
It's just a swing from me...
but it's too violent a swing.
Kittredge is no great tower of strength.
[...]
But whatever he is, toots, you'll have to stick.

But Dexter answers by denying the accusation and not taking the stroke:

-He'll give you no out as I did.
-I won't require one.
I suppose you'd still be attractive to any man of spirit, though.
There's something engaging about it, this "'goddess'" business...
something more challenging to the male than the more obvious charms.
T-Really?
D-Really.
We're very vain, you know.
"'This citadel can and shall be taken, and I'm the boy to do it.'"

3° round: Dexter recurs to suasion, playing on Tracy's vanity (narcissistic trait – psychoanalytic view)

1   "you'd still be attractive"

2   Because of "this goddess business"

3   "Something more challenging..."

CLIMAX

But again the compliments are taken to hit Tracy's attitude as a goddess citadel:

T- You seem quite **contemptuous** of me all of a sudden.
D- No, Red, not of you.
Never of you.
Red, you could be the finest woman on this earth.

I'm contemptuous of something
inside you
you either can't help or won't try to.
Your so-called "'strength"'...
your prejudice against weakness,
your blank intolerance.
T-Is that all?
D-That's the gist of it.
**Because you'll never be a first-class
human being or a first-class
woman... until you've learned to
have regard for human frailty.**
It's a pity your own foot
can't slip a little sometime...
but your sense of inner divinity
wouldn't allow that.
This goddess must
and shall remain intact.
There are more of you
than people realize.
A special class of the American
female.
"'The Married Maidens.'"
T-So help me,
if you say another word-
D-I'm through, Red.
For the moment I've had my say.
[...]
D-I left you a wedding present. Sorry
I hadn't ribbon to tie it up with.
**[14 scene dialogue between Tracy
and Gorge on 'the True Love']**
G- Look what your friend
considers a wedding present.
T- Why, it's a model of the True
Love.
G- The what?
T- A boat he designed
and built, practically.
We sailed it down the coast of Maine
and back the summer we were
married.
My, she was yare!
G-"**Yare**"? What's that mean?   "Yare": Keyword for the social difference between Tracy and her future
T- It means, uh-   husband George, which is, following Dexter's words, "a difference in
Oh, what does it mean?   mind and spirit"
Easy to handle, quick to the helm.
Fast, bright.
Everything a boat should be...
until she develops dry rot.
Oh, George, to get away.
[...]

As Table I has hopefully highlighted, in the first case argumentation is managed according to non-co-operativeness, interlocutors are like adversaries and their communication tends to be indirect (x says st. to z, which is instead for y) and makes a large use of implicitness (I say something to mean st. else) in spite of assertiveness. In light of our analysis, along with the plot development this projection process will turn out to interest not only the way the characters communicate (indirectness, implicitness), but also the way they more generally relate to one another (Mike evidently functions as an instrumental character for Tracy to come back to Dexter). This is best represented by the model of the True Love, which appears at the end of the first dialogic case, functioning both as a premonitory sign with respect to the plot development and as a transitional object. In this sense, it is interesting to notice the way Tracy looks at the model of the True Love, which is a metonymy for Dexter, the transactional object through which the transition of the desire from hidden and unconscious to conscious and explicit will take place.

Shifting now to the second dialogic case, the scenario opens after the following happenings (synopsis to the second dialogic case – plot stage: solution).

Dexter gives Tracy as a wedding present a model of the True Love, the boat they used for their honeymoon. Tracy, confused by Dexter's and her father's words, gets very drunk at her engagement party and starts kissing Mike after a middle-of-the-night swing at home. The next morning, a very hungover Tracy does not seem to remember what happened the night before, but as Dinah and the others start to remind her, she becomes even more confused, when Dexter arrives...

Table II – *Second dialogic case*

26 scene dialogue between Tracy and Dexter	argumentation: co-operativeness Interlocutors: collaborative lovers (in the final scene they will become specular) Assertiveness
D-Doctor's orders, Red. T-What is it? D-Just the juice of a few flowers. It's a type of stinger. Removes the sting. T-Oh, Dext, don't say that. D-Why not, Red? T-Nothing will. Nothing ever can. I've done the most terrible thing to you. D-To me? I doubt that very much, dear. T-You don't know. D-Maybe I shouldn't, huh? T-But you must. You've got to. I couldn't stand it if you didn't. Dexter, what am I going to do? D-But why to me, darling? Why ask me? Why do I come into it anymore? Aren't you confusing me with a fellow named Kittredge or something? T-George! [...] D-Tell me, what did you think of my wedding present? l like my presents at least acknowledged, you know. T-It was beautiful. And sweet, Dext. D-Yes. She was quite a boat, the True Love, wasn't she? T-Was and is. My, she was yare!	

D-She was yare, all right.
T-I wasn't, was I?
D-Not very. You were good at the bright work, though.
T-I made her shine. Where is she now?
D-I'm gonna sell her to Rufe Watriss.
T-You're going to sell the True Love for money?
D-Sure.
T-To that fat old rum pot?
D-Oh, well, what does it matter? When you're through with a boat, you're through. Besides, it was only comfortable for two people. Unless you want her.
T-No. No, I don't want her.
D-I'm designing another one anyway...along more practical lines.
T-What will you call her?
D-I thought the True Love II. What do you think?
T-If you call any boat that, I promise I'll blow you and it out of the water. I'll tell you what you can call her.
D-What?
T-In fond remembrance of me...the Easy Virtue.
D-Shut up, Red. I can't have you thinking things like that about yourself.
T-What am I supposed to think when I--I don't know. I don't know anything anymore.
D-That sounds very hopeful, Red.
T-That sounds just fine.

Contrary to the first dialogic case, here the co-operation between the two characters is evident at semantic level (e.g. use of terms of endearment), pragmatic level (assertiveness, gestures, proxemic patterns), interactional level (turn-taking) and structural level (the conversation preludes to the solution, where Tracy and Dexter will find a new harmony). That is why no complex graphical schemas are needed to represent their communicative transactions (Table II does not account for a column for the analysis). Even the little shadow of disappointment arousing from the discussion on the name of the new boat is ultimately functional to set out the conditions for a deeper agreement between the two main characters, who will turn out to marry again in the end.

It is interesting to notice that the transactional object, the True Love's model, which functioned before as a metonymy for Dexter, functions again in the second part of this dialogue as to bring the desire to the surface (cf. the transactional object through which the transition of the desire from hidden and unconscious to conscious and explicit will take place) as to 'close the circle' and lead the plot to the solution.

3. *Conclusions*

Despite the limited scope of our analysis, we hope to have cast some light on some of our theoretical claims. To start with, provided that film dialogues are a likely representation of real dialogues, lovers' discourse can be analyzed in terms of argumentative dialogue. Secondly, and most relevantly, our main point should have here emerged in such as conflict vs. cooperation & rational vs. emotional instances are not intrinsic characteristics of argumentative dialogue, to be considered

as conversational maxims, but depend on a number of other factors affecting the characters of the dialogic action game such as their inner motives, their position within the plot and context. More specifically, the characters will be non-cooperative ('irrational') and they will perform non assertive communication (communication is played on ulterior levels: implicitness, indirectness), when they have internal conflicts (psychological dimension) and their motives do not to coincide (AP) – a case which is typically represented in a development stage within a comedy plot. They will be co-operative (rational) and they will perform assertive communication (pragmatic dimension, see Watzlawick) when their internal conflicts are solved out (psychological dimension) and their motives coincide (social interaction, AP) – a case which is typically represented toward the 'solution and end' within a comedy plot. If a framework for argumentation can be applied to love dialogue, the very nature of the genre at issue questions the reasonableness of a fixed alternative between rational and emotional argumentation as, following Weigand (2000: 16) "we are always different human beings interacting in the action game".

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EXPRESSION OF ANGER
IN SPONTANEOUS FRENCH DIALOGUES

CATHERINE MATHON

1. *Introduction*

In the field of emotions and especially in the numerous studies about the vocal expression of emotions, the corpus is a central problem. A great number of experiments are based on simulated emotional expressions with actors (professional or not) playing roles. This allows for a tighter control of the quality of the recordings as well as a selection of the emotion to be acted, and finally a control of the lexical content in the expressions.

Some studies are conducted on elicited speech under laboratory. It consists of putting subjects in situations that may cause an emotional reaction. In most condition subjects have to perform a specific task, which can limit the lexical content of the utterances produced. The scenarios vary according to studies. They may be based on a video game (Johnstone & Scherer 1999) or a computer task.

Recently more and more researchers have insisted on the necessity of using natural emotional speech. Some are conducted using multimedia data (Chung 2000; Mathon 2007). Some corpus is also obtained from call-centers (Vidrascu & Devillers 2005). This methodology allows scientists to work on "authentic" emotions. However, spontaneous emotional speech still causes many problems because of a lack of overall control parameters. Indeed, to obtain these data, there are ethical as well as practical difficulties such as:
–   the signal is quite often of poor quality, because of bad recording conditions;
–   the situation of speech cannot always cover a wide range of emotions; indeed it is often difficult to find a discourse type favouring emotion expression.
–   lexical content of the statements is not controlled.

This last point leads the researchers using natural speech data to take into account not only vocal features (i.e. fundamental frequency parameters, speech and articulation rate, high frequency energy, intensity...) but also segmental information and speaker behaviour.

Thus, I assume that in natural speech data, emotion is expressed through both segmental and supra-segmental parameters. A multimodal analysis is conducted in order to verify this.

My second hypothesis in this study is that male and female speakers do not use the same means to express anger.

The first part of this paper describes the corpus on which the study is based, and how the emotive charge of the corpus has been validated; it measures also the real influence of both segmental and supra-segmental information on emotion detection. Then, I present the results of a multimodal analysis, connecting pragmatic contexts, segmental features (lexical and morphosyntactic) and supra-segmental cues (F0 registers). This analysis reveals a difference between female and male speakers in the management of a conflictual dialogue; there is a strong relationship between the management of a speaker's emotion on the one hand, and linguistic (segmental and supra-segmental) strategies s/he uses to express anger on the other hand.

2. *Corpus*

The study is based on a corpus of natural dialogues recorded from a radio program. The radio presenter calls professionals and provokes a situation of miscommunication by playing the role of a client and asking something which doesn't fit the situation. Eventually, this miscommunication leads the victim of the hoax to express anger.

The corpus consists of twelve dialogues transcribed using Transcriber 4.0.

Table 1: *Characteristics of the corpus*

Dialogues	12
Speakers	13M, 14F
Speaker turns	765

The entire corpus was labelled with three types of labels:
- – N for Neutral State (concerning principally the speaker turns at the beginning of the exchange),
- – A for Anger (associated with a scale from 1 to 5, depending on the intensity of emotion),
- – OE for Other Emotion. This last label indicates all the speaker's affective states, which are not anger.

The labelling task, made by the experimenter herself and another linguist, consisted in listening to all the dialogs, and reading the transcriptions of the speaker turns simultaneously and deciding which was the expressed emotional state, according to the

conventions above. In case of disagreement, the speaker turns were re-evaluated until the annotators came to an agreement. The productions of the radio presenter were not taken into account since we assumed that his productions could contain a part of acted out speech.

Table 2: *Proportion of speaker turns by label*
(N = Neutral State; A1 = Anger degree 1; A2 = Anger degree 2; A3 = Anger degree 3;
A4 = Anger degree 4; A5 = Anger degree 5; OE = Other Emotion)

Labels	Ratio (%)
N	52
A1	12
A2	15
A3	9
A4	3
A5	1
OE	8

Table 2 shows the proportion of the speaker turns by labels. 40% of the victim's turns were labelled as anger, across the five degrees of the anger scale. Mild anger seems to be more present than strong anger, probably because of the socio-professional context of the dialogs.

3. *Perception test*

The labelling of the corpus permitted to select which speaker turns were to be tested perceptively. A pre-test was conducted with 5 French listeners of 81 out of the 765 initial speaker turns, in order to extract the 26 turns which made up the final stimuli for the perception test. The pre-test was useful to show up the presence of anger in the corpus, as well to verify the most relevant segmental or supra-segmental cues for the detection of emotion. The final stimuli were tested in three different conditions by a total of 49 French listeners:
  – in the first condition, 26 listeners could access both segmental and supra-segmental information;
  – in the second condition, 13 readers could access only the linguistic content of the speaker turns;
  – in the third condition, 10 listeners could access only the prosodic information. The segmental content of the speaker turns had been hidden using white noise.

The subjects task was to indicate if the acoustic signal they were listening to or the transcription they were reading (depending on the test condition) conveyed anger or not. If so, they were to evaluate the degree of anger on a scale from 1 to 5.

Figure 1: *Responses depending on degrees of anger for the three perception conditions*

Figure 1 shows the answers for each degree of anger of the three conditions studied. These results confirm the first perceptive annotations: mild anger is more often detected, while strong anger seems to be less frequent. Prosodic information underlines mild anger, since in the third condition, listeners chose more often degrees 1 and 2 of anger. On the contrary, linguistic information focuses on strong anger (degrees 4 and 5).

4. *Multimodal analysis*

The next step was to conduct a systematic analysis of all the speakers' turns in order to list the relevant linguistic features for anger detection. We focalized on three types of analysis:

1.   an analysis of the pragmatic context of the speakers' turns. Different speech acts were identified;
2.   an analysis of the lexical and morphosyntactic items relevant for anger detection;
3.   an analysis of the F0 registers.

4.1 Pragmatic analysis

The pragmatic analysis was conducted using both the transcription and the audio data with the help of Transcriber 4.0, that followed the course of the dialogues. Male and female productions were analyzed separately in order to verify if there was a gender difference in the

management of the dialogues. Figures 2 and 3 show the pragmatic contexts found in the corpus and their division depending on the speakers' gender.

Figure 2: *Proportion of speech acts (%) in male speakers' productions*

Figure 3: *Proportion of speech acts (%) in female speakers' productions*

Looking at speech acts in both male and female speaker productions, we can see that explanations and argumentations take an important place in their discourse. Male speakers also express threat and anger, while female speakers do not.

Figures 4 and 5 show the 3 speech acts: "explanation", "expression of anger" and "threat" in male and female speaker productions depending on degrees of anger.

Figure 4: *Proportion (%) of 3 speech acts (explanation, expression of anger, threat) in male speakers' productions*

Figure 5: *Proportion (%) of 3 speech acts (explanation, expression of anger, threat) in female speakers' productions*

We can observe that the proportion of "explanations" decreases in male speaker discourse depending on the increase in anger. On the contrary, the proportion of "explanations" stays at a high level in female speaker discourse on all degrees of anger.

In male speaker discourse, the proportion of "expression of anger" and "threat" increases depending on the increase in anger. On the contrary, the proportion of "expression of anger" and "threat" stays at a low level in female speaker production.

In the first degrees of anger, we observe that speakers, male and female, try to explain the situation of the call, in order to fit with the demand of the client (the radio-presenter). Male speakers also try to threaten and intimidate the fake client, while female speakers prefer to close the dialogues. Even in strong anger, female speakers continue explanations and argumentations while male speakers express strong anger.

The behaviour differences between male and female speakers concerning the management of the situation of communication are also based on different uses of lexical and suprasegmental cues.

4.2 Lexical and Morphosyntactic Analysis

The second level of the analysis consisted in a systematic review of all the lexical and morphosyntactic cues for anger detection (Kerbrat-Orecchioni 2000). All these features were assigned to different classes and occurrences were counted. The proportion of occurrences of each class of features in the different degrees of anger was calculated and converted to percentages.

Five types of morphosyntactic features were identified: interjections, disfluencies, negative forms, verbal forms in the imperative, and other modality orders. Male and female speaker productions were analyzed separately. The negative form is the most occurring feature for both male and female speakers and is present in all degrees of anger. Interjections are also present in an important proportion (from 23% to 39% of the speaker turns) but preferably in the first degrees of anger. Moreover, the proportion of imperative verbal forms increases with the degrees of anger in male speakers productions (from 17% to 47% of the male speaker turns). This last result may be connected with threatening behaviour by male speakers.

Lexical features can be organized in six classes:
–   words expressing anger directly;
–   words expressing anger indirectly;
–   colloquial words, since I assumed that a speaker who feels anger tends to use a more informal language;
–   insults, swear words, which imply that the speaker expresses a strongly negative emotion;
–   words that imply a closure of exchange;
–   and finally all adverbs or coordinating conjunctions which imply an opposition.

In male productions, the most relevant feature is colloquial words. Their proportion in male speaker turns increases depending on degrees of anger, from 2% (A1) to 67% (A5). A regular increase in the proportion of opposition conjunctions is also observed, from 6% (A2) to 33% (A5). The only reliable lexical feature for female productions is the opposition conjunction. A regular increase in its proportion for the female speaker turns is observed, from 9% (A1) to 50% (A5). Female speakers do not use lexical markers at all like colloquial words

or insults. They do not even use words that express anger, directly or indirectly. These results are connected with female behaviour observed in the dialogues. Indeed they prefer to explain and argue which explains why the proportion of conjunction of opposition is relevant in female speech productions. But anger detection in female productions implies that they use other ways than lexical means to express anger. Perhaps a reliable feature for female anger detection will be supra-segmental and this will be treated in the next section.

4.3 Prosodic Analysis

In this study I focused on F0 parameters. Intensity and energy features were not taken into account because of the nature of the corpus. F0 measures were extracted automatically with the help of the WinPitchPro software. This software takes the transcriptions and signal segmentations first made with Transcriber which assigned a layer to each speaker. WinPitchPro recognises all the layers created with Transcriber and treats them separately. F0 was extracted from all the speaker turns (at a time sampling rate of 20 ms).

The minimum, maximum, mean and range of F0 for each turn were statistically computed. The voice amplitude of each speaker i.e. the delta difference between the maximum and the minimum of fundamental frequency, was divided in four equal registers: Low (L), Medium-Low (ML), Medium-High (MH), and High (H). The F0 values of these registers vary from one speaker to another one. F0 means were calculated for each turn using F0 automatic extractions. Then each value was classified in the corresponding register. The proportion of speaker turns (%) was calculated for each register and each degree of anger. This method can be used to compare voices which are significantly different, such as male and female voices.

Just as with the pragmatic and lexical strategies, the results of the classification of speaker turns, depending on degrees of anger and F0 registers, were examined separately in male and female productions. Figures 6 and 7 show the proportion (%) of each voice register depending on each degree of anger, for male (Figure 6) and female (Figure 7) speakers.

Figure 6: *Proportion of F0 registers for male speakers*

Figure 7: *Proportion of F0 registers for female speakers*

For the first degrees of anger, the register used by both gender is the Medium-Low register. However male speakers also use the Low register, while female speakers prefer to go up to the Medium-High register. For both male and female speakers, there is a global increase of the F0 register depending on the degrees of anger, but this movement comes earlier in female speech productions (A3) than in male speaker turns (A4). For strong anger turns (A4 and A5), female speakers use MH and H registers, while male speakers stay in ML and MH registers.

The multimodal analysis showed that female speakers do not use any lexicon which implies impoliteness, or a direct expression of anger. Instead of using lexical information to communicate anger, female speakers use voice registers more easily. On the contrary, male speakers express anger by threatening and insulting the fake client. The lexical information, in this case is meaningful enough to communicate the affective state. It implies that male speakers do not need to use a higher voice register to express anger. Furthermore, they tend to intimidate the interlocutor. It has been demonstrated that intimidation and threatening need a low register (Demers 2003).

5. *Strategies of emotion expression*

Through the multimodal analysis described in the precedent section, it has been shown that there is some sort of a trade-off between segmental (i.e. lexical and morphosyntactic) and supra-segmental (prosodic) levels.

In conclusion, I will show examples of melodic curves, illustrating this trade-off between the two levels. Just as with the multimodal analysis, male and female productions are examined separately.

Figure 8 is an example of the melodic curve of a French woman's expression of anger (labelled as Anger 4).

Figure 8: *Melodic curve (WinPitch Pro) of a French woman's expression of anger (labelled as Anger 4). The horizontal axis is the time axis in seconds and the vertical axis is the F0 in Hertz (Hz)*

The content of the statement "non non mais non mais là vous vous comprenez pas", which can be translated as "no no but no but there you you don't understand", is not meaningful as far as the expression of anger is concerned. Indeed, considering the lexical content, there is no expression of anger, no swear words. There are just some conjunctions of opposition and negative forms. In compensation, the melodic pattern presents strong pitch variations with steep rises and falls. The F0 range is very wide going from 150 Hz to 500 Hz. Precisely on the last syllable the voice of the speaker decreases from high to medium-low register. Even in the lowest points of the melodic curve, the speaker voice does not fall under medium-low register.

Figure 9: *Melodic curve (WinPitch Pro) of a French man's realisation of anger (labelled as Anger 4). The horizontal axis represents the duration in seconds and the vertical axis the level of fundamental frequency in Hertz (Hz)*

Figure 9 is an example of the melodic curve of a French male's expression of anger (labelled as Anger 4). The content of the statement "non mais vous m'emmerdez qu'est-ce que c'est que ces conneries Monsieur" which can be translated as "you're pissing me off what are these stupid things Sir", is meaningful considering of the expression of anger. Indeed the speaker strongly expressed anger by using swear words. In contrast, the prosodic information seems to be not relevant. The voice of the speaker stays in the low and medium-low registers. The contour is quite flat except on "m'emmerdez" ("pissing me off ").

6. *Conclusion*

This study brings out the linguistic and paralinguistic speaker strategies to express anger, depending on the behaviour they adopt in a situation of conflict. It reveals a sort of trade-off between lexical and prosodic features.

Moreover, I found there is a gender influence in the management of conflict which influences the segmental and supra-segmental parameters the speakers use to express anger. This research shows a need to explore all communication features of emotion and underlines

the trading relationships between linguistic and paralinguistic (segmental and supra-segmental) features that are used to convey emotion and attitudes.

Modern technology should increase the use of multimodal (visual, acoustic, semantic, pragmatic) analysis in this domain.

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Emotions, parcours émotionnels et construction de l'identité de victime

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La présente étude s'inscrit dans le champ de l'analyse des interactions verbales et de l'argumentation. C'est une analyse de cas portant sur l'apparition et le développement de l'émotion 'colère' au cours d'une interaction se déroulant en milieu scolaire.

L'interaction met en scène deux jeunes filles de 15 ans, Kary et Amélie, qui se sont battues un jeudi matin en sortant des bus scolaires, devant leur collège, Kary accusant Amélie d'avoir trahi son secret. Elles sont convoquées par la Conseillère Principale d'Education (CPE)[1] de l'établissement afin d'établir les raisons du conflit et tenter de le résoudre.

Cette interaction fait partie d'un corpus de 7 interactions enregistrées dans le bureau de la CPE[2]. Nous nous concentrerons sur un extrait de 1 minute 44 (dont la transcription se trouve en fin d'article) qui constitue le moment le plus intense de l'interaction dans la démonstration coléreuse et accusatrice de Kary. C'est ce que nous appelons le 'pic émotionnel' du conflit.

1. *Cadre de l'analyse*

Les convocations chez la CPE sont occasionnées par des problèmes qu'il s'agit de clarifier et si possible de résoudre. Dans ce contexte, les élèves doivent s'expliquer et justifier leur comportement. Au cours de ces interactions, on voit le plus souvent se mettre en place les deux rôles de 'victime' et d'accusé', que les élèves essaient de s'attribuer ou dont ils se défendent. Tel est bien le cas dans notre interaction, où Kary cherche à se construire le rôle de victime d'une trahison, Amélie de son côté s'efforçant de se dégager du rôle complémentaire d'accusée et donc de responsable du problème. La genèse du conflit entre les deux protagonistes peut être reconstituée comme suit à partir de ce qu'elles disent dans le bureau de la CPE le jeudi matin:

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[1] CPE: Les CPE travaillent sous l'autorité directe du chef d'établissement et sont chargés d'un certains nombre de tâches au sein d'un établissement scolaire et notamment celui de la discipline et du bien être des élèves. Il s'occupe des élèves quand ils ne sont pas en cours.

[2] Ce corpus est actuellement étudié par Maryline Mathoul dans le cadre de son doctorat, *Vers une résolution de conflits entre élèves: analyse interactionnelle d'une situation de médiation au collège*, Université Lumière Lyon 2.

Contexte	Kary a un petit ami, M. Kary et Amélie sont copines	Antérieur au mercredi
Rupture	Kary quitte M. Kary confie à Amélie qu'elle a un autre petit ami	
Evt. déclencheur	Amélie révèle le secret à M.	
Incident 1	M. fait des scandales auprès de Kary	mercredi
Incident 2, cause de la convocation	Kary et Amélie se battent devant le collège	jeudi
Interaction	**Les jeunes filles s'expliquent devant la CPE**	**jeudi**

1.1 La situation trilogale de la convocation

Le fait que les deux élèves doivent s'expliquer devant un tiers transforme leur situation initialement duale (situation conflictuelle allant jusqu'à la bagarre dans notre cas) en une situation trilogale censée permettre d'avancer vers la résolution du conflit:

> Les interactions constituant ce que nous appellerons le 'conflit primaire' ont échoué. Les discours antagonistes restés bloqués n'ont pas permis d'aboutir à une décision nécessaire. Comment dépasser cet échec? On pourrait imaginer bien des solutions. La technique ici mise en œuvre peut se décrire comme un changement de cadre participatif. On va publier le conflit qu'on ne peut résoudre, ouvrir le dialogue privé à des discours tiers qui vont le travailler et le faire évoluer: tout se passe comme s'il y avait des choses qu'on ne pouvait dire à l'adversaire que devant des tiers (Plantin 1995: 111).

Cette nouvelle situation engendre de nouvelles contraintes ainsi que des 'jeux' d'alliance voire de coalition entre les participants. Il peut par exemple arriver que la CPE, en questionnant l'élève accusé, établisse un scénario contraire à celui que la victime a rapporté. Elle se rallie alors du côté de l'accusé initial qui devient victime à son tour.

1.2 Emotions et parcours émotionnels

Nous étudierons la colère de Kary, qui se dit victime de la trahison de son amie Amélie. Notre cadre d'analyse a été développé dans les travaux conduits depuis plusieurs années à Lyon sur d'analyse de l'expression, de la construction et de la gestion des émotions ordinaires (Cosnier 1994). La méthode d'analyse a été développée dans Plantin (1998); Plantin, Doury & Traverso (éds. 2000); Traverso (2000); Plantin, Traverso & Vosghanian (2008). L'émotion, ici la colère, n'est pas abordée comme un état qui aurait été déclenché chez un certain individu par un certain événement (tel que ceux que nous avons reconstitués dans le tableau ci-dessus), dont cet individu serait la proie et qu'il manifesterait, mais comme un processus interactionnel, c'est-à-dire d'une part comme quelque chose qui se met en place et qui évolue dans le temps de l'interaction et d'autre part comme une co-construction à laquelle tous les participants contribuent. Le terme 'parcours émotionnel' cherche à traduire cette conception à la fois évolutive et interactionnelle

de l'émotion. Dans cette interaction de surcroît, ce processus de construction collective des émotions s'intègre très fortement dans celui de construction des identités de victime et d'accusé. Sur le plan méthodologique, étudier la construction de la colère de Kary implique non seulement d'étudier les contributions des autres participantes à cette construction, mais aussi de prendre en compte les parcours émotionnels des autres participantes.

Dans le schéma ci-dessous, nous avons représenté d'une part le parcours émotionnel de Kary, qui 'plonge' vers des émotions négatives de type 'colère' de plus en plus intenses dans son interaction avec Amélie, et de type 'plainte' vis à vis de la CPE ainsi que le parcours d'Amélie. D'autre part, le parcours émotionnel de la CPE, qui reste stable et ne manifeste pratiquement aucune émotion.

Le parcours émotionnel d'un acteur (ou 'lieu psychologique') est défini comme la succession des états émotionnels assignables par lesquels il passe au cours d'un événement communicationnel. Nous nous proposons de montrer que dans cette interaction trilogale le 'sujet ému' est divisé selon que son partenaire interactionnel est sa camarade élève, relation où prédomine la colère, ou la CPE, vis-à-vis de laquelle elle affiche de la plainte. L'émotion est donc à attribuer non pas à une personne mais à une position dans l'interaction.

L'extrait se compose de deux étapes, chacune constituée de deux phases. La première étape est celle de l'aveu (Amélie reconnaît avoir parlé du nouveau copain de Kary à l'ex-) (Schéma 1.1); elle est constituée d'une phase 'ça va pas' (l. 235 à 254) puis d'une phase de démonstration de pleurs (l. 255 à 276). La deuxième étape est celle de la dispute (Schéma 1.2), et elle est constituée d'une phase de démonstration de colère (l. 277 à 298) puis d'une phase de retour au calme (l.299 à la fin de l'extrait). La courbe générale descendante de ces parcours représente une évolution vers des émotions de plus en plus négatives jusqu'au retour au calme.

Schéma 1.1: *Pic interactionnel: étape de l'aveu*

Schéma 1.2: *Pic interactionnel: étape de la dispute*

2. *Analyse des parcours*

Trois aspects de l'apparition et du développement de la colère sont particulièrement frappants dans cette interaction.

2.1 Variations émotionnelles dans le parcours

Kary fonde son parcours émotionnel sur la succession de deux types d'épisodes émotionnels.
    1) Des épisodes de type tonique.
Pour Cosnier, les états affectifs de type tonique sont des:

> états affectifs [qui] se prolongent de façon continue pendant de longues périodes,
> formant un arrière fond, sur lequel évoluent les affects phasiques (Cosnier 1994:
> 80-82).

Tout au long de l'interaction, Kary tente de préserver son identité de victime en se plaignant de la trahison de sa camarade. La plainte est à la fois un acte consistant à se plaindre des agissements d'Amélie à la CPE[3], et une émotion, c'est-à-dire «l'expression de la douleur d'un être hu-

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[3] La situation de médiation mise en place au cours de la convocation chez la CPE a pour effet que la plainte est à la fois (ou successivement) un acte adressé à quelqu'un à propos d'une autre personne en présence de cette

main. Expression de la peine, de la douleur par des cris, des gémissements» (TLFI), comme on peut le voir dans la phase 'ça va pas' quand Kary énonce «<(p)'tain ça me rend maLAde là>» (l. 247), ou bien encore dans la phase 'colère' lorsqu'elle répond à Amélie à propos de l'ancien petit ami (qui menaçait de se suicider): «j' PLEURE parce qu'il en est capable» (l. 290).

Qu'elle parle à la CPE dans le premier cas ou qu'elle se dispute dans le second cas, elle se plaint constamment de la gravité de la trahison et de ses conséquences: la peur qu'elle a éprouvée la veille au soir en étant obligée de sortir la nuit pour chercher M. qui menaçait de se suicider et restait introuvable. Enfin, elle se plaint de ne pas avoir dormi à cause de cette peur (peur de la violence de M., ce qui apparaît plus tard dans l'interaction), comme on le voit dans la phase 'colère': «moi j'ai rien dormi/(.)jusqu'à dix heures hier j'étais dans la rue» (l. 294-295 de la transcription). La plainte est la conséquence de plusieurs événements qui se sont succédé et ont entraîné en cascade une série de 'peurs' plus ou moins intenses et longues. Par moments, cette plainte semble 'dominée' par un autre type d'expression émotionnelle: la colère. Dans ces cas-là, la colère envahit l'espace interactionnel mais ne masque pas totalement la plainte.

Remarque: Les zones interactionnelles où l'on observe l'expression de la peur sont plutôt organisées sous forme de récits événementiels tandis que l'expression de la colère s'observe surtout lors de zones interactionnelles pendant lesquelles les interlocutrices échangent des propos et se disputent. La peur est une émotion relative au passé (ce qui a eu lieu la veille), c'est une émotion racontée tandis que la colère est, dirons-nous, une émotion situationnelle, qui s'exprime *in situ*. La plainte reste présente en continu, c'est une émotion transversale.

2) Des épisodes de type phasique.

Les affects phasiques sont:

> 'des moments émotionnels privilégiés, apparaissant bien souvent en courtes phases, accompagnés de paroles, de mimiques et de gestes produits soit par le sujet, soit par son partenaire'. Ce sont des 'micros émotions de base'. Ces émotions passagères sont étroitement liées à ce qui se passe au cours de l'interaction (*ibidem*).

Les manifestations de la colère, «vive émotion de l'âme se traduisant par une violente réaction physique et psychique» (TLFI), apparaissent de façon ponctuelle, lors d'épisodes interactionnels courts et intenses qui s'essoufflent vite pour laisser de nouveau la place à des épisodes de récits, de questionnements de la CPE, de mise au point etc. Les épisodes coléreux sont suivis d'un long silence, sans doute nécessaire pour 'reprendre ses esprits'. C'est le cas pour la phase 'colère' de l'extrait. Cela dit, on note certains indices relatifs à la colère avant la phase 'colère' proprement dite. Par exemple lorsque, dans la phase 'ça va pas', Kary demande à sa camarade «t'étais obligée/ d` confirmer/ toi\ (0.8) t'étais obligée d` dire oui\»

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personne et un acte adressé directement à celui ou celle dont on se plaint. L'opposition traditionnellement établie entre «direct complaint» et «indirect complaint» (voir par exemple Drew 1998, Dersley & Wootton 2000, Heinneman & Traverso (éds.), à paraître) est ici non opérationnelle.

(l. 239-240), tour de parole dans lequel on peut noter, outre la répétition, les intonations extrêmement marquées. De même, dans la phase des pleurs, le ton monte, comme l'indique la prosodie plus marquée sur «obligée» lorsque Kary repose la même question «ben t'étais <(C)OBLIGEE//>» (l. 245). La colère domine la phase suivante, puis s'apaise dans la dernière phase où les manifestations de la colère ont complètement disparu.

On observe donc une forme de colère contenue dans les deux premières phases et une grosse colère dans la troisième phase (ce développement retardé de la colère a des causes interactionnelles que nous présentons ci-dessous, 2.2). On note que la véritable colère est bien circonscrite dans l'organisation temporelle de l'interaction, dans une phase de forte accusation. La colère monte, explose puis s'essouffle. On assiste ainsi à ce que Cosnier appelle une interférence entre les affects toniques et phasiques:

> sur ce fond 'tonique' évoluent les affects phasiques avec lesquels ils ne sont pas incompatibles et ils peuvent même interférer: il peut arriver ainsi que tel affect phasique modifie l'affect tonique sous-jacent, provoquant un 'déblocage' ou le contraire. Ce sont les 'tournants de la conversation' (*ibidem*).

2.2 Des parcours émotionnels construits en fonction des interlocuteurs

Comme on l'a vu, c'est dans le cadre complexe d'un trilogue que Kary doit défendre son identité de victime. Ainsi, lorsque Kary raconte son histoire à la CPE, Amélie devient le témoin de l'échange. A l'inverse, quand elle s'adresse à Amélie, c'est la CPE qui devient le tiers témoin. Dans ce cadre participatif trilogal et asymétrique, on observe que la victime construit différent son identité face à ces deux interlocutrices.

La colère se développe exclusivement dans des passages de dialogue élève/élève. On peut supposer que d'une part Kary n'éprouve pas de colère contre la CPE et n'a pas de raison de lui faire subir sa colère. D'autre part, le statut de la CPE empêche le développement de cette colère: si l'élève se met à parler de façon coléreuse à la CPE, il y a de bonnes chances pour que cette dernière la remette à sa place. Kary perdrait sans doute ainsi l'écoute et l'attention de la CPE, ce qui n'est pas dans son intérêt. La 'stratégie' interactionnelle de Kary consiste donc à faire montre de sa colère devant la CPE pendant qu'elle dialogue avec sa camarade et de n'afficher que de la plainte quand elle dialogue devant sa camarade avec la CPE. Il est en revanche de son intérêt d'exprimer pleinement sa colère face à sa camarade et devant la CPE afin que la trahison d'Amélie soit considérée comme un fait grave ayant eu des conséquences émotionnellement lourdes. La colère exprimée fonctionne comme une forme de preuve de la gravité des faits.

On observe donc la construction de deux parcours émotionnels pour deux interlocutrices différentes. La colère face à Amélie et la plainte face à la CPE, sachant que de toutes les façons, même dans les dialogues coléreux, Kary continue de se plaindre de l'attitude d'Amélie.

Pourtant, si Kary ne se met pas en colère face à la CPE, force est de constater que l'organisation interactionnelle de tous les participants joue un rôle déterminant dans le développement ou non de certaines émotions.

2.3 Construction des émotions et rôles interactionnels

L'étude détaillée de l'expression de la colère montre clairement comment Kary met en scène ses émotions en fonction du rôle interactionnel joué par ses interlocuteurs. Nous observerons deux aspects de la colère: celle qui ne se développe pas et celle qui se développe.

1) La colère qui ne se développe pas.
Dans la phase 'ça va pas', Kary demande à sa camarade si elle était obligée de confirmer les propos de M. Cette question fonctionne comme un reproche implicite. En guise de réponse, Amélie oriente l'interaction vers le parcours interactionnel du reproche et non de la question en demandant un arrêt de ces reproches avec «ben c'est bon/ ça va/» (l. 242) qui est à comprendre comme 'ça suffit, ce que j'ai fait n'est pas si grave, cesse de m'en faire le reproche'. C'est une forme de minimisation des faits. Amélie adopte une stratégie de contournement voire de retardement de l'accusation et par conséquent le retardement de la colère de sa camarade. Cette stratégie fonctionne puisque nous n'avons ici qu'une prémisse de colère et pas de développement coléreux de la victime. En effet, le premier énoncé «t'étais obligée de dire oui» ne suscite pas de développement interactionnel coléreux comme c'est le cas par la suite lorsque Kary réitère cette accusation.

Plus loin, lorsque la CPE intervient en disant «elle en a besoin Kary» (l. 246), elle évoque une identité maladive et plaintive de la victime, à laquelle Kary adhère aussitôt avec son énoncé de la ligne 248: «ça me rend malade». Cette intervention de la CPE ne laisse pas de place, interactionnellement parlant, pour le développement de la colère. On est passé à autre chose.

On voit dans ces deux passages comment le développement de la colère avorte par le jeu interactionnel des trois locutrices. Amélie l'accusée se débrouille pour ne pas répondre aux questions, évite le sujet, la CPE suggère une identité plaintive sur laquelle Kary la victime s'appuie.

Le même phénomène se retrouve plus loin, lorsque la CPE fait le point sur la situation et énonce elle-même ce qui a dû se passer la veille: «Menahen t'a d`mandé si elle avait un nouveau p`tit coPAIN:/ et (.) t'as confirmé\» (l. 249). En réponse, Amélie acquiesce, et Kary lui demande: «t'étais obligée», avec une intonation plus marquée, comme on l'a vu précédemment (l. 255). Cette fois, non seulement Amélie ne répond pas mais c'est la CPE qui prend la parole et répond à la place de l'accusée: «non/ elle était pas obligée j` crois pas (0.3) elle s'est sans doute sentie obligée» (l. 258). Cet énoncé minimise la trahison d'Amélie par l'utilisation du modalisateur «croire» et de l'adoucisseur «sans doute». La CPE forme à ce moment-là une alliance avec Amélie, ce qui, compte tenu de son statut de juge-arbitre, pèse lourd dans l'interaction. Amélie de son côté se met à pleurer. La colère ne peut donc pas se développer et c'est une autre forme d'émotion qui émerge: la peine. Les deux ca-

marades se mettent d'ailleurs à pleurer, l'espace interactionnel est ainsi comblé. Aucune des interlocutrices ne développe l'émotion colère.

2) La colère qui se développe.

A partir de la ligne 265, la CPE se met en quête de mouchoirs. Elle laisse alors une place interactionnelle 'vide', ce qui va permettre le développement de la colère.

Au début de la phase 3 (l. 277), Kary s'auto-attribue la parole en s'adressant à sa camarade. Elle va développer le thème du suicide de M. (qui en réalité n'a rien fait). Les réponses d'Amélie seront d'ailleurs invariablement les mêmes: il n'a rien fait du tout. Les deux jeunes filles développent deux lignes argumentatives différentes sur ce thème:

–   Kary, la victime, justifie sa colère par la peur qu'elle a éprouvée devant les menaces de suicide de M.: «il fait laisse-moi crever en paix/» (l. 289), «j'ai rien dormi/» (l. 294), «y'avait pas moyen d` le JOINDRE» (l. 297).

–   Amélie, l'accusée, récuse systématiquement le bien fondé des accusations de Kary en expliquant que, dans la réalité, il ne s'est rien passé. Elle tente de démotiver une colère que Kary présente comme 'juste'.

La prosodie de la victime poursuit sa montée jusqu'à la fin de la phase. Si au départ elle pleure encore, les pleurs vont laisser la place à manifestation de la colère et aux cris. On passe ainsi de «<(p) toi t'aim` rais savoir qu` ton ex il: allait s` tuer/(0.3)» (l. 278) à «<(p+c)j` PLEURE parce qu'il en est capable>» (l. 290) puis à «<(C) ouais mais MEME//» (l. 293). De son côté, l'accusée ne suit pas cette voie, au contraire. La prosodie de ses propos monte puis redescend. On passe de «<(c)mais il est pas allé s` TUER/» (l. 279) à «<(C) MAIS IL A RIEN FAIT/>» (l. 292) et enfin à «<(c)xxxx là quoi>» (l. 296). Du point de vue du contenu des propos, on note que les propos d'Amélie sont de plus en plus incompréhensibles, tandis que Kary tient un discours qui reste très clair et audible. On peut parler d'étouffement interactionnel du discours de l'accusé par la mise en discours de la colère de la victime.

On observe donc dans ce passage que le retrait de la CPE du jeu interlocutif permet à l'échange entre les deux camarades de se développer, et à la colère empêchée et retenue jusque-là de s'exprimer. L'interaction plus ou moins libre entre les camarades laisse de la place à l'expression de la colère et conduit à un étouffement progressif de l'accusée. En fin de parcours coléreux, le silence ponctué de manifestations de pleurs permet aux interlocutrices de passer à autre chose, c'est la CPE qui prend alors la parole (l. 299) en s'adressant à la victime qui ne montre plus de colère, et se développe la phase 4 de 'retour au calme'.

Conclusion

L'analyse de cet extrait d'interaction a permis de montrer qu'on ne peut pas associer simplement une émotion et un lieu psychologique qui en serait le siège. En d'autres termes, on ne peut pas associer de façon univoque une émotion à un participant. On a vu que ce dernier est capable de développer (et de jouer sur) plusieurs émotions successivement voire si-

multanément. De la même manière, les fluctuations dans la construction de la colère montrent que celle-ci s'effectue de façon collaborative, en fonction de la tournure que prennent localement les échanges. On est donc bien loin d'une situation dans laquelle un individu en proie à une émotion l'exposerait ou l'adresserait à ses interlocuteurs.

L'analyse permet également de dégager des conditions d'apparition et d'expansion de l'émotion (colère) dans ce type d'interaction. Elles sont relatives:

– aux statuts officiels des participants (élèves/CPE);
– à leurs rôles langagiers: pacificateur ou opposant;
– à l'organisation des tours de parole: l'auto-attribution de la parole favorise l'apparition de la colère;
– à l'organisation du cadre participatif. Sur ce plan, il apparaît clairement que le retrait du médiateur laisse des espaces interlocutifs disponibles qui fonctionnent comme autant d'autorisations à prendre la parole et à développer la colère. On a également observé que le silence de l'accusé ou ses stratégies d'évitement freinent le développement de la colère.

En somme, ce type d'interaction montre que, dans certaines circonstances, les émotions comme la colère et la peine sont des phénomènes qui se définissent interactionnellement.

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Transcription de l'extrait

```
235   CPE   'lors maint`nant faut dire la vérité hein/ (0.6)
      AME   mais j'ai (0.5) j'ai=rien=dit/ c'est lui qui: qui parlait qui dit ouais/ j` suis sûr elle a un
            nouveau copain et tout\
      CPE   ah (0.9) et et D'Accord\
      KAR   t'étais obligée/ d` confirmer/ toi\ (0.8) t'étais obligée d`
240         dire oui\ (0.7)
      AME   ben c'est bon/ ça va/ (0.6)
      CPE   non mais [non                  ] heu tu:
      KAR   xxxxxxxx [ben non ça va pas non\]
245   CPE   i: il faut qu` tu joues l` jeu/ (.) Amélie\ (0.6) il faut qu` tu dises la vérité/ [elle en a besoin
            Kary]
      AME   [ben c'est c'est] c` que j'ai fait/
      KAR   <(p)'tain ça me rend maLAde là\>
      CPE   bon [(  .  )] il t'a d`mandé (0.3) Menahen t'a [d`mandé] si elle
250   KAR       [(.h<)]                                   [chri    ]
            avait un nouveau p`tit coPAIN:/ et (.) t'as confirmé\
      KAR   (.H<)
      AME   ben oui
      CPE   voilà\
255   KAR   ben t'étais <(C)OBLIGEE//>
            [ (1.2)   ]
      KAR   [ (.HH<)]
      CPE   non/ elle était pas obligée j` crois pas (0.3) elle s'est sans doute sentie obligée
260         [ (1.5)   ]
      KAR   [ (.H< ) ]
      CPE   voilà t'as la vérité\ (3.2)
      KAR   (.H<)=chri (0.6) Mmm (0.9)
265   CPE   et vous pleurez toutes les [deux  ] et j'ai plus d` mouchoirs/
      KAR                              [(.H<)]
            [(0.9)] à force d'avoir des élèves qui
      KAR   [chrri]
      CPE   [pleurent dans mon bureau/ <(r) j'ai plus d` mouchoirs\>]
270   AME   [(.Hh>)  (h<)                (.HHhh>H<)            ]
      CPE   [      (1.8)      ] heu: Emmanuelle [vous av- vous avez des
      KAR   [(.H< h> h> H<)]                   [      (.H< Hhh> H<
            9 mouchoirs/ (.) non/ [ (2.3)    ]
      KAR                         [ (.Hh< ) ]
275         Oui/ (.) s'il vous
            plaît\ ((bruit de chaise déplacée))
      KAR   <(p) toi t'aim` rais savoir qu` ton ex il: allait s` tuer/(0.3) pour une connerie//>
      AME   <(c)mais il est pas allé s` TUER/
```

280   [il a passé il était   ]> <(C+p)TOUTE LA SOIREE AVEC
      KAR   [ouais ben alors (.) attends/]
             NOUS heu>
      KAR   <(s) ouais mais attends l'autre i vient à Cerdon j` qu'à/- (s) j` qu'à chez moi/ pour m`
             di:re/ chri (0.6) que: ouais/ heu de:
285   que qui fallait qu` je le LAIsse et tout/ heu: (0.5) et tout ça/ tu vois et après en plus (S) tu
             VOIS/ il dit à ma mère ma mère elle dit ben viens à la maison et tout/ heu reste au moins à
             la maison c`te nuit/ heu vas pas m` prendre froid dehors/ sinon heu tu vas mourir/ quoi\
             (.) chri, il fait laisse-moi
290   crever en paix/ (1.3) (.h>) et <(p+c)j` PLEURE parce qu'il en est capable>
      AME   <(C) MAIS IL A RIEN FAIT/> (0.6)
      KAR   <(C) ouais mais MEME// (0.2) avec toi ça t` s`rait arrivé avec Dalois t'aurais flippé toute
             la nuit/ moi j'ai rien dormi/ (.)
295   jusqu'à dix heures hier j'étais dans la rue >
      AME   <(c)xxxx là quoi>
      KAR   <(C)y'avait pas moyen d` le JOINDRE/> (0.3) (.h<) (0.8) (.h> h>)>
      CPE   t'as fini par le trouver/
300   KAR   chri
      CPE   non/
      KAR   <(p)non\>
      CPE   donc tu sais pas où il est\
      KAR   <(p)ben SI/ j` l'ai vu là t'à l'heure/ il était d`vant l`
305   collège\> (0.8) (.hH<)=(.h>h>) (1.1) (°.h<°)

Conventions de transcription

SIGNES CONVENTIONNELS NON RELATIFS AUX PLEURS				
Signes		Description des signes		
Bien/	bien\	Intonation montante	Intonation descendante	
Bien :	Bi-	Prolongement	Troncation	
°bien°	<u>bien</u>	BIEN	Enoncé murmuré ou prononcé très bas	Insistance	Saillance
Bien=		Latching : enchaînement immédiat		
.h,	h,	Aspiration	Expiration	
(.)	(0.2)	Micropause	Pause chronométrée	
xxxxxx		Enoncé inaudible		
<xxxx>		Délimitation d'un phénomène		
[xxx]		Enoncé chevauchant un autre énoncé		
(xxxxx)	((xxx))	Enoncé incertain	Comportements non verbaux, co-actionnels	

SIGNES RELATIFS AUX PLEURS					
Signes			Description des signes		
(.h<)	(.H<)	(.hhh<)	Aspiration	Aspiration forte	Phénomène saccadé et répété
(.h>)	(.H>)	(.HHH>)	Expiration	Expiration forte	Phénomène saccadé et répété
chi	Chri		Reniflement sans larme		Reniflement avec larmes
<(t)xxxx>	<(T)xxxx>		Tremblement dans la voix		Tremblement intense
<(p)xxxx>	<(P)xxxx>		Pleurs dans la voix		Pleurs intenses
<(c)xxxx>	<(C)xxxx>		Enoncé en criant		Enoncé en criant intensément
<(s)xxxx>	<(S)xxxx>		Sanglots dans la voix		Sanglots intenses
(s)	(S)		Sanglot isolé		Sanglot isolé intense
(.h<hHii>(s)hhh<chri>)			Exemple de combinaison de phénomènes		
Hhou hiii			Pleurs vocalisés		

Strategic Use of Emotional Terms in Ethical Argumentation on Abortion

Simona Mazilu

1. *Introduction*

This paper is concerned with the use of emotional terms in ethical argumentation on abortion in an attempt to prove that the emotional or expressive component is a characteristic of this type of argumentation. In texts dealing with the issue of abortion one can notice that expressives represent a recurrent element in the moves exchanged between disputants in the argumentation process. This observation may underlie the hypothesis that expressives are not an accident but an essential component of ethical argumentation on abortion.

This approach to expressives is integrated in the pragma-dialectical theory of *speech acts in argumentative discussions* (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 1984) which accounts for argumentation as an *illocutionary act complex*. Therefore, ethical argumentation on abortion is viewed as an exchange of speech acts between the protagonist and the antagonist of a standpoint. This exchange of speech acts may be viewed as a critical discussion supposed to lead to the resolution of the dispute in case. One question to be answered in the analysis is whether expressives are used by disputants for their dialectical potential or for their persuasive effect or for both. The hypothesis underlying this study is that the main function of expressives is rhetorical.

Argumentation from a pragma-dialectical perspective is considered a complex speech act made up of various speech acts specific to each dialectical stage. The ideal model of a critical discussion provides a list of speech acts which includes *assertives*, *directives*, *commissives* and *usage declaratives* to be performed by disputants according to their role in the dispute as either protagonist or antagonist. The pragma-dialectical model views expressive speech acts, "such as congratulations, condolences, and expressions of joy, disappointment, anger, or regret" as communicative acts by means of which the speaker airs his feelings concerning a certain event or state of affairs" (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 1992: 39). Expressives as "expressions" of the speaker's state of mind, emotions or feelings "have no place in a critical discussion" since they "do not lead to any specific commitment that is relevant to resolving the dispute" (*ibidem*). Moreover, "expressives may sometimes be indirect speech acts through which 'primary' speech acts are conveyed that *do* play a part in a critical discussion. In such cases, they should, naturally, be taken into account in the dialectical analysis" (*ibidem*).

If confronted with the ideal model of a critical discussion suggested in the pragma-dialectical approach to argumentation, the several texts on the issue of abortion selected for analysis appear to lead to the conclusion that ethical argumentation on abortion abounds in overt and implicit expressive speech acts performed at various points in the discourse in order to gain the audience's adherence to a certain position. So, the high frequency of emotional elements is a characteristic of such instances of ethical argumentation on abortion. The use of expressives undermines the critical character ethical discourse is supposed to have as an argumentative type of discourse.

Disputants make use of various means of conveying and arousing emotions. These means range from the topical potential available for the standpoint at issue to vocabulary, from presentational devices to speech acts. Therefore, the cover term *expressives* will be used for all the elements that convey emotions in a text whether they are topics, lexical elements, stylistic devices or speech acts. The term *topic* (Greek *topos*) needs clarification at this point. From a rhetorical perspective, topics have been defined as "the general heads under which were grouped arguments for a particular subject or occasion" (Corbett 1971: 108). In other words, topics should be viewed as "a 'checklist' of ideas" or "as a stock of general lines of argument" (Corbett 1971: 109) that can be used in developing any subject. The notion of topics is taken over by pragma-dialectics in the form of "*topical potential* [which] associated with a particular dialectical stage can be regarded as the set of relevant alternatives available in that stage of the resolution process" (van Eemeren & Houtlosser 2002: 139). In this analysis, the term topics will be employed with reference to the different argumentative options disputants have at a particular point to support their position.

The analysis of expressives in what follows starts from the empirical observation that the degree of emotional attachment depends on the standpoint advanced by disputants: *Abortion is a crime / Abortion is not a crime*. Therefore, the standpoint is the key element that determines the choice of dialectical and rhetorical means which best serve the interest of each party in each stage of the dispute. Thus, pro-life advocates conceive of abortion as "an unspeakable crime", "a great moral disorder", "the deliberate killing of an innocent human being" or "a deadly sin" as opposed to pro-choice supporters who call abortion "interruption of pregnancy". The same terminology clash holds for the fetus, too. According to the degree of emotional commitment of the protagonist or the antagonist, the fetus may be viewed as "a human being", "a personal human life" or "an innocent human being" in contrast with "the result of conception", "a newly fertilized ovum", "a newly implanted clump of cells" or "not a person from the moment of conception". Behind these acts of defining abortion and the fetus in a certain manner, there lies the intention of the speaker *to condemn* vs *to defend* abortion as well as the intended effect upon the audience that is to repent, to feel pity for the fetus or the mother, to stir anger at defenders of abortion, etc. vs not to feel guilty, to have confidence in one's reason, etc.

The expressive speech acts discussed in the paper have been identified in text excerpts illustrating opposing positions on abortion and interpreted as maximally argumentative. As mentioned above, the central claim in this analysis is that the emotional component may

be viewed as an essential characteristic of ethical argumentation on abortion and that expressives are mainly used for their rhetorical potential to gain the audience's adherence to a position.

The analysis is structured in two main parts. The first part is devoted to a presentation of several linguistic means of conveying emotions related to the standpoint *Abortion is a crime* which is further divided into the "hard" anti-abortion perspective and the "soft" anti-abortion perspective. The second part deals with emotions related to the standpoint abortion is not a crime. Topics or argumentative alternatives available to discussants, stylistic devices, speech acts and lexical items are the main means of conveying emotions in this type of argumentation. In both parts, the focus is upon the vocabulary of emotion used by disputants in their argumentative exchange.

2. *Means of conveying emotions in ethical argumentation on abortion*

This part of the analysis is an attempt at making a classification of the various means of expressing emotion in ethical argumentation on abortion starting from the assumption that the choice made by one party is determined by that party's position towards abortion: abortion is / is not a crime. According to this opposition one may witness *expressions of disapproval* on the one hand and *expressions of approval* on the other hand. Thus, the party holding that abortion is a crime may express in his argumentation the whole range of emotions related to crime such as horror, rage, fear, revenge, punishment, grievance, suffering, pain, blame, torment, remorse, reprobation, etc. All these feelings are stirred by the central element in anti-abortion argumentation – the fetus – which is considered a human being.

The other party maintaining that abortion is not a crime is not expected to make use of emotional terms related to the fetus but to the mother who is considered aggressed by the imposition to carry a child to term against her will. Yet, in their argumentation abortion defenders employ terms deliberately devoid of emotion when referring to the fetus as "result of conception", "newly fertilized ovum" or "newly implanted clump of cells". In defending the anti-abortion or the pro-abortion position the choice of means to communicate emotions has major consequences for the whole process of argumentation and as such for the perception of each type of discourse as a reasonable or unreasonable one.

As stated before, ethical argumentation on abortion is an illocutionary act complex whose communicative dimension resides in arguing in favor or against abortion whereas the interactional dimension consists in convincing the other party of the acceptability or unacceptability of the standpoint abortion is / is not a crime. This illocutionary act complex is made up of various types of speech acts among which expressives occupy a very important place. Disputants' emotions or mental states are "exchanged" by means of expressive speech acts that can be grouped under two major illocutions: *disapprove* in the case of anti-abortion argumentation and *approve* in the case of pro-abortion argumentation. Interestingly, explicit expressions of approval / disapproval and of other mental states derived from them

are rarely used as such. Therefore implicitness seems to be the rule rather than the exception. Moreover, besides its primitive illocutionary force any expressive speech act has several secondary illocutionary forces which are manifested when the act is performed (Vanderveken 1990). Illocutionary forces are carried not only by verbs but also by nouns, adjectives or adverbs which express a particular emotion or state of mind. As concerns the perlocutionary force of these expressives, among the effects they have upon the audience one can mention guilt, remorse, fear, repentance, etc. in the case of anti-abortion argumentation and ease of mind, lack of guilt, relief, etc in the case of pro-abortion argumentation.

2.1 Emotions related to the standpoint *abortion is a crime*

Anti-abortion fighters express their disapproval of abortion by calling it a *crime*. In defending the standpoint *Abortion is a crime* they make use of a wide range of emotional arguments meant to convince a third party of the wrongness of this deed. In broad lines anti-abortion argumentation goes this way: Abortion is a crime because the one killed is an innocent human being. Who are the actors in this scenario? The mother is the murderer, the fetus is the victim. Usually, alongside with the mother other members of the social community such as the father, the family, friends, doctors, nurses, pharmacists or legislators are considered guilty of complicity in abortion. As a matter of fact, abortion is metaphorically conceived of as an act of aggression against life or a threat to life in general. In other words, by abortion, not only the life of an individual but the life of the whole society is menaced. That is why the most appropriate pattern or scheme of argumentation chosen to condemn abortion is that of cause and effect or facts and consequences.

As regards the topics or the lines of argumentation employed to defend their position, anti-abortion fighters manipulate opposing concepts such as good vs evil or life vs death. The audience is provided with two options: either do good by condemning abortion and this way choosing life which is conducive to their happiness or do evil by not taking a stand against abortion and this way choosing death which is conducive to their unhappiness.

The audience is therefore faced with two kinds of emotions: emotions related to the fetus which represents life and emotions related to the mother who represents death. In the category of emotions related to the fetus one may experience pity, sorrow, regret, pain, while in the category of emotions related to the mother there are feelings of rage, revenge, reprobation, blame, torment, compassion, suffering etc. depending on how the mother is seen as either a criminal or a victim of the social environment in which she lives. All these emotions are typical of the anti-abortion argumentation and are communicated by "hard" or by "soft" means. For more specificity, the term "hard" will be used for those instances of argumentation which lay heavy emphasis on the violence of abortion, on the tragic consequences of abortion for the child, the mother and the whole community. This type of "hard" anti-abortion argumentation appeals to the audience's emotions by means of extremely powerful imagery whose function is to reproduce the atrocity of abortion and make the audience repent, fear, pity, etc. at the same time. The term "soft" will be used for those instances of

anti-abortion argumentation which try to move the audience in a moderate manner by means of a mixture of rationality and emotion.

2.1.1 The "hard" perspective

Under the "hard" perspective heading three texts were selected that have certain characteristics in common: *Despre avort, cu Pr. Serafim Man (On Abortion with Father Serafim Man), Mărturii ale unor femei care au făcut avort (Testimonies of Women that have had an Abortion)* and *Scrisoare deschisă adresată dnei Aurora Liiceanu, psiholog (Open Letter to Mrs Aurora Liiceanu, Psychologist)*. These three texts consider abortion as a murder on the basis of the argument that the fetus is a human being. They argue against abortion in terms of facts and consequences pointing out that abortion is not an individual act but an act for which the whole social community is responsible. The question to be answered in the analysis is: What are the specific features of these texts with respect to expressing emotions related to abortion as a crime?

First of all, as instances of the "hard" anti-abortion perspective these fragments may be viewed as parts of a "documentary" on abortion which is not only informative but also instructive. This "documentary" starts with the definition of abortion from a religious perspective and the consequences of abortion for the child and the mother (*On Abortion with Father Serafim Man*). The second text contains the testimonies of two women who had an abortion. These two confessions are meant to have a great impact upon the female audience that could ever think of abortion as a solution to an unwanted pregnancy (*Testimonies of Women that have had an Abortion*). The third part of the "documentary" is an excerpt from a letter written as a reaction to a newspaper article drawing on abortion and family planning (*Open Letter to Mrs Aurora Liiceanu, Psychologist*). This letter presents abortion as a moral problem which generates violence and grave forms of abuse that affect the whole social community.

In what follows, the different types of emotions manipulated in the three texts will be grouped into several categories according to the effect they may have upon the audience.

> (1) Abortion is a double murder: first, against God who created that being, and then against that soul which, not being united with Christ by the the Sacrament of Holy Baptism, will be deprived of God's Glory, remaining in a dark place until Judgement Day when, by God's mercy, it is saved. But, on the woman there lies a great deadly sin. Abortion is one of the greatest sins which brings about God's wrath on us all, and for a woman dying while having an abortion is similar to committing suicide and according to the Church Fathers, the Church is not allowed to pray for her soul, this being a sin against the Holy Ghost. Abortion is a revolting sin and brings about God's punishment both in this life and especially after death. The immediate punishment is sometimes, even death; and later the impossibility of giving birth to other children, diseases on the other children or on parents, conflicts between hus-

band and wife and other forms of punishment. Sinful are also those who urge the woman to have an abortion – husbands, mothers, friends, as well as those who perform the abortion – doctors, nurses or pharmacists who provide contraceptives. (my translation)

Despre avort, cu Pr. Serafim Man (On Abortion with Father Serafim Man, www.avort.ro)

Regarding the emotional vocabulary used by the protagonist one can notice in excerpt (1) a mixture of terms related to the notion of *crime* and religious terms related to the notion of *punishment* supporting the argumentative scheme of cause and effect, or facts and consequences, mentioned before. This instance of argumentation seems mainly aimed at: A) a religious audience whose belief that abortion is a crime is once more reinforced; B) an indefinite audience whose belief is that *Abortion is not a crime*. Thus, terms like *crime*, *dark place*, *frightful*, *great sins*, *deadly sin*, *revolting sin*, *punishment*, *death*, *diseases*, *conflicts* are employed to stir fear. In other words, faced with such nightmarish imagery the audience is made aware of what abortion represents as well as of its consequences. Moreover, religious terms such as *God*, *Christ*, *the Sacrament of Holy Baptism*, *God's glory*, *Judgement Day*, *God's mercy*, *God's punishment*, *God's rage*, *the Church*, *the Church Fathers*, *the Holy Spirit*, *prayers* are meant to strengthen the emotional value of the first category of terms. Abortion is presented as such a grave act that only God can punish it accordingly. At the same time, these religious terms represent expressions of the protagonist's religious authority or *ethos* as a priest. Therefore his argumentation is supposed to enjoy the highest credibility before the audience. In a persuasive message as the text in point the mixture of concrete and abstract terms is not accidental. It creates what Kinneavy (1971) calls "persuasive clarity" which is quite different from clarity in scientific or informative terms. The audience is made to believe it has "a clear picture of reality" when in fact it is provided with a screened or filtered view of the reality.

The use of emotional vocabulary may thus be seen as subordinated to the major purpose of the argumentative text which is to convince the audience of the wrongness of abortion. Put simply, the expressive component of the protagonist's argumentation represents a persuasive device intended to have a psychological effect upon the audience.

The testimonies of two women who had an abortion can be viewed as another instance of the "documentary" from the "hard" anti-abortion perspective. The two testimonies are extracted from a leaflet called "Sarcină nedorită?" (Unwanted Pregnancy?) that the Christian-Orthodox Association "Pro-Vita" circulated a few years ago to persuade women to choose other solutions to an unwanted pregnancy than having an abortion. The two fragments were excerpted from texts which can be regarded as a confirmation of the "reality" of abortion and its consequences as presented in excerpt (1) above. The testimonies are the following:

(2) I have aborted my child. Together with him a part of me died too, a part that can no longer rise to life. Today I wouldn't take such a decision, no mat-

ter what the people around me might say. I live with a fear inside I can no longer escape. I have nightmares in which a little girl is running towards me with open arms and keeps asking me: "Why mummy? Why?" [...]. I tell this story for all women's benefit. Consider well what you are doing because your dreams will torture you and you'll be haunted by the eyes of those who are no longer alive [...]. (Judith) (my translation)

"Sarcină nedorită?", Leaflet of the Christian-Orthodox Association "Pro-Vita"

(3) Why did nobody tell me what would follow? All those who advised me to have an abortion two years ago – the doctor, the counsellor, my parents, my friends and my husband – assured me that it was the best thing for me and my child! Now my child is dead and I'm desperate! I can no longer sleep at night, I can no longer laugh. Nobody understands me! Please, tell everybody how awful an abortion is. Terrible pains torture my body and soul. (Jutta) (my translation)

"Sarcină nedorită?", Leaflet of the Christian-Orthodox Association "Pro-Vita"

The two fragments are not in themselves argumentative texts. They can be interpreted as maximally argumentative for the sake of this analysis to reveal that in fact they (can well) function as arguments within the anti-abortion argumentation promoted in the leaflet. After a brief presentation of abortion and its effects, the testimonies are strategically placed at the end of the leaflet text because they are meant to be perceived as strong arguments. Since they represent the personal experiences of two women supposed to exist in reality, the testimonies have a greater psychological impact upon the reader or the audience than any other impersonal discourse against abortion. So, the two quoted stories represent emotional arguments by means of which the audience's persuasion is aimed at.

The vocabulary of the two testimonies is another means by which emotions are manipulated. As instances of expressive discourse the two confessions focus on the "self"and its relation with the world. Thus, what we expect to find in this case is the female "self" expressing feelings and emotions induced by a painful experience before a female audience that should be convinced of the wrongness of abortion. Therefore, there are terms which express psychological states such as fear ("I live with a fear inside"), suffering ("I have nightmares", "I can no longer sleep at night", "I can no longer laugh"), torment ("your dreams will torture you and you will be haunted"), remorse ("Today I wouldn't take such a decision"), despair ("I am desperate") as well as physical suffering ("Terrible pains torture my body and soul"). The frightening imagery of abortion is suggested by nouns like *fear*, *nightmares*, *pains*, verbs like *torment*, *haunt*, descriptive adjectives like *desperate* and evaluative adjectives like *awful* and *terrible*. The emotional impact of such words is even greater since they are directly chosen by the speaking subject who makes a confession. Moreover, the degree of credibility of the two testimonies before the audience is higher as people tend to be more easily persuaded by first person stories or even to recognize themselves in other people's experiences.

The next text for analysis under the "hard" anti-abortion perspective is an excerpt from an open letter written as a reaction to a women magazine article on abortion as a "necessary evil" and on family planning as a "great gain of humanity":

> (4) I believe that abortion should be viewed as a moral issue that has to do also with the healing of people's psychology. The savage violence directed against children and against other vulnerable creatures, the violence that we witness every evening on TV, is the same violence directed against unborn children. The abuse of the already born children will continue as long as the violence against children in their mothers' wombs is tolerated, even, legalized or considered a necessary evil, etc. The abuse of women will continue at least as long as there are forms of extreme violence, such as the abuse of the unborn children. Abortion has become a daily crime in which not only the mother but also the entire family, the father, the other children, the grandparents participate. You, as a psychologist, have all the necessary instruments to reveal all the lies that cover such a tragedy. (my translation)
>
> Larisa Iftimie, Open Letter to Mrs Aurora Liiceanu, psychologist,
> File Provita Media no.72, August 2004, www.avort.ro

If the first two parts of the anti-abortion "documentary" promote the image of abortion as a "deadly sin" – excerpt (1) – or as a painful personal experience – excerpts (2) and (3) –, the final part presents abortion as an act of extreme violence. The protagonist strategically chooses to deal with *violence* since it seems to be a form of life nowadays to which people have grown more and more accustomed. As she states, we are permanently "entertained" with violence whether we talk about violence against children, women or any other vulnerable creatures. So, the emotions manipulated in the passage are related to the concept of violence and its effects upon the audience.

As noticed above, lexical choice is a strategy to communicate and stir emotions at the same time. It should be again emphasized that not all the terms chosen to present abortion as an act of violence are emotional as such. Their emotional value may be determined by the context, in other words they represent terms that acquire emotional value in the context. The key terms of the passage are *violence* and *abuse* whose emotional content is intensified by the use of descriptive adjectives. Thus, structures like *savage* or *extreme violence* as opposed to *vulnerable creatures* are meant to arouse the reader's pity for the innocent victims of any form of abuse as well as his/her indignation at abortion. Of great psychological effect is also the correlation between structures like *the abuse of unborn children, the abuse of already born children* and *the abuse of women* suggests the fact that abortion affects directly or indirectly a large number of individuals. In addition, terms such as *crime* determined by the frequency adjective *daily*, terms like *lie* and *tragedy* and the use of the passives *will be tolerated*, *legalized or considered a necessary evil* with a negative connotation show that abortion is an act of violence performed on a large scale and with the participation of the whole society. All these terms create the same image of a sphere of aggression dealt with in the analyses of the previous text excerpts.

2.1.2 The "soft" perspective

If from the "hard" perspective abortion was treated as a crime, from the "soft" perspective it is considered an infringement of rights. The "soft" anti-abortion perspective can be illustrated by means of an excerpt from Dr. Sam Vaknin's article *The Aborted Contract and the Right to Life*. The author draws on the relation mother-fetus as a contract which is broken when abortion is performed.

> (5) When a woman engages in voluntary sex, does not use contraceptives and gets pregnant – one can say that she signed a contract with her fetus. [...] The contract between a mother and her fetus is derived from the larger Social Contract. Society – through its apparatuses – stands for the embryo the same way that it represents minors, the mentally retarded, and the insane. Society steps in – and has the recognized right and moral obligation to do so – whenever the powers of the parties to a contract (implicit or explicit) are not balanced. It protects small citizens from big monopolies, the physically weak from the thug, the tiny opposition from the mighty administration, the barely surviving radio station from the claws of the devouring state mechanism. It also has the right and obligation to intervene, intercede and represent the unconscious: this is why euthanasia is absolutely forbidden without the consent of the dying person. There is not much difference between the embryo and the comatose.
>
> Dr. Sam Vaknin, The Aborted Contract and the Right to Life,
> http://samvak.tripod.com/abort.html

The protagonist argues against abortion starting from the premise that the mother-fetus relationship is a contract between two parties that are supposed to have equal rights. Yet, when the mother decides to have an abortion, she infringes the fetus's right to life. The mother is endowed with consciousness or power to decide while the fetus lacks consciousness and thus cannot exercise his/her will. Therefore, one party's rights prove stronger than the other party's rights. The resolution of this conflict of rights is one of the major responsibilities of Society. As the author upholds, Society has the right and obligation to defend the weak party's interests. These are in broad lines the main ideas Vaknin puts forward in his argumentation.

Regarding the lexical choice appropriate to the types of topics employed we can notice a mixture of concrete and abstract terms by means of which emotions related to abortion as an abuse of human rights are manipulated. The protagonist combines *legal terms* (*contract*, *sign*, *Social Contract*, *apparatuses*, *stand for*, *minors*, *insane*, *right*, *obligation*, *parties*, *citizens*, *monopolies*, *administration*, *state mechanism*, *protect*, *intervene*, *intercede*, *represent*) with *qualifying terms* of the ordinary language (*small*, *big*, *tiny*, *mighty*, *barely surviving*, *devouring*). This combination of terms is *strategic* – or a strategic maneuvre, according to recent developments in the pragma-dialectical theory – in that it results in a very persuasive appeal to the audience's sense of citizenship. The maneuvre is achieved by use of terms lacking emo-

tional content, i.e. whose fundamental meaning is completely deprived of emotional value (most of the legal terms mentioned above), in a context where terms such as *fetus*, *mother*, *embryo, minors, the mentally retarded, the insane* can be emotionally valued. The semantic association of the (scientific) paradigm *fetus*, *embryo* with the (legal) paradigm *minors, the mentally retarded, the insane* allows the transfer of the characteristics of the latter to the former and thus directs the audience to a representation of the act of abortion as an infringement of law.

The use of this mixture of legal and common terms creates an impression of emotional involvement and at the same time of objectivity from the protagonist's side. He can be viewed both as a detached social analyst and an ordinary citizen who needs Society's protection. Vaknin's language suggests two dimensions of the issue of abortion: on the one hand the dimension of "rationality" and on the other hand the dimension of "aggression". Abortion represents an abuse of the embryo's right to life and therefore a form of aggression that needs to be addressed by Society in the same rational manner used for other forms of social abuse. The word *thug* used instead of *the physically strong* as opposed to *the physically weak* is strategically chosen to convey the idea of aggression the weak party is subjected to by the strong one.

2.2 Emotions related to the standpoint *abortion is not a crime*

Abortion defenders express their approval of abortion by defending the standpoint *Abortion is not a crime*. Broadly, pro-abortion discourse puts forth the argument that *The fetus is not a human being*. If anti-abortion argumentation focuses upon the fetus's right to life, pro-abortion argumentation concentrates upon the mother's right to choose. The abortion scenario is modified so that the mother plays the part of the victim while the fetus stands for the aggressor. Therefore, abortion defenders are expected to use emotional arguments related to the mother. Since she is viewed as a victim, abortion is presented as the right thing to do to remove the "source" of aggression. So, in defending the standpoint abortion is not a crime, protagonists attempt to convince the audience of the rightness of abortion.

The following fragment – excerpted from an article drawing on the mother's right to self-defense – illustrates this perspective:

> (6) I think that the premise is false, that the fetus is not a person from the moment of conception. A newly fertilized ovum, a newly implanted clump of cells, is no more a person than an acorn is an oak tree. [...] I should perhaps stop to say explicitly that I am not claiming that people have a right to do anything whatever to save their lives. I think, rather, that there are drastic limits to the right of self-defense. If someone threatens you with death unless you torture someone else to death, I think you have not the right, even to save your life, to do so. But the case under consideration here is very different. In our case there are only two people involved, one whose life is threatened, and one who threatens it. Both are innocent: the one who is threatened is not

threatened because of any fault, the one who threatens does not threaten because of any fault. For this reason we may feel that we bystanders cannot intervene. But the person threatened can.

Judith Jarvis Thomson, A Defense of Abortion in *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, vol. 1, no. 1, Fall, pp. 47-66.

Starting from the premise that the fetus is not a person from the moment of conception, the protagonist tries to argue in favour of the mother's right to abortion. The main argument advanced is the following: the mother's life is threatened by the fetus. Although neither of them can be blamed for this situation, the mother has the right to intervene to put an end to it. In order to defend her position convincingly, Thomson resorts to certain elements such as topics or particular lines of arguments, lexical choice, stylistic devices and speech acts by means of which emotions related to the mother as a victim are manipulated.

As regards lexical choice**,** several terms are used which are suggestive of the same sphere of *aggression*. However, the major difference is that the object of aggression is no longer the fetus but the mother and, thus, the one whose rights are emphasized is not the fetus but again the mother. The vocabulary of Thomson's argumentation is not emotional as such but contextually emotional. *Right* and *threaten* are the key terms of the excerpt which in combination with other terms such as *life*, *death*, *self-defense*, *fault*, *person*, *save*, *innocent* bear an emotional burden.

These terms express the protagonist's emotional attachment to the aggressed mother. The intended effect is to make the audience feel sympathetic to the mother and therefore perceive abortion as an act of self-defense and not as a crime. The interplay between *threaten* in the passive and *threaten* in the active ("one whose life is threatened, and one who threatens it", "the one who is threatened is not threatened [...], the one who threatens does not threaten because of any fault", "But the person threatened can") is extremely effective in suggesting the power relation between the two parties, the aggressor and the aggressed. The use of the modal verb *can* both in the affirmative and the negative forms with the meaning *be allowed to* ("For this reason we may feel that we bystanders cannot intervene. But the person threatened can") points out the fact that the mother is the only one that can decide what to do with the aggressor.

As regards reference to the fetus, "intentionally unemotional" terms are used in the excerpt such as *a newly fertilized ovum* or *a newly implanted clump of cells*. By these terms the fetus is placed in opposition with the mother who is a person. Surprisingly, the protagonist labels both the aggressed and the aggressor as *innocent people*. However, the mother is perceived as more of a "person" than the fetus is.

3. *Conclusions*

The analysis of the several text excerpts illustrating treatment of the standpoints *Abortion is a crime* and *Abortion is not a crime* in point of expression of emotions, reveals that ex-

pressives represent an essential characteristic of ethical discourse on abortion. This characteristic could be extended to other instances of ethical discourse dealing with a moral dilemma of the *good* vs *evil* type. In other words, the hypothesis that expressives are not an accident but a fundamental component of ethical argumentation has been confirmed.

Whether we talk about the "hard" or the "soft" anti-abortion perspective or the pro-abortion perspective, emotions are conveyed by similar means such as topics, vocabulary, stylistic devices and overt or implicit speech acts. Therefore, the emotional appeal present in the excerpts dealt with can be viewed as a very powerful strategy of winning the argument. The main function of expressives in ethical argumentation is a rhetorical one. As stated in the ideal model of a critical discussion and as confirmed by the present analysis expressives do not contribute to the resolution of a dispute yet, they are used to gain the audience's adherence to a standpoint.

Ethical argumentation on abortion may be considered an instance of critical discourse because of the difference of opinion externalized in the confrontation between the protagonist and the antagonist. However, the disputants' rhetorical objective to win the argument by appealing to the audience's emotions overweighs their dialectical objective to solve the difference of opinion. This type of argumentation does not conform to the critical standard of reasonableness and, so, the disputants can hardly be regarded as reasonable ones.*

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EMOTIVE ARGUMENTATION EXPONENTS IN COMPUTER-MEDIATED DIALOGUE.
THE CASE OF A ROMANIAN POLITICIAN'S BLOG

TEODORA POPESCU

The aim of this paper is to present an analysis of the emotive argumentation exponents present in the computer-mediated dialogue recorded on the personal blog of a Romanian politician, now an ex-major player on the political scene. The mini-corpus that we base our study on consists of the replies given to a blog posting written by the politician with regard to a statement made by the current Romanian president in a press conference. The emotive exponents identified and discussed in the present study are: slang/jargon words and expressions; use of foreign words and expressions; use of idiomatic utterances; forms of address (e.g. terms of endearment, etc.); value judgments; presuppositions; euphemisms; punctuation (exclamation marks, suspension points, etc.). We will also discuss these emotive exponents with regard to the relationships established between interlocutors, as well as to their politically-laden illocutionary force.

Introduction

We will start with a short theoretical background and some working definitions relevant to our study. *Weblogs* represent websites with a standardised but at the same time flexible structure built on a CMC (content management system). They also allow for a possibly attractive, marketable presentation. Unlike traditional mass media communication, weblogs support the interaction of authors (bloggers) with their readers by offering services to comment and give feedback on articles (the so-called "blog posts"). They also support the interaction with other bloggers by facilitating hyperlinking to other blogs or blog posts available on the Internet. It is different from emails in that it is group communication and everybody has access to what each interlocutor has previously said. It is asynchronous, since communication does not take place in real time. The totality of weblogs – the *blogoshpere* – represents the new virtual communicative space, with an exponentially increasing number of members every day.

A by-now quite common type of blogging is to be found in the political arena. *Political blogs* are weblogs in which the content concentrates on issues, events and policy in a constituency, national, international or party political context (Ferguson & Griffith 2006: 366). One of the reasons why blogs have become so popular in this sphere is that they may represent an alternative channel for the distribution of information as well as a mobilisation tool due to their ability to spread news very quickly (Ito 2004, Kahn & Kellner 2004). Bloggers are sometimes considered

as a "fifth power" that increasingly occupies the control function of the mass media (Gillmor 2004, Himmelsbach 2005), different from the established news values through their more personal, direct, and often location-specific style of reporting. To a certain extent, blogs can turn into a tool for opinion formation, as they may influence agenda setting and framing processes (Farrell & Drezner 2008). This orientation towards sustained dialogue and lasting social relations has a greater impact on partisans and supporters and seems to increase their political engagement.

On the other hand, there are some negative aspects pertaining to political weblogs, which can be detrimental to effective communication. For example, hyperlinking on weblogs might foster fragmentation by connecting only like-minded bloggers, who, consequently, avoid dealing with diverging views (Howard 2005). Political clustering along ideological divides may lead to homogeneous spheres with little, if any, communication with the outside world. Another aspect pertains to the threat that blogs pose to the reflective quality of public political communication by allowing anybody to share their more or less concise thoughts. Thirdly, it has been argued that blogs might worsen the inequality of voices in the public sphere by supporting a star culture with few prominent authors (the so-called "A-listers") and a large number of unknown bloggers (Shirky 2003).

Political blogging has existed for quite some time, to a larger or lesser extent, in different democracies. Tom Watson was the first UK's MP to use a blog in 2003. By 2004 there were 5 MP's using blogs, whereas during the 2005 general election campaign there were approximately 65 parliamentary candidates who resorted to blogging as part of their campaign structure (Ferguson & Griffith 2006: 366).

During the 2004 US presidential campaign weblogs were very much used in order to transmit information and to allow for political debate. Campaign blogging was also present in other Western democracies: the 2005 UK general election (mentioned above), the 2005 Danish parliamentary election, the 2005 New Zealand general election, the 2005 German Bundestag election, as well as the 2007 French election (Albrecht et al. 2007).

Emotive markers in computer-mediated communication

We shall argue for the purposes of this study that emotive argumentation exponents fall into two broad categories: the first being in relation with and specific to computer-mediated communication, while the second pertains to the pragmaliguistic means of achieving communication. Table I presents a taxonomy of the most frequent emotive exponents, revealed from a sample sub-corpus extracted from Adrian Năstase's blog.

In the following we will try to analyse this categorisation, accounting for the specificity of communication through blogging, which is a sub-category of computer-mediated dialogue (CMD) (along with chatting). CMD, as previously mentioned, is a hybrid-type of communication (neither purely written, nor verbal). For this very reason (the lack of paraverbal indicators), CMC needs to find substitutes in order to ensure the interpersonal dimension of communication.

For the first category of affective markers we identified the following: emoticons, punctuation, spelling and usernames.

TYPE	EMOTIVE MARKERS / EXPONENTS		EXAMPLES
CMC-related devices	Emoticons (smiley face, wink, frown, sad face, etc)		☺ ☺ ☺
	Punctuation (suspension points, exclamation marks, inverted commas, etc.)		*I beg you… / 'va rog eu frumos…'* *Congratulations! / 'Felicitari!'*
	Spelling	Capital letters	*YOU'RE TELLING US NO NEWS* 'NU NE SPUNETI NICI O NOUTATE'
		Wilful transcription of faulty Romanian pronunciation/grammar	'almanhe' *(faulty plural for 'almanahuri' – almanacs)*
	Usernames (revealing vs concealing identity)		'mirceag' *(possibly indicative of another politician's name?)*
Non-directly CMC-related pragma-linguistic devices	Speech acts carrying emotive load: expressives/assertives		*I am ashamed of such a president* / 'Mi-e jena cu un asa presedinte' *I don't consider that* […] / 'Nu consider ca […]'
	Vocatives (affective forms of address)		*Liviu, sonny* / 'Liviu, taică[…]'
	Diminutives and superlatives		'superbase' *(from super + Băsescu)*
	Coinage of new words and expressions		*Băsescian dictatorship* / 'dictatură băsesciană'
	Foreign words and expressions		*'capisci'; 'c'mon'; 'j'en ai assez'; 'thanks anyway'*
	Slang/in-group language		the AN / 'AN-ul'
	Colloquialisms and use of the vernacular		*set-up* / 'facatura' *at once* / 'mintenas'
	Idiomatic expressions		*he shot from the hip* / 'l-a luat gura pe dinainte'
	Proverbs and sayings		*The truth will out* / 'Minciuna are picioare scurte'
	Presuppositions		*just like Mona Musca's denunciation on the letterhead of the DA Alliance* / 'la fel ca si denuntul Monei Musca pe antetul Aliantei DA'
	Implicature		*t b lied. answer: so what? he's a politician* / 't b a mintit. raspuns: si ce daca? e politician'
	Value judgments		*AN may represent a solution to this crisis* / 'AN poate reprezenta o solutie pentru aceasta criza'
	Controversial assertions		*Any lie is construed on a truth, otherwise it won't hold.* / 'Orice minciuna se construieste pe un adevar- altfel, nu sta in picioare.'

Table I: *Taxonomy of emotive markers in computer-mediated communication*

As far as the second category is involved, we detached 13 exponents which are non-directly CMC-related: speech acts carrying emotive load (expressives/assertives); vocatives (affective forms of address); diminutives and superlatives; coinage of new words and expressions; foreign words and expressions; slang/in-group language; colloquialisms and use of the vernacular; idiomatic expressions; proverbs and sayings; presuppositions; implicature; value judgments and controversial assertions. All these CMC-related or -non-related devices mostly account for the polarisation of allegiances and the individual expression of ideological stances.

The first Romanian political blog

Although at present there are numerous politicians (MP's) or private individuals (partisans/supporters of a political doctrine) who lead blogs, the one we are going to analyse in the following has the merit to be the first one on the Romanian political scene.

Adrian Năstase, the blogger, formerly an extremely potent political actor, lost the presidential elections of 2004 in favour of the current president, Traian Băsescu. The battle was fierce and the victory only came after the second scrutiny, the difference being almost unnoticeable. The failure was allegedly assigned to the politician's lack of popularity with common people.

Nevertheless, the claim to elitism is still overt in the motto:

1) "...Cititorii mei sunt mai inteligenți decât scriitorii altora."
   '...My readers are more intelligent than others' writers.'

The implied idea is that other politicians are not even capable of writing their own speeches and therefore hire professional writers to this end. However, the people who engage in conversation in this blogospace outsmart the other politicians' writers.

The next line in the letterhead summarizes the political trajectory of the MP:

2) ministru – prim-ministru – blogger
   'minister – prime-minister – blogger'

There is also an attached tag that reinforces the idea of intellectual elite:

3) blog cu accord intellectual / conținut implicit
   'blog with intellectual consent / implicit content'

The corpus we chose to analyse in order to reveal affective exponents present in a computer-mediated dialogue is made up of all the comments triggered by an entry posted on 26th September, 2007, 12:09 PM. The post triggered 102 responses, the first on September 26, 2007, 12:15 PM (6 minutes after it was launched on the weblog), and the last on October 2, 2007, 1:23 PM (a week after, it still aroused interest among participants). The transcript totals 15226 words, out of which 3947 are unique words.

As to the patterns of interaction, there were 59 individual posters, some of them posting several times, mostly in reply to other posters. 26 posts were directly addressed to A.N.[1], 15 posts were not addressed to anybody in particular, 60 posts were replies to other posters' responses and only one reply of the blogger's was recorded.

The title of this post reads:

4) Traian Basescu minte!
'Traian Basescu is lying!'

This represents a forceful assertive, which sets not only the topic, but the tone and the direction of the conversation as well. It comes as no wonder, then, that the verb *to lie* (a minți) is found in 28 instances (25 present simple – 'minte', 3 past simple – 'a mințit', 1 gerund – 'minţind', all with reference to Traian Băsescu. From the same word family we also encounter *lie* (15 occurrences in the singular – 'minciuna' and 4 in the plural – 'minciuni[le]') and *liar* in 2 occurrences – 'mincinos'.

We will present below the input post in full, and will try to analyse the message that it conveys. The statement, taken out of context, seems, at first sight, completely nonsensical and contradicts common logic. In fact, the president makes a parallel with previous accusations of abuse that he himself made against Adrian Năstase and the prosecutors in office during Adrian Năstase's mandate as prime-minister. The difference, though, he states, lies in the fact that unlike his case, when the PSD officials gave instructions that his file be sent to the Prosecutor's office, now, during his mandate as president, nobody gave any instruction to anyone as to sending ex-ministers' files for investigation.

5) In conferința de presa de ieri, Traian Basescu afirma: "***S-a dovedit***[2] *insa ca, in ceea ce ma privește, exista o stenograma a PSD, in care demnitarii PSD din acea vreme au stabilit sa se trimită dosarul la Parchet. Ceea ce ar fi foarte greu de susținut de către actualii miniştri. Nimeni nu a dat nicio instrucţiune nimănui.*"

'In yesterday's press conference, Traian Băsescu asserted that: "*It has been nevertheless **proved** that, as far as I am concerned, there existed a PSD*[3] *shorthand report in which the then PSD officials decided that the file be sent to the Prosecutor's office. Which would be very difficult to uphold by the present ministers. Nobody gave any instruction to anyone.*"'

As we shall see in the following, Adrian Năstase starts from the assumption that everybody is well within the context and leaves out completely this aspect of the apparent lack of logic and chooses instead to confute one verb - 'to prove' (used in the passive voice, to emphasise indirectness). By 'logically' inferencing that 'it hasn't been proved', the politician aims to demonstrate that Traian Băsescu is lying. The strongest argument used is the traditional one: quoting exact sources, with clear time reference.

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[1] The initials of the politician.
[2] A.N.'s bold type.
[3] The Social Democrat Party.

6) In realitate, in **Rezoluția DNA**[4] nr.6/P/2005, din 28.XI.2005, se arata ca: *"Din ansamblul actelor premergătoare efectuate in cauza* **nu s-a confirmat existenta niciunei stenograme a discuțiilor purtate in cadrul sedintelor organismelor de conducere ale PSD** *– mai precis in sedintele Delegației Permanente sau ale Biroului Executiv Central – ce s-au desfasurat in cursul anilor 2003-2004 si* **nici ca s-ar fi dispus înregistrări ale discuțiilor pe banda magnetica sau alt tip de suport**.*"*
'In reality, in the **DNA's Resolution** no. 6/P/2005 on 28.11.2005, it was shown that: *"Out of all preceding documents drawn up for the purposes of this case, there has been* **no confirmation of the existence of any shorthand report of discussions conducted within meetings of PSD management bodies** *– more precisely the meetings of the Permanent Delegation or of the Central Executive Bureau – which were held during 2003-2004,* **neither of the fact that there had been an order to magnetically tape or by any other means to record conversation**.*"'*

7) Deci **nu** s-a dovedit. Deci Traian Basescu minte.
'Therefore, it has **not** been proved. Therefore, Traian Băsescu is lying.'

Although political blogs, as we previously mentioned, may run the risk of becoming partisanship-driven, in this particular instance one can still find some divergent ideologies and side-takings. The first three replies are in fact against Adrian Năstase, the stance varying from mild to strong opposition. We will reproduce the one that Adrian Năstase chose to answer to (actually his only intervention in this dialogue).

8) haide D-nule Nastase nu ne mai luati de fraieri va rog eu frumos...macar faza cu stenogramele lasa-ti-o asa si nu va mai umpleti de penibil negandu-le autenticitatea...pentru ca totusi nu sunt numai fani care va sustin neconditionat cei ce mai scriu pe blogul dumneavoastra...apropo rugati administratorul sa nu mai cenzureze mesajele in care nu sunteti ridicat in slavi...daca sunt decente si nu contin limbaj licentzios nu vad rostul cenzurarii lor... Sau macar scrieti in titlul blogului: interzis a scrie celor care ma contesta
'com'n Mr. Năstase, please don't take us for fools any more...at least leave the shorthand reports thing as it is and don't plunge into ridiculousness by denying their authenticity...because anyway, there are not only fans who support you unconditionally, the people who happen to write on your weblog...by the way, ask your administrator to stop censoring the messages in which you are not being lauded...if they are decent and do not contain licentious language I see no point in censoring them...Or at least write in the letterhead of your weblog: forbidden to the ones who will contest me'

The first to answer to this reply is from the administrator himself:

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[4] The National Anti-corruption Department.

9) Liviu, taică, ai ceva să-mi transmiţi sau te mai zbaţi niţel în conspiraţie?...☺
'Liviu, sonny, are you telling me something or keep struggling against the conspiracy?...☺'

The blog administrator replies to the overt accusations of purposefully planned like-mindedness in a superior, sarcastic tone ('taică' = affectionate term in the vernacular, used by an older person to address a younger one, cf. DEX 1998); yet the use of a smiley face can have a double role: to mitigate the effect of the rather blunt implication that the interlocutor has in fact nothing to say and to belittle the importance of the exchange. He is nevertheless the one who administrates the blog and enforces impartiality; therefore he has to at least apparently preserve a balance between the diverging ethea in the dialogue.

Adrian Năstase's reply is meant to clarify his reasoning. Nevertheless, he does so by shedding a somewhat negative stigma on the whole political body of which the president is a leading member. He declares that he did not refer to the 'shorthand reports thing', although the syntagm 'shorthand reports' does appear in bold type, and it actually represents the crux of his argument.

10) Eu nu m-am referit la chestiunea stenogramelor – istoria e lunga si murdara, legata de campania electorala, la fel ca si denuntul Monei Musca pe antetul Aliantei DA, avandu-l drept co-presedinte pe Traian Basescu. M-am referit la afirmatia "s-a dovedit". Eu am aratat simplu, citand dintr-un document al Parchetului, ca "nu s-a dovedit" si, ca deci afirmatia a fost o minciuna. Asta nu inseamna ca nu poti sa-l mai votezi odata pe Basescu!
'I did not refer to the shorthand reports thing – that's a long and dirty history concerning the electoral campaign, just like Mona Musca's denunciation on the letterhead of the DA Alliance[5]. I referred to the statement "It has been proved". I simply showed, by quoting from a document issued by the Prosecutor's Office that it hasn't been proved, and therefore, that the statement was a lie. This doesn't mean you can't vote for Băsescu once more!'

The condescending and sarcastic tone is again conspicuous: *I am telling you what is right, but in the name of free will, it is up to you to choose what's wrong*, would be a fair translation of the of last exclamative sentence.

I. *CMC-related emotive exponents*

a) *Emoticons* are probably the most important paralanguage affective marker in computer-mediated communication. According to Sanderson (1993: 1), emoticons (or "smileys") represent "a sequence of ordinary characters you can find on your computer keyboard. Smileys

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[5] Political alliance between the National Liberal Party and the Democrat Party, concluded in 2004 for electoral purposes. It subsequently proved non-functional and was therefore dissolved in 2007.

are used in e-mail and other forms of communication using computers". They were also described as "visual cues formed from ordinary typographical symbols that when read sideways represent feelings or emotions" (Rezabek & Cochenour 1998: 201). In CMC they are an expression of emotion, also called "pictographs" and are used as "surrogates for nonverbal communication" (Thompson & Foulger 1996: 226), giving clues as to the facial expression of the message sender, in order to provide "a paralinguistic component to a message" (Thompson & Foulger 1996: 230). According to Godin (1993: 4), when "properly used, a smiley can spice up virtually any form of written communication".

Most of the time, in this conversation, emoticons are used as a contextual tool and pragmatic mechanism shaping and acknowledging shared mindsets.

> 11) Ca Traian Basescu minte cum respira o stie prea bine orice roman in-
>   telegent. Cariera politica a scumpului nostru presedinte este cladita pe
>   minciuna. Numai un mic exemplu: Mai tineti minte cand a promis ca va
>   demisiona in 5 MINUTE. Ha, ha, ha, ce gluma buna! 😃
>   'That Traian Basescu lies as he breathes is well known by any intelligent
>   Romanian. The political career of our beloved president is built on lies.
>   Just a little example: Do you remember when he promised he would re-
>   sign in 5 MINUTES. Ha, ha, ha, what a good joke! 😃'

This final exclamation has by now an anecdotal value. It is the president's favourite expression of appreciation of his own sense of humour. Its use here is meant to emphasise the initial statement referring to the president's innate propensity to lie.

b) *Punctuation* is used as a substitute for face-to-face paraverbal indicators. Suspension points are used to suggest that the implications go beyond what was said; exclamation/question marks are used to mark the interactants' amazement, indignation, etc.; inverted commas indicate that the meaning of the word/expression is figurative.

c) *Spelling* performs the same function as punctuation, plus a supplementary one which again comes to reinforce the idea of cultivating group identity through common valorisation benchmarks.

Capital letters are a substitute for intonation and an indicator of higher voice pitch used for greater emphasis:

> 12) Mai clar, NIMENI, dar absolut nimeni din afara acestui partid nu ar putea
>   "desăvârşi" lucrurile fără ajutorul "intern"!
>   'More specifically, NOBODY, but absolutely nobody outside this party
>   could "round off" things without "insider" help!'

Wilful transcription of faulty Romanian pronunciation/grammar is used to refer to uneducated politicians. Marian Vanghelie, otherwise a prominent PSD figure, has made history with his illiterate discourses in broken syntax and suburban lingo. In this conversation just a few of his most celebrated linguistic blunders are referred to, e.g. marean /ma'ræn/ (instead of Marian /ma'rjan/); almanahe (instead of 'almanahuri' – almanacs, n.pl.); asfalte (instead of 'asfalturi' – asphalts, n.pl.).

d) *Playing the identity game* is a very important element of computer-mediated communication. Preserving anonymity in CMC is a double-edged sword, in that it has both advantages and disadvantages. On the one hand, it might be possible that behind an assumed name, people may feel freer to uninhibitedly express their opinions, while their interlocutors give them the benefit of the doubt and focus on the apparent truth value and accuracy of the arguments put forward, refraining from any conjectures as to ulterior motives or intentions. On the other hand, the positive dynamics of a discussion group may be based on the fact that people count on clear identification of the interlocutor, in order to ensure credibility. Interlocutors' anonymity may render their contributions less reliable or accurate, distorting the perception of the group members, who will distrust the expertise of the speaker and question the believability or motivations of the statements made[6].

The most relevant example in our mini-corpus refers to the assumptions one interlocutor makes about the identity of another poster. *Aya* (herself with an irrelevant nickname) replies to the comments of *mirceag* with a series of invectives and defamatory statements. Strangely enough, their language borders bawdiness at times, but their comments are not banned by the administrator, nor condemned by any of the other participants.

> 13) Marea problema a celui care are gresita impresia ca este cu adevarat presedintele PSD (individul despre care vorbim - stii care, ala care crede ca se ascunde cand semneaza "Mircea G" pe forum la JN sau "mirceag" ori "mircea" aici pe blog) e urmatoarea: dupa ce ca sta pe picioroange, mai si umbla tras de sfori de catre stapanii lui.
> 'The chief problem of the guy who is under the false impression that he is the real president of PSD (the guy we are talking about – you know who, the one who thinks he's under cover when signing "Mircea G" on the JN forum and "mirceag" or "mircea" here on the blog) is the following: not only is he walking on broomsticks, he is also being string-pulled by his masters.'

II. *Non-directly CMC-related emotive exponents*

a) Speech acts carrying emotive load: expressives/assertives are rather forceful tools for the expression of one's party identification or ideological orientation, or simply the articulation of closeness to or distancing from Adrian Năstase.

> 14) ...ma simt mai reprezentat de Adrian Nastase ca om de stat si, de ce nu?, presedinte decat de bufonul Basescu.
> '... I feel more represented by Adrian Nastase as a statesman and, why not?, as president, than by Basescu the jester.'

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[6] For more information on competing hypotheses concerning perception of anonymous sources – the discounting hypothesis and the benevolence hypothesis, see Rains (2007).

15) Nu consider ca Adrian Nastase este un om desavarsit. Sunt convins ca are pacatele lui, asa cum avem toti.
'I don't consider that Adrian Nastase is a perfect man. I am convinced he has his shortcomings, like we all do.'

b) Vocatives (affective forms of address):

16) haide D-nule Nastase...
'come on, Mr Nastase...'

17) Domnule Adrian Nastase...'
'Mister Adrian Nastase...'

18) Domnule Presedinte,'
'Mister President,'

19) Prostanacule,...
'Dopey,...'

The first three instances represent forms of address to Adrian Nastase, and it is interesting to note that negative politeness strategies never go that far as to use the second person singular (in Romanian, social distance is grammatically marked through the use of the second person plural verb and the personal pronoun of politeness – 'dumneavoastră') The fourth instance is from an exchange between Aya and the one she considers to be Mircea Geoană, the current president of the PSD party. 'Dopey' is a nickname that Mircea Geoană was given by the first Romanian post-Decembrist president, the founding father and long-standing president of the PSD party (until demoted by scheming party dissenters).

c) Diminutives and superlatives are classical devices of expressing affect. Romanian is particularly linguistically rich in diminutives and superlatives, due to its agglutinant characteristic of word-formation through affixation. The following examples are included in the mini-corpus: 'base' (*from Băsescu*), 'superbase' *(from super + Băsescu)*, 'baselu' (*popular form of base + definite article*); 'fratioare' (*little brother*).

d) Coinage of new words and expressions is another lexical device that can contribute to the expression of emotions, all politically-oriented. Examples include 'dictatura basesciana' (Băsescian/Băsescu's dictatorship) or:

20) Nu stiu cat de corupt este, nu i-am numarat ouale.
'I don't know how corrupt he is, I haven't counted his eggs.'

A număra ouale cuiva ('to count sb's eggs') is a newly coined idiom in Romanian, meaning 'to probe sb's honesty', making reference to a political corruption scandal in which Năstase was involved, when he allegedly had some shareholding in a poultry farm.

e) Foreign words and expressions are indicative of the fact that the group members share a common language. Examples include: 'c'mon'; 'capisci'; 'J'en ai assez', 'y compris', 'bref', 'Wow!', 'Thanks anyway', etc.

f) Likewise, slang and in-group language are also used as a cohesion factor for the members of this virtual community. E.g. ANul, ANului (*the AN, i.e. the Adrian Năstase; proper noun initials + def. art. suffix, m.sg., N/G*); adminii (*the admins, i.e. the administrators of the weblog; abbrev. + def.art. Suffix, m.pl., N*).

g) Colloquialisms and use of the vernacular increase the degree of familiarity between interlocutors and spice up the conversation. Examples include:

> 21) Mi se rupe magistral de PSD/PRM/PNL
>   'I don't give an imperial damn about PSD/PRM/PNL[7]'

'făcătura' (*set-up*); 'mare specialist în cacialmale' (*real specialist in games of bluff*); 'mintenaş' (regional expression meaning *at once/in a second*, used in Transylvania); 'oleacă' (*a little bit*); 'nene' (*old chap, brother*); 'mai tre' (*still needs to*); 'idee faină' (*great idea*), etc.

h) Idiomatic expressions serve the same purpose as colloquialisms and use of the vernacular, contributing to an increased feeling of belonging to and solidarity within the group. From a pragmatic perspective, proverbs may serve a double function: of positive politeness when they are applied to the members of the group and negative politeness when they refer to group opponents.

> 22) haita n-are ce roade
>   'the pack has nothing to chew on' (meaning that the politicians in the PSD party have nothing left to steal).
>
> 23) Nici in gluma sa nu "arati coltii" cand e vorba de suferinta cuiva!
>   'Don't "show your fangs" when it comes to somebody's suffering, not even in jest!' (to show one's fangs = to be ready for attack)
>
> 24) Presedintele Romaniei nu minte, ci l-a luat gura pe dinainte (!).
>   'The president of Romania is not lying; he's just shot from the hips.' (he spoke without forethought)

i) Proverbs and sayings, used in the context of computer-mediated communication contribute even more to encoding in-group relations. On the one hand, they transmit solidarity by instituting a sort of positive politeness amongst participants, who adhere to the same set of rules, values and beliefs. On the other hand, they institute negative politeness, by expressing indirectness and by distancing from those who have divergent views and are not supportive of the same cause. As it might be easily expected, the proverbs/sayings/proverbial expressions used are mostly in relation to lies/lying/liars.

> 25) Minciuna are picioare scurte si odata si odata tot il va ajunge mania poporului!
>   'A lie has short feet (= the truth will out) and one fine day the rage of the people will run you down'

---

[7] Acronyms for Romanian political parties.

26) Prostanacule, ai mare grija: cel care sare multe garduri, sigur "agata apasat"
un varf de par cu sezutul pantalonilor!
'Dopey, be very careful: he who jumps over many fences will surely hook
his trousers on a picket' (= a thief will always be caught eventually).

j) Presuppositions refer to the "assumptions the speaker makes about what the hearer is likely to accept without challenge" (Givon, 1979: 50). In the example below, the speaker assumes as common ground the fact that Mona Musca's denunciation of former involvement with the Securitate[8] is a stain on the public image of the DA Alliance, which was supposedly founded on justice ('Dreptate') and truth ('Adevăr').

27) la fel ca si denuntul Monei Musca pe antetul Aliantei DA
'just like Mona Musca's denunciation on the letterhead of the DA Alliance'

k) Implicatures are useful means of expressing meaning without explicitly uttering or stating it. The example below is a relevant example. The speaker implies that by definition, politicians are notorious liars, and that their lies are common knowledge and have therefore no effect.

28) t b a mintit. raspuns: si ce daca? e politician
't b lied. answer: so what? he's a politician'

l) Value judgments refer to a common set of values that the participants in the blogosphere share or dissociate themselves from.

29) AN poate reprezenta o solutie pentru aceasta criza
'AN may represent a solution to this crisis'

30) Si eu ma simt reprezentata de un om de talia lui Adrian Nastase.
'I too feel represented by a man of Adrian Nastase's stature.'

m) Controversial assertions are made with the purpose of building arguments in favour / in refutation of moral reasoning and political ideology.

31) Orice minciuna se construieste pe un adevar – altfel, nu sta in picioare
'Any lie is construed on a truth, otherwise it won't hold.'

32) In politica, e nevoie sa minti frumos si credibil, nu sa spui adevaruri neplacute. Daca alegatorul e bou si vrea sa i se spuna 'Sa traiasca bine', asa i se spune.
'In politics, one needs to lie nicely and credibly, not to say unpleasant truths. If the voter is an asshole and wants to be wished 'Live well', that's what he will be told.'

---

[8] The secret service of communist Romania.

Conclusions

Although blogs are generally created with a view to ensure communication between the author and his/her readership, in this case there is little, if any communication between the blogger and the posters, which consequently turns the blog into a sort of self-casting of the id of a formerly powerful political leader. We believe that in the long run this will surely determine less involvement from non-party participants, leaving space for divisive debate between close supporters and opponents of the Parliamentarian.

It is apparent that there is more communication among the posters themselves than between the blog owner and the posters, inevitably leading to an ideologically heterogeneous arena.

This pluralistic ideological positioning is still auspicious. The posters' utterances cover a wide range of stances, varying from solidarity/commitment to detachment.

34) Va spun toate acestea pentru ca stiu ca nu este nevoie ca unui om ca Nastase sa ii adresezi indemnuri la actiune. Dar pentru Adrian Nastase pe care il simt, stiu ca valoreaza mult sprijinul moral si prietenia in momentele de singuratate si confirmarea valorii in clipele de declin.
'I am telling you all these because I know that one needs not urge a man like Năstase to act. But for the Adrian Năstase I feel, I know that moral support and friendship in moments of loneliness and the confirmation of value in times of decline count a lot.'

35) Ca sa fim foarte clari, de la bun inceput: urasc PSD, il urasc pe Ion Iliescu si pe Nastase. Cred cu tarie ca aceste entitati au adus mai multe prejudicii Romaniei decit Nicolae Ceauşescu.
'To make myself very clear, from the outset: I hate PSD, I hate Ion Iliescu and Nastase. I firmly believe that these entities have brought more prejudice to Romania than Nicolae Ceauşescu.'

We have tried to demonstrate in this paper that the weblog under discussion is more emotion/affect-driven than politically programatic, particularly because of the interactants, who are minor political actors and/or supporters, and who display their side-takings by resorting to a wide range of emotive argumentation exponents.

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ARGUMENTATION IN CLASSROOM DISCOURSE

WORDING VIEWPOINTS AT SCHOOL
IN DEBATES ABOUT RELATIONSHIPS WITH OTHERS

MARIE CARCASSONNE & MIREILLE FROMENT & CHRISTIAN HUDELOT

Usually, a dialogue is considered an argumentative one when the speakers utter arguments with the intention of making their point of view prevail and of persuading their interlocutors. In fact, a debate offers the speakers the opportunity to formulate and compare points of view. The relation between intention and linguistic means can be present, but there is a diversity of discourse figures. Dialogical effects also have to be taken into account.

Argumentation is spoken of when discursive moves modify the former utterances, whether through a shift of theme, or a shift of genre, or modalisations... Those discursive moves are all together what propels the debate and what justifies it.

They also raise theoretical questions. Some of these moves can only be determined by the analyst, others are the result of speakers interpreting words differently and also depend on the type of words used.

The analysis is led from the receiver's point of view, no-one can tell in advance how the discourse he receives will make sense for him/her. Thus, argumentation is not merely in the speaker's intention. Besides, it also raises the question of lexical meaning in argumentative dialogue, and precisely how words work in accordance with their type.

According to Weinreich (1963), Hockett (1958) and François (1980), different types of words can be distinguished. Technical words (eg. *sulfur, sulphate, sulphide*), names of artefacts (eg. *chair*), concepts defined in a set of relations (eg. *phoneme*, *sentence*, *string*), can be distinguished from 'full' words, which support *notions*, as mentioned by Perelman (1988), Grize (1990), François (1994), (eg. *difference, racism, jalousy, rejection, liberty*, etc.).

Some words refer to a notion. According to François (1994), we can speak of a "notion word". This is precisely because there are words whose particularity is to be "notion words" (Grize, Perelman) that discussion is possible: "if words meant the same thing at the end of a text as at the beginning, it wouldn't worth speaking or writing" (1994: 48).

Our conception of meaning and types of words is elaborated from the receiver's point of view, which can be said a "dialogical" point of view. This is why, in a dialogue or a text, we contrast expected and unexpected words, which strike the receiver: words that are familiar or unfamiliar to him, either words from specialized discourse or words referring to another culture.

The diversity of interpretation is linked to the fact that the meaning of words is not only in the words themselves but in the relationships between speakers, as Bakhtine-Volochinov even says (1977: 146): "one has no grounds to say that meaning belongs to the word per

se. In reality, it belongs to the word as a hyphen between speakers, which it is actualised only by the process of active understanding, implying a response".

In fact, it's important to note two aspects of interpretation, one which is tied to the words and which everyone can have access to, another which is relevant to our own experience, feelings and associations.

The reception of an utterance involves both the interpretive movements that discourse imposes and interpretive movements of the receiver himself or herself, based on the associations the utterances awaken. On the one hand, the utterance has a restraining effect upon its receiver, on the other hand it resonates with him or her.

1. *Interpretation, wording and dialogue*

More than other words, notion-words generate what Wittgenstein (1945/1961) has called "language-games". It is worth debating because of them. Several authors have noted that they stimulate formulations of points of views (Lahire 1998, Froment & Hudelot 2007).

François underlines that "thinking with words" can partly be defined as "searching to transform *a notion into concept*" (1994: 43), by analysing the notion, clarifying presuppositions, giving definitions, or distinctions, as well as examples or telling stories. The matter will then be a "concrete concept".

Therefore we will not study words but the "wording" and the elaboration of notions. Wording implies the relation between discourses, that is to say the discourse of the self with the other (present or missing) as well as the relation between discourse and the experience to be communicated.

Wording is defined by François (2004) by noting that language offers a large number of possibilities: it concerns words or constructions but also genres of discourse. In order to refer to a concrete or abstract object, the selection of words and of their arrangement may be different from one speaker to another and from one moment to another for the same speaker: these possibilities arise during a process which occurs "within us but without us", that is to say not by effective choice.

Using the concept of wording lays the emphasis on the process of spontaneous selection among possibilities: it does not imply that there is a notion which pre-exists and is "worded" afterwards. Wording is not conceived as a "tracing" of the reality (a complete description for example would be impossible) nor as a reflection but as a process including a part of creativity or at least of specificity – the fixed aspect of ideological discourse for instance doesn't really allow us to talk of "wording" anymore.

The wording always manifests a point of view and so always simultaneously elaborates notions, several authors have noted this trend (François 1994, Grize 1990, Tomasello 1994/2004).

2. *Move, theme, genre, linking*

The theme of the discourse does not determine its wording. How one imagines the theme is always worded through a genre of discourse, which can be observed in the linking of utterances.

In this study, we also mobilize the notion of *move* (discursive and/or interpretive move), that is to say the various displacements involved in the linking of utterances, the various ways a speaker links up his discourse to another one. The relationship can be a genre move, a move of theme, a move of genre and theme, a move affecting lexical-grammatical categorization or a move that affects the referential world. We use this term to depict how a notion is elaborated through the confrontation of viewpoints and/or values tied to various dialogical frames.

In the debate which we observed and analysed, we noted, as Wertsch (1985) did, the meeting of the pupils' spontaneities with what is expected in the school world. The moves show the locutors' various relationships with the referent in a given interaction with certain co-locutors. They show the encounter between the various locutors' social worlds, the values and affects they perceive in them. Moreover, some moves are easily identified, in particular the moves concerning the themes, the modification of the categories or those which are introduced by a grammatical word. Other moves result from the receiver's interpretation.

In our data, at least three social worlds are linked together: the school source, the class group source and the child's family. Of course, it is not the speaker's knowledge and culture as a whole which are involved, and we can add that those worlds interact and modify each other.

3. *The data*

Our study focuses on a debate at school about relationships with others. The data consists of a session of civic instruction in a primary school (2nd and 3rd level). The teaching-learning situation is a deliberative debate, based on the reading of a fable *Les chameaux et le dromadaire (The camels and the dromedary)*, taken from a book written for pupils, whose title is *Silence, la violence* (*Violence, be silent*) (1999). Its theme is difference, which leads to violence between the animals.

The children were encouraged to interact and answer one another, so that they might find a non-violent solution to a conflict.

We selected a group made up of four children (seven to eight years old) who interacted with one another. The teacher managed the macro units of the dialogue. Children were supposed to elaborate a problematics and to be involved in the debate. They were asked not to express content with doxic utterances.

From a didactic point of view, the institution expects children to learn to distance themselves from their own experience and their usual ways of wording, so that they may become familiar with a genre of discourse less tied to the context.

Some characteristic moves collected in our corpus are examined in the next section.

4. *Some characteristic moves in our data*

The first selected example[1] is located in the beginning of the dialogue. Pupils build a discursive space and explore the notion of difference.

> Example 1
>
> Marion 2: [...] we don't exactly know if they will/ if they will try to live together since they are different or if they will fight. That is, we don't know very well what they'll do about that
> Axel 2: Because sometimes there are some kinds of animals that don't accept others so er... because they're different and all that but actually it's false so er...it is not because we are different that we should
> Marion 4: we should reject others + it's not because for example it is like racism it's not because
> Axel 3: The others are Black
> Marion 5: The others are Black and (because) they are not like us that we should push them aside and that we should say that they are slaves who don't know anything + we shouldn't say that 'cause **they also look like us** + they have two arms and two legs and they have a head with a brain and they are a little bit like us + **they are like us** it's only the skin that changes because there is a lot of sun that's all + If it was like us but except that if it weren't for the sun it would be the same it would be exactly the same for all of us.

Pupils rather quickly speak of racism instead of difference. The elaborating of the notion is the result of several intricate moves.

Figure 1

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
[1] Tape recording debates are transcribed along the following code:

/: used when the locutor modifies his /her utterance

+: used for a pause (the number of crosses depends of its lenght)

Capital letters: the locutor stresses a word or a sentence.

Our choice for children' discourses translation is to keep the wording even if it sounds more French than English.

First, we take interest in the re-categorization move: the pupils reword the word "different" which represents a notion here. They reword it three times as "fight", "reject, and "push aside".

"Different" here becomes a pivot-word around which the locutor makes a move. A pivot word is an anchor point in the discourse, a word which is repeated or modified. There is no possibility of knowing before the utterance which word will become a pivot word, nor how it will be modified.

The lexical move corresponds to an evolution of the meanings of the notion, which are negotiated between the locutors. We have to take into account the children's spontaneity, the repeating and modifying, the frames in which the discourses are interpreted.

Figure 2

> Notion Word / pivot
>
> narrative
>
> racism
>
> Typical example
>
> The others are Black
>
> Because sometimes there are some kind of animals that don't accept others so err because they're/ they are different and all that
>
> *But actually it is false*
>
> They are slaves who don't know anything + we shouldn't say that because they also look like us +
>
> *They have two arms and two legs and they have a head with a brain and they are a little bit like us + they are like us it's only the skin that changes because there is a lot of sun*

The word *racism* becomes a main word. We observe both a theme move and a genre move.

– On the one hand a genre move: the locutor utters a generic narrative. Then there is an opposite move: the locutor utters a typical example. *To be Black* is taken as an emblematic example of racism.

– On the other hand, we observe a theme move: in the narrative we identify the theme of rejection, in the example of the theme of equality.

The typical example shows a child's point of view about racism and Blacks. More or less doxic beliefs from different historical contexts are repeated. These can be seen as the memory words and discourses.

The pupil speaks of "slaves" which reminds us of the colonial era, and she adds "they know nothing" which points out the belief in a cognitive difference. We notice that the typical example is a medium between the generic and the particular.

Example 2

Andréa 2: *I* have a pal who is Black in our building his name is Sidiki and well I do play with him because we ARE not racist we really like Black people because **they are like us**, as Marion said they have a brain like us <laughter> and what's more ***I* know some Black people who are nice there are even sometimes Blacks who are nicer than Whites.**

Marion 6: It's true, it's true, I even think that Blacks are nicer than Whites
Dimitri 1: Like Igor he is very nice Igor
Marion 7: Except that sometimes he gets on our nerves
Andréa 3: sometimes he gets on our nerves but we really like him
Axel 4: some are very nice but some are quite nasty + like Kevin
Marion 8: no but it's not really nastiness he also has friends so it means that he's not nasty + he is not nasty with them + I AM nasty with some people, other people but I am not nasty with the ones I like.

We interpret this second example through an affective frame. The speakers deal with particular cases that take a typical value and support or refute Andrea and Manon's generic assessment: "Blacks are nicer than Whites".

The sharing of experience shifts the generic into the particular. Marion (Marion 7) modalises Andréa's utterance and brings an opposite argument.

Two affects (being nice # getting on one's nerves) are put together. The discourse goes from inherent qualities to relational ones. Marion (Marion 9) reflects back on the meaning of *nastiness*.

Figure 3

Her reflexive move is constructed through nominalization ("nasty" becomes "nastiness") and the restriction brought to the generic utterance with the addition of "with them" which plays the role of a modalisation and allows her to build her demonstration.

She speaks of herself as an example and presents herself as the one who knows. This explanatory discourse is not expected from a child (she can surprise herself) and here we cannot identify her discursive sources. Does she repeat a former discourse or not?

With the nominalization, we go from a judgement to the notion of "nastiness": lexical-grammatical tools ("so it means"), and the added "with them" points out the moves that have built the demonstration explicitly. The demonstration itself is justified by a typical example, which presents the speaker's behaviour as exemplary.

> Example 3
>
> Andréa 4: MY cousin she is racist and I try to make her understand because Blacks are exactly the same as Whites because they are nice because me/ in her building there is a Black boy so when he asks her to play with her well she pushes him away and me I think it's kind of a shame/ so to make her understand and/ well I say "OK I'm going to play with the boys" so after that she gets bored and then she comes to play with us.
>
> Axel 7: That is not
>
> Axel 8: coming back to Andrea's **supposition** it's not racism it is some kind of jealousy anyhow
>
> Axel 9: you try to make her feel jealous 'cause she plays with him but in fact she will try to take his place and she will push him aside once more/ it won't do any good.

Andréa tells an example, given as a personal one. She communicates her attempt to make her cousin modify her behaviour. Her narrative shows both linking to the former utterances and to the fable.

She tries to give an answer to the first question: "what will happen between the camels and the dromedary?". She imagines making the opponents play together.

This example (n. 3) is a very precious one. It shows how complex wording can be.

Her utterance can be interpreted through various interrelated items: genre of discourse and wording (she tells a narrative), the assignment, the former discourses, the next locutor's interpretation, and her enunciative habits.

Our interpretation thus take *all of them* into account:

– Andréa's utterance is a narrative. We can identify five of the six narrative components identified by Labov (1978): introduction, indications, development, evaluation, and resolution.

Introduction	MY cousin she is a racist and **I try to make her understand** because Blacks <u>are</u> exactly the same as Whites because they <u>are</u> nice
Indications	because me in her building there <u>is</u> a Black boy
Development	so <u>when</u> he <u>asks</u> her to play with her then **she pushes him away**
Evaluative comment	And me I think it's kind of a shame
Resolution	so to make her understand and well I <u>say</u> "OK I am going to play with the boys" **so after that she <u>gets bored</u> and then she <u>comes</u> to play with us.**

As far as wording is concerned, we notice the use of "when he + present" which confers an iterative or nearly generic meaning to the narrative (due to the non-actualization), and of "I try to": thus the extent of this modalisation cannot be determined. The present authors hesitate between a local modalisation that will concern the predicate "make her understand" or a global modalisation: in that case the whole narrative will be interpreted as an example of behaviour that could make a racist into a non-racist.

– The assignment required answering the question at the end of the fable: "how will the meeting go on?"

Andréa's answer is to act upon the others' behaviour and to bring them to play together.

> Andréa: so after that/ **she gets bored and then she comes to play with us.**

> Axel**:** coming back to Andrea's supposition it's not / not racism it's kind of/ kind of jealousy anyhow.
> Axel: *you* try to make her feel jealous 'cause she plays with him but in fact she will try to take his place and she will **push him aside** once more/ it won't do any good.

Axel's utterance "to push aside" modifies Andréa's narrative way of meaning. It makes a fiction of it like the fable. His utterance is tied with the beginning of the dialogue, on the first question.

– Andrea's narrative is also related to the former discourses. We notice that some other locutors' words are repeated (the repeated words or sentences are in Black):

> Andréa [...] **because the Blacks are exactly the same as the Whites because they are nice**

> Marion 5: The others are Black and it's not (because) they are not like us that we should push them aside and that we should think that they are slaves who don't know anything + we shouldn't say that 'cause **they also look like us** + they have two arms and two legs and they have a head with a brain and they are a little bit like us + **they are like us** it's only the skin that changes because there is a lot of sun that's all + If it was like us but except that if it weren't for the sun it would be the same it would be exactly the same all of us.

> Andréa 2: I have a pal who is Black in our his name is Sidiki and well I do play with him because we ARE not racist we really like Black people because **they are like us**, as Marion said they have a brain like us <laughter> and what's more ***I know some Black people who are nice there are even sometimes Blacks who are nicer than Whites.***

– Her narrative is linked to the next locutor's interpretation too:

> Andréa 4: MY cousin she is a racist and I try to make her understand because the Blacks are exactly the same as the Whites because they are nice because me in her there is a Black boy so when he asks her to play with her well she pushes him away and me I think it's kind of a shame so to make her understand and well I say "OK I'm going to play with the boys" so after that she gets bored and then she comes to play with us.

> Axel 8: <coming back to what Andrea supposition> it isn't racism it's some kind of jealousy anyhow

> Axel speaks of a "supposition", so he makes Andréa's narrative a hypothesis. His discourse is linked with the first question at the beginning of the dialogue. From this point of view, he doubts its relevance. For him, the example concerns jealousy and not racism.

– We can add that each Andrea's narratives resemble each other (have "family resemblances" as Wittgenstein said): she often searches for a compromise.

Let us read a later narrative of Andréa's:

> Andréa 30: In Portugal, in the past they did not like red colour because it was the colour of blood and they often went to mass so err.. after when we went to Portugal well Mum she was wearing red things and so **Mum explained to my granny** that it is not because it's the colour of blood that you shouldn't have to wear these clothes because red won't hurt you + **so after** that they wore red clothes + and to go to mass they didn't wear red things they wore Black things all the time.
> (Andréa's narrative is in its relationship to her enunciative habits)

She seems to think that a good intervention is enough to bring a good conclusion. Andréa is also playing the pupil who answers the teacher, thus her narratives are personal, but recomposed to fit the assignment.

We can say that the dialogue has built the notion and the viewpoint under our eyes.

Conclusion

In this school debate, the aim is neither to persuade the others nor to take the advantage. It's a debate with a heuristic aim. The pupils learn to explore a notion through wording and dialogue.

Favourable conditions have been created to allow them to propose a resolution together and to elaborate notional content. We remark that they do it by repeating former discourses and personal experiences, or given as such, that they success to create a discussion space which supposes listening and cooperation.

We notice the importance of lexical meaning in the debate. We underline the relationships between the way the words work and their types. Words can be the support of a move, but not every word. Besides, the move is tied to the interpretative process, along the exchanges.

Thus, the question of accentuation and interpretation arises: what is the good distance to interpret? What is the good distance to deal with notions?

In our debate, pupils through their discursive moves express viewpoints they would not have said lonely. One can also notice the meeting of various worlds, world of the school, of the family, of history, of stories... and child-like points of view concerning values. The moves manifest the locutor's place and his relationship with the theme, they also reveal the doxa's heterogeneity, and that of the social groups in which we are involved in.

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ARGUMENTATION IN CLASSROOM INTERACTION.
TEACHING AND LEARNING ITALIAN AS A SECOND LANGUAGE

SILVIA GILARDONI

1. *Introduction*

This paper aims at considering the role played by argumentation in teaching and learning languages, by focusing on metalinguistic sequences about grammar and word meaning in classroom interaction.

From the theoretical point of view the study is based on two approaches to research: a) an approach to discourse analysis, which underlines the relevance of the argumentative dimension in verbal communication in a semantic-pragmatic perspective (Rigotti 1998; Rigotti et al. 2003, 2004), and b) a social interactionist approach to language acquisition, which uses the methodology of conversation analysis, taking into account the essential role of interaction in the process of formation and development of language competence (Mondada & Pekarek Doehler 2000, 2001; Pekarek Doehler 2000, 2006)[1].

Following this theoretical and methodological framework, we suggest two levels of analysis:

1. an analysis at the macro level, which focuses on argumentation as a basic dimension of classroom interaction, with specific reference to language teaching;
2. an analysis at the micro level, in order to examine how argumentative discourse emerges from language teaching in different types of classroom activities and interaction sequences. With this purpose, the research is based on a *corpus* of oral classroom interactions collected in different contexts while teaching Italian as a second language to adult learners in Italy and abroad.

The general aim of this research is then principally descriptive, but the analysis also tries to evaluate the different ways of argumentative discourse from the point of view of language teaching and learning, thus giving some methodological suggestions for teaching practice.

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[1] As Pekarek Doehler states (2000: 8-9), the core of this approach can be identified with three fundamental postulates: 1. the constitutive role of the interaction as a structuring factor of the language development process; 2. the contextual sensitivity of the language competences, which depend on the conversational and socio-interactional conditions; 3. the situated and reciprocal character of the discourse and of the cognitive activity, which are situated in the context of action undertaken by the interlocutors and have an interactional nature.

2. *Argumentation in classroom interaction*

In order to better understand the role played by argumentation in language teaching and learning we will briefly consider the concept of education to define the specificity of pedagogic communication in the teaching context.

Education is achieved through the communicative interaction among people, a teacher and a student in the case of a teaching context. In this communicative exchange the teacher takes on the task of providing knowledge, abilities, values, suggesting an interpretation of reality; the learner sees the teacher as an authority because of his/her store of knowledge and competence.

The classroom interaction, like other kinds of interaction in institutional settings, is characterized then by an asymmetry in the relationship between the interlocutors, which contributes to define the discourse organization and the presence of recurrent interactional structures, as the well-known three-part "initiation-response-feedback" sequence (Sinclair & Coulthard 1975)[2]. This asymmetric relationship is normally regarded as a relationship based on the power of social roles, and this fact has led to debate the forms of this kind of interaction and the communicative and pedagogical styles of the educational contexts[3].

Actually it is necessary to focus on the notion of power and it is useful to consider the origins of the word. The Latin word *potestas* is a *vox media*, i.e. a word with positive or negative meaning depending on the context: it can be understood as power based on coercion (*vis*), or power based on authority (Rigotti et al. 2003: 42; Rigotti et al. 2004: 32-33). In the first case, power makes someone do something with a form of violence. The second case is a form of power which makes someone do something to help him/her grow up; as a matter of fact *auctoritas* (authority) comes from the Latin verb *augeo*, i.e. to raise, to grow something.

Power based on authority is related to persuasive discourse and argumentation practice; it can be interpreted in this way, as Rigotti et al. state (2004: 32): "another person does something because I have persuaded him to do so on the basis of good reasons".

Now we can make some observations on the teaching context.

The teacher has an authoritative role because he/she carries out a function of mediation and co-construction of knowledge, in order to help the learner grow up, accompanying him/her into the relationship with reality, and the learner needs this mediation to grow up and *to be* in a properly human sense[4].

The authoritative mediation of the teacher is based then on persuasive communication and argumentation is its essential component.

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[2] See also Mehan (1985), who names this three-part sequence "initiation-reply-evaluation sequence", the so-called IRE sequence. On the asymmetry in institutional interactions and in the classroom interaction see Orletti (2000).

[3] See for instance Fasulo & Girardet (2002) and for a review of studies in this field of research see Ciliberti (1999).

[4] About the vocation of the teacher as a mediator see Zambrano (2008 [1965]).

When the teacher conveys knowledge and data, he/she asks the learner to accept them and while speaking he/she has to explain the reasons: it is clear that the way of communicating requires an argumentative approach, not simply the transmission of information, in order to be adequate for the pedagogic communication itself and for the felicity of communication (Rigotti 2007).

In the learning process the learner gives credit to the teacher because he/she sees the teacher as an authority, i.e. a trustworthy witness for his/her store of knowledge and competence.

The pedagogic action of the teacher interacts then with the task of the learner, who undertakes to verify the teacher's interpretation of reality: so, the learner receives and accepts contents, explanations, data, theses, internalizes them and verifies them in his/her personal experience.

We can observe that the teaching and learning interaction is based first of all on the responsibility of each interagent, who does not have to give up his/her task[5].

On the other hand, pedagogic communication is influenced also by other factors, i.e. the interest and the relevance, which are the core of the pedagogic interaction as well as of communication in general. Interest and relevance are the basis of an important notion of educational psychology, i.e. motivation: as everybody knows, learning is not possible without motivation, the key element that sets in motion the learning process[6].

2.1 Argumentation in second language teaching and learning

Let us now closely examine the case of interaction in teaching and learning a second language.

As regards the content and aims of language teaching and learning it is necessary to consider the known dichotomy between competence and performance, in Chomskian ter-

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[5] The pedagogical relationship can be considered as a meeting place of the responsibility and freedom of the interagents, as Zambrano (2008 [1965]: 118) clearly points out: "Tutto dipende da ciò che accade in quell'istante che apre la classe ogni giorno: tutto dipende dal fatto che, nel confronto tra maestro e alunni, non si verifichi la rinuncia di nessuna delle due parti: dal fatto che il maestro non rinunci trascinato dalla vertigine, quella vertigine che assale quando si sta soli, su di un piano più alto del silenzio dell'aula, e dal fatto che non si difenda neppure dalla vertigine aggrappandosi all'autorità stabilita. La rinuncia trascinerebbe il maestro sullo stesso piano del discepolo, alla finzione di essere uno di loro, al proteggersi rifugiandosi in uno pseudo cameratismo. La reazione difensiva lo condurrebbe a dare per fatto quel che deve ancora farsi, poiché una lezione deve essere offerta allo stato nascente. Nella trasmissione orale della conoscenza si tratta di un doppio risveglio, di una confluenza di sapere e di non sapere ancora. E questo doppiamente, perché la domanda che il discepolo porta incisa sulla fronte deve manifestarsi e rendersi chiara a lui stesso, dato che l'alunno comincia a essere tale quando gli si rivela la domanda che porta nascosta dentro. Una domanda che, nel momento della sua formulazione, è l'inizio del risveglio nella maturità, l'espressione stessa della libertà".

[6] On motivation in pedagogical science see Titone (1977).

minology, that is to say between the system and its realization, system and use, system and text.

This distinction is clearly dealt with in the "Common European Framework of Reference for Languages" (Council of Europe 2001: 9), when it defines the "communicative language competences", i.e. those competences "which empower a person to act using specifically linguistic means". The communicative language competences comprise several competences: linguistic, sociolinguistic and pragmatic. The linguistic competence includes the dimensions of language as a system, i.e. lexical, phonological, syntactical knowledge and skills. Sociolinguistic and pragmatic competence refer to language use: sociolinguistic competence is concerned with "the sociocultural conditions of language use"; pragmatic competence refers to "the functional use of linguistic resources (production of language functions, speech acts)" and the mastery of discourse, of text types and forms (Council of Europe 2001: 13).

The language system consists of structures and rules as a whole that the teacher is expected to give students as means to understand and produce texts.

The student accepts data and examples and is expected to discover rules and structures, verify and internalize them. The learner starts a process of developing hypotheses, of reflecting on language, and this process leads to the development of his/her awareness of how a language works and consequently how it is used. It is the case of the metalinguistic competence, which is implicit, operational, at the beginning of interlanguage development, while it becomes explicit and formal in the following stages (Freddi 1994: 90).

Performance corresponds with taking the risk of communication, with creativity in language use: the teacher is supposed to introduce the learner to the risk of communication, to lead him/her to experience language and to use the language system in relationship with reality, and the learner is expected to take this risk.

The motivation to learning will be linked with the personal and social need of the learner and with the attractiveness of the language itself, from a social and cultural point of view[7].

As regards the practice of argumentation in this context, we can notice that argumentation is often required in language comprehension and production classroom activities: we can consider, for example, the activation of inferential processes in comprehension activities (questions, cloze tests, etc.) or the argumentative practices in production activities such as writing argumentative texts, summaries, taking part in a discussion, in role-plays, in a debate about pros and cons of an issue.

Nevertheless, there is an argumentative dimension at a deeper level of communication, which is related to the discourse of the teacher and to the interaction moves.

The teacher is expected to give explanations about language and has to give reasons about various aspects of the language system and language use.

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[7] On motivation in language teaching see Freddi (1994: 4-6) and Balboni (2002: 37-40). On the concept of language attractiveness with particular reference to Italian language, see De Mauro et al. (2002) and Gilardoni (2005).

The teacher also has a specific role in the interaction. Relating to some observations in Py (1990), we can state that there are two complementary moves in language classroom interaction: a "self-structuring move" performed by the learner when producing messages (on the basis of the interlanguage), and a "hetero-structuring move" performed by the native (or native-like) speaker, who intervenes in the previous move monitoring communication.

Besides, the discourse is characterized by the so-called bifocalisation (Bange 1992), that is to say the double focus on form and content which is typical of the interaction in second language classes, where the participants can focus their attention on the linguistic aspects of messages and/or on the content.

In the interactional moves, negotiation processes of meanings and forms take place between the interagents: during the interaction the teacher and the learner reach an agreement on communicative aims, meanings, procedures and forms of communication.

The monitoring activity of the teacher and the activation of negotiation processes can originate "potentially acquisitional sequences" (De Pietro, Matthey & Py 1989), i.e. sequences, which are particularly favourable for second language acquisition, because, by answering communicative needs, they facilitate the integration of new elements into the interlanguage.

3. *Teaching and learning Italian as a second language: argumentation and interaction*

The empirical part of this research, that is the analysis at the micro level of the argumentative dimension in classroom discourse, is based on a *corpus* of oral classroom interactions collected in different courses of Italian to foreigners. The contexts we analysed are the following:

– a summer course of Italian language and culture for adult learners, with an intermediate level of proficiency, held by an Institute of Italian language and culture in Italy;
– a course of Italian language and Business Italian for students with an upper-intermediate level at the University of Coventry[8].

The analysis considers how argumentative discourse emerges in language teaching and learning. Emphasis is placed on two different types of interaction sequences, which seemed significant from the point of view of argumentation:

– sequences about grammatical questions, consisting in a metalinguistic reflection about aspects of the language system;

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[8] The *corpus* consists of 10 hours of audio recorded lessons at the Institute of Italian language and culture in Italy, collected in August 2007, and of 20 hours of audio recorded lessons at the University of Coventry, collected in the period between October 2007 and February 2008. We would like to thank the headmistress and the teachers of the Institute of Italian language and culture (the Tolomei Cultural Institute in Settignano, near Florence) and the teachers of the courses at the University of Coventry, who took part in the research. We also thank Paola Arrigoni and Margherita Tanca, who collaborated in collecting the data.

–   sequences about use and meaning of words, consisting in cooperative activities of building, negotiating and verifying lexical hypotheses.

3.1 Grammar and argumentative discourse

A metalinguistic reflection on grammatical questions can be managed by the teacher on his/her own initiative or at the learner's request, during the different activities and stages of the lesson.

In the following example the teacher is correcting the students' written texts together with them, in order to point out the most common grammar mistakes; a typical mistake regards the use of combined prepositions with the definite article:

Extract 1 (Se2_130807_39.10)
1   T: fai una frase con .. eh . l'espressione di: l'avverbio di luogo . vicino\ .. inventa una frase usando .. magari
2   pensa alla: .. la descrizione di un luogo non lo so\
3   S1:   la nostra casa è: . vicino . al- alla chiesa\
4   T: bene . brava .. perché qui fate bene e quando scrivete fate male/
((*laughs*))
5   T: <la nostra casa è vicino (4s) alla chiesa\ > ((*T writes on the blackboard*)) okay\ eh molti di voi molti=molti di voi
6   si dimenticano/ ... si dimenticano la preposizione articolata si dimenticano l'articolo\ .. la regola di uso
7   dell'articolo .. della preposizione articolata la regola è: la stessa che eh: . la regola della preposizione articolata
8   è la stessa dell'articolo\ . cioè io vivo A settignano\ .. no/ . senza articolo quindi la nostra casa è vicina A
9   settignano . ma eh con le parole e i nomi comuni usiamo l'articolo\ . quindi la nostra casa è vicino Alla chiesa\ .
10   tante persone si dimEnticano l'articolo\

The teacher reminds the students that the rule of combined prepositions with the definite article is the same as the rule of the article (l. 6-9). This is explained through examples: one example is elicited from a student (l. 1-4), another example is offered by the teacher (l. 8-9). The examples allow to infer the rule, which is then made explicit (l. 9: "we use the article with common nouns").

This excerpt exemplifies a recurrent style of grammar explanation, which is conducted through examples and enunciation of rules: in this way the teacher shows his/her authority and competence and tries to guide the learners in the discovery of language, in the construction of knowledge and in the development of language awareness.

The interaction goes on with a question by a student, who asks the difference between "vicino" and "vicina" ("near"), both used by the teacher in the examples:

Extract 2 (Se2_130807_39.15)
1   S1:   è è vicinO o vicina?
2   T: brAva\
((*laughs*))
3   T: questo è un problema cioè . eh: mh in questo caso puoi dire in=in entrambi i modi cioè . così questa parola è
4   un avverbio\ . se metti . vicina diventa l'aggettivo\ . ma è uguale la nostra frase in questo caso sì ... eh mh . la
5   maggior volte però lo usiamo come avverbio quindi sempre con la o\
6   S1:   ah
7   T: sì è più usato\ . mh/ . la nostra casa . è vicina alla chiesa la nostra casa è vicino alla chiesa .. sono abbastanza
8   intercambiabili\

The teacher answers that the difference between "vicino" and "vicina" is a problem. She explains that they are two different parts of speech, "vicino" is an adverb, while "vicina" is an adjective (l. 3-4). But the argumentation goes on in a slightly weak way: she says that there is no difference in use (l. 4: "it is the same"), then she corrects herself and says that the two words are nearly interchangeable (l. 7-8).

The teacher wants to find a criterion for the choice and uses as an argument the frequency of use, a statistical criterion. The reasoning is: let's use "vicino" because it is used more frequently (l. 4-7). Actually the frequency criterion does not seem valid enough in this case, it has to be checked.

The choice between "vicino" or "vicina" is an aspect of the system, which is variable and linked to use. A reasoning which could be helpful for the learner could rather be the following: let's use "vicino" because it is easier, it always ends in "-o", and you have no problems with agreements.

In the following extract we find another example of metalinguistic reflection within the activity of correcting exercises; the argumentation is problematic again:

Extract 3 (Se2_130807_1.06.20)

1 S1: voglio: gli voglio bene . voglio loro bene\ .. gli o loro/
2 T: brava questa è una bella questione\ qui c'è sempre la differenza parlato scritto\ .. eh faccio solo un accenno a
3   questa cosa poi la incontreremo: eh ... allora eh ...< voglio . bene . voglio bene alle mie: amiche\> ((*T writes on*
4   *the blackboard*)) volere bene amare essere amico no/ . <voglio bene (2s) loro .. sarebbe voglio bene loro ..
5   oppure A .. loro> ((*T writes on the blackboard*)) questa è la forma corretta . è la forma dello scritto\ .. la
6   REGOLA vuole che tu non usi un gli una=una: particella pronominale . ma usi direttamente il pronome
7   personale\ .. voglio bene a loro=voglio bene loro\ .. NEL parlAto parlando . quindi una una regola non proprio
8   correttissima .. usiamo gli voglio bene <gli voglio bene> ((*T writes on the blackboard*)) anche se sono donne e al
9   plurale\ ... questa è la FRASE .. che usiamo parlando\ . questa è la frase CORRETTA .. è la frase che usiamo
10   nello scritto è la frase che spiega la regola\
[...]
11   eh questo è strano perché questo gli: . di solito . cioè questo gli secondo la regola è maschile singolare\ .. ho
12   un fratello . GLI voglio molto bene\ . è corretto . A LUI\ mh/ .. e parlAndo questo GLI . lo usiamo <sia per .. loro .
13   a loro maschile ... a loro femminile\> ((*T writes on the blackboard*)) ... quindi questa non è la regola .. ma è
14   l'uso\

A student asks a question about the use of the pronouns "gli" or "loro" ("them") for the third person plural of the indirect object pronoun (l. 1). The teacher explains that there is a difference between the written and the oral form (l. 2). There is a correct form, which is the form used in writing and follows the rule, i.e. the use of the pronoun "loro" (l. 4-7 and 9-10). When you speak there is a form which is not really correct (l. 7-8): "gli", which in accordance with the rule is the masculine form of the third person singular, is used instead of "loro" as the masculine and feminine form of the third person plural (l. 8-9 and 11-13).

We can observe that the teacher appears a bit uncertain about the explanation. First she says that in speaking there is a "rule" which is not really correct (l. 7-8), then she states that it is not the rule but the use (l. 13-14).

The example shows the persistence in teaching practice of the idea of rule as norm, prescription, correctness, in opposition to use, which can also be incorrect. But, why should a learner follow the rule, if the use is different? Actually, the problem is simply to acknowledge that in the system of the language and also in language teaching, there is a distinction between a variety for formal writing and a variety for speaking[9].

In the next extract the teacher is explaining the negative structure of the imperative form:

Extract 4 (Se2_130807_1.00.56)
1   T: quindi ricordate sempre la negazione è NON più .. eh infinito per quanto riguarda il TU noi stiamo parlando del
2   TU va bene/ . <imperativo .. imperativo ... mh/> ((*T writes on the blackboard*))
3   S1:   ma se devo dire: voi noi/ metto:/
4   T: benissimo . okay ora facciamo: vi faccio uno schema\ . a:llora ... <TU . e VOI questi sono gli imperativi più usati
5   ovviamente\ ... mh/ . tu ... positivo e negativo\ eh quindi positivo è METTI> ((*T writes on the blackboard*)) ...
6   negativo/
7   S2:   non=non mettere\
8   T: <non mettere\> ((*T writes on the blackboard*)) ... il voi/ chi: voglio sentire qualcuno che mi risponde:/
9   S3:   mh voi/
((3s silence))
10   T: questo è semplicemente: . il verbo all'indicativo\ ... voi/ questo è tu METTI voi/ ... met- [te te . mh/
11   S3:   [mettete
12   T: la negazione/
13   S3:   non mette- . non mettete\
14   T: brava mh/ <non . mettete\> ((*T writes on the blackboard*)) .. quindi l'Infinito è solo per il tu .. questo è strano\ ...
15   okay\

For the negative structure of the imperative, "non" is placed before the forms used in the affirmative structure; for the second person singular "non" + infinitive is used, as it is illustrated by the example "non mettere" ("don't put"). In this case the teacher only states the rule (l. 1-2), she does not argue and does not explain the rule thoroughly; she says only "it's strange" (l. 14), that is to say it is unusual, it is different from the other forms. The reason of this language form can be understood in a diachronic perspective, because the form comes from the neo-Latin negative structure of the imperative. Then the teacher decides not to give

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[9] On the linguistic varieties of Italian language in relation to language teaching, see Sabatini (1984), Benucci (2001) and Santipolo (2002). In the mentioned extract we have to notice another problematic aspect in the discourse of the teacher: speaking about the difference between the use of "gli" and "loro" she distinguishes between "gli" as pronominal particle and "loro" as personal pronoun (l. 8-9), giving a terminological distinction which can create confusion and does not appear pertinent. As a matter of fact "gli" and "loro" are both personal pronouns; if we want to distinguish them, we can refer to their form, which in the case of "gli" is unstressed, while in the case of "loro" is considered pseudo-unstressed.

a complete explanation for a pedagogic choice, because she thinks that it is not relevant for the addressees.

The previous extract exemplifies a way of presentation of grammar, which responds to a pedagogic and teaching criterion: in the description of the language system the teacher has to refer to the notion of the so called "pedagogic grammar" (Corder 1973), that is to say a presentation of information about language with the purpose of facilitating language learning, a grammar, which has to be useful for the learner.

3.2 Word meaning and argumentative discourse

The focalization on the meaning and the use of words, the so-called process of noticing (Nation 2001), occurs in classroom interaction when learners have to face lexical gaps and partial or complete opacity of lexical units, or when the teacher suggests the development of vocabulary as the learning goal. This means that the teacher is expected to communicate the meaning of words, in order to solve lexical comprehension or production problems and/or to increase the learners' vocabulary. To communicate word meanings the teacher can use various techniques, which are complementary: non verbal communication (using gesture or actions, drawing, using real objects), translation into the first language (or into another known language), and definition in the second language. We will deal in detail with this last way of communicating the meaning of a word[10].

Using definitions in the second language involves an argumentative dimension of the discourse. The teacher is expected to provide or elicit the definition of a word, that is to discover and to verbally describe the content of a concept: this means explaining and justifying the use and the meaning of a lexical unit, giving relevant, clear and understandable information.

There are many ways of defining a word and different typologies of definitions have been classified. From the point of view of language teaching we think that it is useful to refer to the analysis suggested by Jakobson. Studying the functioning of language and aphasic language disturbances, he pointed out two possible ways of giving definitions, one called "predicative" and the other one "substitutive", which are based on the two types of relations connecting linguistic units, i.e. the relation of contiguity and the relation of similarity (Jakobson 1971 [1956]). Thus, a definition can be based a) on a predicative connection, which expresses a relation of contiguity with the word to be defined, when, for example, the class of a concept or its defining characteristics are pointed out; or b) on a substitutive relation, which expresses a relation of similarity, as in the case of using synonyms or antonyms.

In the following extract the teacher has to explain the meaning of the utterance "sembrare una scamorza" (to look like scamorza cheese), here related to the appearance of a little girl, a character of a novel read by the students:

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[10] On the various ways of communicating word meaning in teaching Italian as a second language see Gilardoni (in press).

Extract 5 (Se3_130807_0.13.03)
1   I: barbara è bassissima è grass- è una bambina . cioè sembra dicono sembra una scamorza\ . il
2   formaggio scamorza . <è fatto così> ((*T draws on the blackboard*))
3   I: <è un formaggio: italiano> ((*T draws on the blackboard*)) ... okay/ questo si chiama scamorza\   ... è   un
4   formaggio che ha la buccia dura dentro . dentro è tipo: mozzarella ma non è mozzarella è più secco della
5   mozzarella\

After drawing the shape of scamorza cheese, which the suggested comparison with the very short and fat child is related to[11], the teacher also gives a verbal definition of the word, providing a term, the class word, and its characteristics, which are in a relation of contiguity with the word to be defined: explaining the word "scamorza" she says in fact that it is Italian cheese (l. 3) and it has a hard skin (l. 4). The teacher then mentions another kind of Italian cheese, "mozzarella", which has a relation of similarity with "scamorza", but it allows to add another characteristic of the object to be defined, i.e. the drier, harder texture (l. 4-5).

In the following example, a student asks a clarification about the meaning of the word "bassotto" (dachshund):

Extract 6 (Se3_130807_16.15)
1   T: innanzitutto volevo chiedere a voi se ci sono parole . che non avete capito\
2   S1:   mh un bassotto è un cucciolo di cane/
3   T: NO il bassotto è un: eh razza .. il bassotto è una RAZZA di cane\ . <il bassotto è ((*T draws on the blackboard*))
4   S1:   ah
5   T: <okay/ è fatto . così è lunghi:ssimo\> ((*T draws on the blackboard*))
6   S2:   il bassotto è lungo
7   T: <ha il muso così\> ((*T draws on the blackboard*)) .. il bassotto è con le gambe corte e il corpo lungo\
8   S3:   vuol dire che è . è un cane no/
9   T: sì però è una razza non è un: non è un cucciolo o:
10 S2:   penso che bassotto perché sia: basso\
11 T: esatto esatto basso bassotto mh/ il corpo lungo e le zampe corte\

The student, asking a question about the meaning of "bassotto", puts forward a hypothesis for the definition, thinking that "bassotto" means puppy (l. 2). This lexical hypothesis probably arose with reference to the concept of "basso" (short), which the word seems to derive from[12]; but being short is a characteristic of this dog, as suggested afterwards by another student (l. 10). The teacher corrects the student's hypothesis by giving the predicative definition "it is a breed of dog" (l. 3) and also by drawing the dog on the blackboard; she then adds some characteristics of the animal, it is very long (l. 5), it has short legs and a long body. But it looks like another student does not understand the correction of the first hypothesis of definition (l. 8): this allows the teacher to repeat the correct definition: "it is a breed, not a puppy" (l. 9).

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[11] To be precise, the expression "essere una scamorza" ("to be 'scamorza' cheese") is usually used in Italian to define a person of weak character and who lacks personality or who is inadequate.
[12] Actually "bassotto" can be considered a lexicalization of the form derived from the adjective "basso" (short) and the suffix "-otto".

In this example we can notice a way of communicating the meaning which is not really effective. We mean that the choice of the hyperonym "razza" (breed) in the definition caused comprehension problems, because the word was probably unfamiliar to the learners; using a more common and basic word like "tipo" (type) might have facilitated the comprehension.

In extract n. 6, the teacher is presenting the vocabulary related to the weather:

Extract 7 (Se2_130807_1.55.23)

```
1   T:   queste sono le parole delle stagioni (2s) e le parole del tempo\ .. Oggi=oggi secondo voi come è/ è una
2        giornata/
3   S1:  pioggia/
4   T:   l'aggettivo/ . piovosa .. mh/ piena di pioggia\ ... sono cose molto semplici . È sereno quindi c'è il sole È coperto
5        ci sono le nuvole è nUvoloso\ . è coperto:/ .. ci sono delle nuvole non tanto forti non tanto pesanti\ . è nuvoloso
6        ci sono delle nuvole\
```

The teacher explains the predicative content of some adjectives related to the weather, by giving the definition of their meaning. In the case of "sereno" (clear) she speaks about the condition: the weather is clear, when it is sunny (l. 4). In the case of "piovoso" and "nuvoloso" (rainy and cloudy) she considers, even if not explicitly, the semantic value of the bound morpheme "-oso": a day "full of rain" and "when there are a lot of clouds" (l. 4-6). This example shows that the knowledge of word formation processes is an important part of lexical competence, as everybody knows, and it is also a useful strategy to elicit and to communicate the word meaning.

In the last extract, the metalinguistic work of lexical definition is used by the teacher in order to develop the lexical competence of the learner in a cooperative way:

Extract 8 (IL_200208.39.48)

```
1    S1:  ho visto un bando di concorso per un posto di: . tecnico eh dell'ambiente/
2    T:   mh . sì sì è giusto un bando\ . che cos'è il bando/
3    S2:  si trova in un: giornale\
4    T:   mh . potrebbe essere su un giornale su una gazzetta ufficiale . e che cos'è esattamente il bando/
5    S3:  eh (3s) una pubblicità . come=come pubblicità per un:
6    T:   si:/
7    S3:  per il lavoro/
9    T:   mh sì pubblicità oppure è . viene si dice viene .. pubblicato un bando cioè è l'annuncio [mh/
10   S2:                                                                                          [l'annuncio
11   T:   l'abbiamo fatto anche quando [abbiamo fatto business
12   S2:                               [sì=si
13   T:   italian for business okay\ . il bando di un concorso cioè viene annunciato . che ci sarà un concorso\
```

While correcting some exercises, the teacher decides to verify the comprehension of the word "bando" (announcement of competition), found in an utterance, and asks the students the meaning of the word (l. 2). A student tries to define the word in a predicative way:

"you can find it in a newspaper" (l. 3). The teacher accepts only partially the definition of the word suggested by the student and repeats the question, eliciting a new definition from another student; in this case the student defines the word in a substitutive way: "bando" is like an advertisement for a job (l. 5-7). The teacher then suggests a definition with a better substitute, underlining the sense of announcement, which the concept of "bando" is related to (l. 9).

The negotiation of word meaning to find a good definition in the second language helps to develop the defining competence, which is based on the ability to infer lexical meaning from contextualized language use, making a metalinguistic operation of decontextualisation: this means, as Nation states (2001: 64), "that the word is removed from its message context to be focused on as a language item". Defining is then a rather specialized speech genre, which requires some cognitive effort of the learners and is possible, above all, with students at upper-intermediate or advanced level. Nevertheless, we should recognize that it deserves proper attention in classroom interaction, as it is an important part of both the lexical competence and the metalinguistic competence.

4. *Concluding remarks*

Through the analysis of the interaction between teacher and students in the classroom we have tried to show the essential role of argumentative discourse in the context of second language teaching and learning.

In the language classroom the task of the teacher meets the task of the learner.

The teacher is expected to be a good arguer, because he/she has to explain and justify both the use of language structures and word meaning and use. In his/her activity of supporting and monitoring language learning, the teacher has also to provide his/her authoritative confirmation about the hypotheses formulated by the learner in the process of the development of the interlanguage.

The learner is then expected to develop hypotheses on language structure and use and verify them practicing and improving the second language.

This means that the classroom should be considered as a "community of practice" (Wenger 1998), that is a context where the interagents have a shared understanding of the purposes of the interaction, of their actions and tasks and of themselves as members of the community.

In such a community of practice clear and effective argumentation is a condition to facilitate and support learning and contributes to generate potentially acquisitional sequences in the interaction. This occurs, as we have tried to show in the analysis of the *corpus*, both in the explanation of grammar and in the communication of word meaning.

After this analysis, we think that it is necessary to further examine and assess the various argumentative practices in second language teaching and learning, in order to develop

the awareness of the argumentative dimension in teaching discourse and to plan teacher training courses in this field.

As a matter of fact the skill of argumentation is to be considered as one of the characteristics of a good second language teacher; so, quoting and paraphrasing Corder (1973: 347), we can state that "a well-qualified, energetic[,] inventive" and well arguing "teacher can be a 'living' pedagogical grammar".

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Transcription conventions

[		overlapping speech
-		cut off word or truncated speech
. .. ...		short pause, pause of medium length, long pause
(3s)		a pause, timed in seconds
:		prosodic lengthening
/		rising intonation
\		falling intonation
AABB		prominent speech
=		words following each other fast, without a break
(( ))	< >	features of interaction that cannot be transcribed (( )) and delimitation of the commented features < >
[...]		part omitted in the transcription

Symbols to identify who is speaking:

T: teacher

S1, S2, ...: students

Each extract is labeled with a code indicating its collocation in the *corpus*.

HOW DOES ARGUMENTATIVE STRUCTURE PLAY OUT WHEN COMMENTING ON A THEORETICAL TEXT IN ONE'S SECOND LANGUAGE?

MARIE J. MYERS

Description of the study

In this qualitative case study we analysed students' argumentative discourse in e-mail discussions on assigned theoretical readings in a training course for teachers of French as a second language. These readings were assigned weekly and served as the basis for the next in-class discussion. The contents of the e-mails were used to identify the major questions that required follow-up in class. In analysing the e-mails we used two measures: first, we looked for emerging categories and second, we used a complexity scale to look for 'complexification' in language use. The assigned readings were varied but were all in French. The level of difficulty the readings entailed could be classified as advanced. The reaction papers were not part of assignments to be graded but rather only formative in nature and a way to identify what had not been understood and in need of further clarification (Lave & Wenger 1991; Wenger 1998; Gee 1999; Wertsch 1991). Students were required to forward their e-mails on a weekly basis using their anonymous e-mail code. We analysed the e-mail reactions over five consecutive weeks. The object of the study was to examine argumentative discourse in reaction papers on theoretical texts (Laing, Phillipson & Lee 1966).

Since these assigned reaction-papers were expected to be written in French, the students' second language we also examined the characteristics of ability to use the second-language in argumentative discourse (Kern 1994). The objective of this study using dialogue analysis was two-fold: one, to find emerging categories and then we classified the various utterances in order to uncover intention, ability to express opinion, logic, causality, objectivity, information content, disengagement or inertia in meaning transfer and contestation, so as to identify communicative ability at an advanced level and to channel it in an opportune way for the benefit of future teaching practice (Verity 2000; Swaffar 1988; Myers 2004); second, to understand the level of complexity at which these future teachers of French could function in the French Language, their L2, and uncover weaknesses in order to develop remedial strategies for the future (Johnson 1982).

Theoretical background

Sperber & Wilson (1989) divide verbal communication into two communication processes, one based on coding and decoding, and the other one having to do with ostentation and inference. What is coded is of course of a linguistic nature but also corresponds to an intention. Relating to the former there are acoustic signals being used for semantic representations. Regarding the latter Foppa (1984) claims that every utterance is formulated by someone with an intention. The researcher thinks that when we start expressing ourselves we pretty well know what we intend to say although our intention may not be very clear in our minds. It appears that we do have to formulate our utterances in order for us to be able to verify if what we say corresponds to what we intended to say, and if need be we back-track and correct ourselves. Levelt (1989) also agrees that there is an intention underlying every articulation. So as intention and language use go hand in hand it is quite appropriate to study the language used by these teachers in training so as to establish their level of functioning in language and meaning-making (Auerbach 1992) and to assess the development of their professional thinking (Harré & Gillett 1984).

Participants

We used purposive sampling for the selection of papers from the participants who were part of the course. All the papers were from a fifth year university course with 24 students starting in September 2007. After the course ended, regularly assigned course reaction papers from a five week duration were chosen for analysis. Papers ranged from one to two pages in length. The selection was made based on the fact that these papers were anonymous, sent by e-mail and could not be traced to the author. Each page was assigned a number, so two consecutive page numbers could be part of the same paper. In fact from more than 150 pages, only 50 could be retained for analysis to protect anonymity.

Data analysis

We used two measures to look at argumentative structure.
    First, we analysed the transfer of lexical meaning from the 46 French texts of students' reactions into reaction in inter-linguistic and inter-cultural transposition. More specifically we looked at the relations between the utterances, in terms of intention based on the understanding achieved of complex texts, and the ability of enunciators to convey their reaction in argumentative discourse by linguistic means. Logic, causality, objectivity and informational content are factors taken into account. The pages were given numbers from 1 to 50 with some having more than one page. Within each paper each line where an item or unit of meaning appeared was numbered as well. So for instance P 18-20 refers to paper 18 and to the unit of meaning on line 20 in that paper.

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The texts were colour coded for each emerging category. The categories were entered onto a chart, with each uncovered item transcribed and referenced under the appropriate item heading.

Second, Duran & Ramaut's (2006) framework originally intended for setting-up tasks in a sequenced order of difficulty was adapted and made to fit the context of our study and our situation in order to use it for the analysis of results.

We understand that this framework, intended for the measurement of processing ability for the receptive skill of reading will certainly represent a greater challenge where the measurement of language production is concerned, namely in our case, critical reaction texts. The authors think nevertheless that the complexity scale also works for production-based tasks. They state that at basic proficiency levels, fluency and complexity prevail over accuracy. So, as far as language output is concerned, getting across the message was considered more essential than spelling accurately or having perfect grammar, this category fitted within our study.

The complexity scale was taken into account when looking at the data and relevant numbers of examples identified under each category as each emerged in the findings. These are reported below.

Results

We found that the students agreed overall with the theoretical underpinnings presented in the different assigned weekly readings in the textbook. One problem that surfaced was disengagement in a very small number of texts while in others, but only for 6% of the text items, we identified contestation, questioning and even rejection of the statements made in the readings.

A. *Findings related to the first dialogue analysis measure that was applied.*
The analysis uncovered the emergent main categories listed below:
- Intention based on understanding achieved
- Ability to convey reaction to argumentative discourse by linguistic means
- Logic
- Causality
- Objectivity
- Informational content.

Other smaller categories were uncovered, namely:
- Disengagement
- Contestation and rejection.

The question was whether or not the students were impeded in their argumentation because of the request to use their second language in the critical response. There were two such cases, where at times responses to the French text were in English and frustration was evi-

dent. The question is whether these students clearly understood the argumentation in the theoretical text in French, their second language; or whether other constraints were placed on them by their lack of practice in using argumentative discourse in general. Another argument could be made around the more strenuous effort entailed in summarizing and critiquing in another language, in which one may not be as used to the economy of words expected, although one might be a fluent user. For the examples, the first number given is the number assigned to the paper followed by the line number in that specific paper.

- Examples at the 'Intentional levels' (amount of effort applied to arrive at a full understanding).

In one instance, there was no effort made: *J'aime l'idée de donner le texte écrit qui correspond à ce que l'apprenant écoute* (22-19, 20).

The instructions were to only give the text to look at after the listening activity, clearly the student skimmed the text and did not try to get the full meaning.

Some effort was apparent in a number of texts: *Je ne suis pas certaine ce que les termes veulent dire. Donc si possible, est-ce qu'on pourrait en discuter...?* (9-8,9).

This person identified the barrier caused by a lack of understanding of some terms.

The same is obvious in the following examples:

> 11-2: *Je n'ai jamais étudié la linguistique donc, je trouve cela un peu difficile à suivre: Que veulent dire la pragmalinguistique et la sociopragmatique exactement?*
> 11-9: *qu'est-ce-que la pré-communicative exactement?*
> 13-17, 18, 19: *La chose que je n'ai pas vraiment compris{e} de ce chapitre est le concept de réalité métaphorique construite par la langue. Je ne sais pas si c'est un concept essentiel ou non, mais je n'ai pas tout à fait compris!*

Clearly efforts were made according to these comments at various levels.

- Examples under: 'Ability to convey opinion by proper linguistic means'.

Under this category there is great variation going from 'inability to do so' (paper 5) and 'doing so with difficulty' (paper 1) to 'great ability'.

In one case the comment was limited to a general reaction: *je ne suis pas du tout d'accord avec cet énoncé* (10-4,5).

In other cases, the students were quite able to do so: paper 7 was good throughout; other good examples are:

> 4-27, 28: *Quelques suggestions sont différentes pour les niveaux en 9e année, 10e, pour les explications du fonctionnement de la structure lexicale.*
> 19-1, 2: *L'accent mis dans ce chapitre sur la prise de conscience du contexte de situation, des pratiques sociales, est, à mon avis, particulièrement pertinent.*
> 22-30, 31, 32: *Une chose que j'ai appris en faisant ce lecture est la variabilité d'un sens en contexte dans la compréhension de l'écrit. Et l'habileté du lecteur de voir ce qui est explicite et implicite.*

- Examples under the topic: 'Logic'.

There were cases where total confusion was apparent (paper 6) and where a lack of logic was identified (paper 5).

Otherwise there appeared to be a good display of logic in papers 8-1 to 17.

Regarding the following example: 19-22: *On participe chacun à la création de ce qu'on est.* Nowhere in the text was there a reference made to this point, so there is evidence here that a logical conclusion was drawn.

- Examples under the heading: 'Causality'.

Negative causes were identified in the following examples:

> 7-20: *4 ans d'études ont abouti à un niveau oral pitoyable*
> 11-5: *Il peut y avoir beaucoup d'anxiété quand les locuteurs natifs sont présents*
> 11-34, 35, 36: *Vous dites qu'il manque un pont entre les savoirs et les savoir-faire; moi je suis d'accord, car cela est un problème que j'ai. Dans une leçon de grammaire je réussirai, mais quand je dois l'appliquer j'ai de la misère.*
> 19-13, 14: *Dans mes cours j'ai hâte d'offrir à mes élèves l'occasion de ce développement à travers, comme le texte suggère, des textes écrits en L2 à propos de la cultures/des cultures de L1.*
> 32 (end): *on pourrait encourager des gens moins compétents à continuer leurs études de français après la 9e année.* To date most learners drop French after Grade 9. So the suggestion is to have those who don't reach the required level of competence continue their French Studies.

- Examples under the heading: 'Objectivity'.

Not unlike what is required of future teachers these students were level-headed and for the most part no lack of objectivity was identified**.**

> 12-8 and 9-16,17 are typical examples.
> 18-21, 22: *On doit se rendre compte que le contexte culturel et nos expériences personnelles peuvent influencer notre compréhension d'une langue seconde.*
> 11-7, 8: *Il est important que les apprenants aient des silences plus longs si nécessaire avant de se mettre à interagir, comme vous dites.*
> 46-19, 21: *Je suis d'accord que le vocabulaire est très important dans l'apprentissage et l'enseignement d'une langue seconde et la qualité, l'étendue et la maîtrise du vocabulaire sont des paramètres essentiels de l'acquisition de la langue.*
> 3-22, 23: *J'ai beaucoup aimé lire cet article et il m'a beaucoup fait réfléchir sur mon enseignement de la langue étrangère.*

- Under the heading 'Informational Content' we identified the various ways provided for adding information including when we detected bluffing, where there was incomprehensibility and where economy of words corresponded to the use of more abstract language.

Bluff was identified in the following examples: paper 6 and 1-12, 13: *Commence avec un exemple au lieu d'une liste pour catégoriser les idées.* In the latter example the comment was on lay-out but did not add anything to content.

> 27: *Il y a un article du Reader's Digest [dans lequel on dit] que les américains sont plus polis que les asiatiques et aussi les européens. Il y a des préjudices mais ceci l'issue. Peut-être quand on parle de culture, la parole et le résultat on peut utiliser "being direct or indirect" au lieu place de poli et impoli.*

In that example there is no contribution in informational content, rather it appears to be confused talk.

Direct transposition/translation was identified in the following example: 11-9: *En anglais on dirait "longer wait-time".*

> 23-13, 14, 15: *Je pense que c'est très important ... qu'on développe l'aud[i]tif ... en faisant beaucoup d'activités d'écoute et à l'oral.* In this example the text is repeated.

A number of good contributions were identified:

> 4-17, 18: *L'expérience vraie d'apprentissage est quand les étudiants essayent d'utiliser la langue eux-mêmes.*
> 21-9: *donne un tableau à compléter lors de l'étude d'un roman:*
> – *Idiome dans le texte*
> – *Qu'est-ce-que ça veut dire*
> – *Idiome semblable en anglais*

- Under the heading 'Contestation and Rejection' the example below identifies a student who is clearly having difficulties in the course:

  > 1-12: *plus d'emphase sur faire et moins étudier* and 1-15,16: *pas d'occasion pour l'auteur de montrer leur connaissance mais place pour poser questions.* This student expresses frustration about the workload involved.

- Under the heading: 'Disengagement or inertia in meaning transfer'.

There are a number of times where ambiguity or ambivalence appear and examples range from a sense of someone totally lost to someone who tries to escape from completing the assignment.

There is also inertia identified: paper 15, this student did not react, in a very odd way seems to have taken segments in the text and placed them side by side, as a result there is, among other oddities, no correspondence between the nouns and the pronouns going with them.

There was an attempt to summarize the text but the words picked and put together make no sense from a professional standpoint, as in the following examples.

> 31-29: *La plupart des gens avec une langue seconde utilisent leur première langue pour créer des phrases donc quand je vais décoder un texte, je vais utiliser le L1 de mes étudiants pour mieux interpréter ce qu'ils ont écrit.*

> 17-8: *on peut savoir une chose mais pas un autre. Ce qui est plus important est que tu peux les comprendre.*

In fact the idea, in the text reported on, was to arrive at meaning through context!

In the examples below there is a clear indication of disengagement: in both examples no usefulness is found in the assigned reading. One wonders if it was the same student. There are obvious difficulties in understanding French.

> 14-8, 9: *Vraiment les mots sont difficiles. Je ne peux pas comprendre vraiment comment ce chapitre est utile au cours.*
> 1-18, 19: *meilleur usage de notre temps comme enseignant que utiliser les textes très académiques,* and 1, 8, 9: *trop académique et trop ennuyeux.*

- Examples under 'Contestation'.

There is evidence of a negative reaction to the conservatism of the education system, not against the course, in the following examples:

> 7-21: *Je trouve inadmissible que le système soit encore structuré de cette façon.*
> 8-17, 18, 19: *Je crois que si nous comme des enseignants nouveaux décider de changer comment nous enseignons, nous pouvons vraiment améliorer l'expérience.*
> 22-39, 40: In the text it is mentioned that various language abilities come into play together, the student reacted to the text saying the following:
> *Mais en réalité on sépare les éléments en écoute, écrit, oral, lecture dans les activités en classe et les examens.*

- One example of 'Rejection of advice given in the textbook':

> 35-29, 30: *Le texte mentionne comment des étudiants peuvent savoir la prononciation des mots s'ils utilisent la notation phonétique. Cela m'énerve un peu.*

It is not clear why exactly this student rejects the idea of helping students with pronunciation by showing them how to recognize the phonetic script that is found next to words in good dictionaries. Did the student think that she had to teach phonetics, that was never the case made in the text although some of the students had taken courses in linguistics and therefore could have been able to teach learners the fundamental aspects of phonetics. However this notion was only introduced as being a way to support learners when not in class and trying to remember the sounds of unfamiliar words.

B. *Findings when examining data with the complexity scale*

The second treatment shows a continuum for each category from minus to plus, or simple to complex. The Duran and Ramaut complexity scale results were entered under the following overarching parameters: "the world" (Table I), "the task" (Table II), and "the text" (Table III). See the charts below. All in all these university students' utterances were all ranked by analysis to be at least at an average level of complexity.

Parameters	SIMPLE		COMPLEX →
(a) World			
1 **Level of abstraction:** concrete or abstract approach to the topic?	Concrete descriptions (here-and-now)	In other time/space (there-and-then)	Abstract perspective
2 **Degree of visual support:** to what extent is visual support provided, and does it support task performance?	Much visual support	Limited visual support	No visual support
3 **Linguistic context:** to what extent is linguistic context available, and does it support task performance?	High level of redundancy; low information density	Limited level of redundancy	High density of information; low level of redundancy

Table I. *World parameters* (Duran & Ramaut 2006)

In section 1, "level of abstraction": we need to include a 'Rejection category', as was identified in the analysis above. "Concrete descriptions" are found in two papers (11, 9), "In other time/space" is found in paper 9 and an abstract perspective is adopted in all papers except for 1, 14, 15, 16, 31.

Under section 2, "degree of visual support", there was only limited visual support included in three papers, in 21 (a chart), 37 (a column of sound symbols), 43, 44, (in both cases quotes from the text in16 font followed by short comments), with no visual support in the remaining 42 papers.

As regards section 3, "linguistic context", a limited level of redundancy was found in papers 1, 14, 15, 16, 43 and 44. All other papers displayed high density of information.

(b) Task (communicative and cognitive processing demands)			
4 **Level of processing:** what should students do with information in the text? At what level must the information be processed?	Descriptive (understanding information as presented)	Restructuring (reorganizing information)	Evaluative (comparing different information sources)
5 **Modality:** how should students provide their answers or produce the outcome?	Non-verbal reaction (purely receptive)	Limited verbal reaction (writing/talking at copying level)	Verbal reaction (talking or writing at descriptive level)

Table II. *Task parameters* (Duran & Ramaut 2006)

For section 4, "level of processing", the category 'No understanding' has to be added to the chart as was evidenced in the analysis above. Under "descriptive" there is the use of paraphrase, under "restructuring" there is evidence of some summarizing and under "evaluative" we noted that ideas were seldom confronted to other theoretical concepts but rather the contents of the texts were calibrated against one's experience.

In section 5, "modality": Under "non-verbal reaction" we can count the few missing papers that were not sent in for a given week. "Limited verbal reaction" was identified in nine papers. All the other 37 papers displayed a descriptive level verbal reaction.

(c) **Text**			
6 **Vocabulary:** is the vocabulary used highly frequent or not?	Highly frequent words	Less frequent words	Infrequent words
7 **Syntax:** are the sentences simple or complex?	Short, simple sentences	Reasonably long sentences with juxtaposition	Long, embedded sentences
8 **Text structure:** is the text clearly/ explicitly structured?	Structure is explicit and clear	Structure only partly explicit	Structure is left implicit
9 **Text length:** is the text short or long?	Short	Reasonably long	Long

Table III. *Text parameters* (Duran & Ramaut 2006)

At "text level" all categories were identified on some text or other but without student identity one cannot study a trend.

Discussion

What can be said about the interface syntax/argumentative structure? An interesting aspect emerged as concerns syntactic versus argumentative concessions. In light of these we investigated the use of grammar, theory of argumentation/critiquing and logic. Both questions related to inertia of meaning from one language to another and the ambiguity or ambivalence permeating the viewpoint of the respondent were addressed.

Finally we explored the implications of this study for intercultural communication (Lantolf 2000; Hofstede 1980; Eco 1983; Borden 1991) and we ask ourselves if it is fair to evoke a disability from bilingualism (Downs 1971; Wiseman & Abe 1986).

In this study the instructor acted as a true interactional partner in the sense described by Van den Branden (2006: 217). Negotiation of meaning and content took place and the instructor was encouraging output throughout the course. Focus on form only took place when appropriate, and the main focus appeared to be on meaning-making with form taking a secondary position or was sometimes not really cared for. Indeed a number of anglicisms were found. The whole class was offered a rich, relevant and communicative input connected to the readings (Lee 1986; McQuillan & Rodrigo 1995; Levine & Haus 1985).

In addition the instructor tried to implement Olson's (2003) joint intentionality principle, and as regards learning goals played out, one could say that a "meeting of minds" was reached, with some staying at the periphery (Gee 1999). In addition the interplay of teacher and student interactions resulted in more language learning and contributed to continuous and intense mental activity. So much so that it was painful to some and as a result we observed disengagement and rejection, yet in time these situations would be resolved through group simulation activities in class.

Our results concur with Borg's (2003: 81) statement regarding teachers he describes as "active, thinking decision makers who make instructional choices by drawing on com-

plex, practically oriented, personalized and context-sensitive networks of knowledge, thoughts and beliefs".

The mix of reactions channeled through the different aspects of their profession including the practicum school context to which they constantly referred, the students they had, the curriculum, theories of language learning and practical applications, etc. There is much complexity in the cognition teachers rely on, with a mix of blurred distinctions between personal opinions and thoughts and many inextricably intertwined components.

According to Van den Branden (2006) our understanding of interaction comes from an articulation of not only teachers' perceptions and actions but also through taking into account and being influenced, whether consciously or not, by students' actions and their perceptions. This was not only showing in the analysis through the future teachers' discourse as based on their experience with their own pupils during their practicum placement in schools but in the interaction with the theoretical text written by their instructor at the university, with more general implications for individual students' reaction papers. However independent of the on-looking instructor the future teachers' actions and perceptions influenced each other and were also influenced by, as well as having an influence on, their pupils' perceptions and actions and all this was brought into the university course such as these actions were inspired by, and in turn inspired the same actors' perceptions (here the students in the university course) in a 360 degree movement, or a back or forward spin (Brophy & Good 1986). According to Lampert (1985: 190), the course instructor then becomes "a dilemma manager, a broker of contradictory interests who builds a working identity that is constructively ambiguous". University instructors need to maintain a sense of control over the learning environments that they create and ensure that they remain powerful, otherwise only the meaning attached to practical experiences will constitute the backbone of what these students think and believe about language teaching, when in fact the university course should have a strong impact on teacher cognition and teacher actions in order to prepare them for the future.

In our second analysis we began to wonder if some of these students were experiencing a "muddled level of operation" in the second language. As regards others it appeared that they engaged in contestation and rejection perhaps to cover their inability to synthesize. The translational strategy uncovered was rather unusual for students at that level: they were picking-up words for summarizing like in their mother tongue but because of an apparent lack of mastery of argumentative discourse in L2 and perhaps also in L1, some passages in their texts made no sense. How did these students manage to pass their earlier courses in the language? Did they manage to get their papers assessed as successful because of "complex –sounding" discourse that in fact they did not understand? Would it be possible that instructors rated them as acceptable because they were afraid of sounding stupid if they had said that the complex sounding discourse was incomprehensible. This trend of writing without making sense was namely identified in papers 31, 29 and 34.

We question whether the identified disengagement was not rather evidence of an avoidance strategy so as to not have to deal with sorting out ambiguity and ambivalence.

In conclusion we can say that failure to properly use argumentative discourse could be due to a problem in cross linguistic/cross cultural communication. We can report that we uncovered some potentially emotionally overwhelmed people and perhaps their minds were clouded by task-anxiety, because they could not complete the task, or perhaps because they did not apply themselves or take the time to do so.

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**ARGUMENTATION
IN PROFESSIONAL AND INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXTS**

THE WITNESS EXAMINATION OF PUBLIC INQUIRIES.
A CASE OF ARGUMENTATIVE DIALOGUE

SILVIA CAVALIERI

1. *Introduction*

Legal discourse has been thoroughly investigated from a variety of angles over the last thirty years or so. Investigations on courtroom interaction have involved linguistic analysis of legal style and rhetoric (Mellinkoff 1963, Crystal & Davy 1969, Goodrich 1986 and 1987, Tiersma 1999), studies of specific legal genres (Levi 1990, Bhatia 1993, 1994, Maley 1994, Trosborg 1997, Gibbons 1994, Kurzon 2001), as well as ethnomethodological and socio-logical approaches (O' Barr 1982, Drew 1985, O'Barr & Conley 1990). The analysis of courtroom discourse has recently extended to issues of language power relations and on the legal argumentative strategies employed by counsels during the examination of witnesses (Walton 1996, 2002, 2003).

As the title suggests, this study intends to analyse a particular kind of courtroom discourse, that is, the witness examination of Public Inquiries. Specifically, some linguistic tools exploited by the lawyers in the questions posed will be observed and described in order to demonstrate that even this inquisitorial proceeding retains some traces of the adversarial system typical of any other jury trial in Common Law countries such as England, Scotland and Northern Ireland.

In particular, this study aims at shedding some light on the argumentative functions of the lawyer's self-mention in his/her questions during the witness examination of Public Inquiries. Thus, the analysis will principally focus on two lexical items used by the counsels as "shifting reference" to the authority, namely "Inquiry" and "Tribunal" and will try to demonstrate how their combination with other meta-argumentative elements contributes to the construction of argumentative strategies during the examination of witnesses.

The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 deals with the presentation of the data and methods adopted in the study. Section 3 presents some preliminary definitions of "Tribunal" and "Inquiry" to better understand the etymology of these two words used as shifting reference and discusses both the quantitative and the qualitative results of the analysis. On the basis of these results, Section 4 draws some concluding remarks about the different argumentative strategies in which "Tribunal" and "Inquiry" are involved.

2. Data and methods

2.1 The data

The analysis is carried out on a corpus of witness examination transcripts collected from the official websites of three Public Inquiries established in England, Scotland, and Northern Ireland. The Public Inquiries are described in the following lines:

   a)   Cullen Inquiry: Public Inquiry concerning the "Dunblane massacre", a multiple homicide committed in a primary school of Dunblane (Scotland), on 13th March 1996. Chaired by Lord Douglas Cullen.
   b)   Bloody Sunday Inquiry: Public Inquiry dealing with the killing of civilians due to a shooting caused by British soldiers during a peaceful march in Derry (Northern Ireland), on 30th January 1972. Chaired by Lord Saville of Newdigate.
   c)   Shipman Inquiry: Public Inquiry concerning the homicide of 15 patients, carried out by Dr. Harold Shipman when he was a practitioner at Market Street, Hyde, near Manchester (England). Chaired by Dame Janet Smith.

Specifically, the corpus is composed of 5 days of transcripts for each Public Inquiry giving a total number of 507,346 tokens. As the main interest of the present paper concerns the questions posed by the lawyers both during Examination-in-Chief and Cross Examination, the corpus has been subsequently tagged by means of the software "Note Tab Light", which enables the user to select by hand parts of text that could be used separately in a quantitative analysis. As shown by the following description, three tags have been chosen to identify three smaller sub-corpora concerning questions:

   a)   <QST> (question): including all the questions posed by the lawyers and by the Chairman of the Inquiry.
   b)   <DE QST> (Direct Examination question): including the questions posed during Examination-in-Chief.
   c)   <CE QST> (Cross-Examination question): including all the questions posed during Cross-Examination.

This type of tagging allows the subdivision into sub-corpora and, at the same time, leaves all the data available in their entire form for a more complete analysis.

2.2 The methods

The analytical framework of the present work has followed three different steps, involving both a quantitative and a qualitative observation of the data presented in the previous section.

First of all, since the focus of this paper centres on the items "Inquiry" and "Tribunal" as shifting references to the authority used by the counsels as shields to create different ar-

gumentative strategies in their questions during the witness examination, the methodology has at first considered the etymology of these two words looking at their definitions as a preliminary point.

Secondly, after these introductory generalisations, a quantitative analysis with the software "WordSmith Tools" (Scott 1996) has been made considering the frequency of these items in the three sub-corpora, their keyness, as well as their concordances, their collocations and clusters in order to identify their argumentative roles through their combination with connectives and other meta-argumentative expressions.

Lastly, a more qualitative analysis of the argumentative functions of "Inquiry" and "Tribunal" has been carried out on some samples extracted from the data combining two theories proposed by Stati (2002) and Walton (2002). The investigation has focused in particular on the role these two items take in the forms of argument they produce ("active" *vs.* "passive subject") (Stati 2002: 47) and on the legal argumentative strategies in which they are involved (Walton 2002: 35-72).

3. *Discussion*

3.1 Premises

In this section, before starting with the quantitative and qualitative analysis of the data, the preliminary definitions of "Tribunal" and "Inquiry" provided by the *Oxford English Dictionary* (OED) are discussed in order to better understand the lexical-semantic nature of these two items.

The definition of "Tribunal" in the OED is the following:

> a.   a court of justice; a *judicial* (my emphasis) assembly
> b.   *fig.* place of *judgement* (my emphasis) or decision; *judicial authority* (my emphasis)

As shown by the previous definitions, we can notice that the etymology of the word "Tribunal" is strictly linked to the idea of judging and it is characterised by its reference to the "judicial authority" that has as a final goal to return a verdict. Thus, we expect the data to confirm the presence of this item as a shifting reference to the authority in judging argumentative strategies.

Moving on to "Inquiry", the definition proposed by the OED is the following:

> a.   the action of seeking, esp. (not always) for truth, knowledge, or information concerning something; search, research, *investigation*, *examination* (my emphasis)
> b.   a course of inquiry; an *investigation* (my emphasis)

Differently from the definition of "Tribunal", the etymology of the word "Inquiry" is associated with the action of investigating and its semantics involves an information-seeking

process. As a consequence, we expect a different use of "Inquiry" from "Tribunal" as a shifting reference to the authority in the construction of the argumentative strategies. We argue that the data will demonstrate the presence of the reference to the "Inquiry" in argumentative patterns involving an investigative purpose.

3.2 Quantitative results

Considering the frequency and the keyness of "Tribunal" and "Inquiry" in the two sub-corpora of questions posed during the Examination-in-Chief and during the Cross-Examination analysed with "WordSmith Tools" (Scott 1996), and comparing their results, it is interesting to notice how the quantitative presence of the two items is diametrically opposite in the two phases of the witness examination. In fact, as can be seen in Table I, "Tribunal" presents 54 entries in the Examination-in-Chief and 106 entries in the Cross-Examination, while "Inquiry" presents 173 instances in the Examination-in-Chief and 50 instances in the Cross-Examination.

Table I: *Frequency of the reference to the authority in the sub-corpora Examination-in-Chief and Cross-Examination*

Reference to the authority	Examination-in-Chief	Cross-Examination
Tribunal	54	106
Inquiry	173	50

The former table represents a first confirmation of the expectations raised by the preliminary definitions of the two items. In fact, the word "Tribunal" is more frequent in the Cross-Examination, the most combative phase of the examination, in which the witness is questioned by the counsel representing the opposite part in the proceeding. On the contrary, the situation is overturned for the item "Inquiry" that is more recurrent in the Examination-in-Chief, the first investigative stage of the witness interrogation. As a consequence, as already shown by the semantics of the two words, "Inquiry" is associated with information-seeking situations such as the Examination-in-Chief, while "Tribunal" to judging ones such as the Cross-Examination in which the credibility of the witness is tested and judged by the authority.

3.3 Qualitative results

After having presented the quantitative results concerning the frequency and the keyness of "Tribunal" and "Inquiry" in the sub-corpora, in this section the discussion moves on the qualitative analysis of the two items and some examples selected from the data are presented in order to show the argumentative role of the two references to the authority and the strategies they contribute to create.

The first example involves "Tribunal":

Ex. 1

Q. Could you see if you could help us make sense, please, of M25.255. To put it in context, this is where you are playing him the recording that you had made of your interview with soldier D, who is referred to as SD in the transcript. He is speaking in the background in his conversation with you and you were commenting on the quality of the evidence and Paul Mahon [...]
Would the *Tribunal* be right to assume what he was saying was: yes, this is jolly good evidence, but I have got it now on the recording that I have made; is that what that means, or can you ascribe any other meaning to it or help us with what it does mean?

A. Does that not look like it is soldier D says, "Yes, very good"?

As shown by Ex. 1 extracted from the Cross-Examination of the Bloody Sunday Inquiry, in the first part of the question the lawyer starts an "argument from testimony" (Walton 1996b: 61) by presenting part of the witness written statement (M25.255) as a piece of evidence. Then, in the second part of the same question, he makes a claim about the evidence presented and introduces it by placing himself behind the reference to the "Tribunal", which in this case becomes an "authoritative self" for the lawyer. In this extract, the item "Tribunal" is the subject of the argumentative strategy and it is used as a personification of the judicial authority that enables the counsel to give his assumptions by "hiding behind the authority" ("Would the Tribunal be right to assume...”). The creation of an "authoritative self" serves the lawyer to frighten the witness and to make his question more effective.

Moreover, the item "Tribunal" is also employed during the Cross-Examination in the creation of the "*ad hominem* argument" (Walton 2002: 59-63) as shown by the following extract:

Ex.2

Q. If the position is that you saw somebody with blond hair who you understood to be a journalist talking to Michael, it is not entirely candid to this *Tribunal* to say today on oath that you did not see any journalist, is it?

A. No, I was told he was a journalist, I did not know he was a journalist at the time.

Q. Are you doing your best to help this *Tribunal*?

In Ex. 2, we can see two instances of "Tribunal". In the first question, the reference to the authority follows the same pattern already pointed out in the previous example. In the second instance, on the other hand, "Tribunal" is introduced as a passive subject in the argumentative strategy to create an "*ad hominem* argument". In fact, we can notice that the question in which is employed does not represent a request for information, but a personal attack to the witness who is alleged of not doing his/her best to help the authority ("Are you doing your best to help this Tribunal?").

As well as in the two previous forms of argument, we find the shifting reference from the counsel to the "Tribunal" also in the realization of a biased type of "argument from position to know", in which the witness is in the position to know something about the evidence (Walton 2002: 45-50), as highlighted in the following example:

> Ex. 3
> Q. Could you please help the *Tribunal* a little more with your own rec-
> ollections of what you saw on the day, and could I ask you again,
> please, to look at AM44.6, the whole page first of all. Have you today
> been shown the original of this document?
> A. I have. [...]
> Q. Could we look at it together, please. Is it right that you saw five sol-
> diers running across Glenfada Park?
> A. No.
> Q. Firing on people who were carrying a wounded man?
> A. No, the only recollection I have is three soldiers in Glenfada Park.
> Now, there was people running, carrying people. I did not actually see
> a soldier shooting one of them.
> Q. This first sentence is certainly not accurate?
> A. No.
> Q. Are you telling this *Tribunal* on oath today that you have no recol-
> lection of giving that statement in 1972?
> A. I have not.
> Q. No recollection at all?
> A. No.

In the first question of Ex. 3, the reference to "Tribunal" is clearly used in an "argu-ment from position to know" since the witness is asked to help the Tribunal in the rec-ollections of facts ("Could you please help the Tribunal...?"). The second instance, on the contrary, could seem at first again implied in the construction of an "argument from position to know". However, in this case the reference to the authority serves the lawyer as a shield to make a counter-claim to a previous statement given by the witness. In fact, in the second occurrence it is possible to notice the presence of the progressive form related to the item "Tribunal" that, following Heffer (2005), is a clear signal of challenge to the witness evidence commonly used in trials. Moreover, another hint to this challenging strategy is the meta-argumentative item "on oath" that again serves to frighten the witness remembering that he/she is producing his/her testimony in front of the authority.

Moving on to the shifting reference of "Inquiry", we can observe a different role from that of "Tribunal" as regards to the construction of the legal argumentative strate-gies. Indeed, "Inquiry" is often used as a simple collective self-mention reference to the authority which is receiving the evidence from the witness, as shown in the subsequent example:

Ex. 1b

Q. You told the Inquiry that you were going to inquire if soldiers A or C, or indeed the others, had given statements to the Tribunal. Have you been able to do that?

A. No, I have not been able to make contact with either of them

In this extract, the "Inquiry" is the "receiver" of the witness evidence (the witness "told the Inquiry" that...) and it can be considered as a passive participant in the creation of an "argument from testimony" (Walton 1996: 61). In the example, it is possible to observe also an instance of "Tribunal", which is implied in the "argument from testimony" too. In fact, it is associated with the meta-argumentative item "statement" that makes the "Tribunal" object of the action "give statements to..." and consequently passive subject in the "argument from testimony".

Another form of argument in which the reference to "Inquiry" is involved is the "argument from position to know" as shown in example 2b.

Ex. 2b

Q. First of all, can you tell the *Inquiry* how you first either heard from him or met him?

A. It is quite difficult for me to recollect the detail. It was shortly after I was elected. He came to my surgery and gave me a tale that is broadly set out in the Ombudsman's Report. The gist of it was that he had been a Scout leader, and he had run an organisation I think called the Dunblane Rovers for youngsters [...]

Q. Can you date this meeting?

A. I cannot.

Q. Was it long after you were elected?

A. I don't know, but it must have been during 1983, certainly.

In the former extract, we can see an instance of "Inquiry" at the beginning of the passage as reference starting an "argument from position to know". In fact, through the authoritative reference "Inquiry", the counsel asks the witness to "tell" what he/she remembers. The "Inquiry" is in this case the direct object of the verb to "tell", thus being the passive subject of the "argument from position to know".

However, we can also find the shifting reference "Inquiry" as an active subject of different forms of argument. One of these is again the "argument from testimony" as proposed by the following example:

Ex. 3b

Q. You can take it that the *Inquiry* has heard direct evidence about how this system worked, and indeed works up to the present time. What I am more concerned about at the moment is what you saw as perhaps the shortcomings of that particular direction, and you make comments on Page 4, and can I take it that essentially you are saying there that that is a fairly skeletal direction on how to carry out such an enquiry?

A.   I took the view that all parts of the system must be in place and be equally
supportive of the overall purpose of the system, and in respect of the
Order and the form which was required to be completed by the officers,
I felt that they were not adequate in their form.

In Ex. 3b, "Inquiry" is personified as demonstrated by its association with the verb "has heard". Furthermore, it is the subject of the verb, thus being at the same time the active participant of the argument in which it is involved. In this case, the "Inquiry" is presented as reference for the construction of an "argument from testimony" as also substantiated by the meta-argumentative item "direct evidence" by which it is followed.

4. *Concluding remarks*

The results of both the quantitative and the qualitative analysis has confirmed the expectations given by the different semantics of "Tribunal" and "Inquiry" in the way they contribute as shifting references to the authority for the lawyer in the creation of different argumentative strategies.

In fact, considering the quantitative results, "Tribunal" has appeared to be more frequent in the Cross-Examination (106 *vs.* 54), the most combative phase of the witness examination. On the contrary, "Inquiry" has proved to have a higher keyness in the Examination-in-Chief (173 *vs.* 50), the part of the witness examination devoted to the search for information.

Moreover, as demonstrated by the qualitative observation of some samples of data, "Inquiry" is implied in information-seeking kind of arguments both as active and passive subject in the argumentative strategies. Indeed, "Inquiry" is used by the counsels especially in the Examination-in-Chief mainly in the creation of the "argument from position to know" or of the "argument from testimony".

On the other hand, "Tribunal" is involved in more judging forms of argument as for example the "*ad hominem* argument" or to make counter-claims about a previous evidence given by the witness. As shown by the data, "Tribunal" acts differently from "Inquiry" as an "authoritative self" for the counsel that "hides behind the authority" to produce a more powerful and effective question and, sometimes, to scare the witness.

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Pârvulescu vs. Ceauşescu and all vs. Pârvulescu. Argument and pseudo-argument in a unique event in a communist dictatorship

Mihai Daniel Frumuşelu

The present paper is a case study of a unique event that occurred in 1979 Romania, during the communist dictatorship that marked the history of Eastern Europe in the second half of the 20th century. During the 12th congress of the Romanian communist party, a veteran member of the party, Constantin Pârvulescu, took the floor unexpectedly and talked against the dictatorial leader of the party and the country, Nicolae Ceauşescu.

This is my second paper on this event, whose complexity and originality under several aspects (audiovisual, linguistic, argumentative, and, last but not least, political) suggests that it may and should be the focus of many investigations from different perspectives, especially by researchers from my generation, who lived the communist period, including the moment of this event. My first paper on this subject (Frumuşelu, forthcoming) investigated general aspects related to discourse features. The present paper highlights the argumentative strategies used by Pârvulescu and by those speakers who counterattacked him and the context in which this argumentative confrontation took place.

1. *Material and method*

This paper will use as primary source the TV recording of the incident, made by the Romanian television. The fact that there was only one television in Romania at that time, the public one, and that it was strictly controlled by the communist party, will appear blatantly obvious in the analysis. The analysis of the event will start from *multimodal* considerations on the place where the event occurred and on the participants, and will continue with a semantico-pragmatic account of the verbal interaction between the participants in the event. The multimodal investigation brings information about both linguistic and non-linguistic features of the event, which is relevant to its rhetorical and argumentative aspects.

2. *General features of the event*

After WW2, Romania, as most of the Eastern European countries, experienced the dictatorship of the communist party, which held the monopoly of the political power, assured

by the state constitution. This happened despite the fact that there were extremely few communists in Romania (less than 1,000 members in 1944). After 1965, when Nicolae Ceauşescu was elected secretary general (i.e. leader) of the communist party, the power was gradually concentrated into his own hands, either directly or by means of his family, first of all his wife, Elena Ceauşescu. Nicolae Ceauşescu governed virtually unrestrained, mainly by emitting decrees. The parliament (officially called "The Great National Assembly") was reduced to the formal role of meeting a couple of times a year to ratify Ceauşescu's decrees.

This general situation caused the discontent of several veteran members of the party, who were not lucky enough to be relatives to Nicolae Ceauşescu. One of them was Constantin Pârvulescu, who had the courage to speak up on this matter during the 12th congress of the communist party, in November 1979.

2.1 Participants

Constantin Pârvulescu's intervention was followed by four speeches, that where held in chronological succession by: Ion Popescu-Puţuri, George Macovescu, Leonte Răutu (Lev Oighenstein) and finally Nicolae Ceauşescu. The first three speakers who counter-attacked Pârvulescu were high-ranking members of the Romanian Communist Party. The last of them, Leonte Răutu, is mentioned under his two names. He was a Soviet Jew (Lev Oighenstein) sent to Romania after WW2 to contribute to the implementation of the communist system there, and, like other persons who were in the same situation, he changed his name into a Romanian one (Leonte Răutu).

2.2 The multimodal transcription of the event

The multimodal perspective on human interaction considers discourse meaning being made up of the different semiotic channels, which equally contribute to the resulting meaning (Thibault 2000; Baldry & Thibault 2006). A consequence is that language is regarded as one of the meaning components, a part of the acoustic channel. This unlike the customary theories of discourse analysis and conversation analysis, which consider language as playing the main part and therefore other features are marked as, for instance, *paralinguistic* or *non-linguistic*.

I made a multimodal transcription of the whole recording of the event, translated the interventions into English and added the corresponding English subtitles to the recording. My multimodal transcript of the audiovisual recording describes and identifies the main components of the multimodal text as follows:

    a)   *timeline*, that corresponds to the chronological flow starting from the moment immediately before Pârvulescu's asking to take the floor;

    b)   *soundtrack*, that corresponds to the notion of *discourse* in discourse analysis – in the Romanian original and in English translation, and including the components *participant* and *content*, that respectively render the participant in the interaction

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(e.g. the speaker or the audience) and that content of audio channel that is relevant to the event;

c) *visual frame*, corresponding to the *extra-linguistic context* in discourse analysis, and including the marking of the relevant *proxemic* and *kinesic* features, if any.

The whole event lasts for 38 minutes and its multimodal transcription covers 43 pages in A4 format. Pârvulescu's intervention, that triggers the trail of events, is rendered completely, in the Appendix, whereas the relevant excerpts of the other participants' interventions will be quoted in the course of the study. In the transcription notation several suggestions given by Du Bois *et al.* (1988) were also used. The general conventions on the notation that are relevant to the present study are shown in Table I.

Table I: *Multimodal transcription conventions*

Transcription	Meaning	Example
Bold type	stressed word or fragment	**we** should ask him, and he **does** know
Dots	The absence of the context	... the floor, to hand it in to the congress secretariate.
Slash	A short pause made by the speaker	
Square brackets	Added context in the English translation, to make the meaning clearer for non-Romanian readers	Do I have less merits than this— [poet] Păunescu?
Direct descriptions	Other actions that are relevant to the event	*unclear* *applauding* *Part of the audience chanting*

The mention *unclear* is used instead of an unclear fragment of the soundtrack.

Further multimodal events and comments are made in italics. Comments referring to pragmatics, discourse analysis, rhetoric, are made separately, as inserted comments. The transcriptions rendered in this study contain the English translation of the interventions, without the Romanian original, as it focuses on argumentative schemas rather than on linguistic features. Moreover, the excerpts present along the analysis lack the mentioning of the visual frame, as the camera manoeuvring is not relevant to them, but only to Pârvulescu who was shown before and after his attack on Ceauşescu.

The multimodal transcription is essential to understand those aspects of the discourse that cannot be understood after an analysis of the discourse, rhetorical and argumentative features of the event have been analysed. An example is the reason why Pârvulescu is not able to reply to his opponents after they have counter-attacked him: he simply has no access to the microphone, and in addition the TV cameras are no longer showing him in close-ups but on a long shot on the whole audience.

2.3 Multimodal features of the event

Constantin Pârvulescu could not plan his intervention beforehand, due to the strict control that Ceauşescu had on the speakers: the list of speakers was made up and approved in advance and the speakers' interventions were also composed and verified in advance. The speakers' role was reduced to reading out a written intervention, whose content consisted of praising the accomplishments of the nation under Ceauşescu's leadership. This formal role of the speakers had a counterpart in the audience, who was reduced to a "robotic" role: applauding, cheering and chanting.

The auditorium where the congress took place was also designed to favour Ceauşescu. Its disposition was highly asymmetrical, and marked the gap between Ceauşescu and the audience, the latter being hindered from any spontaneous intervention. The asymmetry of the auditorium is shown in Figure 1 (Frumuşelu, forthcoming).

Figure 1: *The asymmetry of the congress auditorium*

Presidium

Rostrum

Audience

In this disposition of the auditorium, it was only Nicolae Ceauşescu and his wife, Elena Ceauşescu, who had unlimited access to the microphone. The television settings were also adjusted to privilege Nicolae Ceauşescu, who was the only participant to be shown in close shot.

3. *Discourse events and their argumentative effects*

Ancient rhetoricians such as Aristotle (*Rhetorica* 1358a36-58b20, *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum* 1421b7), Quintilian (*Institutio oratoria* 3.3.14), and the author of *Rhetorica ad Herennium* (1.2.2), identified three main rhetorical genres, which may be rendered in English as the *deliberative*, the *forensic* and the *demonstrative* (or *epideictic*) ones (Sloane 2006: 119; Too 2006: 265). The way in which the debates of the communist party congresses took place may

be described in a nutshell by saying that the *deliberative genre*, that was normally expected to occur in a political debate, was replaced by the *epideictic* one.

One of the strongest effects of Constantin Pârvulescu's intervention was the change he implicitly made in the discourse of the congress debates, from the purely formal discourse of *epideictic* nature to a genuinely critical *deliberative* one. The speakers who counter-attacked Pârvulescu had two main goals: (i) to cancel the perlocutionary effects of Pârvulescu's intervention, and (ii) to reverse the debate to its initial *epideictic* form. The former goal was described in detail in Frumuşelu (forthcoming). The present paper will highlight the counter-attack of the four speakers who took the floor after Pârvulescu's intervention, particularly the use of fallacious argumentation in doing it.

As it can be noticed from the multimodal transcription in the Appendix, Pârvulescu replied an *ad hominem* attack on him in a rhetorical scheme of *praeteritio* (Dragomirescu 1995: 342), also called *paralepsis* or *occultatio* (Sloane 2006: 659), i.e. by mentioning something by pretending to keep silent upon it. His mentioning of the name of the Soviet Union would be used against him by the speakers who would counterattack him by hinting at the fact that his interests are foreign to the Romanian people, and thus suggesting that he is a traitor (Table II below).

Table II: *Constantin Pârvulescu's mentioning of the Soviet Union*

Timeline	Soundtrack	
	Participant	Content
04:44	Male voice in the board	*Unclear*
04:47	Female voice in the board (Elena Ceauşescu?)	... in the party.
04:48	The audience	(*applauding*)
04:51	Pârvulescu	I didn't ask you when you entered the party.
04:56	Pârvulescu	And what did you do during WW2.
04:58	Pârvulescu	If you didn't fight against the Soviet Union.
05:02	Pârvulescu	I didn't ask you about this!
05:03	Members of the audience	(*unclear voices*)

Van Eemeren & Grootendorst (1984: 124) define the enthymeme as an argument with a missing part, which can be either one of the premises or the conclusion. Constantin Pârvulescu's intervention introduced two arguments in form of enthymemes with one missing premise:

    (i) Ceauşescu had staged the congress in order to be re-elected, and therefore he should not be re-elected.

    (ii) The congress debates were empty talk on the positive sides of the party activities, and they should turn immediately into genuine critical debates.

The two enthymemes, with the unexpressed premises reconstructed from the context, are described below.

> (i)
>
> Conclusion:
> *Nicolae Ceauşescu should not be re-elected.*
>   ⇑
> Expressed premise:
> *Nicolae Ceauşescu has staged the congress in order to be re-elected.*
>
> Unexpressed premise:
> *Staging a congress is an unpardonable deed.*
>
> (ii)
>
> Conclusion:
> *The party congress should turn into a genuine debate.*
>   ⇑
> Expressed premise:
> *There are no debates going on, but only empty talk about positive aspects.*
>
> Unexpressed premise:
> *A congress should be held in form of critical discussions.*

As one remarks, Pârvulescu's argument complies with the rules of syllogistic reasoning. From a classical rhetorical perspective the force of an argument is given by *ethos*, *logos* and *pathos* (Aristotle 1994: 90-93/1356a). The two enthymemes prove that Pârvulescu gives his argument the *logic* dimension. In addition, his remarks at timeline 00:57-01:09 are meant to enhance his *ethos*, whereas several remarks, as those at timeline 01:19-01:28, 01:52 and 02:53 are loaded with *pathos*. The conclusion is that Pârvulescu had complied with the classical rhetorical requirements of conducting an argument. One should expect a reply whose rhetorical features should be at the same level.

In spite of this, the interventions against Pârvulescu were completely irrelevant to the two arguments made by him. The analysis of the four interventions against Pârvulescu identified four arguments of fallacious nature: *ignoratio elenchi* (ignorance of refutation) (Walton 2003: 1222), red herring, straw man, *ad hominem*.

At this stage, the debate forced by Pârvulescu reached its *prima facie* stage. Then an immediate question arises: why did it not continue? And the answer is given by the multimodal pre-settings of the congress auditorium: Pârvulescu was denied any further access to the microphone and the TV cameras no longer showed him in medium shot: a general long shot on the whole audience was shown while he was speaking.

The first speaker who followed Pârvulescu, Ion Popescu-Puţuri, was also a veteran member of the party, totally subdued to Ceauşescu. His intervention is completely irrelevant to Pârvulescu's intervention, at times even hilarious. It may be characterised as a gen-

eral *ignoratio elenchi* that not only ignored Pârvulescu's standpoint, but even repeated what Pârvulescu suggested that it should be avoided: Popescu-Puţuri continued the apology of the people's and the party's achievements under Ceauşescu's leadership. This strategy is of the red herring type, aiming at distracting the attention from the topic started by Pârvulescu.

These two types of fallacious argument – *ignoratio elenchi* and red herring – have in common the fact of being fallacies of relevance. The first two, *ignoratio elenchi* and the red herring fallacy are called by Walton "pure fallacies of relevance" (2004: 1). In another study, Walton remarks the fact that being irrelevant in an argumentative confrontation may be used to hide a reasoning that is *logically* faulty:

> A speaker who wanders off the topic, distracting the audience with matters that are exciting but not relevant, could be normatively criticized for failing to address the issue. The wandering could be a logical fault of his or her argumentation. Even if the audience is rhetorically persuaded by it, the argument could still be logically faulty. Indeed, the red herring tactic is the sort of trick a sophist might use, and is known in logic as a fallacy. (Walton 2003: 1221-1222)

No wonder then that George Macovescu, the speaker who took the floor after Popescu-Puţuri continued to make use of arguments of irrelevance, but, however, chose to be less irrelevant than Popescu-Puţuri by using another type of attack: *ad hominem* starting from the connotations of Pârvulescu's old age.

Table III: *George Macovescu's* ad hominem *attack on Pârvulescu*

Timeline	Soundtrack	
	Participant	Content
25:56	George Macovescu	Therefore, comrades, I do think that we should strongly reject all what comrade Pârvulescu has said here, and explain it by some circumstances. True, old age gives you wisdom, but can also make you act wrongly.

The *ad hominem* argument is particularly powerful in its irrelevance, precisely because it is not always irrelevant, as remarked by several scholars including Walton, who also summed up the views on this aspect (1998, Chapter 2). If a smoker advises one not to smoke, the latter could reject his argument by pointing at the fact that the advice is given by someone who smokes. This *ad hominem* attack, however, does *not* invalidate the argument, and this is precisely because the attack was not aimed at the argument itself. This indeterminacy leaves open the possibility that the argument may be correct. George Macovescu presumably used this feature, in an unethical way, to suggest that Pârvulescu may be a decrepit individual and consequently not aware of what he is saying. From this point to implying that Pârvulescu's argument is wrong is just one step, as one may wonder to what extent can a decaying mind produce a sound argument.

Another *ad hominem* attack on Pârvulescu was the reference to Pârvulescu as a "traitor", done by Ceaușescu (Table IV). This was an implicit hint at his (would-be) allegiance to the Soviet Union.

The straw man build up by Nicolae Ceaușescu had as a starting point the proper name "Soviet Union" mentioned by Pârvulescu (timeline 04:58), and consisted in the indirect suggestion that Pârvulescu has no allegiance to the Romanian homeland, and his intervention was implicitly marked as an anti-national one. Ceaușescu intertwined his straw man with an *ad hominem* attack built on Pârvulescu's past.

Table IV: *Nicolae Ceaușescu's attack on Pârvulescu's past*

Timeline	Soundtrack	
	Participant	Content
32:38	Nicolae Ceaușescu	As he asked Macovescu what did he do during WW2, **we** should ask him, and he **does** know, because he was **asked** why for four years, during WW2, he stayed indoors, until **we**, who had been imprisoned, took him out and put him to work!

The fact that Ceaușescu combined the straw man with the *ad hominem* is not entirely surprising, given the similarities shared by the two types of fallacious argumentation. Walton, for instance, remarks the relation between the *straw man* and the "poisoning the well" variety of the *ad hominem* one (1996: 120).

The frustration of the communist leaders was best expressed by George Macovescu's urge "Let us pretend we did not even hear what comrade Pârvulescu said!". This was an attempt to cancel Pârvulescu's speech act of accusation at its elementary level, called by Searle (1969: 57) the "normal input and output conditions", as pointed out in Frumușelu (forthcoming).

Table V: *George Macovescu's infringement on the norms of rational discussion*

Timeline	Soundtrack	
	Participant	Content
26:16	George Macovescu	Să susținem –
	The audience	(*Applauding*)
26:23	George Macovescu	Let us support further, with all our determination, and let us pretend that we **didn't even hear** what comrade Pârvulescu said.

To sum up, the counter-attacks on Pârvulescu ignored both his arguments, and were directed either astray (*ignoratio elenchi*, red herring) or against Pârvulescu's person (straw man, *ad hominem*), as shown in Figure 2 below.

Figure 2: *The targets of the counterattacks on Pârvulescu*

This is in a deep contrast to Pârvulescu's rational intervention, in which the three components *ethos*, *logos* and *pathos* were balanced to result in a convincing argument that was hard to counteract. The only way to counteract Pârvulescu's argument was by a series of non-rational interventions, built on irrelevant arguments and supported by the multimodal settings of the auditorium.

This brings up one more question: how was it possible that the audience was completely controlled by Ceauşescu? In his book on the genocides in history (Anti-Jewish, Anti-Armenian, against Native Americans and other nations), the social psychologist James Waller argues that there is a natural tendency in the human individual to find the cause of events outside his own person:

> Generally, we have a preference for seeking causal explanations in forces outside the individual – particularly features of the immediate situation. (Waller 2002: 175)

In the case of the analysed event, this means that the members of the audience were inclined to consider themselves not responsible of what happened in an event that was not organised by them, but in which they were called to play the mere part of statists. However, the organisers skilfully used them as much more that statists, as their automatic reactions were considered to be genuine. Waller notices the interactive dynamics of the relation between individuals and the external situations in which they may be involved:

> [...] we are partly the products of our situations, but we are producers of our situations as well. (Waller 2002: 198)

In other words, the audience cannot escape the inherent responsibility that they had in playing the infamous part of an applauding machine run by Ceauşescu. With the audience keeping silent, the argumentative parody held to silence Pârvulescu would have left Pârvulescu's opponents exposed in their empty arguments.

4. *Conclusions*

Constantin Pârvulescu's intervention against Nicolae Ceauşescu made an abrupt transformation of the genre of the congress debate from the mere epideictic discourse to a deliberative one. His intervention moved the debate up to the stage of *prima facie*, but it was blocked by irrelevant counter-attacks. The end of the debate was favoured by three factors: (i) the allegiance of the leaders to Ceauşescu, (ii) Ceauşescu's complete control on the audience, and (iii) the asymmetric settings of the auditorium in terms of proxemics, as well as audiovisual settings. It was this multimodal setting of the auditorium that hindered Pârvulescu from any further contribution in the debate that he himself had launched. Pârvulescu made a great accomplishment by launching an attack and a debate in its incipient form, but he could not change the settings of the auditorium, nor could he influence the people hired to support Ceauşescu.

Obviously, such a debate does not fulfil the elementary conditions for a rational discussion, such as, for instance, the "code of conduct for rational discussant" listed by Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1984: 151-176), and therefore even less the requirements for a debate in a political institutionalised confrontation. Among the rules listed by the authors, there are those granting the participants "the right to challenge" (1984: 158), that was obviously denied to Pârvulescu from the moment of his intervention. Most notable is Van Eemeren and Grootendorst's mentioning the obligation to retract one's point of view as a part of the concluding the debate:

> The protagonist is obliged to retract the initial point of view if the antagonist has (while observing the other rules of the discussion) sufficiently attacked it [...]. (Van Eemeren & Grootendorst 1994: 174)

It goes without saying that Pârvulescu has been *sufficiently attacked*, at least as to the number of arguments launched against him. This means that in a rational discussion as described by Van Eemeren & Grootendorst, Pârvulescu should have admitted, in the end, that he was wrong! Then an immediate question arises: why was he not given the floor to simply admit that he was completely wrong, as proved by the four speakers who counter-attacked him? The immediate answer is that Pârvulescu had no reasons to consider himself proved wrong, and the irrelevance of the arguments brought against him – and shown in Figure 2, above – can only support such a conclusion. In this case, Ceauşescu was only afraid to continue a genuine debate with Pârvulescu, and the only way to do it was to deny any latter the further access to the floor.

A small but decisive mistake made by Pârvulescu was his mention of the name of the Soviet Union. Together with his old age, this name would be used by the speakers who counter-attacked him in order to depict him as an enemy of the people. His own reply was used as a starting point of the attacks against him.

Despite all the convergent attacks on Constantin Pârvulescu's image, his intervention was far from being ineffectual. Its immediate perlocutionary effects on Ceauşescu were reflected by Macovescu's suggestion to pretend that nobody even heard what Constantin Pârvulescu said – a wishful thinking, impossible to accomplish. The very existence of the present paper is just one more proof of this.

Appendix

The multimodal transcription of Constantin Pârvulescu's intervention during the 12th Congress of the Romanian Communist Party, November 1979.

The content of the soundtrack is rendered in English translation only. In addition to the general conventions listed in section 2.2, the bold type at Timeline 05:10 marks a pronunciation stress in the marked syntagm. The dash marks a short pause (as at timeline 01:19).

The square brackets at 01:24 are used to add information that is unlikely to be inferred by non-Romanian readers.

Timeline	Soundtrack		Visual frame
	Speaker	Content	
00:55	Pârvulescu	Comrades!	Medium long shot on Pârvulescu
00:57	Pârvulescu	This year I have celebrated 60 years since I have entered the communist party.	Medium long shot on Pârvulescu
01:02	The audience	*Applauding*	Shift to long shot on audience
01:09	Pârvulescu	Out of these 60 years, about 55 I have been a member of the party leading organs.	Medium long shot on Pârvulescu
01:16	The audience	*Applauding*	Shift to long shot on audience
01:19	Pârvulescu	Do I have less merits than this—	Shift to medium long shot on Pârvulescu *Head: pointing towards left (where also Ceauşescu was sitting)*
01:24	Pârvulescu	[poet] Păunescu?	Medium long shot on Pârvulescu
01:28	Pârvulescu	... Who talked a lot of nonsense yesterday. Didn't he?	Medium long shot on Pârvulescu
01:32	The audience (partial)	*Applauding*	Shift to long shot on audience
01:37	Pârvulescu	To occupy the rostrum of this congress?	Shift to medium long shot on Pârvulescu
01:41	–	–	Medium long shot on Pârvulescu
01:43	Pârvulescu	Comrades!	Medium long shot on Pârvulescu
01:45	Pârvulescu	I was astonished at the way this congress was prepared, and at the congress itself.	Medium long shot on Pârvulescu
01:52	Pârvulescu	How is it possible, comrades,	Medium long shot on Pârvulescu
01:55	Pârvulescu	while there are so many major problems to be discussed,	Medium long shot on Pârvulescu
02:03	Pârvulescu	and a lot of shortcomings	Medium long shot on Pârvulescu
02:05	Pârvulescu	to debate on, and to find solutions to improve.	Medium long shot on Pârvulescu
02:10	Pârvulescu	We, communists, have always talked on our accomplishments, but we have even more focused on our shortcomings.	Medium long shot on Pârvulescu

00:26	Pârvulescu	And how to mend these failures.	Medium long shot on Pârvulescu
02:32	Pârvulescu	So that we may improve our work.	Medium long shot on Pârvulescu
02:35	Pârvulescu	This is our communist spirit.	Medium long shot on Pârvulescu
02:38	Pârvulescu	Comrade Ceauşescu had the impunity	Shift to long shot on all
02:41	Pârvulescu	to	Long shot on all
00:42	Pârvulescu	prepare the congress in advance,	Long shot on all
02:46	Pârvulescu	and during the congress and the conferences,	Long shot on all
02:48	Pârvulescu	to be re-elected	Long shot on all
02:51	Pârvulescu	secretary general of the party.	Long shot on all
02:53	Pârvulescu	It is something unprecedented, in the history of our party, comrades!	Long shot on all
02:57	Pârvulescu	And in the history of the communist parties!	Long shot on all
03:01	–	–	Long shot on all
03:05	Pârvulescu	Why does Ceauşescu avoid	Long shot on all
03:08	Pârvulescu	to be elected to the central committee?	Long shot on all
03:12	Pârvulescu	And out of the central committee to be re-elected?	Long shot on all
03:15	Pârvulescu	Why?	Long shot on all
03:17	Pârvulescu	Because Ceauşescu is avoiding the control of the party.	Long shot on all
03:22	Pârvulescu	He tries to...	Long shot on all
03:23	Male voice in the audience	It is not correct!	Long shot on all
03:24	Pârvulescu	What?	Long shot on all *People rising*
03:25	Pârvulescu	What is not correct?	Long shot on all
03:27	Pârvulescu	Comrades!	Long shot on all
03:28	One voice in the audience	Ceauşescu re-elected!	Long shot on all
03:30	The audience	*Audience rising, applauding, cheering* Ceauşescu re-elected!	Long shot on all
03:38	The audience	*+ chanting*	Switches between long shot on audience, and long shot on all
03:48	The audience	*Applauding and chanting*	Long shot on audience
04:18	The audience	–	Long shot on all

04:21	Pârvulescu	In this spirit was this congress organised, comrades.	Long shot on all(!)
04:25	Pârvulescu	And there are teams of agitators here.	Long shot on all
04:28	The audience	From the first to the last row.	Long shot on all *Part of the audience rising*
04:29	–	*Part of the audience chanting*	Long shot on all
04:32	Male voice in the audience	This is not true!	Long shot on all *Audience sitting down*
04:35	Pâvulescu	I listened to all the speakers.	Long shot on all
04:38	Pâvulescu	I didn't interrupt anyone.	Long shot on all
04:40	Low voice in the board	Wait, wait...	Long shot on all
04:41	–	–	Long shot on all
04:44	Male voice in the board	–	Long shot on all
04:47	Female voice in the board (Elena Ceauşescu?)	... in the party.	Long shot on all
04:48	The audience	*Applauding*	Long shot on all
04:51	Pâvulescu	I didn't ask you when you entered the party.	Long shot on all
04:56	Pâvulescu	And what did you do during WW2.	Long shot on all
04:58	Pâvulescu	If you didn't fight against the Soviet Union.	Long shot on all
05:02	Pâvulescu	I didn't ask you about this!	Long shot on all
05:03	Memebrs of the audience	–	Long shot on all *A few members of the audience rising*
05:09	Pârvulescu	Comrades!	Long shot on all
05:10	Pârvulescu	I **won't** vote for Ceauşescu's re-election as a leader.	Long shot on all
05:16	Pârvulescu	–	Long shot on all *Pârvulescu leaves the rostrum and walks up the stairs to his seat*
05:17	The audience	*Rising, applauding and chanting* Ceauşescu re-elected!	Shift to long shot on audience
05:34	The audience	*Applauding and chanting* Ceauşescu re-elected!	Shift to long shot on all
05:49	The audience	–	Long shot on all *The whole audience sits down*

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AD HOC CONCEPTS AND ARGUMENTATION
IN POLITICAL DEBATES

ANABELLA-GLORIA NICULESCU-GORPIN

Lexical items have been regarded as conveying a basic, literal meaning, captured in most cases by lexicographic definitions. Nevertheless, when communicating, speakers select (unconsciously) only those 'literal' features relevant for that particular context, loosening or narrowing the basic, literal concept encoded. On the other hand, in processing utterances to recover the speaker's meaning and to understand particular constructions, hearers may not retrieve the same encyclopaedic features as the ones put forward by speakers, but different though similar ones. Such instantaneous formed concepts have been known in the literature as *ad hoc* concepts (Barsalou 1983, 1987; Carston 2002).

Following the relevance-theoretic account of this phenomenon (Carston 2002; Wilson & Carston 2006; Wilson & Carston 2007; Sperber & Wilson 2006), this article attempts to discuss several aspects of meaning in connection to *ad hoc* concept formation, argumentation and persuasion. Using as corpus the 2004 American Presidential Debates, the analysis considers the way in which the candidates employed recurrently several lexical structures to argue for their own campaign and to dismantle the one of the opponent. The analysis focuses on several constructions that are representative for the entire corpus. It also proposes several possible lines of interpretation that could have been followed by the audience in processing the candidates' message.

The analysis shows that such means are instances of loosening or narrowing leading to *ad hoc* concept formation, revealing ways in which the candidates used repetition to strengthen their arguments in their attempt to persuade the voters.

1. *Introduction*

Politicians want to persuade, that is they try to change their hearers' beliefs and knowledge, and sometimes their behaviour, too. Candidates to presidency attempt to persuade their audience, making them believe that they represent the perfect solution for the problems of the country and its citizens; they use language to achieve their final goal, that is getting elected.

Linguistic elements, such as sentence structure (coordination and subordination, passive or active voice), choice of lexical items, use of metaphors, framing, rhetorical elements have been described as contributing to achieving persuasion to a greater or lesser extent. The present article is part of a larger project concerned with the analysis of the 2004 Amer-

ican Presidential debates. The focus here will be on *ad hoc* concept formation, its link to the relevance of the message and on the relationship existing between argumentation and persuasion in political debates.

The main points of the theoretical framework will be described in the sections preceding the actual analysis.

2. *Relevance theory and* ad hoc *concepts*

To arrive at the relevance-theoretic interpretation of *ad hoc* concepts, a brief overview of the main tenets put forward by the theory is presented here.

According to relevance theory (Sperber & Wilson 1986/1995, 1987) having cognitive effects is a necessary condition for relevance; the greater the cognitive effects, the greater the relevance.

People have intuitions about relevance: they can distinguish, without being aware that they can, between irrelevant and relevant information, or between more or less relevant information. These intuitions are in close connection with the context, that is a particular item of information is more relevant in one context than in others.

A stimulus is said to be worth the hearers' attention when the information transmitted can be linked with background information possessed. Moreover, any utterance / input creates predictable expectations of relevance. Relevance is connected with some form of cost-benefit analysis. To be relevant, the processed information has to yield positive cognitive effects, i.e. "a worthwhile difference to the individual's representation of the world – a true conclusion, for example" (Wilson & Sperber 2004: 3[1]). Positive cognitive effects are of three types: contextual implications, strengthening of a contextual assumption or contradiction, and elimination of a contextual assumption. Contextual implications are the most important and are defined as "[...] a conclusion deducible from the input and the context together, but from neither input nor context alone" (Wilson & Sperber 2004: 3-4). Cognitive effects are achieved by mental processes, which involve a certain effort. Since processing effort is a negative factor, relevance is lower when the processing effort is greater than expected.

For a political debate to be relevant to an audience, the information it contains must combine with the context in which it is delivered, and to yield positive cognitive effects. Political debates are considered ostensive stimuli because by producing them, politicians draw their audience's attention to a particular stimulus. Considering the above highlighted relevance-theoretical claims, it is assumed that the audience expected that the information contained in these speeches would have yielded positive cognitive effects at a low processing effort.

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[1] Most articles are cited from the authors' websites so they are Word documents; page numbers may refer to the document as downloaded from the website.

As pointed in the Introduction, there may be (and often is) a gap between the concept encoded by a word and the actual concept put forward by speakers. According to relevance theory (Wilson 2003; Carston 2002; Sperber & Wilson 2006; Wilson & Carston 2006; Wilson & Carston 2007), what bridges this gap is the construction of an *ad hoc* concept. *Ad hoc* concepts are constructed pragmatically by both speakers and hearers either when performing an utterance or when trying to comprehend a message. There is no need for speakers and hearers to end up with the same *ad hoc* concept for successful communication to occur. *Ad hoc* concepts are not linguistically given and are not necessarily stored in the lexicon; as just mentioned, they are constructed pragmatically, on-line and this is due to specific expectations of relevance determined in particular contexts. Thus, an *ad hoc concept* "[i]s accessed in a particular context by a spontaneous process of pragmatic inference, as distinct from a concept which is accessed by the process of lexical decoding, and so it's context invariant" (Carston 2002: 322-323).

It seems that more often than one might expect, the 2004 candidates to the US presidency used 'non-literally' the linguistically encoded meaning of a concept either because language did not provide them with any word/structure that would best suit their purpose, or because this would have been the most effective way in which they could communicate their plans (readers are referred to Section 4).

Within the realm of relevance theory, the theory of *ad hoc* concepts has been developing in relation with its proponents' attempt to provide a unifying theory of lexical pragmatics, that is a theory which attempts to show that "narrowing, loosening and metaphorical extension are simply different outcomes of a single interpretive process which creates an *ad hoc* concept, or occasion-specific sense, based on interaction among encoded concepts, contextual information and pragmatic expectations or principles" (Wilson & Carston 2007: 1).

Such an approach and its implications are important for the analysis of the 2004 US presidential debates because they may offer an explanation on how the audience might have arrived at the relevant interpretation of the candidates' messages. More specifically, the audience employed the same inferential mechanisms in deriving both the meaning of 'literal' and 'figurative' expressions because, a unified account of lexical pragmatics rejects "the traditional distinction between literal and figurative meaning and claims that approximation, hyperbole and metaphor are not distinct natural kinds, requiring different interpretive mechanisms, but involve exactly the same interpretive processes as are used for ordinary, literal utterances" (Wilson & Carston 2007: 3).

The 2004 American presidential debates provide examples that illustrate the definition given by relevance theory to *ad hoc* concepts which can also inform the analysis of my corpus (for an extensive discussion see Carston 2002; Wilson 2003; Wilson & Carston 2006; Wilson & Carston 2007, etc.). Following the relevance theory approach, concepts are presented with capital letters and *ad hoc* concepts with an asterisk.

3. *Persuasion and argumentation*

When it comes to the 2004 US presidential debates, *ad hoc* concepts can be studied in relation to the way in which candidates bring arguments in favour of their own programmes or against their opponent in their attempt to persuade the audience.

Persuasion has been studied from different points of view, and within different disciplines, such as rhetoric, linguistics, sociology or psychology, making it a great candidate for an interdisciplinary approach.

I have neither the space nor the intention to go into a long analysis of the different approaches to persuasion, therefore only those aspects important for my analysis are emphasised. Persuasion is considered to take place when opinions and values are changed; this may happen during an electoral campaign. How candidates use discourse to achieve persuasion is still a matter of discussion in the linguistic, sociological and psychological fields. Persuasion cannot and should not be analyzed from one single perspective; any pertinent study should consider not only the linguistic elements that could contribute to the persuasiveness of the message, but also the socio-cultural and economic context in which the debates took place.

Here, persuasion is defined as an attempt to change hearers' beliefs and knowledge in order to change their behaviour (Zimbardo & Leippe 1991). According to this theory, successful persuasion requires four steps: a message may persuade if hearers are exposed to it, pay attention to it, understand it and accept it (Zimbardo & Leippe 1991: 129). Two more steps are needed for persuasion to be fully achieved through change of behaviour: retention of the new attitude and its translation into the expected behaviour (Zimbardo & Leippe 1991: 129, 136, 137).

In the case of the 2004 American presidential debates, US citizens watching or listening to the debates were exposed to the message. Some of them may have paid attention to it; some may have also understood it, and some may have even accepted it.

Establishing the percentage of the audience which was persuaded during these debates would have involved actual questioning of people, but this was neither possible nor the purpose of my article which is to see how *ad hoc* concepts formation, argumentation and persuasion may be linked.

My approach to rhetoric follows the interpretation given by Michael Billig (1996) who claims that rhetoric has mainly to do with argumentation. Protagorean rhetoric was concerned with argumentation that had at its core the idea that there are always two sides of one issue (Billig 1996: 3). This is also what candidates to presidency are doing: each contender tries to bring arguments in favour of his particular electoral programme and to dismantle the one of his opponent. Of interest are both the form (i.e. the lexical structures used) and the content (the meaning of such lexical structures) of their messages, since in processing the message, the audience would look for that information that will yield more positive cognitive effects at a low processing effort.

The term *argument* may be misleading in itself, since it may mean a quarrel, a discursive battle, or "reasoned discourse", especially in dialogue (Billig 1996: 27-28). The two-sidedness of argumentation implies the existence of dialogue, since no real argumentation can take place if there is no voice to counter-react.

The opposition between Plato's and Protagoras' philosophy is of help here: Plato claimed that people's different opinions have nothing to do with actual knowledge. He considered that the unchangeable truth, the World of Ideas lies above contradictions of shifting oppositions and sense-perceptions. Hence, oppositions exist between truth and opinion, appearance and essence. To discover the ultimate truth means to put an end to all argumentation; thus, the Platonic view becomes the one of indisputable truth.

On the contrary, Protagoras and sophists argue that there is nothing but the different opinions people have, hence denying the validity of objective truth; there is no underlying reality besides argumentation, and since any issue is two-sided, then both sides are true. Thus, there is a constant possibility that any speech is opposed by a counter-speech. For example, in arguing that his solutions were valid, Kerry had to consider that a possible true counter-speech was also available – that of his opponent, and the other way around.

According to Perelman (1979), the basic features of the context of argumentation are justification and criticism, rhetorically related to each other: "Every justification presupposes the existence or eventuality of an unfavourable evaluation of what we justify" (Perelman 1979: 138) and "a question of justification ordinarily arises only in a situation that has given rise to criticism" (Perelman 1979: 33). The context of argumentation must be social, because criticism is meaningless "unless some accepted norm, end or value has been infringed upon or violated" (Perelman 1979: 33). Actions and decisions are criticized in relation to accepted rules and values, not in abstract. The same is also true for justification. Hence, it was necessary for candidates to justify and legitimate their campaigns and programmes in order to persuade their voters and to get elected.

By their own nature, political debates presuppose argumentation. In the case of these political debates (as in the case of all modern political debates), a dialogue is established along two dimensions: on the one hand, the dialogue between the candidates and the audience, and on the other hand, the dialogue taking place between the candidates. Argumentation was involved in the second case: each candidate had to provide justification for his electoral programme and to criticise his opponent. This dialogic dimension is well represented in my corpus: each candidate's answer is opposed by a counter-speech, the opponent's rebuttal. On the other hand, the dialogue existing between the candidates and the audience gave the latter the possibility to react only through one means: their votes.

Since persuasion is sometimes difficult if not impossible to achieve, the purpose of argumentation is not always to persuade the other party. Moreover, the candidates did not want to persuade each other, but the audience. To do this, they used the basic features of argumentation to justify their own programmes and to criticise their opponent. Nevertheless, because immediate persuasion is often unattainable, the candidates were also in search for the last word, that is to provide an unanswerable criticism, or to fail to offer justification

on the part of the opponent. By having the last word, a candidate may have higher chances to persuade more voters and thus to get elected.

The 2004 US candidates made use of argumentation: they bring arguments in support of their actions and statements, arguments that are related to legal situations (UN resolutions, the American Constitution, etc.), to past situations (Saddam's former actions, former military interventions that were a success), to traditions (oaths taken, the Bible, etc.), or even to future situations (the possibility of a future attack using weapons of mass destruction). By bringing arguments, their programmes may become legitimate. Trying to legitimise their programme, the candidates' answers are examples of justification of their own position and of criticism of their opponent. Thus, argumentation as a rhetorical device may increase persuasion.

4. *The analysis*

In bringing arguments in favour of their own programmes and attempting to combat their opponent, the 2004 US candidates had to keep in mind that their messages had to be relevant to their audience, i.e. to yield greater positive cognitive effects at a low processing effort. If the candidates wanted (part of) the audience to process their answers (step 3 in the definition of persuasion) then their message had to be relevant: if the processing effort had been greater than the positive cognitive effects achieved, the audience would not have processed the candidates' answers at all. Given that recency of use and frequency of use are factors that may decrease the processing effort due to high activation of particular structures in the mind of the audience, the candidates used several (lexical, syntactic, etc.) constructions recurrently. In his attempt to justify his own electoral programme and to criticise his opponent, each candidate used his own achievements and the opponent's failures as premises of enthymemes[2], sometimes leaving a lot of information presupposed. As the examples (1)-(5) show, the concepts encoded by the candidates' words were either loosened or narrowed.

The short analysis below discusses several structures that were present recurrently in the candidates' answers, structures the candidates might have used to make their messages relevant for their audience, i.e. to keep the processing effort low while increasing the positive cognitive effects.

The first example belongs to John Kerry, and it occurs (as such or with a slightly different form) nine times in the debates analysed:

> (1) I have a plan to have a summit with all of the allies, something this president has not yet achieved, not yet been able to do ***to bring people to the table***.
> (John Kerry; italics mine, A.G.N.G).

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[2] Enthymemes, which are made up of a conclusion and its justification, are the basic unit of a rhetorical argument; they resemble syllogisms, but they lack one premise, thus always leaving some information presupposed. As opposed to syllogisms whose deductions are certainties, enthymemes deal with probabilities. The justification of the claim might also be criticised and, in its turn, it will need an enthymemic support and so on, *ad infinitum*. Thus, rhetorical arguments presuppose open-endedness (Aristotle, Rhetoric).

Following relevance theory, a possible inferential analysis of the conventional metaphor *bring people to the table* would look as follows:

> (2) BRING PEOPLE TO THE TABLE
>   with the propositional form:

JOHN WANTS AT T_1 TO BRING PEOPLE TO THE TABLE

The encyclopaedic assumptions it may activate are:
→ people come to the table in order to eat;
→ when people sit together around a table they may talk, disagree or reach a conclusion;
→ sitting together at a table involves friendship;
→ the table is seen as a place which automatically puts people together;

BRING* [PEOPLE TO THE TABLE]*

→ creating alliances, making the allies talk;

The audience is likely to create this *ad hoc* concept having available or recently activated contextual information such as Kerry is a politician and he is talking about America's allies, trying to emphasise the necessity of strong alliances in the war on terror. In trying to interpret Kerry's utterance, this *ad hoc* concept will satisfy (part of) the audience's expectations of relevance.

The second example is represented by the expression *the new wars of the 21st century* used by Bush in the second debate:

> (3) the war of the 21st century

The structure in (3) is not a metaphor, but it represents a narrowing of the literal meaning of WAR. It may be analysed along the following lines. All people have some knowledge about wars: armed forces colliding for different reasons. Yet, in this particular context, the construction activates information related to the Iraq War, the 9/11 terrorist attacks, and other such events. Assuming that the candidates are structuring their utterances according to their own abilities and preferences, trying to be as relevant as they can[3], the audience will construct the *ad hoc* concept (21st CENTURY WAR) * whose encyclopaedic entry could contain information such as *wars involving terrorist attacks such as those of 9/11*, *wars involving weapons of mass destruction*, etc. This example displays another interesting and rare feature: narrowing does not take place here at the verb level.

G.W. Bush and John Kerry tend to use the same constructions when they talk about a particular subject. Their recurrence will determine particular *ad hoc* concepts to be highly activated in the audience's minds, lessening the processing effort needed to comprehend the message.

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[3] According to the second clause of the Presumption of optimal relevance: "An ostensive stimulus is optimally relevant to an audience if: (a) It is relevant enough to be worth the audience's processing effort; (b) It is the most relevant one compatible with communicator's abilities and preferences." (Wilson & Sperber 2004: 7).

In bringing arguments in favour of his programme, and trying to show how determined he is to make America safer, Kerry uses the structure under (4) every time he has the opportunity (6 times in the corpus analysed).

(4) I will hunt down and kill the terrorists. (John Kerry)

This construction exhibits a major metaphor characteristic: the speaker does not want to communicate the literal meaning of the predicate. Example (4) falls in the class of cases where the property could be true of the entity referred to in some particular cases (Carston 2002: 352). There is no doubt that J. Kerry could hunt down and kill the terrorists. However, what he is trying to emphasise is his plan to support the fight against terrorism. The loosening of the concept HUNT* is also determined by the direct object *terrorists*, since usually people would think that the element of hunting would be an animal, not a human being. Again, by recurrently using particular constructions, the candidate would have made his answers relevant to (part) of the audience.

The last example focuses on one occurrence of the verb *to go*, trying to show how speakers tend to 'select' unconsciously only those features that are relevant for the current purpose of communication, leading to *ad hoc* concept formation.

(5) They're going from tyranny to elections. (G.W. Bush)

It is neither the place nor the space to go into a long analysis of *go*, trying to establish its basic/literal meaning; therefore, *go* it is considered to imply movement from one place to another. Following the relevance-theoretic comprehension procedure, which according to relevance theory (Wilson 2004; Wilson and Sperber 2004, etc.) implies three steps[4], part of the audience could process the example as in (6):

(6) **Contextual Assumptions**
→ people usually tend to go from a point in space A to another B, say from London to Manchester;
→ going from one place to another implies a change
→ the Iraqi people were under a tyranny;
→ they are about to have elections;
→ the Iraqi people are moving from one political regime to another;

Contextual implication:
→ Bush is the president who helped the Iraqi people go through the change;

Implicated Conclusion:
Bush's decisions are good.

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[4] "a. Follow a path of least processing effort in computing cognitive effects: Test interpretative hypothesis (disambiguations, reference resolutions, implicatures, etc.) in order of accessibility. b. Stop when your expectations of relevance are satisfied [or abandoned]." (Wilson & Sperber 2004: 9).

This is how such an example could have been processed by (part of) the audience. Such an implicated conclusion could have satisfied the expectations of relevance some voters might have had.

Suppose some voters already trusted Bush and were looking for confirmation of their already held attitudes: such an implicated conclusion (Bush's decisions are good) would have strengthened an already existing assumption. Since Bush frequently employs such constructions, they are highly activated in the minds of the audience (Bush used these constructions in the debates and in other speeches, and some voters could have attended to these stimuli). Thus, the processing effort is lowered, while the positive cognitive effects are increased. On the other hand, if other voters were against Bush, then such an implicated conclusion (Bush's decisions are good) would have led to the contradiction and elimination of a contextual assumption/an already held attitude (Bush does not take good decisions). Last, but not least, for undecided voters, the example may have triggered strong contextual implications such as the one under (6) which would have made them vote for Bush.

In bringing arguments against his opponent, Kerry uses constructions such as *He broke his word*, *He just declared it dead*, [it=Kyoto Protocol], *I believe that this president, regrettably, rushed us into a war, made decisions about foreign policy, pushed alliances away*, etc. Suppose part of the audience would have processed these utterances, since the processing effort needed would have been low due to their recurrence and because in processing them, they would have used the same mechanism used for comprehending other lexical items. For those who already considered that Bush had not achieved a great deal during his office, the message could have led to the strengthening of an already held assumption. On the other hand, for some undecided voters or for Bush's followers such recurrent structures would have led to different positive cognitive effects such as the contradiction and elimination of a contextual assumption/an already held attitude (Bush actions are good) or to contextual implications.

These examples show once more that in many cases it is very difficult to claim that only one single type of positive cognitive effect is observed; such cases are rare, and appear most of the times in artificial contexts created for the sole purpose of theoretical explanations.

5. *Conclusions*

Both candidates used recurrent constructions to bring arguments in favour of the way in which they would solve the main issues at stake (Iraq War, Home Land Security, Tax Cut, etc.) and to dismantle their candidate's programme. Since these structures display features of loosening or narrowing, they encode *ad hoc* concepts. Being recently and frequently used, they were highly activated in (part of) the audience's mind, decreasing the processing effort required and increasing the positive cognitive effects achieved. For those voters, the debates

were relevant. The 2004 elections' outcome together with the analysis suggests that both candidates used almost the same means in their attempt to persuade, i.e. to get voters to elect them.

The analysis suggested in Section 4 may explain how, following the second clause of the Presumption of optimal relevance, the candidates used particular lexical items that encoded only those features that would make their answers relevant to (part of) their audience. By narrowing or loosening the 'literal' meaning of several lexical items, new *ad hoc* concepts were built up that served the candidates' argumentative purposes. On the other hand, (part of) the audience might have interpreted the analysed debates as in 4, following a path of least processing effort. The theoretical framework of *ad hoc* concept formation as understood within relevance theory warrants that the audience will follow the path of least processing effort, because in attempting to bridge the gap between sentence meaning and speaker's meaning, the audience would retrieve only those features that satisfy the audience's expectations of relevance, and not the entire encyclopaedic information a concept may encode. There is no need for hearers to retrieve from their memory all features related to, say, the verb *go* in order for them to reach the intended meaning. Moreover, by repeating particular structures, the candidates were certain that the features they had in mind were highly active in the minds of their audience, thus being more accessible and easy to retrieve.

It has to be mentioned that the outcome of any elections depends on several other factors mainly related to the last two steps involved in persuasion: retention of the new attitude and its translation into the expected behaviour (Zimbardo & Leippe 1991: 129, 136, 137). Since attitudes people hold predict behaviour, when conditions (1) to (4) below are met, one may talk about attitudes-behaviour consistency:

> [...] (1) the attitude is strong and clear; (2) the attitude is relevant to the behavio[u]r called for by the situation at hand; (3) the attitude and the behavio[u]r have strong links to the same additional component of the attitude system (either cognitions or affective responses), and (4) the attitude is important to the individual (Zimbardo & Leippe 1991: 192).

Investigating how these factors may influence the outcome of elections might bring new insights into the very complicated mechanism of persuasion. Nevertheless, such research has less to do with a linguistic analysis, and should consider a wide range of factors (socio-psychological, political, economic, etc.) specific to each electoral process. The present article has only tried to shed some light on the link between *ad hoc* concept formation and its use in presidential debates.

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Do you (dis)agree? Investigating agreement and disagreement in Newsgroups interaction

Elisa Corino

1. *Introduction: Computer Mediated Interaction*

This work aims to investigate the use of agreement routines in a peculiar form of communicative interaction: the Newsgroup (NG). The choice of NGs as object of our research is due not only to the interest they raise as a particular expression of Computer Mediated Communication/Computer Mediated Discourse (along with mail, chat, MUD… and the like) from the textual point of view, but also to the potential field of research they offer for discourse analysis. Besides discourse analysis, agreement, disagreement and argumentation strategies have been the object of psychotherapy, focus groups (Myers 1998) and legal studies, but there is little material about written forms of communication.

It is a matter of fact that in the past few years the Internet has triggered a boom of research on discourse in connection with human behaviour, on the basis of regular interactions between a huge and steadily increasing number of people.

Online interaction overwhelmingly takes place by means of discourse, nonetheless the traditional methods used by scholars dealing with discourse analysis before the spread of CMC are now feeble for a certain number of reasons.

As Herring (2002) points out, various attempts have been made by linguists to classify CMD as a third way between speech and writing, or as a kind of "written speech", as it exhibits features of orality, including rapid message exchange, informality, and representations of prosody, though produced by typing on a keyboard and read as text on a computer screen.

Nonetheless Netspeak is not a single homogeneous *genre* of communication, it is rather a set of "socio-technical modes" (Herring 2002) that combine the technological means of communication with the social and cultural practices that have arisen around their use.

One of the features that distinguishes CMD from other types of communication, determining some distinctions within CMD itself as well, is *turn taking*. It is commonly recognised that turn-taking in spoken conversation follows a regular alternation between speakers, ideally without gaps and overlaps, whereas CMC suffers from the constraints imposed by the medium that affects the nature of the conversation itself: on the one hand we can find asynchronous CMC, such as e-mail, where there is often a considerable time lag between when a message is sent and when it is responded to, on the other hand synchronous CMC, such as IRC, involves more rapid exchanges of turns, but fosters a lot of overlapping.

Usenet Newsgroups are still a quite unexplored field that lies in between: they deal with a kind of computer mediated group communication that, though asynchronous, presents a high degree of overlapping between exchanges. In comparison with chat messages, NGs posts are much longer and the exchange between the participants is more structured and complex, multiple responses are often directed at a single initiating message, and single messages may respond to more than one initiating message. This is a typical feature of asynchronous CMC, where longer messages tend to contain multiple conversational moves and *quoting* is thus the most relevant way of achieving a successful communication.

In particular NGs provide a wide source of data about (dis)agreement and argumentation, being a virtual community based on opinion and information exchange. The posters[1] most of the times explicitly ask for opinion and judgement or do express theirs about other posters' messages. This kind of exchange implies that the bare occurrence of agreement and disagreement formulas must be higher than in normal colloquial conversation.

In such an environment where dense interactional patterns take place and many people are involved, even agreeing and disagreeing strategies seem to follow certain schemes and rules. We are now going to explore these strategies, trying to sketch a qualitative survey that aims to be as representative as possible, if not exhaustive, of the agreement scale as well as of the gender and interlingual differences displayed in the Newsgoup communication[2].

2. *CMD and quoting*

As it was stated in the previous paragraph, turn-taking in CMC does not adhere to the ideal that speaker turns alternate in an orderly manner. The fact that in CMD there is not a one-to-one correspondence between an initiation and its response is particularly true when speaking about asynchronous communication in Usenet Newsgroups, where exchanges are often interrupted by messages from other exchanges. The task of reconstructing adjacent conversational moves is additionally complicated by the fact that a single message may contain two or more moves which are physically, but not functionally, adjacent. The Gricean maxim of local relevance is frequently violated, as physically close posts are often pragmatically irrelevant to one another, whereas distant messages can be interrelated.

It is not possible to reproduce here a whole thread to exemplify the discussion development, however we try to present a schematic account of a series of consecutive messages posted as part of a discussion on a listserv discussion list reproduced by Herring (1999) and a screen shot of a newsreader like Forte's Agent where you can see the development of a thread according to the hierarchical levels of indentation. Furthermore we refer the reader to the works of Marello (2007), Corino (2007), Fiorentino (2005) and Gheno (2004) for an in depth discussion about the structure and the textual variety that characterise the Newsgroup as a form of CMD.

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[1] People who are posting messages in a NG, each single message is considered a post.
[2] All the examples are drawn from the NUNC (Newsgroup UseNet Corpora), a suite of multilingual corpora to be found at www.corpora.unito.it, description to be found in Barbera, Corino & Onesti (2007).

Figure 1: *Schematic representation of interaction in a discussion list sample (Herring 1999)*

Figure 2: *Representation of a thread in a newsreader program*

The NG thread is a text built in a progressive way through the sequence of posts by different participants, therefore it is not possible to control its communicative effectiveness revising it as it hap-

pens for dialogues in other textual genres. It deals rather with cooperation among participants and respect of common rules of behaviour and textual devices used in order to give as much coherence (and somehow cohesion) as possible to the exchange.

Concerning this Storrer (2002) speaks of "Sequenzialisierung der Antwortnachricht", though it is not possible to speak of sequencing in a broad sense, i.e. the argumentative progression is set by a series of overlapping messages characterized by the deletion of transitional passages and the repetition of relevant paragraphs. The text as a whole is thus shaped through the selection of the parts of every single post that are considered significant to the participants.

Quoting is therefore a crucial strategy to be studied in order to make comments on any of the textual features of the NG as a genre of communication.

In [1] we can see how the poster explicitly asks for quoting in order to be able to easily follow the discourse and interact.

> [1] ti pregotipregotiprego…
> Per favore, potresti mettere – la prossima volta – la tua risposta sotto
> il messaggio originale debitamente tagliato di tutte le parti non utili
> alla comprensione della tua risposta?
> Grazie.
> Saluti, XXX[3]

In [2] we find the quoting of an answer of a previous post; there is clearly a situation of flaming going on, but a newcomer does not understand the reasons of the disagreement as the quoting is not complete: the lack of the prior messages invalidates the coherence of the discussion, and therefore its intelligibility.

> [2] > "Sara YYY"
> >>> Iniziamo dal tono: era paro paro a quello del suo mex urlato e
> >>> minatorio:
> > Pliz: mi manca il mex a cui sta rispondendo la signora YYY… qualcuno me
> > lo inoltra? Grazie! :-)[4]

The meaning of the text is negotiated and co-constructed by the participants and the use of quotation is particularly important when speaking about agreement and disagreement as it determines the relevant elements on which the discussion is based, focusing the attention of the participants on a well localized theme and determining therefore the textual movement and the progression of the argument.

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[3] Pleasepleaseplease.
Could you please – next time place your answer under the original message and cut out from it all parts that are not necessary to understand your answer?
Thanks.
Greetings, XXX.
[4] "Sara YYY".
>>> Let's begin from the attitude: it was just the same as her msg, shouting and menacing:
> Pliz: I missed the msg to whom Mrs. YYY is answering… could somebody forward it to me? Thanks :-)

The whole focusing mechanism changes according to the characteristics of the dialogue it-self and its task oriented features. For instance, contrastive markers re-orient the co-participants' cognitive states towards grounding ungrounded topical aspects to be meta-negotiated. Such markers offer a collaborative context-updating strategy, tracking the status of common ground during dialogue topic management.

In the following we are going to illustrate by examples how quoting enables participants to keep alive the focus of the conversation and to prosecute the subject just by pasting parts of the previous messages, analysing the possible connections and mutual influences between quoting and agreeing/disagreeing routines and their implications in topic negotiation.

As Pistolesi (2004) points out, to resort to the quoting strategy can depend on the emo-tional tenor of the exchange and on the involvement of the participants: direct quoting and re-sumption techniques seem to be more frequent when one has to express slight opposition and disagreement, whereas they seem to disappear in messages expressing total disagreement.

3. *Etiquette vs Netiquette*

The particular features of the NGs' language could be explained by the structure and nature of the NG itself. On the one hand it deals with a well-defined community, organised and self con-scious, and therefore allowed to a certain amount of "freedom of expression" (participants know each other and are "virtual friends"; they keep regular contact and have regular interaction), avoiding introductions, explanations and formulas typical of controlled interaction. But on the other hand it is strictly regulated by a clear *Netiquette* defining the rules of interaction. In [1] we have introduced an example of the conventions governing the co-construction of the text and the need of a well known and carefully planned quoting strategy, in [2] a menacing attitude is men-tioned[5], but Netiquette implies (dis)agreement rules as well.

> [3] **Q**[6]: > […] riflettesse un pochino su. Per esempio, * quanti * messaggi si ... si ... ho capito potrebbbero essere scritti in mail privata? Quanti vengono scritti solo per dire * sono d'accordo *, quando nei ns - più che in altre sedi - vale la regola del * chi tace acconsente * ... e via di questo passo! e, ad esempio, gli "auguri"? Io, da tempo, non ne faccio sul ng ... 1 Se è gnucco, poi, randellate sui denti. Ma solo dopo averlo aiutato.
>
> **A**: ah ... vedo siamo d'accordo anche su questo ... il problema è che la selezione naturale tende a far convergere niubbo e gnucco[7] ...

---

[5] Reproducing the whole thread would have been too long here, therefore we refer the reader to the online queryable version of the corpus, nonetheless this example requires some more details to be understood: it deals with a conversation where one of the posters wrote the whole message in capital letters, which is considered a sign of an aggressive attitude, as it often simulates the rising of the voice.

[6] **Q:** marks the quoted passage, **A:** marks the answer.

[7] The Italian word *gnucco* has a twofold meaning suggested by the pun between its literal meaning, *dull*, and its phonetic likeness to the English *newco*(*mer*).

Saluti, XXX[8]

As this post points out agreement and disagreement are strictly regulated, even though there is not a rule explicitly mentioned in the official Netiquette. Nevertheless the principle "silence gives consent" seems to be ignored by newbies and newcomers, whereas experienced posters are irritated by the redundancy and by the noise messages of simple agreement cause in the thread.

Actually there are lots of messages posted just to show one's agreement, though they do not add any new information to the discussed topic. In § 4 we are going to observe indeed how agreement is never an end in itself, it is rather a strategy to introduce a certain amount of disagreement or further details to the conversation.

4. How to (dis)agree in multilingual NGs

In NGs posters most of the times explicitly ask for opinion and judgement or do express theirs about other posters' messages. This kind of exchange implies that the bare occurrence of agreement and disagreement formulas must be higher than in normal colloquial conversation. Even usual turn taking signals in colloquial conversation can trigger argumentative thread where agreement and disagreement overlap and cut across each other.

In this form of CMD the interactional functions of agreement and disagreement are often carried out by similar routines, playing each time a different role in the negotiation of information. These roles can be roughly divided into three main categories or *levels of agreement* (Bazzanella 1996) that can be applied to this analysis as well: total agreement, partial agreement and total disagreement, and they can be ordered according to a well-known scale ranging from signals of total agreement to total disagreement as in Table I:

Total agreement
sharing
Partial agreement
[...]
Turn taking strategy
Topicalization of information
[...]
Asking for an explanation
Asking for correction
Partial disagreement
Total disagreement

Table I: *Agreement/Disagreement scale (Bazzanella 1996)*

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[8] **Q:** How many messages could be written in a private mail? How many are written just to say *I agree*, while in ng – more than in other places – serves the rule "silence gives consent"... and so on! And, for example, "good

Total agreement and disagreement are obviously defined by clear and precise expressions, as in [5] where there is a formal and plain expression of disagreement and in [6], where a more creative form of pointing out one's mistake is introduced:

[5] **Q:** > È una enorme rottura di palle; *magari* fosse di tutti i giorni la
> cucina speciale o quella per gli ospiti...

A: Dissento. Come ho già detto, io sono uno di quei single che lavora tutto il giorno in ufficio, arriva a casa tardi la sera e *se* dovessi mangiare un panino schifido al bar o una pizza da asporto o cose comprate in gastronomia tutti i giorni, penso che mi suiciderei. Secondo me è *FAVOLOSO* tornare a casa, sia a pranzo che a cena e mettersi a cucinare. Mi rilassa, mi fa dimenticare il grigio mondo dell'ufficio, mi fa insomma star bene e mi permette di cominciare la notte di buon umore :-)
[...]
JXX[9]

[6] **Q:** > Senti maaaaaaa... Perozzo, sei sicuro di volere il pesto rosso con basilico
> o non cercavi, FORSE, il pesto rosso alla siciliana, che il sempre grande
> Sergio mi ha detto trattarsi di Capuliato alla trapanese... Capuliato, trito
> di carne, e per traslato anche di pomodori secchi, i quali danno il
> caratteristico sapore e consistenza al pesto rosso...

A: Blokka i manzi! ;-)))
Quello trapanese (sennò Gianmaria ci capulìa) è un pesto di pomodori FRESCHI. Il capuliato con i pomodori secchi è palermitano e viene dalle montagne e dal centro e, che io sappia, lo usano anche ad oriente. "Capuliatu" è comunque il "tritato" (basso latino capulare, antico spagnolo capular e antico francese capler, capleier); anche il soffritto (cipolla, sedano e carota) se fatto a punta di coltello è capuliatu.

---

wishes"? I haven't been doing it in the ng for a long time... If one is newco, then, clubbing. But only after having helped him.
A: Ah... I see we agree about this as well... the problem is that the natural selection makes newco and newbie converge.
Greetings, XXX.
[9] **Q:** > It is just big pain in the ass; *if only* could special dishes or guest dishes be everyday dishes...
A: I disagree. As I already said, I am a single, working all day long, arriving home late and, *if* I had to eat a disgusting sandwich or a take away pizza and such, everyday I think I will commit suicide. I just think that it is *GREAT* to go back home, both for lunch and dinner to cook. It is relaxing and I forget about the grey world of the office. It is in the end good to me and allows me to start the night with a good mood.:-)
[...]
JXX

XX*10

English speaking NGs' users often use intensifying elements such as *really, strongly* or *do*...

> [7] Eat all you can... **I do agree**, but they do prove particularly useful when you are run off your toes and need a quick lunch that is more than a sandwich. I took my kids to a circus in Chelmsford yesterday afternoon and we dropped in to one of the buffet style places for dinner afterwards.

The use of these routines in order to express only partial agreement usually implies a more complex operation, where agreement is a sort of kind and implicit device used to introduce disagreement. Pomerantz (1975) observes that when participants feel that they are expected to agree with an assessment, yet disagree, they usually express their disagreement with some form of delay. He introduced the term of "dispreferred-action turn shape" to refer to second assessments that display features such as silence or delays after an assessment has been introduced: action that is not "oriented to" the talk as it was invited to be. These actions are structurally marked, displaying what she calls "dispreference" features such as "delay, requests for clarification, partial repeats, and other repair initiators, and turn prefaces". When posters feel that they are expected to agree with an assessment, yet disagree, they usually express their disagreement with some form of delay. Some of the forms of delay that Pomerantz lists are initial silence in response to forthcoming talk and repair initiators, yet in written forms of communication such as NGs we can find a certain degree of disagreement concealed under conversation repair strategies, quoting or initial agreement used to delay and mitigate the confutation of the previous statement, such as in [8] where first of all there is the quoting of the previous messages, the sharing of the same opinion and then the objection, which makes of this post a representative example of partial agreement.

> [8] **Q:** >>> La cucina quotidiana non è una banlità
> >> È una enorme rottura di palle
> > Per me la preparazione della cena quotidiana è un piccolo rito
> ...
> > Un punto fermo di fine giornata lavorativa,
> > un attimo di raccoglimento,

---

[10] **Q:** > liiiisteen... Perozzo, are you sure you want the red pesto with basil
> or weren't you looking for, MAY BE, sicilian red pesto, that the great
> Sergio told me is like the Trapani Capuliato... Capuliato, minced
> meat, and dry tomatoes as well, that give the
> characteristic flavour and consistency to the red pesto...
A: Stop the calves! ;-)))
The trapanese one is a pesto made of FRESH tomatoes. The capuliato with dry tomatoes is from Palermo and comes from the mountains and from the centre and, as far as I know, it is used in the East as well. "Capuliatu" is the "minced" (old Latin capulare, old Spanish capular and old French capler, capleier); also the lightly fried mixture of chopped onions, carrots and celery if it is done with a knife is capuliatu.
XX*

> un muovere le mani con precisione e tempismo.
> È "casa".

> **A: così è anche per me**, la cena ... telefonini spenti, le chiacchiere serali
> con le puzzole, la scelta del menu a partire dagli ingredienti disponibili e
> dalla voglia :) pentole ciotole vapori profumi per casa...
> [...]

> **ma** è anche rottura di palle, quando 7 giorni su 7 devi preparare anche il
> pranzo per almeno 2 belve affamate (e che non sempre si accontentano),
> che deve essere rigorosamente già pronto per le 8 del mattino ... e di fatto
> è la prima cosa che faccio appena alzata
> LXXX[11].

Some forms of request for explanation can be considered ways of expressing partial disagreement as well, even if it is not explicit but has to be inferred from the context, such as in [9] where comments alternate the quoted passages and create a sort of dialogue in progress: the external reader – the lurker – of this passage has actually the impression to witness an actual dialogue where the one speaker does not know what the other speaker is going to say next.

> [9] **Q:** > [...] nel momento in cui contrasti gli allevamenti e giustifichi i lab-
> oratori bisogna che tu ne valuti i motivi. 1 Non è uguale uccidere un animale
> per farne una salsiccia, per farne un cappotto, per trovare cure.

> **A:** quindi, tradotto ai minimi termini: la vita degli animali vale a seconda
> del grado di convenienza dell'uomo. lo spieghi tu ai bambini nelle scuole
> che uccidere gli animali per mangiarli non va bene e ucciderli per "curarsi"
> va bene?

> **Q:** > Se non fai differenze fai solo danni al movimento animalista.

> **A: ah ecco, volevo ben dire.**

---

[11] **Q:**>>> Daily cooking is not a stupid thing to do
>> It is a great pain in the ass
> To me preparing dinner is a small rite...
> An anchor to the end of a working day,
> a moment of concentration,
> a movement to be done with precision and sense of timing.
> it is "home".
A: So is it for me, dinner ... mobiles turned off, evening chatting with our polecats, choosing the menu according to the available ingredients and to the will :) pans cups steams and smells around...
[...]
but it is a pain in the ass as well, when 7 days out of 7 you have to cook for lunch as well _ for at least 2 hungry wild beasts (that are not always happy with it), that has to be ready by 8 in the morning... and actually it is the first thing I do after I get up.
LXXX

Q: > Perché è comprensibile a più la futilità dell'uccisione di un animale per farne pellicce o per farne cotolette

A: mi pare che tu stia solamente cercando giustificazioni perchè appoggi un massacro scientifico e non lo fai per uno alimentare.

Q: > Se c'è la possibilità di trovare cure a favore della razza umana molti saranno favorevoli.

A: stando dalla parte dei vivisettori ti riuscirà difficile conseguire questo scopo: le persone ti chiederanno che diavolo di animalista sei, e tu dovrai rispondergli che non lo sei[12].

Muntigl and Turnbull (1998) identify four major types of disagreement, ranked from most to least aggravated: irrelevancy claims, challenges, contradictions, and counterclaims. They found that the more a second turn threatens the face of the speaker who made a claim as a first turn, the more likely it is that the third turn will contain further support of that first speaker's claim. The poster in [10] disagrees with a previous message (the quoted message that in its turn disagrees with another message) and agrees with the recipe on the web site, then in the second part agrees with the first poster following his/her logical thread. The quoting mechanism enables participants to mix strategies of agreement and disagreement and to support them with extratextual devices such as hyperlinks, moreover they tend definitely to combine the functions of *agreement markers* and *contrastive markers*, thus re-orienting the topic by commenting or refusing part of it.

[10] **Q:** > ci vuole una faccia da chiulo non indifferente per inventarsi una
> pizza simile
> http://www.pizza.it/ricette/ricetta_week/Gennaio/pizza_capodanno.htm

A: Sulla pizza ci potete sbattere tutto quel che volete. È lo zampone precotto la mostruosità assoluta
0=:-)

Q: > Eccone un'altra convinta che la pizza sia sacra e che Napoli ne sia la

---

[12] > **Q:** [...] the moment you are against stock farming and not against laboratories, you must consider the reasons. 1 It is not the same to kill an animal in order to make a sausage, a coat or a medicine out of it.
A: that is to say that: animals life has a different value depending on the convenience degree of mankind. How do you explain to children that killing animals in order to eat them is wrong while killing them looking for "a cure" is all right?
Q: > if you do not distinguish you just damage animalists.
A: Yep, that's true.
Q: > 'Cause it is clear the uselessness of killing an animal in order to have fur or steaks.
A: It seems to me that you are just looking for justifications, since you are supporting a scientific massacre but not an alimentary massacre.
Q: > If there is the chance to find some cure of any use to mankind many will agree.
A: Being on the side of vivisection you'll have a hard life: people will ask what kind of animalist you are, and you will have to say that you are not.

> Capitale...
   A: Sono daccordo anche su questo, la pizza, soprattutto quella bassa e
   croccante, non è altro che una mensa aedibile, come una tortilla messi-
   cana o una piadina o una crepes. Un piatto su cui ci metti ciò che ti piace.
   Si potrebbe eccepire per la pizza spessa, che allora diventa una focaccia, ma
   questo è un altro discorso.
   Ciao
   XXX[13]

The prosecution of the conversation could easily then shift on the nature of the *focaccia* or
the possible substitutes of the pizza.

According to Bazzanella's scale of agreement asking for explanation and correction is
nearer to disagreement as it leaves out the intention of the speaker, that does not accord
with his counterpart. In the following example, for instance, the poster delays his disagree-
ment with a discursive marker (*senti maaaaaaa...*) introducing a challenging point, then
he asks if the author is sure about what he said - may be he wanted to point out something
else - and eventually he resorts to the expert's opinion, reporting his judgment. This is a typ-
ical example of how politeness in the NG community carries out disagreement, by disguis-
ing it as partial agreement.

[11] **Q:** > Scusate la mia ignoranza, Io avevo richiesto una riccetta di pesto di
> Basilico rosso, Io non sapevo che c'è il basilico di colore rosso, (Red
> Rubin Basil)
> e anche di colore blu (African Blue Basil), però quando si pesta non ha
> il colore rosso, per far il pesto il migliore è Sweet Basil Italian
> Large-Leaf.
> (Ho richercato questo all'Universita di Wisconsin Horticultural Diparti-
mento)

   A: azzo... altro che la Massaciucmel University di Bologna... me cojoni!!!
   qui adesso useremo i nomi botanici, visto che del basilico che abbiamo
   non ce ne puo fregar di meno...

   Senti maaaaaa... Perozzo, **sei sicuro** di volere il pesto rosso con basilico
   o non cercavi, **FORSE**, il pesto rosso alla siciliana, che il sempre grande

---

[13] **Q:** > you must really have quite a brazen-face to invent such a pizza
> http://www.pizza.it/ricette/ricetta_week/Gennaio/pizza_capodanno.htm
A: One can put whatever he/she wants on a pizza. It is the precooked stuffed pig's trotter the ultimate mon-
struosity 0=:-)
Q: > And here we have someone else convinced that pizza is sacred and Naples the capital of it...
A: I agree about this as well, the pizza, expecially the thin and crispy one, it is nothing more than a food base,
just like Mexican tortilla or Italian piadina or French crepe. A dish you can put whatever you like on. One could
make an exception for thick pizza, but now again it becomes a focaccia and that's something else again.
Ciao
XXX

> Sergio mi ha detto trattarsi di Capuliato alla trapanese... Capuliato, trito
> di carne, e per traslato anche di pomodori secchi, i quali danno il caratte-
> ristico sapore e consistenza al pesto rosso...[14]

A similar strategy involving clarifying requests displays an opposite procedure, though ob-
taining the same final effect: instead of implying the poster's erroneousness, the writer ex-
plicitly mentions a comprehension trouble, caused by the imprecision of the expressed idea.
This is a further stage of the scale, getting closer and closer to overt disagreement:

> [12] **Q:** >Un punto fermo di fine giornata lavorativa,
>
> **A: Non capisco.**
> Anch'io fui singolo, ma la sera, che a mezzogiorno a casa non rientravo
> ma neanche mangiavo, mi nutrivo solamente daltronde come adesso, il
> pensare di DOVERMI mettere a cucinare era un tormanto; quante volte
> pane e mortadella e via a letto a leggere.
> [...]
> Ciao
> XXX[15]

Indeed the interaction can determine a change of course, introducing reparation moves and an
unconditional *no* can make over into a reparation and finally in an agreement assessment.

> [13] **Q1:** >> [...] scopo la comunicazione di "messaggi" ben più ampi del-
> l'oggetto in se. non penso che tu ne abbia paura (perchè mai?), ma come ti ho
> detto in queste cose credo che ogniuno abbia il proprio punto di vista esclu-
> sivo e ogni ragionamento finisca per essere fine a se stesso.

---

[14] **Q:** > Sorry for my ignorance, I asked a recipe the red pesto, I didn't know there is red basil, (Red
> Rubin Basil)
> and even blue (African Blue Basil), but when you grind it, it isn't red, to make the best pesto you should use'
Sweet Basil Italian
> Large-Leaf.
> (I searched this at the Horticultural department of the University of Wisconsin)
A: shit... you bet! Massaciucmel University of Bologna... oh my balls!!! Now we're going to use botanic names,
as we don't care about basil...
liiiisteen... Perozzo, are you sure you want the red pesto with basil or weren't you looking for, MAY BE, sicilian
red pesto, that the great Sergio told me is like the Trapani Capuliato... Capuliato, minced meat, and dry toma-
toes as well, that give the characteristic flavour and consistency to the red pesto...
[15] **Q:** >An anchor at the end of a working day,
A: I do not understand.
I've been single as well, but in the evening, at lunch time I never came home and I didn't even use to eat, I used
to feed myself as I do now, thinking of HAVING TO cook was a torture; so many times bread and mortadella
and directly to bed.
[...]
Ciao
XXX

> **Q2:** > **No**, io più che altro ho inteso che tu forse hai paura del "campo minato", ossia quel campo sul quale tutti possono avere pareri discordanti senza che nessuno debba veramente avere torto o ragione. **Sbaglio? penso di no!**
>
>> **A: ah scusa non avevo capito! Hai proprio ragione mi fai paura!!** Ma ricordati che secondo me invece é propio questo tipo di discorsi (paragoni tra vino, arte e filisofia anche spicciola), che spesso nascono davanti ad un bicchiere di vino, 1 Io non faccio mai paragoni tra vino ed arte (oltretutto di arti grafiche e scultoriche non capisco una mazza) , men che meno tra vino e filosofia, purtroppo ho poco tempo per studiarla, ma detesto quella spicciola[16].

Johnstone (1989) lists three types of persuasive strategies: quasilogic (persuasion can be achieved by using a type of informal reasoning); presentation (moving and involving the listener in order to persuade); persuasion (calling to mind traditional wisdom), exploring our multilingual suit of corpora it can be noticed how the use of these schemes are largely culture-, gender- and language-specific.

English speaking users, for example, tend to employ a well defined range of disagreeing patterns combining the quasi logic and the presentation strategy and obtaining as a result a level of faded agreement that in the end turns to be disagreement. In particular the routine gets going from a simple quoting device, the next turn repair initiators indicate that the speaker of the NTRI is about to disagree and the argumentative moves aim to turn the expression into total disagreement following the sequence quoting – agreement – adversative preposition.

> [14] **Q:** > It is polite, and safer, to credit the source of the publication, as you do in the recipes following your post, >which puts one in the same position as a reviewer. Reviews are sppecifically exempted by copyright rules
>
>> **A: I agree. But frankly** I get fed up with the way that every time someone does something positive in this NG, there are always a bunch of whinging twits who find some excuse to criticise.
>
> [15] Even Madhur Jaffrey on the cooking programme about fast food today (Saturday) stated that 'they' (Indian restaurants) cooked anything and called it Rogan Josh. Sadly, **I agree with her, but** widen the dishes to incorporate

---

[16] **Q1:** >> [...] aim of the communication in "messages" longer then their object. I don't think you fear them (why then?), but as I told you I think every one has his own point of view and each reasoning eventually becomes an end in itself.
Q2: > **No**, rather I understood you are afraid of the " mined field ", that is to say that field in which any one can have different opinions, even if no one is really right or wrong. **Am I wrong? I don't think so no!**
A: ah sorry I didn't understand! you're right, you scare me!! But remember, I think it's exactly this kind of conversations (comparisons between wine, arts and simple philosophy), that often start in front of a glass of wine, I never compare wine and arts (besides this I do not understand a shit of graphic and sculptural arts) , even less wine and philosophy, unfortunately I have little time to study it, but I hate the small one.

> ALL dishes they cook! When I have cooked RJ for the uninitiated (into good
> Indian cuisine) there is always a period of silence

These features are to be found both in Italian and in English, as well as in German, though they seem to be more common in the latter. Herring (1992) considers these pattern of disagreement to be typical of female posters, our results though seem to withdraw hers, they seem to be rather a regular and recursive structure more language specific than gender specific. A possible explanation could be the existence of an informal Netiquette unwittingly acquired by the community or the sense of belonging to this community itself, as one does not want to be impolite towards a "Net mate".

As for the strategies to introduce disagreement through partial agreement, unlike Italian, English makes full use of modals and conditionals both to express dissent and to set up new themes in the discourse progression.

> [16] Mr X does not get the expected result, and may be put off trying again. It's prefectly fair to sell the stuff as "chilli seasoning", because that is not the exact name of another common ingredient. I checked with out local TS, and they said they would investigate a complaint such as this. 1 And I'm quite sure they'd reach the same conclusion as I have. **Now if the ingredients weren't clearly labelled I'd agree with you, but they are, and I simply can't see a problem with it**.

> [17] **Q:** >> Bitter? Lime pickle should be hot and sour. (Probably overkill with something like a vindaloo.) yes, lime pickle is bitter like other citrus fruits, (but it does mellow on maturing, so may be perceived by some as sour), green or unripe mango is sour (like pomegranate). There is the difference.

> > **A:** It may be a difference between different people's interpretations, but **I would * never * class** a citrus fruit as "bitter". **I would say** that lemon (juice) is the quintesscence of 'bitter'. Possibly because any bitterness that is there is swamped by the effect of the acid. so what is acid if it is not bitter, have we got our wires crossed? Is vinegar not bitter?, acetic acid? Other people may not get that effect. well either you or I have an atypical opinion on what is what!! but I **would agree** that people's perceptions on food are different, that is what makes me like pukka Indain food, and others like 'Indain restaurant food', (unless they haven't tried the pukka stuff yet!) cheers WXXX

5. *Gender related agreement/disagreement*

Social rules have to be taken into account even when talking about CMD, male and female posters are supposed to follow different discoursive patterns, just as they do in spoken discourse, both in the way they structure the message and quote passages, in the way they express (dis)agreement, and in the way they select the content of their messages. It seems that

traditional gender stereotypes can be reified even when people believe they are freely choos-
ing their online gender identity in non traditional ways.

Agreement and disagreement strategies can display the different features of the so
called "genderlects": as Herring (1995) points out, women often disagree by cushioning
their disagreements with affiliative comments, posting questions rather than making asser-
tions, whereas men use an adversarial style.

Baym (1996) investigates agreement and disagreement patterns in a mostly female
newsgroup. The disagreement patterns she discovered matched those suggested by Pomer-
antz (1975), but some major differences emerged due to the medium, gender, context, and
interactive goals: disagreements included quoting, were linked to previous discourse and
had pervasive elaboration. Interestingly, accounts and justifications emerged with agree-
ments, and not with disagreements, as the notion of preference predicts.

The tendency for women to be more polite, supportive and emotionally expressive,
and conversely the one of men to be more likely to insult, challenge, express sarcasm, use pro-
fanity, and send long messages is confirmed by all the examples we have been giving through
this contribution. So far we have found long messages (according to Herring 1993 an evi-
dence of the writer's gender) where contributors use to dwell on the subject displaying an
authoritative orientation, using strong assertions and sarcasm. On the contrary female
posters can in theory be identified with a stylistic variety characterized by personal orien-
tation, attenuation, questions and justification (Herring 1993).

In the following exchange the difference of gender is plain: on the one hand a woman
commenting a recipe, on the other hand a man criticising the woman's knowledge of in-
gredients, stressing her inexperience by the use of capital letters (elsewhere in [2] negatively
judged by participants as a sign of impoliteness).

> [18] **Q1:** >>> Proverò a sostituire la fecola con l'amido di mais (sospettavo che
> >>> fossero intercambiabili, ma aspettavo che lo dicesse qualcun altro per
> primo)., casomai poi solo farina
>
> **Q2:** >>Maizena e amido di mais NON sono intercambiabili... sono la stessa
> cosa! Maizena è, infatti, un marchio commerciale che indica UNA MARCA
> di amido di mais. Puoi usare anche fecola di patate e amido per dolci. Anche
> sola farina, ovvio, con il risultato di avere però una torta più pesante. :-)
> --
>
> **Q3:** > Ma mi sa che lei intendesse come intercambiabili amido di mais e
> fecola...
> > se non ho capito male..
>
> > **A:** Evvabbuò... ho fatto l'ennesima figura mia! Ecchessarà mai!!! Una più,
> > una meno... ;-)))[17]

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[17] **Q1:** >>> I'll try to substitute the potato flour with maize starch (I guessed they were the same thing, but I was
waiting for someone to tell me)., just in case only flour

This example shows how women are discouraged or intimidated from participating on the basis of the reactions with which their posts are met when they do contribute. Male are generally more likely than women to produce bald, unmitigated disagreeing, though this does not mean they always agree, but they use to express disagreement indirectly, off-record, using intraturn delays, hedges, and pre-disagreement tokens, which are generally followed by using weak disagreements. Even when they are verbally aggressed as in [18] they try to avoid direct confrontation, they rather try to mitigate the exchange seeking for reparation.

Verbal aggressiveness comes to have a different significance for women than for men; as Coates (1986) observes, women are apt to take personal offence at what men may view as part of the conventional structure of conversation.

In the following example the attitude of the man answering the message is rather accommodating, but the repetition of the NP and the appellative "stellina" might offend the woman, treating her as an unacquainted child.

[19] **Q:** >**Semola**, DXX. **Semola** di grano duro (venduta anche come *sfarinato di grano duro*).

A: No, stellina; semolino-semolino, quello che si usa per fare le pappate ai microbimbini, che ha la grana simile a qualla dalla farina di mais bramata bergamasca, che viene venduto in pacchettini da 250/500 g o sfuso da sacchi da 50 kg. proprio quello, addizionato di circa un 20 % di quella che viene venduta come semola di granoduro ma che a me sembra proprio **farina-farina** di grano duro. Fo molti errori, moltissimi di questi molti sono voluti, gli altri sono caz....uali, ma in questo caso giustissimo fui.[18]

6. *Conclusion*

In this contribution we have been trying to shed light on a genre of computer mediated discourse that has not been fully explored by discourse analysis yet. NGs offer an environment where people engage in socially meaningful activities online in a way that typically leaves a

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Q2: >> maize starch and maizena are NOT interchangeable... they are the same thing! Maizena is a brand, kind of maize starch. You can use the potato flour and starch for cakes as well. Even the simple flour, of course, obtaining although a cake a little bit heavier. :-)

Q3: > I thought she was meaning interchangeable maize starch and potato flour...

> if I understood...

A: Ockey dockey... I made again a fool of myself! So what!!! Just one more... ;-)))

[18] **Q:** >**Semolina**, DXX. **Semolina** of durum wheat (also known as *flour of durum wheat*).

A: No, little star; middlings-middlings, the one you use to make babyfood, that is similar to the maize meal from Bergamo, that is sold in 250/500 g packets or by measure 50 kg sack. Exactly that one, with a 20 % of what is sold as semolina of durum wheat but looks like **fluor-flour** of durum wheat. I do a lot of mistakes, some of them are deliberate, others are caz... ual, but this time really right I was.

textual trace, making the discoursive interactions more accessible to the analysis and to the observation. In particular, agreeing and disagreeing routines have proved to be an interesting aspect of CMD to be further investigated. Our findings partially contradict the previous results of gender related discourse analysis, in particular we found out that some routines, such as the procedure of showing agreement first to object afterwards in the prosecution of the discourse, seems to be more language specific and culture related than a distinction based on genre.

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THE MEDIATOR AS MEANING NEGOTIATOR

DANIELA MURARU

1. *Introduction*

This paper aims at identifying and discussing the various linguistic strategies employed by the American president, Jimmy Carter, in exercising his role of a "mediator" in the conflict between Egypt and Israel. He displays an argumentative behaviour characterized by the use of language strategies that function as persuasive techniques. These are resorted to with the purpose of helping the two parties to come to dispute resolution, by making them agree on signing a peace treaty. The empirical material (enclosed in the *Annex*) is made up of several fragments of texts that belong to the mediator, and in which the starting points of the two parties are formulated.

The focus on starting points was generated by the importance they have as the basis for identifying the main points of disagreement and agreement. Thus, the notion of common ground is essential in defining the issues of a conflict, so that resolution may be possible. Also, the re-formulation of the starting points is very important as it enables the parties to stay focused on the relevant aspects of the conflict. The use of (re-) definitions enables the mediator to exercise his roles of communicator, formulator and manipulator, in his attempt to minimize the disagreement space between the parties. The various roles play a part in differentiating the position of mediator from that of negotiator. In exercising his roles, the mediator resorts to a series of linguistic strategies or tactics.

It is important to, first of all, define the major concepts this paper operates with, in order to have a better picture of the context in which these particular types of strategies occur. Then the paper briefly mentions some of the typologies for classifying the various mediation strategies, proposed by different scholars (Bercovitch & Regan 1996, Bercovitch & Wells 1993, Carnevale & Pruitt 1992, Schultz 1991). Unfortunately, these models refer to the non-linguistic reality, that is, they see facts only as an account of data, and discuss and evaluate various strategies of mediation as mere observation of facts. As a difference from this, this paper is trying to approach the empirical facts from a pragma-dialectical perspective, in order to study the verbal interaction and to discover the strategies that the use of language has to offer.

The reason for this kind of approach is that the pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation is not concerned with the psychological or cognitive dimension of people's states of mind, but with the people's expressed commitments, that is, with what can be externalized only. Consequently, applying this theoretical framework to the study of mediation enables the analyst to observe certain patterns of behavior at the verbal level.

2. *Key concepts*

"Mediation" is the process in which a third party – ideally neutral – assists two or more parties in conflict, facilitating communication and offering some guidance in order to help them solve the dispute by themselves (van Eemeren *et al.* 1993; Jacobs & Aakhus 2002).

The person who mediates is called a "Mediator", defined (Naess 1966, Eemeren *et al.* 1993: 118) not as a person who necessarily has to solve the conflict, or who must come to a conclusion about the truth or falsity of information, but especially as one whose job is "to regulate communication, manage interpersonal relations, and facilitate decision-making" (Jacobs & Aakhus 2002: 29).

"International mediation" is a particular type of mediation used in international conflicts, which "involves interventions by credible and competent intermediaries who assist the parties in working toward a negotiated settlement on substantive issues through persuasion, the control of information, the suggestion of alternatives, and, in some case, the application of leverage" (Fischer & Keashly 1991: 30).

"Negotiation" is viewed as "a joint decision-making process in which parties, with initially opposing positions and conflicting interests arrive at a mutually beneficial and satisfactory agreement" (Albin 2001: 1). The purpose of negotiation – that of reaching a settlement – is attained by means of a dialogic dialectical process in which the two parties actively influence each other (cf. Hutiu 2007: 39). Thus, from the formal point of view, negotiation involves two parties in dialogue trying to resolve a conflict; therefore, it is a "two-way process of persuasion" (*ibid.*).

By its definition, mediation needs three parties that can reach the phase of negotiation: – the two conflicting parties have, in turn, the roles of protagonist and antagonist of a standpoint, while the third party – the mediator – addresses either each of the party, thus presenting the position of the other party, or both parties, as a common audience. First, the mediator may negotiate with each of the disputants in private, and then the parties may come to negotiation between themselves. Actually, as a facilitator of communication, the mediator has the role of helping the parties agree on reaching the negotiating phase.

As opposed to mediation, negotiation necessarily implies reaching a common point and agreement settlement. Therefore, mediation turns the dyadic relation of negotiation into a triadic interaction.

It should be added that negotiation, in this particular case submitted for analysis, is a process the third party gets involved in, at certain moments, as part of his mediating task, that is, the negotiating sessions he resorts to are employed with the specific purpose of determining the parties to reach a settlement. Also, the two conflicting parties are initially engaged in a negotiation process, but, when reaching a stalemate, the need is felt to require the presence of a third party to help them clarify the divergent issues. Nevertheless, during the entire mediation process, there are various attempts for Egypt and Israel to come to a resolution by becoming engaged in negotiations all by themselves, without the involvement of the American party. The failures make them see the mediator as the only reasonable solu-

tion of getting to an agreement. Thus, one of the roles of the mediator is "to facilitate negotiation" (Fischer 1983: 305).

3. *Mediation strategies*

Wall, Stark & Standifer (2001) set the premises for mediation occurrence: the interacting disputing parties must request or permit a third party to mediate; and the third party must agree to mediate. These premises enable us to treat mediation as a critical discussion, viewed within the pragma-dialectical framework.

In the context of international mediation, the notion of strategy is defined as "an overall plan, approach or method a mediator has for resolving a dispute... it is the way the mediator intends to manage the case, the parties, and the issues" (Kolb 1983: 249).

It should be added that there is no such thing as a universal strategy or a general set of strategies to act as rules that can be applied in any case of mediation, or valid for every type of dispute or conflict. Therefore, the mediator's choice depends on the context of the dispute and the type of the parties, which exist prior to the mediation itself. Nevertheless, they influence the mediator's perceptions and approaches to the dispute.

3.1 Non-linguistic strategies or tactics for mediation

A distinction is made between strategies and tactics (Himes 1980, Kolb 1983, Schultz 1991), in the sense that the former determine the choice of the latter (Schultz, 1991: 205); strategies focus on the process of thinking or planning, while tactics involve taking action of what has been planned. In other words, tactics regard applying the theoretical points thought up in a plan to the practical level of action, in order to evaluate the effectiveness of the strategy.

Bercovitch & Wells (1993) talk about various classifications of strategies, that the literature on mediation and negotiation has made so far, and evaluate their effectiveness in practice. Some of the strategies mentioned by them are not necessarily linguistic, and could be viewed simply as tactics, such as gaining the trust of the parties, searching for information, acting as a communication link, engaging the negotiators in role-reversal, educating the disputants in conflict management techniques, acting as a sounding board, providing a face-saving mechanism, and arranging an environment conducive to conflict management.

Being considered a typology which does not allow clear distinctions between different types of mediation behaviour, Touval & Zartman (1985) suggest another classification, which seems particularly useful in the context of international mediation. In the Introduction to *International Mediation in Theory and Practice* (1985), the two scholars make a classification of the "methods" by which the mediators contribute to conflict resolution. Thus, we may speak about three main roles attributed to the mediator: communicator, formulator and manipulator. These are closely connected with the mediator / negotiator distinction,

in the sense that we understand the mediator in a two-fold way: (1) the Mediator as a facilitator of decision-making – engaged in pure mediation, whom is attributed the roles of communicator and formulator, and who typically displays neutrality and transparency, and (2) the Mediator as a manipulator (not necessarily in a negative way) – engaged in negotiation, making use of leverage, eliciting concessions or compromise. Most of the effects of such a strategic behaviour can be skilfully pursued by means of language / discourse.

3.2 Linguistic/Discourse strategies employed by the mediator

The most important means of communication used by the mediator, in establishing a good relationship with the parties, is the spoken interaction, which ensures the progress of the mediation process. It is only at that level that effective mediation and its successful outcome can be achieved. Therefore, we may add that the various discourse strategies depend upon the mediator's "tacit pragmatic competence" (van Eemeren *et al.* 1993: 119). In the case submitted for analysis in the present paper, the mediator tries to achieve his strategic aims in an indirect way, by providing formulations and reformulations of the disputants' standpoints and starting points, with the purpose of minimizing the disagreement space[1] between the parties.

"Formulations" and "reformulations" are the devices which have important argumentative functions within mediation. They "offer strategies that are sensitive to the multiple and sometimes paradoxical demands placed on the conduct of the mediator" (van Eemeren *et al.* 1993: 138). The technique of formulating represents a sample of "how people can employ the resources of ordinary language to approximate an ideal model of a critical discussion under less-than-ideal conditions" (*ibid.*: 139).

The argumentative task that this technique involves is that of helping the mediator to clarify positions, to summarize the status of the issues at stake, and to identify the points of agreement and disagreement, thus laying out options for resolving their impasse. The mediator merely facilitates the discussion by which the disputants may search for their own settlement, as "a disagreement in views cannot be resolved through strategies that end a discussion without mutual consent" (*ibid.*: 28).

The pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation treats the formulation of standpoints[2] as having particular importance, because we can speak about reaching agreement only if there is a common ground for discussion, that is, if the participants in the dispute agree on

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[1] According to the definition given by van Eemeren *et al.* (1993: 95) "[t]he entire complex of reconstructible commitments can be considered as 'disagreement space', a structured set of opportunities for argument."

[2] According to pragma-dialectics, "an oral or written expression is a standpoint if it expresses a certain positive or negative position with respect to a proposition, thereby making it plain what the speaker or writer stands for" (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 2004: 3).

"In the communication between language users, with a standpoint, a point of view is expressed that entails a certain position in a dispute [...] Standpoints may express opinions concerning facts, ideas, actions, attitudes, or whateve" (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 1992: 14).

the acceptability of certain standpoints. As we also know from the pragma-dialectical approach, "[t]here is a clear parallel in mediation where the resolution of differences requires that disputants clearly express standpoints and not shift ground in defending those standpoints" (*ibid.*: 141). The ideal model of critical discussion assumes that no standpoint is more important than another.

According to the code of conduct, both parties wish to resolve and not merely to settle the disagreement, therefore, in order to determine the parties to come to an agreement, the mediator's role is to clearly formulate and reformulate the standpoints advanced by the two conflicting parties. The mediator "should not argue for or against disputant standpoints or tell disputants what to argue" (*ibid.*: 120), instead, he has "to clarify what the disputants are arguing and to project alternative trajectories for the discussion" (*ibid.*). The mediator's role is "to create conditions for rational discussion between the disputants" (*ibid*: 180). To this aim, he combines negotiating sessions, and resorts to reasoning, persuasion and control of information so that the disputants reach an acceptable agreement.

Moreover, the various strategies and roles mentioned above are materialized at the linguistic level by means of appropriate lexical choices that satisfy the interests of the parties best. Some of the language strategies that Toulmin *et al.* (1979) mention involve the use of abstract or concrete terms, of words / expressions with proper or figurative meaning, or other characteristics such as precision and intensity of language. These elements will be discussed in the text analysis in the following section.

4.1 The mediator as meaning negotiator – text analysis

Starting from the idea that language is "a precise instrument for thought" (Naess 1966: 38), one of the mediator's roles is that of manipulator, in the sense that although he helps the parties to come to a dispute resolution on their own, he, nevertheless, tries to impose the outcome of agreement settlement, thus adopting the position of a negotiator. It is known that "word choice influences meaning" (Toulmin *et al.* 1979: 141). Thus, playing the part of a negotiator of meanings entails finding the most appropriate combination of words or sentences that best serve his persuasive aim of determining the parties to reach an acceptable agreement.

In order to be convincing, he exercises his role of a manipulator by resorting to a range of vocabulary items mainly characterized by elements that belong to the semantic field of peace. The mediator's aim is to strategically[3] diminish the zone of disagreement by the repeated use of words such as "mutual(ly)", "common", "together", "unanimous", reinforced by the modals "must" and volitive "will". By resorting to such linguistic elements, Carter

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[3] The term "strategically" is used in this paper in the pragma-dialectical sense of "strategic maneuvering" (see Eemeren & Houtlosser 2002), a concept which means that in an argumentative discourse, in order to come to dispute resolution, the arguers have two maintain "a delicate balance" between the rhetorical and the dialectical aims.

also forces an outcome of the situation, thus exercising his manipulative function of negotiator.

In his first two speeches on the conflict between Israel and Egypt (March 16th, 1977 and January 4th, 1978), Carter clearly formulates the standpoints and the arguments of the disputants and the possible options for moving along with the discussion so that the outcome should be a successful one.

First of all, as a point of departure, he himself defines the process of negotiation:

> (1) We know that confrontation magnifies differences. But the process of negotiation circumscribes differences, defines the differences, isolates them from the larger regions of common interests and so makes the gaps which do exist more bridgeable.
>
> (speech on March 12th, 1979)

by summarizing the mission of the mediation process, as well, and, thus, restricting the disagreement space. The emphasis is laid on the idea of differences, which, he believes, could be overcome.

Later on, the mediator identifies, first, the points of agreement - the common ground that both parties share is their desire for peace. Then, Carter characterizes the disagreement space as represented by the three main issues stated on March 16th, 1977 and re-stated on January 4th, 1978.

In his public address on March 16th, 1977, Carter discusses the three major requirements for peace, which are the starting points for the peace agreement, thus summarizing and clarifying the positions of the two parties.

Therefore, the prerequisites for peace are the following:
1) Israel should open borders for its neighbours "over a period of months or years", which Carter calls "a sense of a common purpose to avoid the repetitious wars and death";
2) "the establishment of permanent borders for Israel";
3) "to deal with the Palestinian problem".

In his address from January 4th, 1978, President Carter re-states the "principles" which "must be observed before a just and comprehensive peace can be achieved", using different structures, though conveying similar meanings:
1) "true peace must be based on normal relations among the parties to the peace";
2) "withdrawal by Israel" and "recognized borders for all parties";
3) "a resolution to the Palestinian problem in all its aspects".

What he does is to clearly formulate the common starting point of both parties: "unanimous desire for peace". This search for peace proves that "broad areas of agreement do exist", an expression that combines the adjective "broad" with the emphatic auxiliary "do", used with the same exact intention of minimizing the disagreement space.

His words summarize the very definition of the mediator's role as a communicator and formulator, and the participants' position in the dispute, as well: "let them seek out among themselves some permanent solution". In this sense, the role of the mediator as a mere facilitator of decision-making, engaged in pure mediation, implies the idea of providing guidance only, while the resolution of the dispute should remain with the parties.

The conclusion is that both parties share the same desire for peace, and freedom, which stand for universal values, though differently understood by them: "Meeting in this hall of liberty reminds us that we are bound more than in any other way by distinctive common ideals and common commitments and beliefs." Therefore, the mediator states that there is common ground, so that the parties should work in the same direction to solve these inconsistencies.

In order for the parties to reach agreement, there has to be "general equality between the disputants" (van Eemeren *et al*. 1993: 118), which Carter tries to attain by addressing both parties equally. It is a technique meant to isolate the differences and to do away with the idea of power, by permanently reformulating and stressing the common standpoints of the parties, and the greatness and uniqueness of the moment: "mutual dedication to these ideals", "unanimous desire for peace", "Prime Minister Begin and the Government of Israel are no less fervently committed to the same noble objective.", "unique relationship" and "indestructible".

Another device used by Carter to promote the idea of equality of positions and to reduce differences is the use of parallel constructions introduced by "like you", stressing upon the common purpose in this conflict as a zone of agreement:

> (2) ... like you, they worry about the uncertainties of that first crucial stage...
> Like you, they hope to banish forever the enmity that has existed between the neighbours, the permanent neighbours of Egypt and of Israel. Like you, they want this peace, and like you, they want it to be real and not just a sham peace.

Welton *et al.* (1988: 182) include among the components of successful mediation "a trusting and emphatic relationship between the mediator and each disputant". This position is defined by the mediator himself, bringing forward as arguments the high degree of involvement and commitment on the American part, and on his part, personally, and the distinction between America and the other countries:

> (3) *we offer our good offices*
> (4) of all the nations in the world, *we are the one that's most trusted*, not completely, but most trusted by the Arab countries and also Israel. I guess both sides have some doubt about us. But we'll have to act kind of as a catalyst to bring about their ability to negotiate successfully with one another.
> (5) we have an excellent chance to achieve peace
> (6) *I will be devoting a major part of my time* on foreign policy between now and next fall trying to provide for a forum.

Thus, he strategically defines America's position and role in the mediating process, stressing its uniqueness, and actually pleading the case of America as the only nation capable of performing a genuine role of mediation. In (4), Carter uses as arguments to convince the parties an opposition of terms – "most trusted" / "not completely" / "but…", stressing exactly the mediator's roles and the idea of a successful outcome America is to mediate.

All these quotes belong to Carter's starting point in the mediation process, that is, to his first speech on this matter – on March 16th, 1977. His address on March 14th, 1979, is a conclusion to the mediating process, in which the American president summarizes the points defined in the beginning and America's position, and the achievements in the peace process: "We went there to use our influence and good offices to help the leaders of those two great nations more decisively toward that peace…".

He expresses his confidence in the parties, and in the fact that they can change history, which is supported at the linguistic level by the use of assertives: "I know that Israel is committed and determined", "I am convinced". This is meant to induce them a positive state of mind with the purpose of gaining their trust as a mediator. America's solidarity with the parties, and the fact they all three share a common ideal are linguistically hinted at, by the recurrent use of a generic "we", which suggests the inclusion of the third party in this search for world peace.

Therefore, the strategic use of the linguistic material represents the means by which Carter tries to manipulate the parties in the sense of influencing the outcome of the conflict in a favourable way.

4.2 The mediator's patterns of argumentation

In exercising two of his roles, mentioned in this paper, the mediator / negotiator resorts, in formulating his ideas, to several language strategies, among which the use of abstract rather than concrete words. Concepts such as "just and comprehensive peace" or "true peace based on normal relations", "successful search for peace" are but few of the expressions that have no fixed boundaries of meaning. They involve abstraction, defined as "the distance separating the sense of a word or phrase from any specific empirical object or situation" (Toulmin *et al.* 1979: 141).

By strategically making use of language, Carter, indirectly, argues that the parties should try to overcome their differences and reach a conflict settlement. Language becomes, thus, a way of manipulation and persuasion, especially when used figuratively. Such is the metaphor the president resorts to when defining the role of America: "We'll have to act kind of as a catalyst…"

Certain wordings and expressions are characteristic for Carter's behaviour at the linguistic level, which proves his equal treatment of the parties, his neutrality and transparency. Nevertheless, we may speak of language intensity when he stresses America's qualities by opposition with other countries.

> (7) Many countries depend completely on oil from the Middle East for their life.
> We don't. If all oil was cut off to us from the Middle East, we could survive; but
> Japan imports more than 98 percent of all its energy, and other countries, like in

> Europe - Germany, Italy, France - are also heavily dependent on oil from the Middle East.

The assumption that any settlement will be based on a "mutual decision" is essential to the mediation process. Consequently, there is a permanent stress on the words "mutual" "common", "both" used by the mediator, several times, in each of his interventions, with the particular aim of reducing the disagreement space between the conflicting parties.

The vocabulary he uses is mainly characterized by noun phrases, which underline the idea of peace and freedom, and of a successful outcome – "peace initiative", "ability to negotiate successfully", "the cause of brotherhood and of peace", "deep longing for peace", "work together successfully to make this peace" , "sacred dedication to peace born and fostered in Jerusalem and in Cairo". At the same time, these wordings are rich in adjectives that contain the idea of superlative: "enormous", "greatest", "highest", "excellent", "one of the finest acts of the world", elements which are meant to suggest a positive state of mind. Their use emphasizes the importance attributed by Carter to reaching a settlement.

The use of "*must*" as a strong performative suggests Carter's sense of obligation, and his commitment and determination that the parties have to come to an agreement, and establish peace, by signing the treaty: "We must not lose this moment. We must pray, ...and we must act as everything depends on ourselves.", "we must make this beginning", "We must seize this precious opportunity"; "We must persevere"; "We must proceed".

Carter's commitment and determination are suggested by the use of another modal - "*will*", which emphasises the mediator's solidarity with the cause sustained by the parties: "we will stay involved", "We will stand by our friends", "We will work not only to attain peace, but to maintain peace", "we will rededicate ourselves", "we will always recognize, appreciate and honor..."

The recurrent topic is that of the worthy and the advantageous, in the sense that he permanently stresses the great efforts ("you have made enormous sacrifices and you have taken great risks for peace") made by both sides, efforts which led to a noble cause – peace in the world. Again "enormous" and "great" emphasize the role of the parties in coming to an acceptable agreement, by trying to imply that otherwise their efforts would be useless.

Another common feature of his discourses is represented by the form of appraisal Carter makes use of, in metaphorically speaking about the leaders of the two parties, even reproducing their words (March 12th, 1979) precisely with the aim of minimizing distance and power ("breaking down the barriers between peoples"): "the visionary example of president Sadat", "strong and courageous man" (about Sadat), "As Prime Minister Begin said [...] the agreements reached there proved that any problem can be solved, if there is some - and he repeated, just some wisdom", "President Sadat told me in Cairo that he will let nothing stand in the way of our shared goal of finishing the treaty of peace between Israel and Egypt, and of making it a living testament of friendship between the two neighboring peoples." The language used in this case is highly figurative, characterized by metaphors, and depicting the two leaders of the two parties in a hyperbolic way.

5. *Conclusions*

The present paper has tried to prove the way in which the mediator can be treated as a nego-tiator of meanings, in the sense of his paying great attention to the linguistic elements, used by each of the conflicting parties, and reformulating these elements with the purpose of forcing an outcome upon the conflict. The theoretical points served as a background for the practical analysis of Carter's mediation process.

First of all, the need was felt for defining the major concepts involved in the context of in-ternational conflict in order to situate this sample of mediation. Then, a clear distinction be-tween mediation and negotiation as third party interventions was drawn, with the purpose of outlining the different procedures and goals that each of these two concepts involves. Also, this discussion was integrated in the pragma-dialectical framework of the argumentation theory, so as to specifically delineate the theoretical concepts this paper uses, later on, for analysis.

A classification of non-linguistic strategies was mentioned, adopting the three-fold dis-tribution of roles attributed to the mediator by Touval and Zartman (1985). Special attention has been given to the language strategy of (re)formulation, which is lexically materialized, in the mediator's linguistic behaviour, under the form of discourse elements that help him play his parts.

The formulation of standpoints is of particular importance in the pragma-dialectical con-text, as it enables the mediator to exercise his function as a facilitator of decision-making, by pre-venting the parties from deviating from the main issues under discussion.

In the analysis section, the mediator's roles have been identified as they function in prac-tice. Thus, the role of the mediator as communicator and formulator engaged in pure media-tion, and that of the mediator as negotiator, resorting to manipulation (in the sense of facilitating conflict resolution) intermingle with Carter.

By the choice of appropriate lexical items, the mediator tries to find ways to bring the two peoples – Arab and Israeli - together, to bridge the gap between them, stressing the area of agree-ment represented by the common pursuit for peace.

All the linguistic elements are strategically used by the mediator, with the purpose of per-suading the parties to become dedicated to this search for peace, in order to determine them to reach the negotiating phase. By summarizing the starting points of the parties, and by stressing their shared goal for peace, the mediator exercises the roles of communicator, formulator, and, at the same time, of manipulator, by means of language. The combination of linguistic strate-gies such as abstraction, intensity, words used figuratively, is meant to contribute to conflict res-olution, by defining and minimizing the disagreement space between the parties[*].

6. *Annexes*

1. President Carter Discusses the Resolution of the Arab-Israeli Conflict (March 16th, 1977).

[...] I think one of the finest acts of the world nations that's ever occurred was to establish the State of Israel.

So, the first prerequisite of a lasting peace is the recognition of Israel by her neighbors, Israel's right to exist, Israel's right to exist permanently, Israel's right to exist in peace. That means that over a period of months or years that the borders between Israel and Syria, Israel and Lebanon, Israel and Jordan, Israel and Egypt must be opened up to travel, to tourism, to cultural, exchange, to trade, so that no matter who the leaders might be in those countries, the people themselves will have formed a mutual understanding and comprehension and a sense of a common purpose to avoid the repetitious wars and death that have afflicted that region so long. That's the first prerequisite of peace.

The second one is very important and very, very difficult, and that is the establishment of permanent borders for Israel. The Arab countries say that Israel must withdraw to the pre-1967 borderlines; Israel says that they must adjust those lines to some degree to insure their security. That is a matter to be negotiated between the Arab countries on the one side and Israel on the other.

But borders are still a matter of great trouble and a matter of great difficulty, and there are strong differences of opinion now.

And the third ultimate requirement for peace is to deal with the Palestinian problem. The Palestinians claim up 'til this moment that Israel has no right to be there, that the land belongs to the Palestinians, and they've never yet given up their publicly professed commitment to destroy Israel. That has to be overcome. [...]

Those three major elements have got to be solved before a Middle Eastern solution can be prescribed.

I want to emphasize one more time, we offer our good offices. I think it's accurate to say that of all the nations in the world, we are the one that's most trusted, not completely, but most trusted by the Arab countries and also Israel. I guess both sides have some doubt about us. But we'll have to act kind of as a catalyst to bring about their ability to negotiate successfully with one another.

We hope that later on this year, in the latter part of this year, that we might get all of these parties to agree to come together at Geneva, to start talking to one another. They haven't done that yet. And I believe if we can get them to sit down and start talking and negotiating that we have an excellent chance to achieve peace. I can't guarantee that. It's a hope. [...]

So, this is such a crucial area of the world that I will be devoting a major part of my time on foreign policy between now and next fall trying to provide for a forum within which they can discuss their problems and, hopefully, let them seek out among themselves some permanent solution.

Just maybe as briefly as I could, that's the best answer I can give you to that question.

2. President Jimmy Carter Addresses Palestinian Rights (January 4ᵗʰ, 1978).

[…] We believe that there are certain principles, fundamentally, which must be observed before a just and a comprehensive peace can be achieved.

First, true peace must be based on normal relations among the parties to the peace. Peace means more than just an end to belligerency.

Second, there must be withdrawal by Israel from territories occupied in 1967 and agreement on secure and recognized borders for all parties in the context of normal and peaceful relations in accordance with U.N. Resolutions 242 and 338. Third, there must be a resolution of the Palestinian problem in all its aspects. The problem must recognize the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and enable the Palestinians to participate in the determination of their own future.

Some flexibility is always needed to insure successful negotiations and the resolution of conflicting views. We know that the mark of greatness among leaders is to consider carefully the views of others and the greater benefits that can result among the people of all nations which can come from a successful search for peace.

Mr. President, our consultations this morning have reconfirmed our common commitment to the fundamentals which will, with God's help, make 1978 the year for permanent peace in the Middle East.

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Decision-Making Process in some Romanian Workplace Meetings

Mihaela Gheorghe & Stanca Măda & Răzvan Săftoiu

Introduction

Meetings are seen as "interactions which focus, whether indirectly or directly, on workplace business" (Holmes & Stubbe 2003: 59), being one of the most important decision-making avenues used today. Participants are dealing with sensitive issues or with everyday workplace business using various communicative strategies according to their objective or subjective goals and their social statuses. Whether in the position of chairperson or regular participant, the speaker aims at establishing and maintaining a certain balance between the power and the politeness dimensions of workplace discourse. Efficiency seems to be the key-word in deciding which strategies fit best in the particular context of every meeting. In order to be effective, any strategy requires certain communicative skills in the encoding and the decoding processes used by participants. The speaker encodes both the objective and the subjective purposes in a single utterance, which is almost simultaneously decoded by the hearer. Among the variety of communicative strategies used by the speakers in workplace meetings, this paper focuses on the argumentative ones, as they were depicted in the analysis of two Romanian meetings.

Researchers have examined the discourse of workplace meetings from different perspectives: the discursive strategies used in the management of meetings (Barbato 1994, Bargiela-Chiappini & Harris 1997), the discursive realizations of status in meetings (Craig & Pitts 1990, Sollit-Morris 1996), the complex communicative processes involved in getting things accomplished interactionally through meeting talk (Drew & Heritage 1992, Sarangi & Roberts 1999), interruptions, seen as manifestations of power in meetings (Edelsky 1981, Craig & Pitts 1990), the amount of talk contributed by different participants as an indication of dominance (Edelsky 1981, Holmes 1992, Sollitt-Morris 1996, Holmes & Stubbe 2003), politeness considerations of participants' contributions to meetings (Pearson 1988, Morand 1996, Holmes & Stubbe 2003).

1. *Methodological issues and description of corpus*

Our research is part of a larger on-going project at the Faculty of Letters from Transylvania University of Braşov, Romania. The project is entitled *Professional Language*

in Present-day Romanian. Linguistic Patterns and Discoursive Structures and is supported by a governmental grant (CNCSIS, ID 142). Its main objectives are to identify some characteristics of effective communication in various Romanian workplaces and to disseminate the results of the analysis among communication and workplace practitioners.

The methodology used for collecting the data was adapted after the participatory framework proposed by the Language in the Workplace (LWP) Project, based at Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand. It involves collecting authentic linguistic data with the help of volunteers, real participants to the communicative process in certain workplace contexts, in order to minimize the intrusion of the research team in the organization. The recordings are completed with ethnographic information and submitted for analysis. The results are thoroughly checked through a feedback mechanism, involving both participants and researchers (see Holmes & Stubbe 2003: 19-30). The ethical aspect is covered through the extensive preparation of the research in advance, the written agreement of participants and the freedom, on the participants' behalf, to edit the recorded material according to the organizational policy.

The corpus of this paper consists of two recordings of workplace meetings, which took place in similar business contexts, with a comparable participatory framework and structure. The first recording (TEXT 1) was done during a department meeting in a Romanian organization. The chair of the meeting is the manager of the sales and marketing department (Carmen, woman, aged 40) and the other participants (Adi, Dorin, Ionuț, Costi, Vasile) are all regional managers (men, aged between 25 and 50).

The second recording (TEXT 2) is that of a board meeting in the Romanian branch of a multinational organization. There are six participants (two men and four women, aged between 30 and 40): the general manager (Ina) is also the chairperson, the sales and marketing manager (Carol), the logistics department manager (Eni), the financial manager (Dana), the industry manager (Rareş), and administrative assistant (Irina).

2. *Managing interaction in meetings*

Meetings are the main venue of transmitting information, planning and organizing everyday activity. During meetings, decisions are made and people work together in order to solve tasks. Mumby (1988: 68) considers that workplace meetings "function as one of the most important and visible sites of organizational power, and of the reification of organizational hierarchy". What is more, workplace meetings are also visible sites of politeness, collegiality and solidarity, or on the contrary, of disrespect and impoliteness, being an ideal context of "relational work" (Fletcher 1999).

Regardless of their type, degree of formality or goals, workplace meetings are a dynamic communicative process based on presentation of points of view and on nego-

tiation. When people are involved in this type of interaction, they use various communicative strategies that take into consideration aspects of politeness and contribute to the construction of power.

Meeting management is a dynamic process in which all participants play a part, whether cooperative or resistant. Among the participants to a meeting, the *role of chair* is vital in carrying out an effective meeting. It is the chair's role to *set the agenda* and to *open the meeting*. It is crucial that they *establish control* at this stage to ensure that participants orient to the chair's authority throughout the meeting. The chair also *keeps track of the progress* of the meeting, marking the stage that is reached and ensuring that all relevant issues are covered.

Effective management often involves *negotiating consensus*. It is the chair's job to make sure everyone at a meeting knows the purpose of the meeting, what the issues being discussed are and that everyone knows what has been agreed. Related to this, it is the chair's role to make sure *everyone feels involved* in the decision-making process. This can include an appropriate amount of small talk and humor in the meeting. Sometimes the chairperson acts as a mere *mediator*, becoming as 'invisible' as possible when the situation requires such behavior. In such cases, without the pressure exercised by the chairperson, people discuss more freely.

In this paper we will analyze and illustrate just a selection from the range of the meeting management strategies and their grammatical interface, focusing mainly on how they instantiate ways of argumentation (and emotive argumentation). We are also interested in the relationship between power and politeness in meetings, trying to define and exemplify specific patterns for Romanian workplace interaction.

3. *Data analysis*

In what follows, we will mainly focus on the discourse of the chairperson and we will try to identify and comment both on some of the discursive strategies and on the grammatical interface.

The discourse of the chairperson invariably starts with *setting the agenda*. There are at least two frames that may be identified at this level: the *topic frame*, i.e. an explicit and clear presentation of the topics to be discussed during the meeting, and a *time frame*, i.e. the time allotted to each topic from the agenda. This suggests that the chairperson controls the entire meeting and indirectly transmits to the rest of the participants that (s)he is allowed to take advantage of the position to interfere and end a topic. If only topics are framed, this may mean that the time allotted to each topic will be negotiated on the spot, thus the chairperson appearing more employee-focused and open to reactions.

4. Balance between expressions of power and solidarity

In the following extract from TEXT 1, a workplace meeting in a company selling roof windows and loft ladders, Carmen is the head of the Sales and Marketing Department and the chairperson.

Romanian	English
CARMEN: O analiză interesantă vă propun aici la top, unde aveţi şi voi nişte centralizatoare a topului de vânzări şi *vă rog chiar să le deschideţi...* tabelele astea... top scări, top ferestre. [...] avem o altă situaţie care *mi se pare alarmantă* aicea. Top zero. Adică din totalul nostru de dealeri treizeci la sută nu vând deloc ferestre, ceea ce înseamnă vreo o sută trei dealeri din cei activi. [...] aicea *vreau neapărat să discutăm un pic* şi poate... avem o sută de dealeri care nu vând deloc, dar din ăştia o sută vreo şaizeci au standuri. *Asta este şi mai alarmant.* [...] O să vedeţi voi, de fapt, din... din această, acest raport al şedinţei noastre... *eu v-am menţionat că vreau să faceţi câte un raport, da?* deci analiza dealerilor care nu vând, dar au standuri se va prezenta raport de către fiecare director în parte şi aceia să analizăm... îi mai ţinem la anu, nu îi mai ţinem, ne scoatem standul, avem stand pentru că e într-o zonă bună şi atunci, sigur, îl lăsăm, dar aici fiecare, *o să vedeţi voi ce trebuie să facem şi ce nu. Da?* [...]	CARMEN: I suggest you an interesting analysis here with the top, where you also have some tabels of top sellers and *please open them...* these tabels... top for loft ladders, top for windows. [...] we have another situation that *seems to me alarming.* Top zero. This means that from our total of dealers thirty percent do not sell at all windows, which means a hundred and three dealers from the active ones. [...] here *I urgently want to talk a little about this* and maybe... we have one hundred dealers who do not sell at all, but from them almost sixty have booths. *This is even more alarming.* [...] you will see, in fact, from this... this report of our meeting... *I mentioned I wanted from each of you a report, right?* So, the analysis of the dealers who do not sell, but who have booths, each manager will present a report and we will analyze them... if we keep them, if we don't keep them, we give up on our booth, we have a booth because it is in a good area and then we will surely leave it there, but here *each of you will see what we have to do and not. Right?* [...]
Şi *mergem acuma la top scări unde situaţia este şi mai dură.* Deci avem la top scări avem un dealer care vinde douăzeci la sută [...] deci *asta ne arată două lucruri, o dată* că depindem de el şi că nu e bine, că de fapt o să vedeţi creşterea la scări se datorează lui, deci dacă el nu era, noi nu ne făceam planul, dar *doi la mână arată şi faptul că* putem să multiplicăm situaţia asta.	And *now we are moving to top sales of ladders where the situation is even tougher.* So we have a dealer who sells twenty percent [...] so *this shows us two things, one thing is that* we depend on him and this is not right, because you will see that the increase for ladders is thanks to him, and but for him we wouldn't have reached the target, and *the second thing is that* we can multiply this situation.

Although in the beginning, Carmen presents herself as a powerful leader, gradually she succeeds in balancing means of expressing power (first person singular – ***I** suggest*, ***I** urgently want*, ***I** mentioned **I** wanted*, emphatic constructions – *I **urgently** want to talk*, *This is **even** more alarming*) with means of creating solidarity (first person plural – *each of you will see what **we** have to do and not*, *now **we** are moving to*, *this shows **us** two things*, asking for feedback – *I mentioned I wanted from each of you a report, **right**?*, *each of you will see what we have to do and not.* ***Right?***).

When reviewing the results of the sales, the chairperson takes a stand and personally gets involved in the presentation by gradually characterizing the situation as *alarming*, *more alarming* and *even tougher*. By choosing these adjectives, the chairperson transforms herself in the one who draws a warning signal that there are problems and indirectly asks the participants (sales representatives from different areas) to take the necessary measures to improve the sales results. Both the gradual presentation (from neutral to intensified) and the choice of the words are used strategically: *alarming* is an adjective that suggests a warning of existing or approaching danger, while *tough* further emphasizes the idea of difficulty of the presented situation.

If in the previous extract, Carmen used emotional involvement as an argumentative strategy, in the next example, taken from TEXT 2, Ina – the general manager – does not make use of such strategy.

Romanian	English
INA: Deci *pe ordinea de zi, azi avem discutarea rezultatelor din 2005*... cu diverse influențe pe care le-au avut anumiți parametrii pe care nu i-am... stabilit... nu i-am avut în vedere la bugetare... *Vom trece în revistă obiectivele pe care ni le-am asumat în 2005*, cele generale ale companiei... și... ăă... *vom discuta apoi ce obiective ne asumăm în 2006*... *urmând ca să trecem la discuții individuale pe obiective*, cu fiecare în parte, *după ce stabilim obiectivele companiei*...	INA: So, *on the agenda, today we have discussions on the results from 2005*... with the various influences of several parameters we haven't... established... we haven't taken into consideration for budgeting... *we will review the objectives that we assumed in 2005*, the general ones of the company... and... errr... *then we will discuss what objectives we set for 2006*... *following this, we will have individual discussions on objectives*, with each of you, *after we set the objectives of the company*...

Not only in the beginning, but also throughout the entire meeting, Ina uses mainly the first person plural (**we** *have discussions on the results from 2005*, **we** *will review the objectives that* **we** *assumed in 2005*) in order to get people involved to make them feel they part of the team. Even though she does not use emotive argumentation, the efficiency of her discourse is maximum.

5. *Description of emotions*

Emotional involvement is also visible when the chairperson describes a personal mood or when she commits herself to the truth of the statement.

Romanian	English
CARMEN: Arhitecți. Este subiectul meu preferat. Deci... *când sunt prost dispusă și vreau să mă cert mă uit la lista arhitecților. Pe cuvântul meu. Deci atunci când vreau să nu mai pot, mă uit la arhitecți*. Vă rog frumos deschideți.	CARMEN: Architects. It's my favourite topic. So... *when I'm in a bad mood and I want to have an argument I take a look at the list of the architects. Trust my word! So, when I want not to be able to stand it anymore, I take a look at the list of architects*. Please, open your folders!
(TEXT 1)	(TEXT 1)

Carmen starts a new topic on the agenda by characterizing it as being "the favourite topic". She obviously marks the speech with irony, preparing the audience for the presentation of bad results. The chairperson shifts focus on herself and associates the list of architects with a "bad mood". This type of presentation (focused on personal involvement) is aimed at creating a positive image of the chairperson, who thus appears as a preoccupied head of the department, hoping that putting herself down (*when I want not to be able to stand it anymore*) will impress the audience and make them feel as bad as she pretends to feel. In order to emphasize the authenticity of the moment, the chairperson commits herself to the truth of the statement in a colloquial manner: *Trust my word*! The speech is deconstructed, the chairperson pretends not to have control over the situation, but in fact it is a strategy meant to manipulate the audience and obtain the envisaged result.

When presenting another topic (performance indicators), the chairperson briefly reviews the head of the table just to introduce the issue in a personal manner. In the extract below, Carmen takes the problem personally, suggesting that it gives her a headache.

Romanian	English
CARMEN: Indicatori de performanţă. Cantitativ număr de dealeri noi, număr de produse vândute, număr de alţi colaboratori introduşi în reţea: constructori, proiectanţi. Număr execuţie, asistenţă, construcţie, montaj. *Şi ajung la încă o problemă care îmi creează dureri de cap: evaluări execuţie-montaj.* Ăsta vroiam să fie ultimul punct. Evaluare execuţie montaj despre care am vorbit tot timpul şi nici unul nu aţi făcut. Absolut nici unul. Deci aici aveţi, zic eu, ca o hartă albă: verificare montaje zero, arhitecţi zero. (TEXT 1)	CARMEN: Performance indicators. Quantity of new dealers, number of products sold, number of collaborators included in the network, constructors, designers. Manufacturing, assistance, construction, assembling. *And I come to another problem that gives me a headache: evaluation manufacturing-assembling.* I wanted this to be the last topic. We've been talking all the time about the evaluation manufacturing-assembling and nobody has done anything. Absolutely nobody. So here you have, as I see it, a blank map: verification of assembling zero, architects zero. (TEXT 1)

The chairperson gets emotionally involved in the speech in order to create herself a positive image, of a concerned manager who gives a lot of time to finding the most appropriate solution but gets no help in return.

This strategy is supported by the use of verbs of perception: *see*, *feel*.

Romanian	English
CARMEN: Cifra de afaceri. Analiza cheltuielilor. Arhitecţi. Situaţia cheltuielilor de reclamă. Buget unu la sută. Şi aici aveţi fiecare câte un buget pentru că trebuie să vă uitaţi. Ne uităm împreună. Pe zona de unu, [nume firmă] am şi realizat ceva. *Văd că cifra de afaceri a scăzut faţă de anul trecut. Chiar am simţit.* Ei nu mai vând ferestre? (TEXT 1)	CARMEN: Turnover. Expense analysis. Architects. Advertising expenses. Budget one percent. And here each of you has a budget to take a look at. We will take a look together. For area D 1, [company name] we achieved something. *I see that the turnover has decreased since last year. We even felt it.* Don't they sell windows anymore? (TEXT 1)

In Romanian, the verb "to see" is used only as a verb of visual perception and lacks the cognitive meaning ("to understand"), which is common in English. In the extract above, Carmen may use this verb both to describe the evolution of the turnover according to the table she has in front of her (visual perception), and to express her coming to understand the effects of its decrease (cognitive meaning). As far as the verb "to feel" is concerned, we notice a transfer from its denotative meaning to a connotative one: the decrease of the turnover is "felt" as a decrease of salaries and bonuses.

6. *Illuminating narratives*

Appeal to the emotional side of the participants may be achieved by another strategy: introduction of narrative passages with the purpose of setting a positive example for the employees. In the following extract, Adi is one of the regional sales managers and his main complaint is that it takes a lot of time to get in contact with the clients because he has to travel a lot and gets at a certain company after working hours, thus not being able to finish his work. Adi introduces a new topic on the agenda – obtaining a guarantee from a prospective client – but Carmen takes advantage of her position during the meeting and suggests a corrective move (*No! It's not working like this.*).

Romanian	English
CARMEN: Adi, stai o clipă! Nu! Nu merge aşa. Uite, ştiu cazul Lindab. Spre exemplu, Lindab merg în trasee ca şi noi. Ajunge la 11 noaptea în anumite locaţii. Păi îţi imaginezi că la 11 noaptea un portar nu-i dă nici ăstuia cec, dar are o garanţie în clienţlu lor. Deci, hai să avem la ăştia care ştim că ne fac probleme, să avem aicea biletul la ordin sau cecul. Ăla, garanţia, acolo unde avem probleme, da? (TEXT 1)	CARMEN: Adi, wait a second! No! It's not working like this. *Look, I know the case of Lindab. For example*, Lindab people take the same steps as we do. They get there at 11 at night in some locations. Well, you can imagine that at 11 at night the door keeper won't give our man a cheque, but he trusts their clients. So, let's have here for those who give us trouble, let's have a note of hand or a cheque. That, the guarantee, where we have problems, OK? (TEXT 1)

This move is used by Carmen to introduce the vivid example of a competitor, emphasizing the idea that a guarantee would be enough for bad payers. The correction functions in two ways: on the one hand, it is about *correcting the topic* (Carmen does not agree that another participant should introduce a topic on the already presented agenda), and on the other hand, it is about *correcting the attitude* (Carmen is supportive of her subordinates and offers them suggestions of how to deal with bad payers). The narrative ends with a summary (the solution: *That, the guarantee, where we have problems*) and with a phatic unit (*OK?*) aimed at ratifying a decision (*let's have here for those who give us trouble, let's have a note of hand or a cheque*).

When talking about the company's relationship with residential architects, Carmen introduces a new personal narrative. This time, the story contains regrets for a missing action (not giving files to the clients) and is aimed at obtaining an emotional response from the participants.

Romanian	English
CARMEN: Extraordinar de mult contează faptul că noi nu avem relații bune cu arhitecții. Extraordinar de mult contează. [...] *Şi eu când am intrat în mai multe birouri de arhitect, primul lucru m-am uitat ce bibliorafturi are, ştiind că Velux are. Foarte mult contează să fie biblioraft.* (TEXT 1)	CARMEN: The fact that we don't have good relationships with architects counts a great deal. Counts a great deal. [...] *When I went to several architects offices, the first thing I did was to look at the files he has, knowing that Velux has. Having a file counts a great deal.* (TEXT 1)

7. *Asking for participants' opinions*

In order to appear supportive, the chairperson tends to ask for participants' opinions on a certain point, while previously characterizing the situation.

Romanian	English
CARMEN: Analiza clienţilor. Aici aveţi un tabel cu clienţii restanţi. Pe acest tabel vreau să mergem. Prima dată vă prezint un o sinteză a acestei analize. Soldul clienţilor noştri este [suma], din care neîncasaţi la termen 45,8 la sută. *Ce părere aveţi?* Sigur aici intră şi cei cu întârzieri de trei-patru zile, dar, ca idee. Foarte mulţi. (TEXT 1)	CARMEN: Analysis of clients. Here you have a tabel with remainder clients. This is the table I want to discuss. Firstly, I will present a synthesis of this analysis. The due balance for our clients is [sum], with 45.8 percent back payments. *What do you think?* Of course, those with three or four days delay are also included here, but, just as an idea. Very many. (TEXT 1)

Carmen has a specific manner of introducing the topics, by just giving the headline of the table. This shows that she is not so much interested in giving an introduction, but in analyzing the situation. In the extract above, the chairperson signals her wish for an opinion from the participants (*45.8 percent back payments. What do you think?*) and yet she does not stop to listen to the commentaries. It is worth noticing that she leads the reactions by introducing a short commentary: *Very many*.

When talking about the company's relationship with residential architects, Carmen firstly introduced a personal narrative, grabbing the attention of the audience and then asked for opinions from the participants.

Romanian	English
CARMEN: Extraordinar de mult contează faptul că noi nu avem relații bune cu arhitecții. Extraordinar de mult contează. [...] Și eu când am intrat în mai multe birouri de arhitect, primul lucru m-am uitat ce bibliorafturi are, știind că Velux are. Foarte mult contează să fie biblioraft. Nu mai zic de faptul... Băi, n-am să uit când ați zis că voi, noi nu dăm nimica, noi n-am dat nimica ani întregi. Păi da, păi aia... Dacă le-am da, binențeles că ar face. E te te! Că de când dăm, avem mai puțini decâți aveam înainte, când nu dădeam niciun comision. *Ce putem face? Aștept propuneri de la voi pentru că mă simt foarte neputincioasă în fața acestei situații. Și vreau să știu poate sunteți de altă părere sau poate, nu știu, poate, nu vreți sau poate nu puteți. Și vreau de la fiecare în parte.* (TEXT 1)	CARMEN: The fact that we don't have good relationships with architects counts a great deal. Counts a great deal. [...] When I went to several architects offices, the first thing I did was to look at the files he has, knowing that Velux has. Having a file counts a great deal. I don't add the fact that... Guys, I'll never forget when you said that you, we don't give anything and we haven't given anything for years. Well, it's this, it's that... If we gave them, of course they would do it. Go figure! Since we started to give this, we have less clients than before when we used not to give any commission. *What can we do? I'm waiting for suggestions from you because I feel very helpless about this situation. And I want to know maybe you have a different opinion or maybe, I don't know, you don't want or you can't. And I want opinions from each of you.* (TEXT 1)

Her entire speech is emotion-based. The chairperson puts herself down (*I feel very helpless*) in order to show that the situation is out of control and she is out of suggestions. Unlike the narrative, which has a supportive function, asking for advice is face-threatening. Carmen feels that her negative face may be at risk (she may no longer appear as a problem-solver) and wants to be included in the process of finding solutions to the proposed problem.

If previously Carmen asked for a general opinion, in the extract above she is more specific and makes this clear: *I want opinions from each of you*.

In an extract from TEXT 2, Ina is closer to her subordinates than Carmen, being personally involved in the process of budgeting that she explains to them gradually, just as she introduces new figures or follows the columns of the comparative table.

Romanian	English
INA: Acum ajungem la B... Am comparat 2004 cu 2005.	INA: Now we get to B... We compared 2004 with 2005.
DANA: Indicatorii cei reali.	DANA: The real indicators.
INA: *Hai să vedem, mai știm să bugetăm?* (...) Hm, hm, hm. Și hai să ne uităm și la formule... Da? forecast-ul doi, cel din octombrie. Da? Și să pornim de la cel vechi. După cum vedem, deviația în cheltuieli față de buget este doar de 1,79 la sută... creștere cheltuieli față de cât ați bugetat, da și... sunt mai mici decât forecast-ul.	INA: *Let's see, do you still know how to budget?* (...) Hm, hm, hm. And let's take a look at the formulas... OK? The second forecast, the one from October. OK? And let's start from the old one. As we can see, deviation of expenses in the budget is only 1.79 percent... an increase of the expenses in the budget, OK and... they are less than the forecast.

8. *Appeal to rules and regulations*

Doing a certain job or having a certain position in a company implies a set of responsibilities. Sometimes, this feature is exploited by the chairperson, who appeals to rules and regulations, in order to indirectly threaten the person(s) who have not carried out a job properly. We consider this to be another emotional strategy by means of which the chairperson enacts her coercive power. In the following extract, the chairperson appeals to a set of responsibilities that are presented in the job description for the position of regional sales manager.

Romanian	English
CARMEN: Tocmai de-aia am zis să mergem pe filiale. DORIN: Şi atunci trebuie mers. Nu, nu, nu la filiale mă refer. Aceeaşi situaţie este şi la nivel de filială. *După părerea mea, eu de exemplu am mers şi acuma pe Arad, săptămâna asta, săptămâna trecută o listă cu arhitecţii de pe rezidenţiale.* [...] DORIN: Şi după părerea mea cam aşa trebuie făcut şi aşa am şi început să fac. Mers sau aflat. Eu de exemplu am aflat la Arad printr-un arhitect, care arhitect e şi dealerul nostru. Şi am zis, te rog, fă-mi o listă cu arhitecţii care sunt pe rezidenţiale şi care au proiecte şi au lucrări, proiecte. Şi mă duc eu la fiecare şi îi dotez cu bibliorafturi, cd-uri şi aşa mai departe şi insist la ei. Deci, eu cam aşa văd problema de rezolvat. De aflat în fiecare zonă sau în oraşele mai mari, în reşedinţele de judeţ, acolo sunt arhitecţii, aflat cine sunt... CARMEN: *O secundă, du-te şi adu fişa postului pentru director de vânzări.* Păi da' asta trebuia făcut şi până acum. Deci nu e nicio noutate ce spui. Lucrul ăsta l-am discutat tot timpul. (TEXT 1)	CARMEN: That's why I said that we should go for branches. DORIN: And this means we go for it. No, no, no, I'm not talking about branches. The situation is the same at the level of branches. *To my mind, I for example went to Arad, this week, last week with a list of the architects for residential areas.* [...] DORIN: And to my mind this is how we should do it and this is how I started to do. I went there and I found out. I for example found out through an architect who is also our dealer. And I said, please, make me a list with the architects for residential areas who have projects and work in the field. And I go to each of them and I give them files, CDs and so on and I insist. So, this is how I see the solution to the problem. To find out in each area or in big cities where there are architects and who they are... CARMEN: *One second, go and bring the job description for sales manager.* Well, this was supposed to be done so far. So, there is no news in what you're saying. We've been discussing this matter all the time. (TEXT 1)

Dorin is one of the regional sales manager who was accused of not doing a proper job in his area. When he gets the floor, he tries to defend himself by giving a lot of personal examples and by shifting focus to himself (*To my mind, I for example...*). In order to create authenticity, Dorin even introduces direct speech: *And I said, please, make me a list with the architects for residential areas who have projects and work in the field.*

The head of the Sales Department indirectly threatens a subordinate by making reference to the job description. In fact, Carmen will use the same strategy several times during the meeting. By invoking the job description, she wants to remind the participants that they are under a contract with strict regulations and they should follow them. In any other context, reference to the job description would be regarded as hilarious, but in the context of a workplace meeting, it may have the expected effect: the person will react to the indirect blame and take a stand.

Whenever the chairperson uses reference to the job description, she acts as an agent who admonishes the wrong-doer (*This will be a condition for your salaries...*).

Romanian	English
DORIN: Eu fac contract. Crede-mă că nu mi-e greu. Că trebuie să trec niște date... Dacă acele contracte, hârtiile contează... CARMEN: Dar nu contractele, banii... Păi nu contează hârtiile, nu contează hârtia, dar contează relația. Ha! *Nu există nimic, nu-i nici hârtie, nici factură, deci absolut nimic nu există*. Asta va fi condiția în salariile voastre pe anul... de fapt era menționat și anul ăsta. Și contează și la premiere. *O să vă aduc și fișa postului ca să o mai citim o dată.* (TEXT 1)	DORIN: I make a contract. Believe me, it's not difficult. I only need to fill in some data... If those contracts matter, if papers matter... CARMEN: It's not the contracts, it's the money... Papers don't count, but a relationship does count. Ha! *There is nothing, no paper, no invoice, absolutely nothing*. This will be a condition for your salaries for the year... in fact, it was mentioned for this year as well. And it will count for the bonus. *I'll bring the job description to read it one more time.* (TEXT 1)

The repetition of negative quantifiers (*nu, nimic, nici – no, nothing*) amplifies the feeling of guilt in the subordinates. This allows the chairperson to further formulate an indirect threat as a punishment.

Conclusions

The constant balance between power and politeness strategies, seen from a communicative-pragmatic point of view, implies both the encoding and the decoding processes, and gives the emotive dimension of argumentative dialogue in workplace meetings. The analysis of two Romanian workplace meetings revealed that the chairperson makes use of different emotive argumentative strategies in order to maintain equilibrium between power and collegiality.

The main strategies that were discussed and exemplified in this paper are: *balance between expressions of power and solidarity, description of emotions, illuminating narratives, asking for participants' opinions, appeal to rules and regulations*. Efficiency seems to be the key-word in deciding which strategies fit best in the particular context of every meeting. In order to be effective, any strategy requires certain communicative skills in the encoding and the decoding processes used by participants.

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L'Argumentation dans la négociation commerciale

Marioara Ion

1. *Introduction*

Le but de notre analyse est d'étudier l'argumentation dans la négociation commerciale – un type d'interaction verbale spécialisée – en particulier au niveau macro discursif, avec un focus spécial sur la séquence argumentative de type: argumentation-contre argumentation. Nous avons en vue une analyse au niveau de l'intention discursive de l'émetteur, par l'étude de la façon dont les protagonistes des négociations commerciales comprennent à faire usage d'arguments, pour aboutir à un accord dans le cadre du processus de négociation commerciale; mais aussi au niveau de la réception du discours, c'est-à-dire l'effet provoqué sur l'interlocuteur par le discours argumentatif.

A la base de notre analyse se trouve un corpus enregistré et transcrit par nos soins (IV II 2007), formé d'interactions commerciales diverses, telles que: la demande/l'offre, la conformité/la non-conformité de la marchandise, le type de contrat de collaboration etc. Par rapport à d'autres types d'analyses de la négociation, qui se sont fondées sur des simulations, des jeux de rôles ou des mémoires, la nôtre est basée sur un corpus réel, tant du point de vue linguistique, que du point de vue commercial, du fait qu'après le moment de l'enregistrement, il s'était déjà matérialisé dans des transactions commerciales. De ce point de vue, notre corpus se situe au deuxième niveau de «l'échelle d'authenticité» des documents admis pour l'analyse conversationnelle (Kerbrat-Orecchioni 1995:71), car il s'agit des conversations entre deux représentants de sociétés commerciales, donc contraintes par le cadre institutionnel.

2. *Le rôle de l'argumentation*

L'argumentation trouve incontestablement sa place dans une situation communicative telle que la négociation commerciale car le différend est un élément constitutif du processus de négociation, et elle-même peut représenter un moyen de résolution du conflit entre les protagonistes. Le déclanchement du discours de type argumentatif se produit au moment ou l'un des interlocuteurs est en désaccord avec l'offre de l'autre, mais il n'exclut pas non plus la possibilité d'une entente ultérieure. Ce désaccord peut être manifesté soit par la réfutation de l'offre, soit par la proposition d'une contre offre (la thèse de l'argumentation), chacun des protagonistes présentant des arguments pour soutenir sa propre opinion et/ou pour réfuter l'opinion de l'autre, dans le but de convaincre son partenaire de la validité de celle-ci.

La négociation commerciale, en tant qu'une «mosaïque communicative» qui se construit continuellement par les interlocuteurs pendant le processus de négociation, devient le champ de bataille des moyens argumentatifs, dont les interlocuteurs disposent pour persuader leur partenaire de l'opportunité de la transaction respective, mais aussi de leur intérêt commun pour arriver à une entente. En conséquence, c'est une démarche fortement orientée vers l'efficacité des outils argumentatifs, mais en même temps, subordonnée au but général de la négociation, celui de conclure une transaction avantageuse pour les deux parties. Cette double contrainte détermine les protagonistes à faire appel à la diplomatie dans l'usage de cet arsenal, à mettre en œuvre des stratégies, des techniques et des tactiques qui défendent le mieux leur intérêt, mais qui emphatisent surtout leur disponibilité d'arriver à un accord, justement par le fait de mettre en premier plan l'intérêt commun pour y arriver.

3. *Les négociateurs – la diplomatie et l'efficacité de l'argumentation*

Dans leur intention d'arriver à résoudre le conflit déterminé par la rencontre de l'offre et de la contre-offre, les négociateurs font appel à l'argumentation, plus précisément à une série d'arguments qu'ils considèrent efficaces. Un argument efficace est celui qui détermine un comportement attendu, justement parce qu'il a été jugé par l'interlocuteur avoir été adéquat, pertinent et valide.

Chaque interlocuteur doit défendre son opinion, tout en ayant la disponibilité de céder, dans certaines limites, de son propre territoire, de telle façon que les parties arrivent à un compromis, bien avantageux pour tous. Cependant ce pas en arrière, par rapport au point de vue exprimé tout au début, appartient rarement à l'auteur même (comme un acte de renonciation), en étant le plus souvent un effet de la démarche de son partenaire (comme un acte de conviction ou de persuasion).

On ne joue pas cartes sur table dans les négociations. La diplomatie est un atout du stratège qui met en scène la négociation. Tout mouvement est prémédité et dissimulé. Une de ses fonctions est de toujours conserver un pas en avance par rapport à son partenaire et d'anticiper son action suivante. Mettre les cartes sur la table équivaut à une stratégie, car il constitue en soi une perte de son avantage devant l'interlocuteur et il positionne son émetteur dans une position d'une vulnérabilité extrême. C'est pourquoi, les intérêts propres à chaque partie, nommés aussi les intérêts divergents, sont dissimulés à l'interlocuteur, afin de permettre une négociation successive et l'arrivée aux intérêts communs des parties, nommés aussi les intérêts convergents. Ainsi, la négociation commerciale représente la conversion de l'intérêt propre en intérêt commun, et chaque MOI, ayant une *persona propre*, contribue à la création de ce NOUS, qui correspond au *territoire commun* de l'entente entre les parties.

Pour que l'argumentation soit efficace, les négociateurs doivent se concentrer sur les besoins et sur les avantages du partenaire dans l'affaire, déterminés par leurs intérêts propres, mais aussi sur l'identification des points faibles de son argumentation. Par exemple : la limitation des offres proposées dans le processus de négociation, l'offre d'une alternative optimale à la négociation ou l'adaptation du type d'arguments à l'interlocuteur (affectifs pour quelqu'un d'émotionnel ou logiques pour quelqu'un de rationnel).

On peut alors remarquer le caractère théâtral de l'attitude montrée à l'autre, c'est-à-dire le masque, l'image empruntée à cette occasion, mais aussi la diplomatie ou la finesse de la mise en scène de la stratégie de la négociation commerciale. Tous ces éléments venant ensuite s'intégrer dans un comportement subtil et efficace. L'objectif du négociateur est de convaincre son interlocuteur que l'affaire ne doit pas être manquée; ses moyens argumentatifs sont orientés vers deux directions:

a) Vers l'émetteur ou soi-même – dans le but de *minimiser son propre intérêt* pour la conclusion de l'affaire;

b) Vers le récepteur – dans le but d'*augmenter l'intérêt de l'autre* pour conclure l'affaire (voir le Tableau I).

Tableau I: *L'argumentation – un moyen de conversion du MOI en NOUS*

La première direction, dont l'objectif est la dissimulation de l'intérêt propre, se manifeste par l'évitement de se montrer à l'autre comme une personne intéressée par la conclusion de l'affaire. A ce niveau d'interaction, la rhétorique utilisée est très éloignée d'une négociation commerciale; des thèmes et sujets connexes sont abordés (par exemple, au début de la négociation, on introduit le sujet du coût moins cher d'un appel téléphonique sur un appareil fixe, par rapport à celui effectué d'un appareil fixe vers un portable, dans le cas d'une négociation ou on discute du contexte financier difficile, déterminé par la baisse du taux d'échange de la monnaie européenne, dans le cas d'une autre):

> 8-A: vă: sun în legatură cu oferta primită: ieri↑ *'je vous appelle concernant l'offre reçue hier'*
>
> 9-B: da. *'oui'*
>
> 10-A: şi:: vroIAM să discutăm un pic # asupra ei↑ *'et je voulais qu'on en discute un peu'*
>
> 11-B: <_R *da cum să nu **da' de CE nu mă sunați pe: numără de fix↑** > ca să nu: # consumăm mobilu↓* <_@ *hî_hî mă sunați pe mobil↓ îi mai scump >*. *'oui. certainement. **mais pourquoi vous ne m'appelez pas sur le numéro du fixe qu'on ne consomme pas avec le portable↓ vous m'appelez sur le portable↓ c'est plus cher'***
>
> 12-A: *a: nu-i nici o problemă asta. hî. <_R nici o problemă>. am vrut să vă găsesc. nu:: ↓* *'ah ce n'est pas un problème ça. j'ai voulu vous trouver. non'*
>
> 13-B: *la birou↓ **deci dacă vreți↑** puteți să mă sunați acuma pe numără de fix de aicea şi: <_p stăm de vorbă>*. *'au bureau↓ **alors si vous voulez m'appelez à présent sur le fixe d'ici et nous discutons'***
>
> 14-A: /o:chei/↓ *'ok'* (IV II, 2007: 313).

En échange, on obtient l'avantage d'ajourner au maximum la déclaration de la position d'entrée en négociation, c'est-à-dire la déclaration des intérêts propres, divergents, parce que celui qui se dévoile en premier devient vulnérable.

La deuxième direction, dont l'objectif est l'*exagération de l'intérêt de l'autre pour la conclusion de l'affaire,* se manifeste par l'insistance et la répétition de certains arguments, qui soulignent les besoins et qui mettent en évidence les avantages de l'interlocuteur dans cette transaction, car on essaie d'identifier les intérêts communs, dans le but d'arriver à un accord:

> **49-B:** nici o problemă. deci io v-am zis î: ă dacă vă spun: astea sunt prețuri care le-am făcut pentru dumneavoastră în funcție de discuțiile care le-am avut AIcea de⊥ c-am înțeles **dumneavoastră sînteți la-nceput↑ vreți să intrați să promovați** problemă. deci io v-am zis î: ă dacă vă spun: astea **sunt prețuri care le-am făcut pentru dumneavoastră** în pe piața: # franceză **am înțeles foarte bine dar** după **prețurile care eu le practic acuma cu: clienții care deja îi AM ↓ sînt MULT mai mari decât astea**
> *'il n'y a pas de problèmes. donc je vous dis si je vous dis **ça ce sont les prix que j'ai faits pour vous** en fonction des discussions qu'on a eues ici car j'ai compris que **vous êtes au début vous voulez promouvoir sur le marché français** j'ai très bien compris mais **d'après les prix que je pratique main-**

tenant avec mes clients ils sont beaucoup plus grands que ceux-ci'
(*Ibid.*: 315).

Dans cette intervention le négociateur emphatise les avantages que son partenaire peut tirer de cette potentielle collaboration, plus précisément les prix moins chers, par rapport à ceux-là dont les clients existants de la compagnie achètent (*ça ce sont les prix que j'ai faits pour vous*), des prix si nécessaires au client, qui répondent aux besoins d'une compagnie qui se trouve à ses débuts (*vous êtes au début*) et qui se lance sur le marché externe (*vous voulez promouvoir sur le marché français*).

Mais, en dépit de l'attitude bienveillante du vendeur, son comportement empathique ne brise pas les standards de la négociation, car les apparences sont trompeuses. Le rôle du négociateur est celui de convaincre son interlocuteur que le produit proposé est bien et qu'il vaut la peine d'être acheté, en vertu des avantages et des besoins déjà mentionnés. Par contre, il n'est pas nécessaire que le vendeur croie vraiment à l'idée qu'il essaie d'inculquer à son partenaire. Car la vérité ou la fausseté de la thèse de l'argumentation n'importe pas ici, ce qui compte ce n'est que l'efficacité de l'argumentation.

4. *L'Argumentation et la contre argumentation – «La Cellule argumentative»*

L'interactivité du processus d'argumentation est responsable de la rencontre de ces deux séquences de type argumentatif: l'argumentation et la contre argumentation. Argumenter est proposer une thèse et la défendre par des arguments. Contre argumenter est rejeter une thèse et les arguments qui la soutiennent. L'enjeu de cette confrontation est la conviction de l'interlocuteur et la provocation d'une certaine façon d'agir.

Quand est-ce qu'on décide de déclencher la contre argumentation ? Au moment où l'un des partenaires de négociation considère ou, tout simplement, pour atteindre son but, simule que les arguments de l'interlocuteur paraissent inadéquats, manquent de conviction ou de pertinence, il le sanctionne par le lancement d'un contre discours. Mais, contre argumenter ne vaut pas que pour signaler l'inconsistance de l'argument du partenaire, mais aussi pour le transformer en sa faveur. En échange, cette action sera réalisée avec subtilité, sans mettre l'interlocuteur en position défavorable.

Du point de vue de la succession temporelle, la contre argumentation peut être définie comme le deuxième moment d'une structure argumentative. Les deux séquences: l'argumentation et la contre argumentation se succèdent en permanence et peuvent générer des situations quand on répond à une contre argumentation avec le même type de séquence, jusqu'au moment où l'un des interlocuteurs oriente la direction de la négociation vers d'autres aspects de la négociation ou il applique purement et simplement la tactique *timeout*.

Le choix des contre-arguments se fait après avoir évalué la pertinence des arguments formulés par le partenaire en faveur de sa thèse. La contre argumentation peut avoir plusieurs formes:

– *Le rejet des prémisses ou /et des conclusions* jugées comme fausses;

–   *L'approche dissemblable ou la présentation des points de vue distincts*, voire oppo-
    sés, concernant une situation;
–   *La découverte des inconséquences* dans les affirmations de l'interlocuteur;
–   *La découverte des contradictions dans l'enchaînement des arguments.*

Nous avons choisi pour cette partie de l'étude une négociation commerciale indirecte (par
téléphone) de type spécialiste-spécialiste, entre le client bénéficiaire (A)-le potentiel ache-
teur, et le fournisseur (B)-le potentiel vendeur, dont l'objet est le contrat entre les deux so-
ciétés, mais nous nous occuperons en particulier de la négociation du prix (les répliques
38-67). Le client est celui qui a l'initiative de l'appel téléphonique, ainsi que c'est lui-même
qui dévoile en premier sa position, c'est-à-dire la thèse, dans la réplique 38-*A: ben: <*$_Z$
QU'EST-CE QUE je peux dire↑ > *les prix sont un PEU trop GRANDS*↓. Ce fait détermine
le déclanchement simultané et presque spontané de la contre argumentation du fournis-
seur, dès la réplique suivante. L'atténuation de la contre argumentation destinée à la der-
nière proposition du fournisseur, c'est-à-dire son offre antérieure, par la reprise de la
proposition initiale de celui-ci, constitue un indice du comportement stratégique et de la
compétence communicative du client. L'agressivité du client, qui essaie de découvrir la limite
supérieure de sa marge de prix et la limite inférieure de la marge du vendeur, et donc arriver
au « territoire » où le rapport d'affaires (gagnant-gagnant) soit le plus avantageux pour les
deux parties, provoque la combativité du vendeur qui lance ses arguments, comme réponse
à cette attaque du client.

On se trouve dans une situation d'argumentation où son initiateur, dans notre cas le
client, fait une contre proposition verbale à une proposition écrite de son interlocuteur. Par
contre, on remarque que, même si le client propose sa thèse (l'argumentation), en étant celui
qui devrait soutenir l'opinion avec des arguments, c'est le fournisseur qui propose des argu-
ments pour la soutenance de sa proposition initiale et en défaveur de la contre proposition
du client (la contre argumentation).

On va présenter dans ce qui suit (voir le Tableau II) la structure argumentative de la né-
gociation, au niveau des thèses proposées (notées Arg.) et des arguments qui les soutien-
nent (marqués avec A ou B, en fonction des participants).

Tableau II: *L'Argumentation et la contre argumentation*

D (le Domaine de l'argumentation) – La Négociation commerciale	
A (Le Client) --- B (Le Fournisseur)	
La Contre Prop (la demande de ré-offre)---La Prop (l'offre écrite)	
Relation d'argumentation	
Arg1 et Arg2 (les prix sont chers)	**Arg1' (les prix sont corrects)**
A 1- argument qui soutient Arg1	B 1.1- argument qui rejette Arg 1
	B 1.2 et B 1.3- argument qui défends Arg 1'
A 2.1- argument qui soutient Arg2	B 2.1- argument qui soutient Arg 1'
A 2.2- argument qui soutient Arg2	B 2.2- argument qui soutient Arg 1'
A 2.3- argument qui soutient Arg2	B 2.3- argument qui rejette Arg2

Il y a deux thèses que le client A propose et qui constituent la contre proposition à l'offre du fournisseur, c'est à dire le désaccord vis-à-vis de sa proposition, mais aussi l'affirmation de sa propre position (Arg1)-les prix sont chers: *ben: <_Z QU'EST-CE QUE je peux dire↑> **les prix sont un PEU trop GRANDS↓*** et la re-offre (Arg2)-les prix sont vingt pour cent plus chers (à voir le rôle des adverbes quantificateurs dans l'interaction: *au moins/autour de*):

> 50-A: ...deci ne-ar interesa niște prețuri mai mici **cel puțin** douǎzeci_la_sutǎ. ramâne de vǎzut dacǎ: se poate discuta sau nu. ǎ:
> '...donc *nous sommes intéressés par des prix plus bas **au moins** de vingt pour cent, il reste à voir si on peut discuter ou non. hein*'

et

> 62-A: sigur.# <_{OF} bun> ce sǎ zic↓ ǎ: pâf↓ rǎmâne de vǎzut dacǎ: DUMNEAvoastrǎ↑ puteți sǎ faceți prețuri mai MICI io v-am ((bip)) # v-am spus cǎ: **CAM DOUǍZECI_la_sutǎ ar⊥ am putea sǎ⊥ cam la douǎzeci la sutǎ am putea sǎ colaborǎm**
> '*certainement. bien.* qu'est-ce que je peux vous dire *ben il reste à voir si vous pouvez faire des prix plus bas. je vous ai dit que **autour de vingt pour cent nous pouvons autour de vingt pour cent nous pouvons collaborer***'

L'argument qui soutient la thèse Arg1 est:

A1- L'argument de *la quantité* du produit qu'il envisage d'acheter, en soulignant ce que ca représente pour le fournisseur en terme de *volume mensuel*, ce qui aurait dû influencer le prix, dans le sens de la baisse, comme effet du volume sur le coût de fabrication:

> 48-A: *ǎ: e vorba totuși de **o cantiTAte** eu știu **CEL putin** de **douǎ_sute_de_metri_pǎtrați** # pe: lunǎ. # # cumpǎrați de la dumneavoastrǎ↓ **CEL puțin**. adicǎ de la unu: la:⊥ unu sau douǎ camioane pe lunǎ. SIgur*
> '*ben: **il s'agit quand même d'une quantité je sais au moins de deux cents mètres carrés par mois au moins achetés de chez vous c'est-à-dire minimum un entre un et deux camions par mois SÛREMENT***'

La contre argumentation par laquelle le fournisseur rejette la thèse Arg1 se réalise par *la réfutation de la prémisse de l'actualité des prix déjà envoyés* et par le soutènement de l'argument du changement de prix, actualisé, en rapport avec l'ancien prix. Le fournisseur expose donc un point de vue différent, qui est fondé sur la «chose omise»:

B1.1- L'argument du *prix réactualisé, en conformité avec la «chose omise»*:

> 39-B: *deci eu v-am zis # prețurile acelea erau prețurile:: vechi. chiar acuma o intervenit o chestie care: noi n-am reușit s-o discutǎm aicea↓ am omis-o atunci*
> '*donc je vous ai dit # ces prix-là étaient les anciens prix. à présent même **il est intervenu un truc** que nous n'avons pas réussi à discuter ici nous l'avions omis à l'époque*'

Parmi les arguments qui soutiennent Arg 1' et qui rejettent, implicitement, Arg 1 nous mentionnons:

B1.2- L'argument de *la qualité du produit* propre sur le marché:

39-B: *o chestie care: noi n-am reuşit s-o discutăm aicea ↓ am omis-o atunci. deci toate modelele care sînt acuma care li fac↑ # şi pentru⊥ deci şi la cele care vi le-am dat oFErta **toate sînt cu: uşi tâmplăreşti. deci uşile sînt mai solidi făcuti**: # nu sînt uşi din alea simpli bătuti exact ca la: # dacă aveţi pliantu în faţî: un exemplu ar fi garaju. # care are uşi bătuti. deci alea sunt uşi simpli↓ la: # casele astea care-a # făcut oferta acuma toate au uşî: uşi tâmplăreşti*

'donc tous les modèles qui existent actuellement que je fabrique # et dans le prix que j'ai fait et pour donc pour celles que je vous ai transmises l'offre tous ont ***des portes menuisées donc les portes sont plus solides faites.*** # ce ne sont pas des portes simples comme # si vous avez *la plaquette de présentation* en face un exemple ce serait le garage # qui a des portes simples. donc celles-là sont des portes simples. pour # ces maisons dont l'offre il avait fait # toutes ont des portes menuisées'

B1.3: l'argument *du prix special pour un client special* –versus-le prix pour les clients existants:

49-B: *nici o problemă. deci io v-am zis î: ă dacă vă spun: astea sunt preţuri care le-am făcut pentru dumneavoastră în funcţie de discuţiile care le-am avut AIcea de⊥ **c-am înţeles dumneavoastră sînteţi la-nceput↑ vreţi să intraţi să promovaţi pe piaţa: # franceză am înţeles foarte bine dar după preţurile care eu le practic acuma cu: clienţii care deja îi AM ↓ sînt MULT mai mari decât astea***

'*les prix que j'ai fait pour vous* en fonction des discussions qu'on a eues ici **car j'ai compris que vous êtes au début vous voulez entrer sur le marché français j'ai très bien compris mais *d'après les prix que je pratique maintenant avec mes clients ils sont beaucoup plus grands que ceux-ci*'**

En ce qui concerne l'argumentation Arg 2: *les prix sont vingt pour cent plus chers,* les arguments qui la soutiennent sont:

A 2.1: L'argument *du secteur/segment du marché* auquel ce produit est destiné:

50-A: *# da. CE să zic↓ numai că:: pîf **sectorul de piaţa la care ne adresăm noi adică:: nu prea: nu prea: merge cu preturile astea** . deci ne-ar interesa nişte preţuri ma:i: mai mici. cel puţin douăzeci_la_sută*

'oui qu'est-ce que puis-je dire↓ **rien que le secteur de marché auquel nous nous adressons hein c'est-à-dire ça ne marche pas avec ces prix-ci.** alors nous serions intéressés par des prix plus petits moins de vingt pour cent. il reste à voir si on peut discuter ou pas hein'

A 2.2*:* L'argument *des coûts supplémentaires omis, comme le transport* du produit:

52-A: *# mda. numai că*↑ *îf < p na>* **mai este transportul de adăugat**↑ *[este:*
*'oui seulement qu'***il y a encore le transport à ajouter'**

A 2.3: L'argument *des autres coûts supplémentaires, pour améliorer la qualité du produit*:

54-A: *acoperisul*↑ *știți ca sint:*⊥ *e u:n:*↑ **cartonu_ala care nu este egzact cel
pe care-l aveti dumneavoastra**
'il y a aussi le toit vous savez que ce sont **il y a le carton qui n'est pas exac-
tement ce que vous avez'**

Les arguments de réfutation constituent en fait des arguments en faveur de la thèse Arg 1':
    B 2.1: *L'argument de la comparaison du produit propre avec d'autres produits du marché
très compétitif* sur lequel le client a l'intention d'entrer, dans le but de relever les avantages de
son produit, en terme de qualité et de prix. Le rôle des modalisateurs et des connecteurs ar-
gumentatifs est essentiel pour l'avancement et la progression du sophisme, en style de dé-
monstration:

51-B: *eu vă spun:* **sincer** *eu acuma* **eu știu exact** *și_* **cum**: *cum: i-n franța am fost
de-atâtea ori. vă dau un exemplu de exemplu casuța asta BIANca care# IOU
v-am făcut prețu: de șapte_sute_treijdoi_di_euro*↓ *în franța sî vindi cu:
o_mie_și_ceVA_di_euro*↓ **deci** *prețu' este aproape dublu. iar*⊥ *și bineînțeles
care-i î: produs care trece pri:n: # doi sau trei: intermediari.* **în schimb**
(conector argumentativ) *dumneavoastră dacă lucrați direct*↑ **deci** *o s-aveți
succes MULT mai MArí* **cî** *vindeți direct clientului. și prețu o să fii mai
MIC dicât în magazin. # eu* **NU CRED** *că prețurile_astea sînt: sînt mari.
'je vous dit* **franchement** *je sais* **exactement** *à présent et comme* **en France**
je suis allé plusieurs fois **je vous donne_un exemple** par exemple cet abri
bianca que je vous ai fait *le prix de sept cent trente-deux_euro*s en France il
se vend à plus de mille euros' donc *le prix est presque double* et et **bien sûr**
c'est un produit qui passe dans les mains de deux ou trois intermédiaires
c'est-à-dire *que si vous travaillez en direct'* **alors** *vous aurez beaucoup plus
du succès* **car** *vous vendez en direct* au client et le prix sera plus petit que
dans le magasin **je ne crois pas** que ces prix-ci sont sont grands'

B 2.2: l'argument du *caractere limite de l'offre et des couts supplémentaires que suppose la de-
mande du client*:

55-B: *EGZACT*↑ *asta vroiam să discutăm. pentru că ieu dacă: ie să iau* **ALT
fel de carton**↓ *deci d-ela care spuneți dumneavoastră î: gen tegola cum e la
noí*↑ **ăla ie MULT mai scump decât ăsta care-l am ieu [aici**
'Exactement↑ *c'est ce que je voulais discuter avec vous. Car s'il faut que
j'achète un autre type de carton*↓ *c'est-à-dire celui dont vous parliez: genre te-
gola comme il existe chez nous*↑ *celui-là* **coûte beaucoup plus cher que celui
que je fournis'**

L'argument de réfutation de la thèse Arg2:

B 2.3: *L'argument de l'atteinte d'une limite de prix beaucoup trop basse, par la proposition du client* avec sa contre offre, conformément à l'auto négociation du fournisseur, qui la juge inacceptable pour lui et qui propose une autre issue:

> 63-B: *((x)) deci la douăzeci la sută din:# să iau așa un exemplu deci la primu model di căsuță↑# din șapte_sute_treijdoi <⌄ să dăm jos> # # douăzeci_la_sutî↑* **asta ar însemna căsuța să fie la șase_sute_zece_euro. este FOARti:↓** *mic prețu adică nu mă-ncadrez io. nu: NU pot.# # <⌄* **nu știu cum↓**
>
> 'alors si je calcule vingt pour cent de je prends par exemple pour le premier modèle d'abri de sept cent trente-deux vingt pour cent vingt pour cent ça veut dire que l'abri devrait être à sept cent dix c'est *c'est très petit le prix* c'est-à-dire *je ne peux pas m'encadrer je ne peux pas # #* je ne sais pas comment'

La première concession et le premier signe de cession du territoire appartiennent au fournisseur, qui fait une proposition concernant la recherche d'une solution de collaboration, mais qui suggère aussi une résolution, par le changement de la configuration du produit, mais qui ne satisfait pas le client:

> 63-B: *dacă vreți↑ deci putem sî: căutăm ALTĂ soluție↑ altfel sî: o vedem:↑ aceleași tipuri de căsuțî sî:* **le facem mai simplu cumva↑** *sî: astfel putem sî ni-ncadrăm în preț*
> 'c'est-à-dire si vous voulez ben nous pouvons chercher une autre solution autrement les mêmes types d'abris nous pouvons les faire plus simples et comme ça nous pouvons rentrer dans le prix…'

Dans cette séquence de négociation le fournisseur est celui qui contre argumente, donc qui montre et qui soutient l'intérêt commun pour la collaboration des deux parties. D'ailleurs, nous observons une certaine *étapisation du contre discours* du fournisseur:

a) Par la manifestation de la compréhension vis-à-vis des besoins du partenaire et de l'empathie face aux intérêts de celui-ci, le fournisseur *semble passer du côté de son interlocuteur* (la demande d'appeler sur le téléphone fixe, la compréhension vis-à-vis d'un partenaire qui se trouve à ses débuts et qui, en plus, a comme objectif d'entrer sur un marché étranger);

b) Il donne l'impression qu'il attend n'importe quel argument tout simplement pour avoir l'occasion de répondre et de *faire connaître son point de vue* (prix nouveaux vs. prix anciens, dus à la «chose omise»);

c) *Il semble mettre en évidence le point faible de l'argumentation du client et il met en doute les arguments présentés*, par le soutènement de l'argument de la bonne connaissance du marché français et par la présentation de l'algorithme de l'affaire de «succès» du client (*je ne crois pas que ces prix-ci soient soient grands*);

d) A la fin, il *semble ne pas soutenir en totalité son opinion, car il devrait présenter l'offre initiale comme étant la meilleure solution pour les besoins du client*. Par contre,

il propose une solution alternative, celle du changement de la configuration du produit.

En vertu de cette dernière observation, nous pouvons affirmer que le fournisseur perd en quelque sorte de son terrain initial, justement parce qu'on ne dirait pas que ses arguments influencent le client, qui se maintient dans un registre objectif d'argumentation et qui garde son point de vue concernant la réduction de prix demandée dès le début. Ce fait détermine le fournisseur à se focaliser sur d'autres aspects de la négociation. De point de vue formel, la contre argumentation peut être reconnue par des indices modaux, tels que: *franchement, exactement, je ne crois pas*.

L'issue de la négociation est prévisible au moment où le fournisseur accepte quelques-uns des arguments du client, sous la réserve des discussions futures et il prend l'initiative de réaffirmer sa position, de reconsidérer la contreproposition du client et de refaire sa proposition initiale, en laissant ouverte la voie des négociations:

145-B: <$_p$ da>. de:ci↓ haideți ca ieu: O: să mai studiez o dată oferta asta↓ și: vă sun: ↓ # în cursul zilei de astăzi #vă sun și: mai discutăm. da↑
'oui donc voilà **je vais étudier encore une fois cette offre-ci et je vous rappellerai aujourd'hui** je vous rappellerai et on en discutera oui↑'

L'effet de la contre argumentation dans la négociation commerciale semble ne pas être celui attendu dans un contexte communicatif neutre, d'une conversation standard, en dépit de la pertinence des arguments qui défendent ou réfutent une thèse, une idée ou une action, ou en dépit de leur adéquation au contexte. Le caractère diplomatique et subtil de la contre argumentation peut être relevé aussi par le manque de véhémence de la confrontation directe, par la finesse de l'introduction des arguments dans l'interaction, mais aussi par le choix des voies indirectes, implicites, pour la transmission du message à l'interlocuteur. La modification du point de vue soutenu par l'un des interlocuteurs n'est pas très visible au niveau discursif et, bien sûr, dissimulée, mais celle-ci devient évidente au niveau perlocutionnaire et, ce n'est pas obligé que ce soit dans le cadre de l'interaction courante, mais dans les interactions suivantes.

Par rapport aux types d'arguments propres à la rhétorique antique, *les arguments* du fournisseur sont aussi d'*ordre objectif*, liés au *logos*, ceux-là qui font référence à l'objet externe à négocier-dans ce cas, le produit (sa qualité par rapport aux autres produits du marché- B 1.1 ou le coût de fabrication- B 2.3), que d'*ordre subjectif*, liés au *pathos*, concernant le client (la politique de la compagnie vis-à-vis d'un client nouveau – B 1.2) et à l'*ethos*, connexes à soi-même (sa propre expérience et sa compétence professionnelle-B 2.1). Ainsi, par la relation de type personnel que B établit en rapport avec A, par le biais des arguments B 1.2 et B 2.1, se produit le passage de l'argumentation à la persuasion (vanter son produit et mettre en jeu la crédibilité personnelle).

Les arguments du client sont exclusivement d'ordre objectif, liés au *logos*. Ceux-ci font référence au message et sont liés directement aux trois facteurs importants impliqués dans la réussite de la relation commerciale: le *fournisseur* (par la quantité qui sera achetée-A 1),

le *produit*, qui doit être compétitif (les coûts supplémentaires omis-A 2.2 et la façon de présentation sur le marché-A 2.3) et le *client final* (le consommateur, le destinataire, identifié par le *secteur de marché*-en fait, le segment du marché A 2.1). Du point de vue de la disposition des arguments, nous remarquons que les deux interlocuteurs lancent les arguments et les contre-arguments les plus importants au début de la conversation.

La création du discours argumentatif est tant un art qu'une science, et l'appel aux arguments de type subjectif ou objectif reflète un certain type de comportement de l'interlocuteur vis-à-vis de son partenaire, mais aussi sa compétence communicative. Car l'argument est premièrement un moyen d'obtenir un certain effet sur le récepteur, et l'accent se déplace sur la disposition des arguments, sur l'organisation stratégique en vue d'obtention de l'effet intentionné, mais aussi sur leur cohérence dans le cadre général du discours. Tous ces aspects sont importants car ils contribuent à l'acceptation et à la validation des arguments comme pertinents, dans la démarche de défense où de réfutation d'une opinion. N'importe quel protagoniste peut faire appel à divers types d'arguments et il peut construire son discours argumentatif tel qu'il considère être le plus efficace pour son intérêt propre.

Tout comme les orateurs antiques qui apprenaient cette science et qui utilisaient un cahier propre où ils gardaient l'inventaire d'arguments, du type-*topoi ou lieux communs*, les négociateurs de notre époque font appel à un set d'arguments, adaptés à la situation communicative respective. Cet *inventaire* contient des arguments objectifs liés à: l'*objet externe à négocier* (le prix, la qualité, la quantité, le délai et les conditions de livraison, les spécifications techniques du produit etc.), *celui qui a l'objet de la négociation* (la marge limitée de négociation du prix, directement liée au coût de fabrication), mais aussi des arguments subjectifs (la crédibilité et l'autorité professionnelle), *celui qui désire l'objet de la négociation* (par des références au produit: la quantité – le volume acheté; la qualité ou les autres coûts supplémentaires, mais aussi au destinataire final – le consommateur). C'est au négociateur d'anticiper les contre-arguments de l'interlocuteur et de les transformer en avantages pour son argumentation.

5. *Conclusions*

L'argumentation dans les négociations commerciales est une forme d'expression de l'intérêt pour l'affaire, mais aussi du respect pour l'interlocuteur. Son rôle est incontestable dans la conversion de l'intérêt propre (MOI) en intérêt commun (NOUS). Cette transformation se passe subtilement, avec diplomatie, car la protection de l'image de l'autre est essentielle pour la réussite de la négociation, mais aussi pour la continuation d'une relation d'affaires à long terme. En conséquence, il est important de créer une image pour soi-même, par la minimisation de l'intérêt propre dans l'affaire, mais aussi pour l'autre, d'augmenter son intérêt, en montrant une emphase appuyée de ses besoins et de ses avantages de l'affaire.

L'efficacité de l'argumentation peut être mesurée par l'effet que les arguments produisent sur l'interlocuteur, c'est-à-dire la conviction d'agir d'une certaine manière, qui conduise

à l'obtention de l'accord réciproque avantageux. Dans ce sens est révélatrice la «cellule argumentative» (Plantin 1995), mais surtout la façon d'articulation de ces deux séquences argumentatives.

Nous remarquons le caractère diplomatique et subtil de la contre argumentation, caractérisée par le manque de véhémence de la confrontation directe, par la finesse de la disposition des arguments dans l'interaction, mais aussi par le choix des façons d'expression indirectes/implicites pour transmettre le message à l'interlocuteur. La modification du point de vue propre, même si elle n'est pas très visible au niveau discursif et, bien sûr, dissimulée par un négociateur habile, devient évidente au niveau perlocutionnaire et, ceci n'est pas obligé que ce soit dans le cadre de l'interaction courante, mais dans les interactions suivantes, car une négociation finit rarement après une seule conversation, souvent se déroulant à plusieurs reprises.

Indifféremment de la manière dont se constitue l'argumentation et se présentent les arguments, l'argumentation est un moyen par lequel chacun des interlocuteurs fait connaître sa position concernant l'objet de la négociation, mais en plus, comme celle-ci conduit à la continuation de la négociation, c'est la preuve indubitable que les négociateurs souhaitent arriver à un accord commun, avantageux pour tous.

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The Four Stages of Critical Discussion
and the Most Frequent Speech Acts in the Letter
to Shareholders

Marta Mignini

In this paper the concepts of written persuasive interaction, stages of critical discussion and of speech acts will be highlighted with reference to the letter to shareholders included in banks' annual reports. On the basis of Keller's and of the pragma-dialecticians' theories, I will focus on the introductory and representative functions of the letter, and on the role played by the stages of confrontation, opening, argumentation and conclusion as well as on the role of speech acts in the persuasive process. The examples quoted in this paper are extracted from the letter to shareholders drawn up by the most important European and northern American banks. The examples, all in the English version, are provided to clarify theoretical principles and to show that the theories considered can be applied successfully even to specialized texts.

Introduction

Following Keller (2004), my contribution will point out the two main roles played by the letter to shareholders, i.e. the opening and the representative functions. These are of crucial importance in the persuasive process: as a matter of fact, thanks to its two main functions (Keller 2004), the letter is a strongly persuasive text: on the one hand, the opening function gives birth to the first contact between addressers and addressees; on the other hand, the representative one stimulates positive images and feelings in the readers.

Furthermore, on the basis of the pragma-dialectical model of critical discussion (van Eemeren *et al.* 1993), my paper is focused on the four stages into which the content of argumentative texts can be divided, i.e. confrontation, opening, argumentation and conclusion, as well as on the distribution and role of speech acts in argumentative communication. In particular, the letter to shareholders is taken as an example of argumentative text in order to show that the Dutch theory can be successfully applied even to specialized fields of knowledge.

In accordance with the School of Amsterdam, this paper will show that the four stages are not always present together, not even in the same order, and that some speech acts can be more easily found in the letter to shareholders, which should be considered as a short but complete part of a longer discussion going on between banks and stakeholders in annual re-

ports. Moreover, the argumentative role of speech acts, as well as their relationship with the introductory and persuasive functions, will be highlighted.

The paper is divided into three main parts: in the first one the position, roles and contents of the letter, as well as the relationship between roles and content will be taken into consideration. In the second part I will sum up the Dutch theory of the stages of critical discussion and will apply it to the letter to shareholders; the third section will be focused on the speech acts and on their influence on the outcome of the interaction.

1. *The letter to shareholders: position, content and roles*

First of all, I would like to say a few words about the content of the letter and about its structure. After that, I will consider the roles of the letter and finally I will deal with the relationship between roles and content.

1.1 The letter: position and content

The letter to shareholders is a rather short text (1 to 4 pages) placed at the beginning of annual reports, along with other sections such as the financial highlights and the company's managerial structure.

The content of letter can be divided into three main parts:

1. the initial greetings, which occupy the first line, and are addressed explicitly to shareholders, e.g. "Dear Shareholders" (Commerzbank 2003) or to a more general public, e.g. "Ladies and Gentlemen" (Deutsche Bank 2002), "Dear Fellow Shareholders and Clients" (Merrill Lynch 2003), "Ladies and Gentlemen, dear shareholders and business partners" (Dresdner Bank Group, 2000). Although the letter is known as a "letter to shareholders", in reality it is addressed not only to shareholders but also to workers, other banks, the media, analysts, savers, and to people who don't even know the bank in question. In a few words, the letter is addressed to all those people who are not necessarily shareholders, but who can become shareholders if they are positively impressed by the institutional results and the communicative strategy. That is why the letter to shareholders should be called "letter to stakeholders": as shareholders own the bank and are the decision-makers, they are surely the most important addressees. Nevertheless, stakeholders in general also influence the bank's results and policies, because they can decide to invest more or less in the bank, and they can judge an institution to be more trustworthy than another one thus affecting the public opinion accordingly;

2. the body, which includes the business review, the description of the social and the economic conditions, the company's policies and the future outlook;

3. the final greetings (including thanks, forecasts, promises and the chairman's signature) constitute the last paragraph of the letter and highlight the chairman's presence to make clear that the letter is not anonymous and that the bank has a human face, someone who people can refer to.

1.2 The roles of the letter and their relationship with the content

According to Keller (2004), the letter to shareholders plays two main roles:
1. the opening function, which is evident thanks to the position of the letter, placed at the beginning of annual reports, and to the strategic presentation of the textual content, which should facilitate the reading process;
2. the representative function, highlighted by the information supplied and the way it is supplied. In fact, the content must mirror the institutional reality, and the author of the letter must faithfully represent the bank, so that readers can feel that what is communicated is true and that the bank is trustworthy.

Now, I would like to investigate the following points:
a. the two functions make the letter one of the most important texts included in annual reports, and they make it an example of dialogic interaction;
b. the opening and representative roles are performed by all the three parts the letter is divided into.

As regards the first point, the letter is a crucial part of the interaction going on between companies and stakeholders, because it puts the two parts in touch with each other, and it must be able to keep this contact alive. As Keller (2004: 122) points out, "[d]er erste Text des Geschäftsberichts hat einen entscheidenden Einfluss darauf, ob der Leser neugierig wird auf das Unternehmen und damit auf die Lektüre, oder ob er die Broschüre gelangweilt wieder zur Seite legt". Moreover, Keller states that the letter must supply readers with a positive image of the chairman representing the institution. If the letter is able to attract the addressees' attention and keep it alive, and if it is able to supply a positive image of the company, the public will go on reading the report and will be more inclined to trust the addresser. On the one hand, the initial greetings play the opening function, as they establish the very first contact between the bank and the readers; on the other hand, the body and the final greetings play the representative function, as they give the majority of information and this must be given in a strategic way, so that addressees can mentally reconstruct a clear and positive image of the bank.

The letter is an example of dialogic interaction between banks and readers: the two parts strive to reach their goals and to satisfy their needs, i.e. persuading stakeholders to trust banks and getting the right information to make decisions, respectively. As banks' and stakeholders' needs differ from each other, a balance must be reached so that communication can lead to positive results. Consequently, a communicative interaction takes place, where addressers state their points of view and support them with *ad hoc* arguments to persuasively answer questions made by addressees, as the next section of my paper will show.

As for the second point, all the three parts of the letter perform the opening or the persuasive function. Thanks to the initial greetings banks get in touch with their readers through an explicit address to a general though identifiable public. The body of the letter performs the representative function: it can be taken as the first, broad answer to the stakeholders' questions about the past and present situation, and about future perspectives and aims. While reading this part, the addressees form a mental image of the writer and, consequently, of the bank. The final greetings include thanks to shareholders, forecasts, promises, references to future contacts between banks and readers and the chairman's signature. This final section of the letter tries to improve the institutional image by stressing the bank's willingness to face difficulties and its confidence in the future. Furthermore, it completes the opening function by promising a standing contact between the parts and by providing the author's signature. As already affirmed in paragraph 1.1, the author's signature makes the text more human and approachable, because it gives an identity to the person who greets the addressees at the beginning of the letter thus completing the text and making the bank identifiable as an entity with a human face.

2. *The letter as a critical discussion and its four stages*

As stated in the paragraph above, an argumentative, critical kind of communication takes place in the letter to shareholders: in fact, banks try to conquer new clients and to improve the relationship with old-time clients by affecting their minds with strategic points of view and arguments. The communicative process often goes through the four stages identified by the pragma-dialecticians, i.e. confrontation, opening, argumentation and conclusion.

To sum up the Dutch theory concerning the stages, I will quote the representatives of the School of Amsterdam (van Eemeren *et al.* 1993: 26-27), who point out that in the first stage, i.e. confrontation, "the disagreement is identified through some form of expression: it becomes clear that there is a standpoint which meets with doubt or contradiction". In the second stage, i.e. opening, "the parties try to find out whether there is sufficient common ground to make resolution-oriented discussion profitable", while as regards argumentation "[t]he protagonist adduces arguments for the purpose of overcoming doubts about the standpoint". Finally, the concluding stage "fixes the outcome of the discussion: either a resolution or a decision that no resolution can be reached".

The theory of the stages can be successfully applied even to specialized texts like letters to shareholders in banks' annual reports, as I will show taking a letter from Commerzank Annual Report 2002 as an example. The most meaningful words and expression will be highlighted in bold.

During confrontation, the involvement of two parts (bank and stakeholders) becomes clear:

> Dear Shareholders, **We** know that **you** cannot be content with the picture
> presented of Commerzbank.

The personal pronouns differentiate the addresser from the addressees, thus giving birth to two groups whose different needs and desires become clearly distinguishable both in the letter and in the whole report.

At the opening stage the bank takes on the role of protagonist, and states its willingness to discuss crucial matters:

> This reality is something **we are actively tackling; we are doing all that we can to alter this picture, to brighten it up and to show it in a better light** with the aid of convincing facts [...].

At the argumentation stage the bank puts forward standpoints and arguments to back points of view in a successful way, as it will be demonstrated in the following quotation, whose first part is the bank's standpoint, and whose second part is an argument supporting the standpoint:

> More than ever, we are convinced that any promising business model for a bank rests upon long-term relationships with their customers. [...] In the interest of providing information as soon as possible, we presented our provisional figures for the 2002 financial year to you and to the public at large at the start of February, and thus very early – not least in order to take the wind out of sails of speculation.

The argument highlights the efforts made by the bank to communicate with its stakeholders. As good communication is the basis of long-term relationships, the argument quoted here proves the bank's belief of the importance of excellent relations with customers.

In the conclusive part of the letter, the definite conquest of the readers cannot be clearly perceived because the letter is a written kind of interaction, and the addressees' involvement differs from the one in oral communication, where protagonist and antagonist are present at the same time and can actively express their standpoints, arguments, and decide who wins. Anyway, while concluding the letter the addresser tries to strengthen the idea that it is worth the readers' trust; what is more, the relationship between the parts and the bank's future success are so strongly highlighted that the bank's standpoints seem to prevail:

> Given our **sound liquidity position and good capital base, we remain committed to the goal of achieving better figures soon and, as a result, of being able to present a more attractive picture of Commerzbank**, despite the persistently difficult conditions. I hope that **I will be able to report further progress** to you at our Annual General Meeting in the Frankfurt Festhalle on May 30, 2003.

Despite the completeness of the letter quoted above, it must be pointed out that, as stated by the pragma-dialecticians (van Eemeren, Grootendorst & Snoeck Henkemans 2002: 27) "[t]he parties often do not go through all four of the discussion stages or not in the same order". As a matter of fact, in the letters to shareholders the four stages are not always clearly distinguishable or presented in the order of the ideal model proposed by the School of Am-

sterdam. Anyway, the examples quoted on the previous pages show that pragma-dialectics offers theoretical principles that can be used to understand how argumentation works not only in everyday contexts, but also in specific fields.

In the next section of my paper I will go through the most frequent speech acts and the way they lead to a change of mind.

3. *The most frequent speech acts in the letter to shareholders*

In the paragraphs of this section I will deal with the way how speech acts are considered by the School of Amsterdam.

With the help of van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992) quotations, first I will sum up the distinction between "*elementary*" and "*complex*" speech acts. Then I will briefly consider their division of speech acts into five kinds (assertives, directives, commissives, expressives and declaratives), and finally I will apply this division to the letter to shareholders and consider the role of speech acts in the argumentative interaction between bank and readers.

3.1 Speech acts: elementary and complex

Before investigating the role of speech acts in argumentative texts like letters to shareholders, I will consider an important distinction made by van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992: 29) between "*elementary* speech acts" and "*complex* speech acts". The authors affirm that argumentative discourse taken as a whole is a complex speech act because its communicative function takes place at a high, textual level instead of at sentence level. In particular, they clarify their theory through three points (1992: 28-29):

> 1) First, unlike assertions, requests, promises, and so on which can consist of only a single sentence, argumentation, in principle, consists of more than one sentence. [...] Sometimes an argument, at first sight, appears to consist of just one sentence and is still a complete defense of a standpoint, but on closer inspection, it will then always be found that part of the argumentation has been left unexpressed.

In addition, the authors state that

> 2) [s]econd, without being indirect speech acts, the utterances that go to make up the argumentation all have two communicative functions at the same time:

these two functions are a) the argumentative function that characterizes the whole interaction as argumentative, i.e. defending a standpoint, and b) the function that is peculiar to each utterance, i.e. assertion, promise, statement, etc.

Finally, pragma-dialecticians highlight that

3) Third, the speech act constellation that constitutes the argumentation cannot stand by itself. It must be connected in a particular way to another speech act: the speech act in which the standpoint is expressed that is supported by the argumentation. Speech acts such as promises, statements, and requests need not be linked to another speech act in such a special way.

And this is one of the reasons why van Eemeren and Grootendorst affirm that "[t]he differences between argumentation and these other speech acts can be better understood when it is seen that argumentation has not a communicative function at the sentence level but at some higher textual level".

3.2 Five kinds of speech acts in argumentation

On the basis of Searle's theory, van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992) distinguish five kinds of speech acts, which play a crucial role in the outcome of the ideal argumentative discussion, and which can occur more frequently at some stages instead at some others:

1) assertives, such as assertions, claims, assurances and suppositions, which are used at confrontation, argumentation and at concluding stage. As the authors affirm (1992: 38) "[a]t the confrontation stage, they can express the standpoint at issue; at the argumentation stage, the argumentation in defense of that standpoint; at the concluding stage, the outcome of the discussion";

2) directives, such as requests, orders and recommendations. Directive speech acts are less frequent than assertives: in fact van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992: 38) state that "[o]nly those directive speech acts play a part in a critical discussion that challenge the protagonist to defend his standpoint (confrontation stage) or to give argumentation in favor of his standpoint (argumentation stage)";

3) commissives, i.e. promises and agreements, are very frequent in argumentative discourse and perform different functions depending on the stage. As pragma-dialecticians point out (1992: 39)

Commissive speech acts can fulfil several roles in a critical discussion. At the confrontation and in the concluding stage, they can be used for accepting or not accepting a standpoint; at the opening stage, for accepting the challenge to defend a standpoint, for deciding to start the discussion, for agreeing on the distribution of roles and the discussion rules, and for agreeing on how to close the discussion; at the argumentation stage, for accepting or not accepting argumentation; in the concluding stage, finally, they can be used for deciding to start a new discussion.

4) expressives, such as congratulations and expressions of feelings in general, are not considered crucial in critical discussion because they "do not lead to any specific commitment that is relevant to resolving the dispute" (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 1992: 39). Anyway, they can influence the persuasive process and lead the parts to change their minds. As van Eemeren and Grootendorst state, "expressives can also encourage or stimulate a meaningful exchange of ideas";

5) declaratives are those speech acts that change a situation, i.e. declarations of war or peace, christening, etc. Pragma-dialecticians (1992: 40) distinguish "nonusage" declaratives which "are performed in more or less institutionalized contexts such as court proceedings, meetings, and religious ceremonies, in all of which it is clear who is authorized to perform a particular declarative" from "usage declaratives, such as explications, elucidations, amplifications and definitions" whose purpose is "to facilitate or increase the listener's comprehension of other speech acts by indicating how they should be interpreted". Like expressives,

nonusage declaratives make no direct contribution to the resolution of the dispute. At best, they can lead to the settlement of a dispute, not to its resolution. They, therefore, do not play a part in a critical discussion.

On the other hand, usage declaratives are crucial at different stages:

At the confrontation stage, they can unmask spurious verbal disputes; at the opening stage, they can clarify confusion about the starting points or the discussion rules; at the argumentation stage, they can prevent premature acceptance or nonacceptance; and at the concluding stage, they can prevent ambiguous resolutions.

After summing up the pragma-dialecticians' differentiation among speech acts and the relations between speech acts and stages of critical discussion, I will investigate which speech acts more frequently appear in the letter to shareholders and what role they perform in the persuasive process.

3.3 Speech acts in the letter to shareholders

Following the Dutch theory, in the letter to shareholders two main groups of speech acts can be recognized:

1) the complex speech act of argumentation, by means of which banks express their standpoints and back them with strategic arguments;

2) elementary speech acts, i.e. assertions, promises, expressions of joy or worry, which constitute the argumentation taken as a whole.

As regards this last group, the main speech acts in letters to shareholders are:

a) assertives. The chairman puts forward standpoints and arguments:

In all our measures it was important for us not to overtax or place undue strain upon our relationships with customers – in other words, the very basis of our business – but, on the contrary, to build upon these. More than ever, we are convinced that any promising business model for a bank rests upon long-term relationships with its customers (Commerzbank 2002)

Our considerable progress, however, is still not reflected in our share price. The main reason is that the Deutsche Bank share has remained linked to the depressed tendency of the German equities market (Deutsche Bank, 2002: 6)

b) commissives. Banks commit themselves to do something or to discuss certain matters:

Given our sound liquidity position and good capital base, we remain committed to the goal of achieving better figures soon and, as a result, of being able to present a more attractive picture of Commerzbank, despite difficult conditions (Commerzbank 2002)

At the same time, the Group intends to exploit all growth opportunities that may arise in new markets and new business, continuing to create development options for the future (Gruppo SanpaoloImi, 2001: 11)

c) expressives. Expressions of joy, sorrow, worry or gratitude are particularly frequent in letters to shareholders, where chairmen show their human face and the human side of banks:

We are not content either, because we find the darker tones of this picture exaggerated and feel that our share price is out of touch with reality (Commerzbank 2002)

We are also extremely proud of recently being named overall winner and financial industry leader in the *Financial Times* "Best of European Business" awards (UBS 2005: 3)

d) usage declaratives. These are not so frequent as the other speech acts, but they are sometimes used to define words or to precise expressions that have already been used or that will be used in the text. I will highlight usage declaratives in bold:

More than ever, we are convinced that any promising business model for a bank rests upon long-term relationships with its customers. **Put in contemporary terms, this means** that we continue to see the consistent relationship-banking approach as superior to deal-based transaction banking (Commerzbank 2002)

Another key trend is the increasing demand from clients for investment banks to combine capital and advice. **In other words**, investment banks are expected to commit more of their own capital when executing transactions (Goldman Sachs 2005: 4)

The four kinds of speech acts can be found all through the letter, and they play a very important role in the persuasive process:

- by means of assertives banks state their standpoints, and support them with appropriate arguments;
- through commissives banks take on the role of protagonists, thus stressing what will be done to convince readers that banks are worth their trust;
- through expressives banks can be perceived as human institutions that are interested not only in economic and financial results but also in their stakeholders' needs. As van Eemeren *et al*. (1993: 29) point out, "[e]xpressives […] are not argumentatively relevant acts. They do not create any commitments for the speaker or writer which are directly relevant to the resolution of a dispute". In spite of this, in the letters there is plenty of expressions of positive and negative feelings, which help banks sound closer to people thus facilitating the contact between the parts. As stated by Keller (2004: 124) with reference to the representative role of the letter,

    Außerdem ist der Brief an die Aktionäre der Ort, wo der Vorstandsvorsitzende seine menschliche Qualitäten dokumentieren kann, denn auch dies ist ein Betrag zur Vertrauensbildung. Das heißt nicht, dass er autobiografisch über seinen Charakter berichten soll; es heißt vielmehr, dass dieser sic him Text zeigen muss. Tugenden lassen sich nicht mitteilen, sie müssen sich zeigen. Der Text muss die Person, die »hinter« ihm steht, verkörpern.

- by exploiting usage declaratives chairmen "announce what a speaker is going to mean in using some expression or to clarify what a speaker meant in having used some expression" (van Eemeren *et al.* 1993: 30) thus avoiding misunderstanding. In letters to shareholders this kind of speech act is normally used not to specify how a speech act must be interpreted, i.e. it does not say whether an expression used in the text is a promise, a statement, a proposal, etc., but it is used to rephrase something written before and that can be misinterpreted.

Conclusions

The present paper focused on the two main functions of the letter to shareholders, i.e. the opening and representative roles, as well as on the stages of critical discussion the letter is divided into and on the most frequent and strategic speech acts exploited in the letter.

Apart from pointing out why the letter is so strategic a text in conquering new customers, the aim of my contribution was to show that the Dutch model can be applied even to specialized texts, and that the same model is helpful to understand how devices such as the choice of certain content and of specific speech acts play a crucial role in attracting the addressees' attention and in influencing their mind. The choice of the letter to shareholders was due to its importance as a short but necessary part of a longer text, i.e. the annual report, aimed at providing readers with strategic information supposed to make readers change their opinion and behaviour.

The first section of my paper was devoted to the opening and representative roles of the letter: thanks to them, the letter can be considered as an example of an implicit dialogic interac-

tion between two parts, one of which (banks) directly addresses to its counterpart. As a matter of fact, the writer explicitly greets the readers (initial greetings), it tries to satisfy the readers' want of knowledge by providing information that answer the addressees' question (body of the letter), and it finally refers to future contacts (final greetings). The text, where only the writer's voice can be perceived, is placed at the beginning of the whole report to present the bank to a vast public (opening function) and to portray its reality (representative function).

After summing up the main principles of pragma-dialectics regarding the division of the critical discussion into four stages, the second section highlighted that in letters to shareholders the four stages, i.e. confrontation, opening, argumentation and conclusion, can be recognized, even if they do not always appear together or in the order proposed by the School of Amsterdam.

The third and last part of my paper was focused on the speech acts considered by pragma-dialecticians, i.e. assertives, directives, commissives, expressives and declaratives divided into nonusage and usage declaratives, and on the most frequent and strategic speech acts in the letter to shareholders. I highlighted that in the letter assertives, commissives and expressives are the most frequently occurring acts. Assertives are used to state standpoints and to support them with appropriate arguments; by means of commissives the addresser takes on the role of protagonist in the discussion and states what it wants to discuss about, what it wants to do in the future. Expressives are massively exploited so that banks can share feelings with readers and they can be considered as human entities. Usage declaratives are used, though not so often as the other speech acts, when banks want to clarify or precise the meaning of words and expression thus avoiding misunderstanding. Directives and usage declaratives are not normally used in the letter to shareholders, where acts like commands, threats, prohibitions do not appear, and which are not so formal as to include specific set phrases such as naming or declarations.

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ARGUMENTATIVE DIALOGUES IN MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS (M&AS): EVIDENCE FROM INVESTORS AND ANALYSTS CONFERENCE CALLS

RUDI PALMIERI

1. *Introduction*

The relevance of public companies' external communication has particularly increased in the last years (cf. Corvi 2000:41). Besides the more and more pressing request for information disclosure by market's regulation and supervision bodies, companies have progressively realized the importance to openly communicate for building and maintaining long-term relationships (Snehota 2004, Lerbinger 2006) with the financial market community (shareholders and investors in general) and, more in general, with the wider public of stakeholders, i.e. «people who are linked to an organization because they and the organization have consequences on each other» (Grunig & Repper 1992: 125), like employees, unions, customers, competitors, and governments[1]. In outlining companies' communications towards the markets, a distinction has to be drawn between *mandatory disclosure*, imposed by regulation, and *voluntary* – or *discretionary* – disclosure (cf. Verrecchia 1983; Clinch & Verrecchia 1997). Public companies must disclose information in order to guarantee a transparent, fair and efficient market, for the sake of investors, savers and other economical actors involved. At the same time, companies need and want to disclose information about their business in order to attract investors, who provide funds, and customers, who buy their products and services. A dilemma arises for companies, tensed between the desire to communicate in order to raise capital and create trustworthiness in front of the market and the desire – restricted by disclosure rules – to retain information in order to obtain competitive advantage, which is an essential condition for making profit (cf. Barone-Adesi 2002).

Thus, the corporate financial communication intervenes in crucial moments of the company's business activities and relevantly contributes to their realization.

Indeed, large part of this communication is argumentative, i.e. it consists of a discourse that presents an opinion (a point of view) and reasons justifying it. If we consider the relevance

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[1] Shareholders can be considered as a particular type of stakeholders as, when they invest in the company, they become owners of the firm and not simply claimants on the company's assets. Their stake is the stock, i.e. ownership. This distinction turns out to be necessary when we consider, as I do in this paper, financial interactions like mergers and acquisitions, in which shareholders affect the organization by directly determining the final outcome of the proposal and are intrinsically affected by the deal, as the object of the transaction is their stock.

assigned to reasoning within economic sciences – especially the theoretical approaches underlining concepts like human rationality, rational choices, etc... – the presence in the economic-financial context of a reasoning activity like argumentation should not astonish us. Actually, reasoning is a necessary but not sufficient condition for speaking of argumentation. Reasoning is in fact involved in many other rational activities like demonstration, inquiry, individual decision-making and explanation (cf. van Eemeren & Houtlosser 2005: 24; Rigotti & Greco 2005, 2009). Tough these activities are not totally unrelated to argumentation we properly speak of argumentation as a "verbal, social, and rational activity aimed at convincing a reasonable critic of the acceptability of a standpoint by putting forward a constellation of propositions justifying or refuting the proposition expressed in the standpoint" (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 2003: 1). Following this *dialectical* view[2], we discover that several argumentative discussions feature the financial context and occur each time the acceptance of a certain statement or the consent to a certain proposal is sought, like a banker trying to convince a client of the profitability of a financial product, counterparties in a deal trying to convince each other of the expediency of the reciprocally proposed terms, financial advertising, a firm needing to raise capital that attempts to persuade potential creditors and stockholders to finance its business, a rating agency justifying a downgrade assigned to a company, etc.

In this paper I want to show how a specific activity type, apparently conceived for information-seeking/gathering only, actually manifests, implicitly and explicitly, argumentative dialogues, in which corporate managers have to defend the reasonableness of the decisions they made or the expediency of the transactions and investments they proposed.

2. *Analysts and investors conference calls*

The example I am going to consider refers to a genre of business communicative interactions that consists of conferences with investors and analysts, which in the last years, thanks to the development of technologies for distance communication, have started to be performed online, giving rise to the so-called *conference calls*. The discussion analyzed in this paper is taken from a blended conference, i.e. with people present in the conference room and people connected online, held by two banks, Barclays and ABN AMRO, after having announced a merger agreement.

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[2] Because it is dialectical and dialogical, argumentation differs from demonstration, which rather aims at establishing knowledge rather than persuading (cf. Rigotti & Greco 2005:24). Because it is social, argumentation differs from inquiry and individual decision-making, which is a sort of intra-personal argumentation that lacks of social commitments. Finally, argumentation differs from explanation because the latter aims at providing the causes of a state of affair which the counter-party already acknowledges, while the former's starting point is, in Cicero's words, a *res dubia* (cf. Rigotti & Greco 2005:3), giving rise to a disagreement discussants attempt to resolve by advancing reasons justifying or attacking the standpoint (the *res dubia*) at the roots of the disagreement.

Originally, companies used to organize analysts conference calls after each quarterly earnings announcement. A selected number of financial analysts participated to the tele-conference looking for more detailed information. Eventually, these online meetings have been opened to a less restricted public (Bushee et al. 2003), also because whoever might connect into the conference and potentially participate in the call. Sometimes, this brings unexpected – and also funny – side effects, as it was the case with *Joe Herrick*, a mysterious person who registered himself as a representative of well-know companies (e.g. JP Morgan, Morgan Stanley) and managed to obtain the line, eventually asking amazing questions[3].

In general, conference calls follow the release of a press announcement (Frankel et al. 1999) that helps analysts and investors to prepare their questions. In contrast with press releases (Jacobs 1999), information disclosed in conference calls shows to be more sophisticated, more detailed, more informally expressed and contains more personal opinions and predictions (Tasker 1998). There is also scientific evidence that conference calls contribute at reducing information asymmetries among investors (Bowen et al. 2002; Brown et al. 2004).

Basically, a conference call is an audio teleconference between corporate managers and various analysts and investors tele-connected. An operator manages the call, organized in two parts (cf. Crawford-Camiciottoli 2007). The first part consists of monological interventions in which corporate managers (at least the Chief Executive Officer and the Chief Financial Officer) present in details the event previously announced – usually the quarterly performance or an M&A proposal – to analysts and investors, temporarily set in a listen-only mode. Then, a dialogical discussion is introduced by the call operator, who opens the line to participants, who, in a Questions-Answers phase (Q&A), have the possibility to ask questions to managers.

In this paper I consider the conference call as a specific *activity type*. The notion of activity type has been developed by Levinson (1979, 1992), who used it for referring to «a fuzzy category whose focal-members are goal-defined, socially constituted, bounded, events with constraint on participants, setting and so on, but above all on the kinds of allowable contributions». In their model of the communication context, Rigotti & Rocci (2006) characterize *activity type* as the institutional dimension[4] of any communicative interaction (Rocci *forthcoming*), where inter-agents are seen as "role-holders" performing specific skills and jobs – *interaction schemes* – embodied within an *interaction field,* i.e. within a social reality establishing the inter-agents' joint goal and mutual commitments.

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[3] "Actually, This is…". *The Wall Street Journal Europe*. February 16, 2008.

[4] The other dimension is the interpersonal one, where inter-agents are seen as people, i.e. individuals belonging to a community and with personal goals that might go far beyond the institutional goal they have within the interaction. Thus, conflicts may arise between individual desires and institutional commitments.

In our case, the concerned interaction field is the financial market, whose shared goal can be roughly defined as creating value through sound investments[5]. M&A conference calls contribute to realize this goal by providing analysts and investors with accurate information for correctly evaluating the proposed financial deal. The schemes deployed in this activity type are those typically characterizing information-seeking dialogues: questioning, answering, explaining, turn-taking...

3. *The role of argumentation in Mergers and Acquisitions*

It has become a common practice by public companies to organize conference calls and presentations with analysts and investors after the announcement of an M&A proposal. The role of argumentation in M&As is indeed decisive (cf. Palmieri 2008). First of all, managers have to convince shareholders to approve the proposed deal. Also, managers have to face the potential concerns expressed by regulators, who could prevent the transaction if it undermines market competition; by employees and unions, who fight against the risk of lay-offs (cf. Höpner & Jackson 2006); by politicians, who very often interfere for defending the independence of a firm with national importance, like an airline company or a big bank (cf. Nowak 2001). Furthermore, an influential role is played by financial analysts, who produce valuations and express opinions that may serve as a starting point for the shareholders' final decision (cf. Mahoney 1991). Analysts are usually distinguished in *buy-side* analysts, who work exclusively for institutions like mutual and pension funds, potentially interested in investing in the company, and *sell-side* analysts, employed by brokerage firms, like investment banks, for producing evaluations and forecasts for their clients.

Investors and analysts (the investment community) are particularly interested in M&A transactions because of their impact on the financial value of the companies involved. Not by chance, the announcement of M&As is followed by significant (positive or negative) movements in stock prices (cf. Bruner 2004, 2005).

The M&A conferences with the investment community follow the announcement of the proposal but precede the shareholders' final decision on the transaction. The phase in which the conference is held is thus extremely delicate as managers have still to obtain the consent from shareholders and stakeholders.

Therefore, the conference cannot be considered as an "idle" entertainment. It is indeed a crucial communicative event in which the information exchanged – as our example will show – is expected to be relevant for the final decision-making.

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[5] Financial markets aim at facilitating the meeting between enterprises, having business projects but lacking capital for realizing them, and investors, having surplus capital but no idea how to employ them in a productive way. Financial communication is performed exactly for fulfilling this purpose.

4. *The Barclays – ABN AMRO case*

In 2007, the management boards of two important European banks, Barclays from UK and ABN AMRO from The Netherlands, found an agreement for a merger. The terms of the agreement included the sale to Bank of America (BofA) of LaSalle, a US division of ABN AMRO, with a break-up fee of €200ml that ABN AMRO should have paid if the transaction would have been eventually cancelled. During the first half of April, rumours were spreading out about a consortium of three banks led by Royal Bank of Scotland (the other two banks were Fortis and Santander) offering to buy ABN AMRO at a price higher than Barclays' but entailing the cancellation of the LaSalle's spin-off. Despite these rumours, on April 23, ABN AMRO and Barclays disclosed a joint press release in which they announced the merger agreement. The same day, they organized a press conference in the morning and an analysts and investors conference in the afternoon.

On the corporate side, six corporate participants, including Rijkman Groenink, the CEO of ABN AMRO, and John Varley, Barclays CEO, held the conference. On the investment side, fourteen participants intervened by asking questions.

The following excerpt, that I am going to analyze, refers to the Q&A phase of the investor/analysts conference. The transcript was available on both companies' websites[6]. In order to check the correctness of the text the audio file of the conference has been considered too. The Q&A phase starts with a question asked by Christopher Hohn, working for a well-known institutional investor:

A.1. Christopher Hohn: Children Investment Fund

> Just a question for Mr. Groenink – Chris Hohn from the Childrens Investment Fund – Mr. Groenink, can you confirm please in yes or no answer if there is a materially higher bid from the Royal Bank Consortium, conditional on the LaSalle sale being cancelled, that the ABN AMRO Board can choose to terminate the sale, albeit with the break-up fee that's been mentioned in the release?

A.2. Rijkman Groenink: ABN AMRO

> I cannot confirm that, because I don't know of any such bid.

B.1.1. Christopher Hohn: CIF

> Could I request, as a just under 3% shareholder of ABN AMRO, that you make public the detail terms of this break-up clause as soon as possible, preferably today, because my concern as a shareholder is to understand if it is effectively put in as a poison pill to frustrate any RBS bid, or is available to be cancelled by the ABN

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[6] The website of publicly traded companies always contains a *Menu* devoted to analysts and investors (usually called *Investor relations* or simply, *Investors*) and, very often, also a separate section for Media (usually called *Media* or *Press*). A subsection usually called *Presentations* contains events belonging to the company's voluntary disclosure, in which we find conference calls and similar presentations held with analysts and investors.

AMRO Board, if it chooses to do so. I think it's something reasonable and I would request that that's done today. Thank you.

C.1.1. Rijkman Groenink: ABN AMRO

Just to be absolutely clear, which break-up fee are you talking about?

C.2. Christopher Hohn: CIF

There is a $200 million break-up fee for the sale of LaSalle.

C.1.2. Rijkman Groenink: ABN AMRO

Yes. Hm… [*expression of consent*]

B.1.2. Christopher Hohn:

So my question again is, I would like to have ABN AMRO disclose today whether the sale can be terminated by the ABN AMRO Board – it says in the release that it's terminable within limited circumstances and you have not disclosed what those circumstances are. I would like to know if there is a higher bid for the company that the board would like to accept, and is conditional on the cancellation of that transaction, if the board is able to do so, I think it would be a breach of fiduciary duty if this is not the case. The first thing I would like to know is what the circumstances are and I would strongly request the board to make that public today.

B.2.1. John Varley: Barclays

Perhaps I can just comment, which is that I think that the ABN AMRO team has done a spectacularly good job in realizing value for shareholders through the sale agreement that has entered into with Bank of America – a spectacularly good job and in the way that I describe, I think that we have maximized value from an asset that didn't fit particularly well with the new enterprise and we've created the opportunity of a very significant distribution of surplus capital to shareholders thereby. So that is the attitude that I take on the point that you are raising.

B.2.2. Rijkman Groenink: ABN AMRO

May I add that of course that as the Management Board and the Supervisory Board of ABN AMRO have accepted the bid of Bank of America for LaSalle, that of course we share the view of John Varley that this is an extremely good bid. We think that there has not been any valuation out there higher than we have managed to extract from the Bank of America. Furthermore, we have negotiated a clause which is today proactively managed by our advisors to invite anybody who has interest to bid for LaSalle, to come in and to do their due diligence. The Bank of America has without any preparation on our side or their side, has done the due diligence in four days and has come up with this extremely valuable bid for ABN AMRO shareholders. Anybody who comes in today will have 14 days and a fully prepared and fully loaded accessible data room. So I think everybody

has a full opportunity to make an assessment whether LaSalle is worth more to them than the Bank of America and to make a bid. Any professional bank, fully prepared and has been analysing ABN AMRO for the last few months, should be able to do that in a fortnight. I'm just going to move to the next question, if I may, because I'm very conscious that we've got a lot of people in the room and there are a lot of questions, if you'll allow me to do that.

(ABN AMRO-BARCLAYS investors and analysts conference, 23 April 2007)

Christopher Hohn opens a dialogue game (A.1.) that, according to the typology proposed by Walton & Krabbe (1998), should be described as an information-seeking dialogue. His question addresses a typical issue in M&As, i.e. the existence of an alternative, better, offer launched by a third party. In this case, Hohn mentions a precise bid on which rumors were circulating[7] since days: the offer made by the RBS Consortium, which does not include the sale of LaSalle. He wants to know whether the ABN Board is still in the position of accepting this bid. In replying the question, ABN AMRO CEO Rijkman Groenink seems to exploit the unofficial character of the RBS bid (A.2.).

At this point, Hohn insists (B.1.1. and B.1.1.2), revealing he is a 3% ABN AMRO shareholder and making more explicit his question: he fears that the LaSalle deal has been set up as a poison pill[8] in order to hinder the Consortium offer and wants to make sure that the management has acted in shareholders' best interests ("I think it would be a breach of fiduciary duty if this is not the case").

Though the question was addressed to Groenink, the reply initially comes from Barclays CEO, John Varley, who defends the LaSalle sale depicting it as a "spectacularly good job" that has "maximized value" for shareholders (B.2.1.). Then, Groenink (B.2.2.) reasserts the expediency of the BofA's offer. Finally, he terminates the dialogue with the justification that other participants wish to intervene ("there are a lot of people in the room...").

5. *Analysis of the dialogue*

First of all, we have to establish whether and to what extent the dialogue is indeed argumentative. A dialogue is argumentative (*persuasion dialogue* in the Walton & Krabbe's typology[9]) if the two parties involved disagree on a certain issue and advance reasons

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[7] See The Wall Street Journal Europe. April 14, 2007.

[8] Poison pills are defense tactics through which target companies damage themselves so that they are no longer attractive for the bidder. Hohn fears that the break-up fee that ABN AMRO should pay to Barclays if the agreed merger would lapse could be exploited by ABN managers to prevent a takeover by the RBS-Consortium.

[9] According to Walton & Krabbe (1998) persuasion is only one of the possible dialogue games in which argumentation can intervene. In our view, every time argumentation takes place a persuasion dialogue occurs, because the ultimate goal of arguing is always persuasion. By the way, the specific activity – negotiation, mediation, information seeking, deliberation, etc. – in which an argument intervenes can decisively influence its design, analysis and evaluation.

supporting their own position in respect to the issue. Indeed, the dialogue we are considering starts with a simple question which does not seem to generate a critical discussion.

However, the presence within Hohn's follow-up question (B.1.1.) of significant argumentative indicators – "I think", "It's reasonable" (cf. van Eemeren, Houtlosser, Snoeck Henkemans 2007, Rocci 2008) – suggests a critical discussion is taking place, i.e. an attempt to resolve a disagreement "between a party who defends a certain standpoint, the *protagonist*, and a party who challenges this standpoint, the *antagonist*" (van Eemeren, Grootendorst, Snoeck Henkemans 2002:25). The ideal model of critical discussion consists of four stages that discussants should go through in the attempt to solve the disagreement. In the *confrontation stage* the protagonist advances his standpoint and meets with the antagonist's doubts, sometimes implicitly assumed. Before the *argumentation* stage, in which arguments are put forth for supporting/destroying the standpoint, parties have to agree on some starting points. This phase, the *opening stage*, is essential to the development of the discussion because only if a certain common ground exists it is possible for parties to reasonably resolve – in the *concluding stage* – the difference of opinions.

In the dialogue here considered, we first of all recognize an argumentative effort made by Hohn to show the objective relevance of the question he initially asked. In front of Groenink's reluctance to answer the question (A.2.), Hohn claims for receiving an answer because of the relevance of its possible implications. The implicit argumentation in support of the standpoint that Groenink has to answer his question is that a question should be answered if it is relevant and that a question is relevant if its answer would decisively modify the concerned state of affair. Hohn refers here to the possibility that ABN AMRO Board has breached the fiduciary duty towards shareholders Hohn ("I think it would be a breach of fiduciary duty if..."). Such possibility actually becomes an object of discussion as it can be inferred by the content of Groenink and Varley's replies (B.2.1.; B.2.2.).

Therefore, applying a maximally argumentative reconstruction, we can indeed single out the following issue:

did ABN AMRO Board act in shareholders' best interests by selling LaSalle to BofA?

In relation to this issue, Groenink (with Varley) can be considered protagonist of the standpoint that ABN AMRO management *did* maximize shareholder value (i.e. it did not breached the fiduciary duty towards shareholders).

The position held by Hohn is, instead, rather complex. Apparently, he is not committing to any standpoint but he is only challenging the protagonist to defend his viewpoint, playing in this way the role of antagonist. Alternatively, it is possible and probable[10] that Hohn actually thinks that the ABN AMRO management has breached the fiduciary duty

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[10] Since months, Chris Hohn was very critical towards the ABN AMRO management board. He and other representatives of The Children Investment Fund publicly expressed their disappointment for the (low) performances of the bank in the previous years and explicitly claimed for a sale, spin-off or merger of ABN AMRO in order to maximize the share value. (See the documents on the 2007 Shareholders Meeting, available on: www.group.abnamro.com/ir/gsm.cfm).

but, instead of stating it explicitly and so committing himself to justifying with arguments, he manages to shift the burden of proof totally on the side of Groenink.

Shifting the burden of proof is a typical fallacy according to Pragma-Dialectics (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 1992) but, in this case, I argue that Hohn is rather realizing a strategic maneuvering (van Eemeren & Houtlosser 2002, 2005). When arguers maneuver strategically they attempt to win the discussion without detaching from the rules guaranteeing the reasonableness of the discussion, i.e. without committing fallacies. Strategic maneuvering foresees specific tasks in each of the four stages of critical discussion. In the *confrontation stage* « each party will attempt to achieve a definition of the disagreement that favors the issues each of the parties wants to discuss and the positions each of them would like to assume », while in the opening stage each party aims at « establishing the most workable starting points and the most opportune allocation of the burden of proof » (van Eemeren & Houtlosser 2002: 138).

In the *confrontation stage*, Hohn expresses his standpoint as an implication of one of the two possible answers to his question: are you still in the position of accepting a higher offer? If the answer is "no", the breach of fiduciary duty is entailed.

This strategy allows Hohn to remain coherent with the conditions imposed by the investor/analyst conference call as a specific activity type. Hohn, in fact, is not speaking at the shareholder meeting, where shareholders have the right to go up the stage and express their opinion about managers' behavior. Conference calls only foresee questions to which managers should answer. In this way, Hohn manages to force Groenink to justify his decision, while remaining a questioner and keeping so a prudent approach.

In the *opening stage*, Hohn shifts the burden of proof entirely on the side of Groenink without violating the *burden-of-proof rule*[11]. In order to do this, he exploits the ontology of the principal-agent relationship[12], typical of this interaction field, imposing managers to show that the proposal they are advancing is indeed the one maximizing shareholder value. Managers (the agent), in fact, are held to run the company in the best interests of the principal, being in this case shareholders, as owners of the firm. This is even more compelling in M&As, as the target of the offer, and so the final decision makers, are shareholders. This move is also perfectly consistent with the constraints imposed by the activity type. Unlike press conferences, analysts/investors conference calls are conceived for a type of audience which can be highly involved at the personal level by the object dealt by the conference. For example, presidential press conferences can certainly be characterized by very adversar-

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[11] Rule 2 (The burden-of-proof rule): A party who puts forward a standpoint is obliged to defend it if asked to do so.

[12] An agency relationship occurs when a subject (the principal) engages another subject (the agent) to perform some services on his/her behalf. Agency Theory, particularly developed within financial economics theory (Ross 1973; Jensen 1976), considers the principal-agent relationship, in particular the shareholder-manager relation within public corporations, by stressing the potential conflict of interests, called the agency problem, deriving from the non-alignment between the agent's personal goals and his/her commitments towards the principal, established by the contract ruling their relationship.

ial questions (cf. Clayman & Heritage 2002), especially from journalists adhering to a different political party. Moreover, journalists are also citizens, thus the main stakeholders of the government's policies. However, when performing their job, we would expect journalists to be impartial and able to separate their personal concerns from their professional duties. The same does not apply with the categories of investors and analysts. By definition, investors hold, potentially or actually, shares in the company, so becoming owners. Analysts, especially buy-side ones, are in a similar position. Therefore, the intervention by shareholders of the firm organizing the conference has not to be considered absolutely out of context but, on the opposite, a natural entailment of this specific context of interaction.

The assumption that managers hold the implicit burden of proving their good conduct finds support in the way in which Hohn's request is replied (B.2.1., B.2.2.). The main concern both by Barclays CEO, John Varley (the first to reply though not directly interrogated by Hohn), and by ABN AMRO CEO, seems to be that of showing the expediency of their decisions for shareholders and that the price paid by BofA for LaSalle is really expedient.

We observe that Groenink and Varley never mention the RBS Consortium's bid. Groenink's first reply («I don't know of any such bid») clearly indicates the strategy adopted by the management: ignoring the RBS Consortium bid and showing the objective expediency of the sale of LaSalle, which works as argument for supporting the standpoint that the Board maximized shareholder value. Here, a fallacious move can be identified. While it could certainly be true that the price paid for LaSalle by BofA has been the highest possible (and so the one maximizing shareholder value), this is not the point raised by Hohn. Hohn's accusation was that the Board failed in preventing a deal with RBS, of which the cancellation of LaSalle is only an implication. In other words, if the sale of LaSalle to BofA prevents the possibility of realizing a better merger, such sale ceases to be expedient as it provides a minor benefit at the expenses of a major benefit (the deal with RBS). Instead of discussing whether or not the LaSalle sale is a poison pill, Groenink and Varley reduce the expediency of the whole transaction to a *local* expediency, deriving from the high price paid by BofA. It is a clear instance of the *fallacy secundum quid et simpliciter*, which occurs «when a property inhering to one part or aspect is generalized to the whole entity» (Rigotti 2005: 9).

The managers' replies can be considered unsound from the perspective of reasonable argumentation, as they ignore relevant factors concerned by the issue under discussion (cf. Rigotti & Greco 2005: 27-36 for the traits characterizing the reasonable approach of argumentation and Rigotti, Rocci, Greco 2006, for an in-depth semantic analysis of the concept of reasonableness). In pragma-dialectical terms, such move can be interpreted as a violation Rule 4 of critical discussion[13], which states that argumentation should be related to the standpoints actually advanced.

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[13] Rule 4 (The relevance rule): A party may defend his/her standpoint only by advancing argumentation related to that standpoint.

We can now summarize the different strategies adopted by the two parties as follows:

– Hohn's main strategy is to force managers to argumentatively justify their conduct by exploiting the rules and commitments of the interaction field. In doing this, he avoids to directly attack the interlocutors, remaining attached to the rules governing the interaction scheme – questioning rather than asserting.

– Groenink's strategy mainly consists of focusing on a partial aspect of the deal negotiated, the sale of LaSalle, and showing its expediency for shareholders.

6. *Conclusive remarks*

In the context of M&A deals corporate managers are committed to support their proposal with adequate reasons. The example I have illustrated is interesting in several aspects.

Firstly, it shows that managers are inevitably expected to do something more than disclosing information. Since they are proposing a transaction, they are required to show the expediency of their proposal. In pragma-dialectical terms, managers implicitly assume the role of protagonist in a critical discussion.

Secondly, the participants can be directly involved in the transaction, especially when the questioner is a shareholder, phenomenon that is not expected to occur in traditional press conferences.

In this paper I limited myself to analyze a single case. However, as numerous further examples might show, similar situations are not rare in investors/analysts conference calls. Participants' involvement in the subject of discussion makes analysts/investors conferences a particular type of communicative interaction that clearly differs from traditional press conferences. Further investigation is required for studying more in depth the dialogues in conference calls in contrast with press conferences occurring both in the financial context and in other social contexts, like politics, sport, and entertainment.

The example analyzed also showed the strict relation between argumentation and its context (cf. Rigotti 2006). The specific traits of the activity type in which the discussion takes place impose constraints to the parties' argumentative moves but can also be exploited by discussants for maneuvering strategically.

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ARGUMENTATIVE DIALOGUE IN SCIENCE, PHILOSOPHY AND LITERATURE

"THESE DATA EMPHASIZE A ROLE FOR TREG CELLS, BUT DO NOT ELIMINATE THE POSSIBILITY THAT...": A TEXTUAL STUDY OF CONNECTIVES IN SCIENTIFIC DISCOURSE

DAVIDE MAZZI

1. *Introduction*

This paper arises from the spate of interest for the pragmatic and textual aspects of argumentation in the last few decades. In his accurate chronological reconstruction of post-World War II developments of argumentation studies, Plantin (2005: 15) talks about a *moment logico-linguistique* [logico-linguistic stage] in which scholars paid increasing attention to the cognitive mechanisms underlying argumentation (Grize 1990 and 1996) as well as to the discursive implementation of argumentative chains. In this respect, emphasis has been laid on key-constituents of argumentative discourse such as connectives.

These elements have been analysed from a wide range of perspectives. For instance, Ducrot (1980) and Maingueneau (2001) explore their polyphonic nature: thus, they observe that connectives like *mais* [but] and *d'ailleurs* [besides] may signal the interplay of the current speaker/writer's voice and other voices in the text. Furthermore, Anscombre & Ducrot (1983) and Plantin (1989 and 1990) point to the centrality of connectives in providing argumentative discourse with a distinct orientation (cf. Anscombre & Ducrot's [1983] example of *au moins* [at least]).

More recently, connectives have been discussed as members of the broader category of auxiliary argumentative lexis. Stati (1998 and 2002) elegantly argues that connectives act as effective argumentative operators shedding light on the argumentative roles – e.g. Explanation, Justification, Acknowledgment and Refutation – performed by speakers/writers in the articulation of argumentative textual sequences. In addition, connectives have been studied within specialised discourse: more specifically, Bondi (2004) carries out extensive surveys on the use of connectives in academic discourse. Her results show that these tools are central in marking textual cornerstones of disciplinary argumentation such as the interweaving of discourse and counter-discourse.

Studies like Bondi (2004) succeed in developing full-relief analyses of connectives in academic discourse by reason of their narrowly-focussed genre-based viewpoint. Genre is defined by Swales (1990: 58) as a class of communicative events exhibiting homogenous patterns in terms of communicative purpose, parent discourse community, content, structure, style and intended audience. Academic genres – most of all abstracts and research articles – have been thoroughly investigated by means of representative corpora, namely large collections of authentic data gathered in electronic form according to a specific set of criteria (Bowker & Pearson 2002; Hunston 2002).

By drawing on the rich mess of studies reviewed above, this paper aims to carry out a corpus-based study of connectives in scientific discourse. The investigation will focus on a single genre, notably research articles (RAs), in order to spell out the main textual and argumentative functions of connectives. Section 2 clarifies the criteria for corpus design and methodological choices, whereas Section 3 presents the main findings of the study: in particular, evidence will stress the significance of connectives in signalling the basic stages of the writer's argument, e.g. the presentation of findings and authorial evaluation at large. Reference is thus made to Hunston & Thompson's (2000: 5) notion of evaluation as the set of linguistic tools through which writers express their attitude towards or feelings about the entities they are writing about, mainly in terms of varying degrees of desirability (the good/bad axis). Finally, results are discussed in Section 4, where suggestions for further research are provided as well.

2. *Materials and methods*

The study is based on a small synchronic corpus of scientific research articles from ten specialised journals. These well-established publications were chosen by means of chiefly endogenous criteria, since they were recommended by the Staff of the Ph.D. School in Clinical and Experimental Medicine of the University of Modena and Reggio Emilia (Italy)[1]. The corpus is comprised of 140 texts, and it amounts to 510,253 words. Research articles cover a homogenous time span as they were all collected from the June-September 2007 issues of journals. In addition, the full running text of RAs was considered, with the exception of the following elements: author name/s, outline, images, notes, tables and graphs, captions, authors' contributions, acknowledgments, references and abbreviations.

As regards methodology, the paper combines quantitative and qualitative procedures. From a quantitative point of view, the linguistic software package *Wordsmith Tools 3.0* (Scott 1998) was used, in order to create a frequency wordlist for the reference corpus. The ten most frequent connectives were identified in the list: these elements served as the object of analysis and they were concordanced[2] in order to be qualitatively studied in context (Sinclair 1991 and 2003).

Connectives were thus investigated in order to find out their main textual and argumentative functions. In that regard, analysis availed itself of some key-tenets of Sinclair's

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[1] Selected publications include the following journals: *British Journal of Dermatology* (BJD); *Journal of the American Academy of Dermatology* (JAAD); *Nature Medicine* (NM); *Blood Cells, Molecules and Diseases* (BCMD); *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States* (PNAS); *Blood* (BL); *Cancer Research* (CR); *British Journal of Haematology* (BJH); *Artificial Organs* (AO); *Proteome Science* (PS); *Clinical Chemistry* (CC); *Journal of Pharmaceutical and Biomedical Analysis* (JPBA); *Science* (SC); *Current Opinion in Genetics and Development* (COGD).

[2] Concordance is also a computer-assisted tool provided by *Wordsmith Tools 3.0*. It enables researchers to enter a search word or phrase, which is automatically retrieved by the programme in all its corpus occurrences and displayed in context.

(1996 and 1998) studies on units of meaning, and in particular on the phraseological tendency of words to go together in order to create meaning. In the upcoming Section 3, therefore, recourse is made to the notions of collocation – i.e. the frequent co-occurrence of words – and colligation, intended as the regular co-occurrence of grammatical phenomena. In order to strengthen the qualitative component of analysis, finally, for all connectives whose frequency is >100, only a random sample of a hundred occurrences was taken into account.

3. *Results*

The quantitative survey of corpus data anticipated in Section 2 highlighted the following ten items as the most frequent connectives:

Table I: *Top-ten connectives and related raw frequency*

Connectives	Freq.	Connectives	Freq.
But	770	*Thus*	284
However	567	*Since*	105
Because	434	*Furthermore*	91
Although	374	*Moreover*	79
Therefore	284	*Yet*	32

At the outset, connectives listed in Table I[3] could be grouped into semantically homogeneous categories, e.g. *but* and *however* as adversative connectives, *although* as a concessive element, *therefore* and *thus* as inferential connectives. However, the corpus-based analysis of the ten elements above transcended the boundaries of these deterministic and *a priori* classifications, since it was aimed at disclosing the broader textual and argumentative functions of connectives in the scientific genre of interest here. In the upcoming sub-sections (3.1-3.4), these functions are reviewed and illustrated with examples, and connectives are grouped exclusively on the basis of the functional closeness revealed by corpus data. Findings are then discussed in Section 4.

3.1 *However*, *but* and *although*: connectives as a key to explanations, dialogic objection-responses and gaps in knowledge

The first function that may be associated with connectives is that of introducing explanatory remarks into research reports. This occurs when researchers observe findings that exhibit one

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[3] For the sake of clarity, it must be specified that for both *since* and *yet*, figures only refer to argumentative usages. Frequency counts do not include cases where the two elements occur as prepositions / temporal adverbials, since the analytical focus of the paper is on the argumentative role of connectives.

trend, while at the same time noting that under certain circumstances there are hints of opposing tendencies. This applies to 41 per cent of the attested occurrences of *however* and to 19 per cent of those of *but*. In this case, connectives are often followed by verbs such as *indicate*, *show*, *suggest*, *hypothesise* as well as nouns like *interpretation*, which all contribute to expressing the writer's explanation for the divergent paths evidence seems to take, as in (1) and (2) below[4]:

1) […] the MPP pool does not exhibit an age-related accumulation of T-compromised cells; **however**, aged MPPs give rise to fewer T progeny. *The simplest interpretation of these data is that* T-compromised HSCs do not transition to the downstream MPP pool, and the smaller burst size of T-competent HSCs is also reflected in their MPP progeny. (BL)

2) The patients presented in this study had mild to severe renal involvement with haematuria and glomerular thrombi. The mutagenesis study suggests that the mutation in patient 1 enabled synthesis of ADAMTS13 **but** secretion and activity were impaired […]. *We hypothesise that* the presence of ADAMTS13 in the glomeruli may be a protective mechanism against platelet plug formation under the high-shear conditions of the glomerular circulation, and lack of secreted ADAMTS13, as in certain TTP mutations, could thus promote formation of thrombi. (BJH)

At a deeper level, the clear dialogic connotation of *but* is indeed noteworthy. In 37 per cent of its occurrences, the connective is embedded in a pattern "P but Q" (cf. Maingueneau 2001: 58), where P and Q are two different, let alone competing voices the writer takes into account, in order to weigh up findings and underlying factors more effectively. This peculiarly dialogic use of *but* may be observed in (3) below:

3) […] we tested GA treatment in STAT6-deficient mice, which do not generate IL-4-secreting TH2 cells26. GA treatment reversed EAE and was associated with induction of Treg cells, but not TH2 cells (Fig. 6d). Like other results42, these data emphasize a role for Treg cells, **but** do not eliminate the possibility that both TH2 and Treg cells contribute substantially to the therapeutic effect of GA in EAE and MS. (NM)

The dialogic dimension enlightened by connectives is also confirmed in the stages of research articles, in which authors respond to potential objections. The author's counter-discourse is signalled by *but* and *however* in 13 and 7 per cent of the respective occurrences, whereas the other voice projected into text and eventually refuted by the writer is often indicated by the modal *may* acting as a "signal of dialogic text" (Thompson 2001: 65):

4) The retention times of d-limonene and IS were approximately 4.2 and 4.5 min, respectively. Naphthalane was selected as the internal standard for its similarity in the retention and extraction recovery to those of d-limonene. Other candidate compound (e.g. limonene-d2 that is much closer in struc-

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[4] In all examples reported in the paper, connectives are written in bold and underlined, whereas relevant collocational items are italicised and underlined.

ture to the analyte) *may* also be used as IS. **But** it is unstable and expensive. (JPBA)

Authorial responses to arguments which may be addressed to the research reported, typically in critical terms, may also be foregrounded by *although*. This concerns 47 per cent of its entries. Interestingly, in 21/47 (i.e. 44.7 per cent), *although* is used in order to concede that the study suffers from limitations, since it may have over-simplified a problem (cf. 4 below) or by reason of downsides in the selection of patients serving as a sample (5). Nonetheless, this does not prevent the researcher from stressing the genuine contribution provided by the paper to knowledge in the field – see "it provides a reasonable starting point …" (5) and "these results indicate that screening […] may have clinical importance" (6):

5) The goal is to recover, given just the sequence of vowel tokens, the number of Gaussians, the parameters of each Gaussian and the respective mixing probabilities. **Although** this formulation simplifies the learning problem, *it provides a reasonable starting point* because the vowel spectra for a population of speakers tend to have Gaussian distributions when projected into a 2D space (29). (PNAS)

6) One additionally later developed myelodysplasia with monosomy 7; one third of SDS patients eventually develop chromosome 7 abnormalities during the course of their disease,1 and monosomy 7 also is the most common cytogenetic abnormality in patients with acquired AA.23 Two patients have died. **Although** the number of patients is small, *these results indicate that screening* patients with acquired AA, especially young patients, *may have clinical importance* to determine therapeutic options. (BL)

Finally, a major function ascribed to the first group of connectives considered so far is to indicate gaps in knowledge previous studies might have left open. In this respect, *however* and *but* mostly occur in introductory sections: in 33 and 8 per cent of their occurrences respectively, they are used for the purpose of establishing a niche (cf. Swales 1990 and 2004) in the relevant research territory. As this is the case, these connectives arguably act as lexical signals that transform RA introductions into the initiating stage of Problem-Solution patterns (Hoey 2001) unfolding in the rest of the article. The writer points to inadequacies of past research in order to motivate the publication of fresh and original results. The emergence of a gap in knowledge as the underlying factor of the current publication is well exemplified in an introductory fragment from the Journal of the American Academy of Dermatology reported in (7) below:

7) The development of cutaneous AS in the setting of radiation therapy has been well described in the literature.[5], [6], [7], [8], [20], [22], [23], [27], [28], [31], [32], [35], [39] and [42]. **However**, the natural history, potential precursor lesions, and definitive histologic and clinical features to differentiate AVL from well-differentiated AS *have yet to be fully elucidated*. (JAAD)

3.2 *Because* and *since*: connectives as a key to the discussion of results

The two inter-related connectives *because* and *since* are evenly distributed across the Results and the Discussion sections of research articles. They both appear to play a significant role in the presentation of findings as well as the related discussion. First of all, data show that *because* and *since* are involved in evaluative statements (Hunston & Thompson 2000) in 23.3 and 28.8 per cent of the respective corpus occurrences.

As a result, writers employ them in order to unveil cause-effect relations and to formulate more or less tentative interpretations about the empirical evidence they collected. In this respect, the researcher's cautious and circumspect attitude is testified by the colligation of connectives with hedgers (Hyland 1998 and 2005) – e.g. *possibly*, *probably* and *presumably* for *because* (13.3 per cent of its occurrences altogether), and *probably*, *appears to be ...*, *it is likely that ...* and *can be interpreted as ...* for *since* (28.8 per cent). Alternatively, *because* also colligates with verbs characterised by differing degrees of authorial self-assertion (*hypothesise*, *speculate*, *suggest*, *interpret*, *view* and *conclude*). In (8), (9) and (10) below, the collocational remarks discussed in the paragraph are shown at work:

> 8) Only during further evolution the patterning employing adjacent cells became more dominant, *possibly* **because** this enforces directly a mutual alignment of adjacent cells. (COGD)

> 9) The positive and significant D value *can be interpreted* as balancing selection (heterozygote advantage) [11] **since** in Southeast Asia there are common selective forces (malaria) increasing some pathologies such as hemoglobin E, a and ß thalassemia [16] or population subdivision [17] [...] (BCMD)

> 10) **Since** egl-20/Wnt mutants have the strongest HSN migration defect and **since** EGL-20 forms a posterior-to-anterior concentration gradient, EGL-20/Wnt *probably* acts as a repellent for the HSN neurons, with the other two posteriorly expressed Wnts, LIN-44 and CWN-1, contributing to this effect (Figure 3a). (COGD)

In second place, the evaluation of results may rely on larger patterns, the most prominent of which can be summarised as follows:

> This/These + signalling noun (e.g. *property*, *feature*, *discrepancy*) + *because* ...

This phraseology occurs when the writer discusses results presented earlier on, by encapsulating them[5] through a signalling noun (Flowerdew 2003), an apparently empty signifier like *property* or, at a deeper evaluative level, *discrepancy*: this is in turn followed by the writer's

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[5] Sinclair (1993: 8) uses the term "encapsulation" in order to designate an anaphoric cohesive phenomenon which makes sure that the semantically relevant aspects of prior textual materials are retained and condensed into a single word or phrase of the upcoming sentence.

motivation/justification introduced with *because*. The pattern accounts for 10 per cent of the occurrences of *because*, and it is instantiated in (11) below:

11) Our most pertinent findings are presented in Figs. 1-5. In general, good concordance between KLK transcript and protein concentrations was observed; in some cases, however, [...]. *These discrepancies* are *most likely* due to degradation of KLK proteins, or **because** KLKs are secreted and therefore may not be present in high abundance in cytosols where their concentrations were measured. (CC)

Finally, connectives may back up an evaluation of empirical findings in terms of desirability (Hunston & Thompson 2000), i.e. by means of statements which develop along the good/bad axis, as it were. In (12) and (13) below, an example is reported of positive and negative evaluation respectively:

12) This interaction between de-aeration method and sampling device is only evident when the teflon coated paddle is used; if the solid teflon paddle is used f2 is higher for sampling device A regardless of which de-aeration method is employed. These marginally statistically significant results, however, are *of little practical consequence* **since** f2 values were >61 across all experimental conditions. (JPBA)

13) Occlusive dressing is one of the innovations in recent decades when treating chronic wounds instead of removing healthy granulation tissues by unnecessary frequent debridement and/or by cleansing.8 If we use a clear film for occlusive dressing, the wound bed condition can be more readily checked through it. *This is important* **since** aggressive debridement is not always effective to treat intractable wounds, especially when treating patients with pyoderma gangrenosum and CUA. (JAAD)

3.3 *Moreover* and *furthermore*: connectives in concluding remarks

The use of connectives in the discussion and overall evaluation of findings may be extended to two further elements, i.e. *moreover* and *furthermore*. In spite of the relative functional homogeneity one may note between the two and those discussed in 3.2 above – i.e. *because* and *since* – *moreover* and *furthermore* have been kept in a separate section above all for distributional reasons. In this respect, they were found to display a marked preference for the concluding section of research articles – namely Discussion or Discussion and Conclusion – where they occur in 65.8 (*moreover*) and 57.2 per cent (*furthermore*) respectively.

To begin with, the two connectives tend to share the same colligational company, as it were. They frequently co-occur with verbal forms characterised by increasing degrees of commitment to the proposition they govern – notably *would support the inference that ...*, *speculate*, *suggest*, *indicate*, *point to*, *show* and *demonstrate* for *moreover*; *leads us to hypothesise*, *propose*, *call for*, *suggest*, *argue*, *provide evidence for ...* and *demonstrate* for *furthermore*.

In addition, there is a high degree of colligational attraction between the connectives and evaluative adjectives / adverbials (*relevant*, *crucial*, *of interest*, *definitive [evidence]*, *reasonable* and *interestingly* for *moreover*; *of great benefit to the field*, *simple*, *attractive*, *important*, *reliable*, *fragile*, *time-consuming*, *significantly*, *undoubtedly*, *curiously*, *efficiently* for *furthermore*). As can be seen from the sequences, evaluative elements mainly describe different levels of desirability (positive v. negative) expressed by writers with respect to the results they are commenting.

On the whole, the colligational surroundings documented above show that *moreover* and *furthermore* predominantly occur in averrals where the writer restates significant results presented earlier on, thus preparing the ground for the discussion of their most relevant implications. This very often takes the form of highly reflexive statements[6] such as those in (14) and (15) below:

14) Physiologic role of p68/p72. The fact that p68 and p72 are involved in the regulation of oncogenes (c-Myc, cyclin D1, fra-1, and c-jun) suggested that they could affect cell proliferation. And indeed, down-regulating p68/p72 in RKO colon cancer cells severely compromised their ability to proliferate (Fig. 6A). **Moreover**, we found changes in cell morphology with the appearance of round bodies that may represent cell carcasses indicative of apoptosis (Fig. 6B). *These data strongly suggest* that p68 and p72 are required for efficient proliferation of colon cancer cells. (CR)

15) In functional concordance with hypermethylation, AKAP12 was transcriptionally silenced in Kasumi-1 and SKNO-1 myeloblasts. **Moreover**, AKAP12 expression was restored by treatment with a histone deacetylase inhibitor (MS275) alone or in combination with a DNMT inhibitor (zebularine), further supporting the importance of epigenetic modifications to transcriptional regulation at this locus. *The results* presented here *fit well with a widely accepted model of* epigenetic gene regulation (Cameron et al, 1999) in which CpG methylation and histone acetylation act as synergistic layers [...]. (BJH)

Reading through examples in more detail, the collocational regularities observed for the two connectives can give rise to the frequently reiterated pattern summarised below:

A. *Moreover/Furthermore*, B. [*Thus/Therefore*] *these data / results + indicate / provide definitive evidence / strongly suggest that ...*

In the pattern, A and B stand for highly-valued results authors want to stress in the final section of research articles. These results are joined by either *moreover* or *furthermore*, and then closely followed by the author's evaluative voice along the colligational guidelines clar-

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[6] Lucy (1993: 1) talks about the reflexive capacity of language in terms of the latter's capability "to represent its own structure and use, including the everyday meta-linguistic activities of reporting, characterizing, and commenting on speech". In the present case, reflexive statements are taken to be averrals through which writers reflect upon and evaluatively reconsider the results they are presenting.

ified above. A further example of the pattern at work is provided in (16) below for the reader's convenience:

16) […] the HSN neurons migrate too far anteriorly in animals with a mutation in cam-1, which encodes an orthologue of the receptor tyrosine kinase Ror […]. **Furthermore**, similar to mutation of egl-20/Wnt, overexpression of CAM-1 causes a premature stop of HSN migration […]. _These results suggest an attractive model_ in which the posterior-to-anterior spreading of EGL-20 (and possibly other Wnt proteins such as CWN-1 and LIN-44) is counteracted by CAM-1, which may act as a sink for Wnt. (COGD)

3.4 _Thus_ and _therefore_: connectives as signals of inductive and deductive reasoning as well as RA structural recycling

Connectives are among the most typical textual devices that mark the unfolding of authorial reasoning, the step-by-step development of the researcher's line of argument. Even without establishing any systematic link between the use of connectives and peculiar argument forms, it is significant that _thus_ and _therefore_ often signal the writer's recourse to either inductive or deductive reasoning at large. From an inductive viewpoint, _thus_ marks the transition from specific quantitative data to broader generalisations in 67 per cent of its attested occurrences: as this happens, the author proceeds from the circumscribed case(s) to the generalisation in an overall cautious manner. This is corroborated by the collocation of the connective with hedgers such as _may_, _seem to_, _we hypothesised that …_, _it is possible/likely that_, _appears to …_, _the most likely explanation is that …_. This aspect also applies to _therefore_ (36 per cent), and it is illustrated in (17) below:

17) MYC expression was relatively higher _(P < 0.1)_ in the FLT3/ITD-positive AML samples compared to non-mutant FLT3 AML (Fig 4A). CCND3 expression _was not significantly higher_ in the FLT3/ITD positive compared to non-mutant FLT3 samples (Fig 4B) […] In addition, there is evidence for autocrine activation of wild-type FLT3 in many other cases of AML and ALL. **Thus**, improving our understanding of how FLT3 signals contribute to leukaemic transformation is important, as it will _probably_ reveal areas that can be therapeutically targeted. Several pathways have been shown to be activated by FLT3 including STAT5, PI3K/AKT and RAS/MAPK. (BJH)

Although considerably less frequent, traces of deductive reasoning associated with connectives may also be retrieved. The reverse case of authors moving from the elicitation of a general trend via factual premises asserted as true to a specific illustrative case is instantiated by the following pattern detected for 18 per cent of the occurrences of _therefore_:

General rule highlighted by _therefore_ + _In other words, … / Consider … / For example, …_

The deductive pattern schematised above is illustrated in (18):

> 18) The rate at which the helix aligns with the gradient direction is ||. **Therefore**, for almost all initial conditions, the system exhibits chemotaxis upwards the gradient if > 0. This behavior is **therefore** robust and does not depend on fine-tuning of parameters. *Consider the case of* a radial concentration field c(x) = C(|x|)... (PNAS)

On a final note, *thus* and *therefore* are also interestingly used as cyclicity markers in the actualisation of RA structure. In the prototypical RA structure (cf. Swales 1990; Swales & Feak 2004), we generally recognise the widely adopted progression from the Methodology to the Results section. In the presentation of results, however, writers may find it useful to go back to, and therefore recycle, the methodological premises introduced beforehand, in order to cast light on the concatenation of findings, their deeply-rooted methodological rationale. The cyclic move from results back to the procedural apparatus of research is signalled by *therefore* and *thus* in 21 and 5 per cent of the respective occurrences. In particular, *therefore* is embedded in the following pattern commonly identified in Results sections:

> R1 → E1. *Therefore, to..., we* + past tense verb / past tense verb in passive voice

The pattern reported above only considers a single hypothetical result (R1) followed by the related evaluation (E1), but it might well be reiterated for as many results as the writer wishes to include in the current research article. After a single result is presented and evaluated, the writer precedes the next finding with a reader-oriented reminder of the procedural justification underlying and justifying it. The writer's step back, as it were, is both signalled by *therefore* and substantiated by the choice of past tense and/or passive voice, two features Swales (1990) empirically relates with the methodological section of research articles. The pattern summarised above is exemplified in (19) below:

> 19) The luciferase gene in this construct is fused to the mini-tau gene and is in-frame only when exon 10 is spliced out (Fig. 2C). This system provided a particularly attractive model for testing our results, as it has previously been shown that overexpression of splicing factors SRp20, SRp40, and SRp55 significantly increased the exclusion of exon 10 from the construct (16). **Therefore**, *to evaluate* alternative splicing activity after DNA damage, *we transfected* LucM14 into the U2OSAS, UOSE64b, HCT116, and HCT116 p53-/- cell lines. Transfected cells *were treated* with mitomycin C, and luciferase activity in treated versus untreated cells was compared. (CR)

4. *Conclusions*

The findings in section 3 show that connectives act as pervasive linguistic tools in research articles, the genre that has the lion's share in specialised scientific communication (Swales

1990). The centrality of connectives is proved by their distribution across all RA sections – e.g. *however* in introductions (section 3.1) and *moreover* in Discussion and Conclusions (3.3) – but also by the rich repertoire of textual and argumentative functions they serve.

In this respect, the paper provided further textual basis to sound intuitions of linguistic research, i.e. the role of *therefore* as a signal of inferential reasoning, both inductive and deductive (section 3.4), and the dialogic function that *but* takes on in some of its occurrences (3.1). But most of all, analysis enlightened key-aspects of connectives that might be overlooked in less detailed surveys failing to rely on small yet representative corpora. For instance, it was interesting to draw the attention to the peculiar use of *moreover* and *furthermore* within phraseology through which the writer effectively prepares the way for a critical discussion and evaluation of findings (3.3). Furthermore, evidence pointed to *therefore* as a discursive signpost of cyclic moves from results back to methodological underpinnings discussed in 3.4.

Connectives were therefore observed to be outstanding textual cornerstones in two main respects. First of all, in their tendency to orient the intended readership through the author's scientific argument, thus making crucial argumentative passages clear and explicit. Secondly, by consequence, in their capability of providing research reports with a skilful argumentative construction in order to turn RAs into cunningly crafted rhetorical products.

This paper finally leaves room for potentially fruitful future research. At a more specific level, some of the recurrent patterns discussed above may be further investigated. For instance, This/These + signalling noun (e.g. *property*, *feature*, *discrepancy*) + *because* could be analysed in more detail within larger multi-disciplinary corpora, in order to find out how often the embedded signalling noun is an evaluative element expressing the writers' attitude in terms of desirability or modality (Hunston & Thompson 2000).

At a more general level, the analytical model proposed here for connectives could be extended to larger comparative studies, in either cross-linguistic or cross-disciplinary terms. From this point of view, cross-linguistic studies should ideally concern English and languages that still retain high academic credibility at least within their national contexts, e.g. French. On the other hand, cross-disciplinary examinations may keep a relatively homogeneous profile, by concentrating on similarities and contrasts in connective usage within the hard sciences (e.g. engineering v. computer technology, medicine v. biology, however fuzzy epistemological boundaries might sometimes seem). Such research undertakings would help refine our knowledge of connectives and other central discourse markers alike.

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La Notion de 'pratique' dans des dialogues de sujet scientifique au XVIe siècle

Maria Teresa Zanola

Le dialogue est une structure rhétorique utilisée dans la présentation de la matière scientifique et philosophique, un lieu idéal pour la discussion dialectique de notions et de faits. La conversation fictive – et celle de ce type de dialogue se veut apparemment artificielle – y est reproduite comme s'il s'agissait d'un échange réel, permettant d'exposer des controverses de manière plus efficace par rapport à ce qu'un traité ne pourrait faire.

Il est intéressant d'observer l'essor du dialogue dans l'histoire du texte scientifique français, qui a pour finalité la discussion théorique et la mise en commun des connaissances. Son emploi a été développé au cours des siècles XVe et XVIe, pour s'arrêter au XVIIe siècle avec les œuvres de Galilée et de Hobbes.

Le dialogue à la Renaissance est un genre "polymorphe, un genre-frontière, insaisissable" remarque Anne Godard: "le dialogue peut traiter toutes les questions philosophiques, de la plus spéculative à la plus pratique, de la science à la morale" (2001: 6-7). Au cours du XVIe siècle il s'ouvre même à des essais de théorisation, tels que les ouvrages de Sperone Speroni, l'*Apologia dei dialogi* (1574), et du Tasse, *Dell'arte del dialogo* (1585). Les commentateurs de la *Poétique* d'Aristote étudient le genre du dialogue: il suffit de penser à la P*oetica d'Aristotele vulgarizzata e sposta* (1570) de Lodovico Castelvetro, les *Annotationi nel libro della poetica d'Aristotele* (1575) d'Alessandro Piccolomini, *L'Organe, c'est à dire l'instrument du discours* (1589) de Philippe Canaye, traducteur de l'*Organon*. "Dans un contexte où l'influence d'Aristote est d'une importance considérable pour la réflexion générique" rappelle Véronique Montagne (2004: 1) dans une étude sur le dialogue philosophique du XVIe siècle, "les théoriciens du genre profitent des analyses des *Topiques* ou encore d'une remarque tirée de la *Poétique* pour légitimer un genre que le philosophe avait écarté de ses préoccupations et pour rendre compte de ses caractéristiques formelles"[1].

Le dialogue de vulgarisation scientifique se situe dans la filière du dialogue philosophique, avec des caractères typiques du dialogue de la tradition platonicienne, et partage le point de vue méthodologique du dialogue didactique (Zanola 2008a: 152).

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[1] Parmi les commentateurs d'Aristote, Montagne cite aussi les *Partitionum dialecticarum libri duo Joannis Sturmii* parues en 1539, à Paris, chez Chrestien Wechel, puis présentées par Valentin Erythraeus dans les *Tabulae Valentini Erythraei, in quatuor dialecticarum partitionum Joannis Sturmii* (1561), dont le dernier chapitre contient des considérations sur le genre du dialogue.

Grâce au dialogue, l'orateur peut faire appel à un moyen de conversation plus agréable, le savant évite les difficultés dues à des modalités plus austères d'exposition et il peut faire des digressions et des reprises.

C'est grâce au dialogue qu'au XVIᵉ siècle Bernard Palissy transmet à un public plus vaste une matière qui l'intéresse, concernant la paléontologie, l'hydrologie, la géologie, la physiologie végétale. L'*Architecture et ordonnance de la grotte rustique* (1563), la *Recepte Veritable* (1563), les *Discours Admirables* (1580), pour citer les dialogues principaux, facilitent l'accès au savoir scientifique de l'auteur. Palissy organise son discours donnant la voix à deux personnes, dont "l'une demandera, l'autre respondra". C'est la prémisse de l'*Architecture et ordonnance de la grotte rustique* (I, 13) aussi bien que de la *Recepte veritable* (I, 58):

> Pour avoir plus facile intelligence du present discours, nous le traiterons en forme de dialogue, auquel nous introduirons deux personnes, l'une demandera, l'autre respondra, comme s'ensuit.

Cameron (1990: 141) observe les avantages d'avoir adopté le dialogue, qui rend l'argumentation de Palissy plus simple à suivre, permettant de prévenir les critiques et de comparer deux points de vue: "Cette nouvelle présentation est non seulement plus vivante mais plus 'scientifique'. Elle a encore un atout, elle englobe le lecteur dans la discussion. Même après quatre cents ans, nous sommes toujours sensibles à la force des arguments de Palissy".

Nous allons illustrer, à titre d'exemple, la discussion autour de la notion de 'pratique' opposée à celle de 'théorie', pour mettre en évidence la force des arguments des tenants des deux parties opposées[2].

1. *Les participants au dialogue*

Palissy est un autodidacte qui affirme ne connaître ni le grec ni le latin: il se veut un esprit libre capable de contester le savoir des Anciens, dont il attaque le dogme d'infaillibi-

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[2] Une brève note sur la vie de Palissy, d'après la biographie restituée par Dupuis en 1894 (3-69). Né en 1510 à Agen, Palissy a vécu à Saintonge depuis 1539, où il a commencé ses travaux d'artiste comme verrier. De 1536 à 1556, il a consacré sa vie à connaître le secret des émaux, transmettant son art à ses fils et à de nombreux disciples. Son activité d'arpenteur-géomètre a continué pendant les années de persécution religieuse : il a été incarcéré à la Conciergerie de Bordeaux à la fin de l'année 1562, accusé d'avoir participé aux troubles fomentés par les huguenots de Saintes en mai. Entre 1566 et 1571, il a construit pour Catherine de Médicis une grotte en poterie vernissée pour le jardin du château des Tuileries, dont il a donné une description très précise dans l'*Architecture et ordonnance de la grotte rustique de Mgr le duc de Montmorancy*. Après la Saint-Barthélemy (1572), il s'est réfugié à Sedan où il a vécu avec sa famille jusqu'en 1576, continuant son activité de céramiste-décorateur. Parallèlement, il s'est consacré à la rédaction des *Discours admirables*, publiés en 1580 à Paris. Emprisonné de décembre 1586 à janvier 1587, Palissy est repris par la Ligue (1588) et condamné à être pendu et brûlé. Cette peine commuée, il mourra deux ans plus tard de "faim, nécessité et mauvais traitement: à la Bastille, à 80 ans.

lité. Palissy n'a probablement lu que des livres écrits ou traduits en français; tout au long de son écriture il cite, commente et paraphrase la Bible, et les Psaumes surtout.

Dupuy (1894: 161) souligne que "Palissy ne distingue pas le moyen âge de l'époque romaine ou grecque. Le voile impénétrable du latin enveloppe également pour lui les vrais anciens et leurs compilateurs. De ces compilateurs le premier est Isidore".

Palissy même avoue la nature de sa formation au maréchal de Montmorency:

> Si ces choses ne sont escrites à telle dexterité que vostre grandeur le mérite, il vous plaira me pardonner: ce que j'espère que ferez, veu que je ne suis ne Grec, ne Hébrieu, ne Poete, ne Rhetoricien, ains un simple artisan bien pauvrement instruit aux lettres: ce neantmoins, pour ces causes, la chose de soy n'a pas moins de vertu que si elle estoit tiree d'un homme plus eloquent. J'aime mieux dire verité en mon langage rustique, que mensonge en un langage rhétorique (*Recepte veritable:* I, 48).

Palissy révise tout le savoir par ces analyses d'expérimentateur. Il est conduit par un désir de pragmatisme, qu'il confie à ses deux personnages: *Demande* et *Responce* dans l'*Architecture et ordonnance de la grotte rustique* et dans la *Recepte veritable, Theorique* et *Practique* dans les *Discours admirables*. *Responce* et *Practique* représentent l'auteur et ont toujours le dernier mot.

Dans la *Recepte veritable*, c'est le personnage de *Responce* qui détient le savoir et *Demande* est un adepte de bonne volonté, très lié au savoir traditionnel. *Demande* et *Responce* discutent du projet de la construction d'un jardin, mais avant d'aborder la question, ils s'occupent d'autres sujets: la nécessité de connaissances dans l'agriculture, la présence de sels dans tous les êtres vivants, dans les minéraux et les métaux, la capacité de la terre de générer d'autres pierres.

Demande et *Responce* – les deux interlocuteurs de la *Recepte* – s'insèrent dans la tradition des dialogues de l'instruction religieuse, alors que dans les *Discours Admirables Theorique* et *Practique* font penser aux prises de position adoptées par les hommes de science et les alchimistes à la fin de ce siècle (Cameron 1990: 141).

Dans l'*Architecture et ordonnance de la grotte rustique, Demande* assume le rôle du naïf non saintongeais (il est pourtant bien informé), alors que *Responce* est l'architecte-maçon, admirateur enthousiaste de l'activité de Palissy.

Dans l'ouverture des *Discours*, c'est Palissy qui justifie le choix des deux personnages du dialogue dans son *Advertissement aux lecteurs:*

> Amy lecteur le desir que j'ay que tu prouffites à la lecture de ce livre, m'a incité de t'advertir que tu te donnes garde de enyvrer ton esprit de sciences escriptes aux cabinets par une theorique imaginative ou crochetée de quelque livre escrit par imagination de ceux qui n'ont rien practiqué, & te donne garde de croire les opinions de ceux qui disent & soustiennent que theorique a engendré la practique (*Discours Admirables:* II, 14).

Seule la pratique permet de connaître le réel: Palissy affirme sa position qui se détache nettement des théories platoniciennes, suivant lesquelles il existerait une idée modèle antécédente. Palissy ne suit pas non plus la science nouvelle, qui voudrait accorder théorie et pratique, et il souligne le rôle premier de la pratique.

2. *Le choix de la 'practique'*

Si dans la Recepte on affirme l'importance de l'expérience – les deux personnages de Demande et de Responce ne sont que des porte-paroles –, dans les Discours les attaques contre le savoir transmis sont plus ouvertes: "les Anciens se sont trompés, les théoriciens se trompent, les autres mentent pour se faire valoir… Les lettrés devenus les empêcheurs d'innover et de chercher, sont sommés de se remettre à l'école analogique des choses simples et réelles" (Fragonard 1996: XXVI).

C'est la pratique qui permet de développer la théorie: il faut d'abord imaginer les choses avant de les mettre en œuvre. Palissy met en discussion l'autorité de l'ancien savoir et invite à se méfier de ceux qui affirment que la théorie a engendré la pratique.

> Ceux qui enseignent telle doctrine prennent argument mal fondé, disans qu'il faut imaginer & figurer la chose que l'on veut faire en son esprit, deuant que mettre la chose à sa besongne. Si l'homme pouuait executer ses imaginations, je tiendrois leur party & opinion: mais tant s'en faut, si les choses conceües aux esprits se pouuoyent executer, les souffleurs d'alchimie feroyent de belles choses & ne s'amuseroyent à chercher l'espace de cinquante ans, comme plusieurs ont fait (*Discours Admirables:* II, 15).

Si cela était vrai, les chefs militaires ne perdraient jamais bataille, mais ce n'est que "l'homme bien expert et practicien" qui sait "conduire un navire par tout pays". Par exemple, seules les études des cartes géographiques et des la cosmographie n'aideraient pas l'homme dans sa navigation:

> Si la theorique figurée aux esprits des chefs de guerre se pouuait executer, ils ne perdroyent iamais bataille. J'ose dire à la confusion de ceux qui tiennent telle opinion, qu'ils ne sçauroyent faire un soulier, non pas mesmes un talon de chausse, quand ils auroyent toutes les theoriques du monde. Je demanderois à ceux qui tiennent telle opinion, quand ils auroyent estudié cinquante ans aux livres de Cosmographie et nauigation de la mer, & quand ils auroyent les cartes de toutes regions & le cadran de la mer, le compas & les instruments astronomiques, voudroyent ils pourtant entreprendre de conduire un navire par tout pays, comme fera un homme bien expert & practicien; ils n'ont garde de se mettre en ce danger, quelque theorique qu'ils ayent aprise: & quand ils auront bien disputé, il faudra qu'ils confessent que la practique a engendré la théorique (*Discours Admirables:* II, 15).

Palissy prévient son lecteur pour qu'il soit conscient qu'il est bien possible de "sçavoir quelque chose et parler des effects naturels, sans avoir veu les livres Latins des philosophes":

> Un tel propos peut auoir lieu en mon endroit, puis que par practique je prouve en plusieurs endroits la théorique de plusieurs philosophes fause, mesmes des plus renommez & plus anciens, comme chascun poura voir & entendre en moins de deux heures, moyennant qu'il vueille prendre la peine de venir voir mon cabinet (*Discours Admirables:* II, 15).

Palissy réalise aussi un lieu d'étude et de rencontre où il est possible de découvrir, de visiter, de voir et toucher ce que la pratique met à disposition de la connaissance. L'*Advertissement* des *Discours* se termine par l'invitation à faire visite à cet atelier, sa "petite Académie":

> En cest endroit je suis exempt de telle moquerie; par ce qu'en prouvant mes raisons escrittes, je contente la veüe, l'ouye & l'atouchement: à raison dequoy, les calomniateurs n'auront points lieu en mon endroit: comme tu verras lors que tu me viendras voir en ma petite Academie (*Discours Admirables:* II, 16-17).

L'*Académie* désigne d'abord un lieu d'enseignement, puis le sens devient plus élitiste désignant "une réunion de personnes qui font profession de Belles Lettres, des sciences ou des Beaux Arts" (*Dictionnaire de l'Académie*). Fragonard (1996: II, 17) met en évidence que "Palissy annexe ainsi un terme prestigieux, qui désigne à la fois les réunions des doctes, et le lieu où il est entreposé le matériel de fossiles et curiosités qu'il décrit à la fin de son livre". Celui qui aura la patience d'aller visiter l'atelier de Palissy découvrira "des choses merveilleuses… mises pour tesmoignage et preuve de mes escrits", et pourra apprendre en une seule journée ce qu'il apprendrait autrement au cours de plusieurs années d'études et de lectures.

La philosophie discute le savoir relatif aux sciences naturelles, mais ce savoir doit être complété par l'expérience. C'est pourquoi Palissy veut prendre ses distances des philosophes livresques, ou des alchimistes, qui n'ont aucune observation du réel. Dans la *Recepte veritable* (I, 54) Palissy donnait déjà des conseils de formation: "Je te prie instruire les laboureurs, qui ne sont literez, à ce qu'ils ayent songneusement à s'estudier en la Philosophie naturelle, suivant mon conseil". Il imagine son savoir tel qu'un chauderon, où l'expérience est l'ingrédient principal:

> PRACTIQUE – Veux tu que je te dise le livre des Philosophes, où j'ay appris ces beaux secrets? ce n'a esté qu'un chauderon à demy plein d'eau, lequel en bouillant quant l'eau estoit un peu asprement poussée par la chaleur du cul du chauderon, elle se souslevoit jusques par-dessus ledit chauderon: & cela ne se pouvoit faire qu'il n'y eust quelque vent engendré dedans l'eau par la vertu du feu, d'autant que le chauderon n'estoit à demy plein d'eau quand elle estoit froide, & estoit plein quand elle estoit chaude (*Des eaux et fontaines:* II, 44-45).

Toute démonstration commence par la nécessité de contredire le savoir qui n'est pas fondé sur l'expérience. Dans sa théorie sur l'eau, Palissy décrit deux types d'eau, l'eau commune –

l'eau de pluie –, et l'eau dite *congélative*, susceptible de se solidifier, telle que l'eau de mer (Zanola 2008b: 176-178). "L'eau est le véhicule des substances dissoutes, qu'il désigne d'abord sous le nom quasi mystérieux de cinquième élément, mais qu'il range par la suite dans la catégorie du sel, *sensu lato*" observe Michel (1951: 21), et ajoute: "Palissy, puisque tout est eau, persistera à dénommer ainsi la plupart des substances à l'état solide, même celles qui, dans leur formule de constitution (qu'il ignorait), sont exemptes de monoxyde d'hydrogène" (1951: 22). Dans le *Traité des métaux et alchimie*, nous pouvons lire un passage où *Practique* résume d'abord ses idées, pour souligner ensuite l'intérêt de son point de vue par rapport aux connaissances précédentes:

> PRACTIQUE – Nous pouvons donques asseurer qu'il y a deux eaux, l'une est exalative & l'autre essencive, congelative & generative, lesquelles deux eaux sont entresmelées l'une parmi l'autre en telle sorte qu'il est impossible les distinguer au paravant que l'une des deux soit congelée (*Traité des métaux et alchimie:* II, 142).

> THEORIQUE – Il y a bien peu d'hommes qui veulent croire ce que tu dis: par ce qu'ils voudront s'arrester aux philosophes antiques.
> PRACTIQUE – Tu diras ce que tu voudras: Mais si est ce, que quand tu auras bien examiné toutes choses par les effets du feu, tu trouveras mon dire veritable, & me confesseras que le commencement & origine de toutes choses naturelles est eau: l'eau generative de la semence humaine & brutale, n'est pas eau commune, l'eau qui cause la germination de tous arbres & plantes, n'est pas eau commune, & combien que nul arbre, ny plante, ny nature humaine, ny brutale, ne sçauroit vivre sans l'ayde de l'eau commune, si est ce que parmi icelle, il y en a une autre germinative congelative, sans laquelle nulle chose ne pouroit dire je suis: c'est celle qui germine tous arbres & plantes, & qui soustient & entretient leur formation jusqu'à la fin (*Ibid*.: 144-145).

Dans le traité *Des pierres*, l'argumentation de *Practique* tourne autour de l'importance de l'expérience, source de connaissance. Ne pas reconnaître sa valeur est une admission d'ignorance, puisqu'il n'y a que la nature qui puisse vraiment être le sujet d'étude principal:

> THEORIQUE – Et où est ce que tu as trouvé cela par escript, ou bien di moy en quelle escole as-tu esté, où tu puisses avoir entendu ce que tu dis?
> PRACTIQUE – Je n'ay point eu d'autre livre que le ciel & la terre, lequel est conneu de tous, & est donné à tous de connoistre à lire ce beau livre (*Traité des pierres:* II, 221).

Nous savons déjà que Palissy avait rassemblé un "cabinet de curiosités" composé d'éléments de minéralogie (Fragonard 1996: 360). A la fin de ses *Discours admirables*, dans la *Copie des escrits*, Palissy rappelle que tout ce qu'il a écrit sur les pierres se fonde sur ce qu'il a observé et trouvé dans la nature: il invite son interlocuteur imaginaire à visiter son Académie parce qu'il y trouvera tout ce qui est décrit dans son ouvrage:

> J'ay mis en ce lieu, en evidence un grand nombre de pierres par lesquelles tu pourras aisément connoistre estre veritables, les raisons & preuves que j'ay mises au traité des pierres. Et si tu n'es du tout alienè de sens, tu le confesseras apres avoir eu la demonstration des pierres naturelles: lesquelles j'a figuré en mon livre, parce que tous ceux qui verront le livre, n'auront pas le moyen de voir ces choses naturelles: mais ceux qui les verront en leurs formes naturelles, seront contrains confesser, qu'il est impossible qu'elles eussent prins les formes qu'elles ont, sans que la matiere eut esté liquide & fluide (*Copie des escrits:* II, 362).

Palissy conclue ses dialogues par un véritable parcours d'exposition, qui lui permet de réviser l'enseignement distribué et le savoir jusque-là illustré. Palissy nous avait prévenu dans son *Advertissement* (II, 16) que dans son cabinet "l'on verra des choses merveilleuses qui sont mises pour tesmoignage & preuve de mes escrits, attachez par ordre ou par estages, avec certains escriteaux au dessouz". En peu d'heures, le visiteur est ainsi mis en mesure d'apprendre "plus de philosophie naturelle [...] que tu ne sçauroit apprendre en cinquante ans, en lisant les theoriques & opinions des philosophes anciens". Un défi séduisant.

3. *Conclusion*

La *Practique* de Palissy est une pratique faite d'expérience, d'étude et d'observation: il n'est pas intéressé à opposer la théorie à la pratique pour une intention de discussion philosophique, à son avis il est nécessaire que les études soient fondées sur les phénomènes naturels si elles veulent avancer. La pratique et l'expérience sont les fondements de toute connaissance, une connaissance qui n'est jamais séparée de la "sapience", c'est-à-dire de l'amour de Dieu, affirme Palissy, avec toute la force de sa logique:

> Je me doute que ceux que tu appelles Philosophes, ne soyent les plus grands ennemis de Philosophie. Car si tu sçavois que c'est que Philosophie tu connoistrois que ceux qui cherchent à faire l'or et l'argent, ne meritent pas ce titre: par ce que Philosophe veut dire amateur de sapience. Or Dieu est sapience; l'on ne peut donc aimer sapience sans aymer Dieu. Et je m'emervaille comment un tas de faux monnoyeurs, lesquels ne s'estudient qu'à tromperies & malices, n'ont honte de se mettre au rang des philosophes. Or comme j'ay dit des le commencement, l'avarice est racine de tous maux, & ceux qui cherchent à faire l'or & l'argent, ne peuvent estre exemps du titre d'avaricieux, & estans avaricieux, ne peucent estre dits philosophes ny compris au nombre de ceux qui aiment sapience (*Traité des métaux et alchimie*: II, 135-136).

Palissy ne pose pas de séparation entre les procédures de validation scientifique et l'adhésion aux dogmes religieux. Les digressions sont fréquentes et voulues, mais les plus nombreuses trahissent son enthousiasme de réformé et sa nécessité apologétique. Cameron affirme qu'"il faut penser, aussi, que Palissy le chrétien a voulu substituer à la science qui ne cherchait que le gain personnel une science qui contribuerait au bien général, une science qui serait fon-

dée non sur des idées païennes mais, ostensiblement du moins, sur la religion chrétienne"
(1990: 136), et il ajoute que Palissy a prouvé que "la science ne peut faire des avances vala-
bles que si la raison et l'expérience marchent de pair" (1990: 143).

Palissy a présenté ses découvertes sous une forme accessible grâce aux possibilités dia-
lectiques offertes par le dialogue, et il a ainsi pu illustrer les contacts entre les intérêts hu-
manistes et scientifiques d'un savant de la Renaissance.

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TRANSLATING THE LEXICAL ITEM: ARGUING OVER DOMINANCE, DOMINATION AND HEGEMONY

DEREK BOOTHMAN

1. *Introduction*

1.1 The background to hegemony

The present essay originates from a recently published study of the background sources for the concept of hegemony as developed in the notebooks that the Italian Marxist, Antonio Gramsci, wrote in a fascist gaol from 1929 until his strength gave out, two years before his death in 1937. These *Prison Notebooks* (*Quaderni del Carcere*) began to be published in Italy in the late 1940s and then in English, first in a couple of slim, very partial, and rather unsatisfactory volumes in 1957, followed by a substantial three-volume anthology in over 1300 pages (plus critical apparatus), beginning in 1971 with *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, and then by a still ongoing project to produce an English translation of the Notebooks in their integral form[1].

About half a dozen main sources feed into Gramsci's concept of hegemony: Marx's 1859 preface to *A Contribution to a Critique of Political Economy*; use of the word within the Italian socialist movement, sometimes with reference to the political situation around the Adriatic; use of the concept and word *gegemoniya* among the Bolsheviks[2], especially but not exclusively by Lenin; the philosopher Benedetto Croce's concept of «ethico-political history» (hegemony in an incomplete and mutilated form, according to Gramsci); Machiavelli's metaphor of the centaur – half man and half animal, representing consent and force – as well as his use of language[3]; Gramsci's own analysis of the various real situations considered; and of course his own university linguistic training (Boothman 2008a, 2008b). All these factors converged to produce "hegemony" as it emerged and developed throughout the six-year span that the *Notebooks* occupied, from its first appearance as «egemonia politica», glossed as «direzione» («leadership»), to the observation in the last *Notebook* (on Gram-

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[1] Gramsci 1971, Gramsci 1985, Gramsci 1995. The integral translation is Gramsci 1992-present.

[2] Leaving aside translations Gramsci commissioned from Russian in the 1919-20 period, the first use he himself made of the word "egemonia" is, it seems in letters written from Vienna (December 1923-Spring 1924) immediately after his stay in the Soviet Union and frequent contacts with the Bolshevik leaders there; a selection of these pre-prison letters, including the Vienna ones, is scheduled for 2009.

[3] Machiavelli pays great attention to the attainment of consent by negotiation between leaders and led, thereby transforming the crowd ("multitudine sciolta") into the people ("populo"); see Fontana 1993, 130-1.

mar) that «every time the language question surfaces it means that a series of other questions are coming to the fore» that pose the «necessity … to reorganize cultural hegemony»[4].

1.2 Comparing "hegemony" in Italian and English: two corpora

The 1971 translation, fundamental as regards purely political aspects of the *Notebooks*, was instrumental in putting into circulation in the English-speaking world a number of innovative concepts, including crucially hegemony. These concepts found widespread application in various fields, among them history, sociology, ethnic and gender studies, cultural studies and political theory and science; the latter includes increasingly important disciplinary fields such as subaltern studies, International Political Economy and International Relations. Somewhat schematically, it may be said that from its ancient Greek historical origins as a military concept, hegemony then developed a near-purely political side, before undergoing a shift at the hands of Gramsci to include not only political aspects, but those of culture (in the broad sense, as understood by anthropologists or by critics such as Raymond Williams), language, economics and other sectors. To try to see how hegemony began to be interpreted and applied, in other words how the English-speaking academic community has *translated* hegemony from its Gramscian context, is a large undertaking and the present, necessarily provisional, essay examines just one aspect of this process. It makes use of the fortunate fact that the *British National Corpus*, assembled to give a fair and representative sample of British English, offering among other things a cross-section of academic writings, was compiled over a period of some dozen to twenty five years after the 1971 *Selections* anthology. This time lapse offered a near-perfect opportunity for Gramscian ideas to percolate through and be applied to conditions in Anglophone culture. The *BNC* therefore is a useful reference corpus to compare with the *Quaderni*, naturally to be used judiciously and, for a fuller study than the present one, together with other sources, but it contains material that helps understand how the concept "hegemony" has been understood and translated in an academic setting. As is known, the *BNC* includes a wide range of oral and written discourse (ca. 10% and 90% of 100 million words respectively), and, not surprisingly, the extracts of publications of the authors in whom the root *hegemon** occurs (extracts amounting to within 1% of 5 million words, as compared with ca. 1 million in the *Quaderni*) are limited, with a few exceptions, to written academic discourse. Together, the noun and adjectival forms appear 386 and ca. 350 times in the *Quaderni* and the *BNC* respectively.

   This paper examines, through use of the *BNC*, whether one may detect a Gramscian influence, i.e. a *translation* of the term "hegemony" that differs from previous uses in Anglophone culture. It is far too easy – and inaccurate – to say that the English "hegemony" is just the translation of a Greek, or an Italian or Russian etc., term, of the same root. What

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[4] Gramsci 1985, 183-4 (translation slightly modified) for the language question in reorganizing hegemony; the first occurrence of "egemonia" is in *Notebook* 1, §44.

is relevant, instead, is translation in the sense of how the *meaning* of a term is modified and extended on going from one discourse or paradigm to another. Section 1 of this paper consequently reconstructs the meanings of hegemony contained in the *BNC*, attempting to trace, necessarily somewhat partially, how the uses of "hegemony" and "hegemonic" have – and in some cases have definitely not – been influenced by Gramsci's writings, i.e. the basic consonance, or otherwise, of meaning in the *BNC* compared with the *Prison Notebooks* (for his general influence in Anglophone culture readers are referred to various studies on the subject. See Boothman 2004-05, Boothman (in press), Eley 1984a, Eley 1984b and Forgacs 1989). In Section 2 we look at the fruitful application of the concept "hegemony" to new areas, crucial to the translation process given that a word, in acquiring its meaning from its overall linguistic-cultural context, then undergoes a partial semantic extension when used in new contexts.

Quaderni del carcere SEMANTIC AREA: COLLOCATION WITH *EGEMONICO** (56 OCCURRENCES)	USE (EXPRESSED AS %)	*Quaderni del carcere* SEMANTIC AREA: COLLOCATION WITH *EGEMONE/I* (33 OCCURRENCES)	USE (EXPRESSED AS %)	*BNC* SEMANTIC AREA: COLLOCATION WITH *HEGEMONIC* (99 OCCURRENCES)	USE (EXPRESSED AS %)
funzione	20			mission/function/role	7
		classi/gruppi sociali	33	class/fraction/bloc	21
costruzione/sistema/ elemento	11			structure/model/ control/authority	14
		forza (militare/politica)	15		
Stato/nazione	13	Stato/nazione ecc.	33	State/country/ nation etc.[5]	4
		gruppi territoriali	6		
quistione/influenza/ atteggiamento/esponente	8			theory/ideology/claim/ tradition/project	8
lotta (tra principii)	4			Struggle	2
				power (not sense of nation)	5
		cultura	3	culture	8
Posizioni	2			Position	5
Other uses of concept	**42**		**10**		**26**[6]
Total	**100**		**100**		**100**

Table 1: Comparative collocations (expressed as a %) between the adjectives *egemone/i, egemonico** *(Quaderni del carcere)* and *hegemonic* (BNC) and the semantic areas of their respective nouns[7].

The table indicates the similar fields for which the English "hegemonic" and its Italian equivalents are used; "hegemonic" – ignoring the rare idiosyncratic variant "hegemonial" – cov-

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[5] Strangely, there are no occurrences of the adjective "hegemonic" in references to ancient history and pre-modern history (BNC) although, as observed, there are frequent usages of the noun "hegemony".

[6] Including "hegemonic practice", perhaps a convergence, as some attempted especially in the 1970s, between Gramsci's historicist and Althusser's structuralist approaches.

[7] Adjectives only are considered in this table. The noun form (ca. 330 occurrences in the BNC and 297, including ten in the plural) is dealt with in the second part of the paper.

ers both adjectival forms "egemone/i" and "egemonic*". By highlighting major fields of use, Table 1 gives some hint of where developments may have taken place in translating the concept into Anglophone culture. Given that "hegemony" occurs rarely outside the confines of "cultural"-political-academic discourse, it may be assumed that, within limits, the use of "hegemonic" reflects usage at the time the BNC was compiled and, presumably to a great extent, is still currently being used. First, "State/nation/power" is found with both Italian adjectives in Gramsci, but more frequently with egemone/i; in this collocation it *is* found, but to a much lesser extent in English (only 4%). However in probably under-representing the recent disciplinary field of International Political Economy, the *BNC* sample may be somewhat skew for current use of "hegemonic", and the percentage reported may therefore be an underestimate of current use in this semantic-academic field. Second, "class", together to a lesser extent with "culture", is the only notion (with a minor exception for State/nation/power) for which "hegemonic" here corresponds to "egemone/i", the collocation with "class" accounting for 29% of the *BNC* occurrences of "hegemonic". Third, for all other uses of "hegemonic" in the *BNC* (ca. 2/5 of the uses of the word) there is a correspondence between "hegemonic" and "egemonic*". Last, "culture" appears to collocate more with "hegemonic" than "cultura" does with "egemone", and thus at first sight culture and hegemony seem to be a more common coupling of concepts in English than in Italian. This however is misleading given the standard collocation "egemonia culturale" in Italian, which is also found eleven times in the *Notebooks*.

2. *The uses of the word "hegemony"*

2.1 The historians of the Early Middle Ages

First, what was actually understood by "hegemony" up to recent times, i.e. the last three or four decades? The full OED (CD-ROM version) gives the meaning as «leadership, predominance, preponderance; esp. the leadership or predominant authority of one state of a confederacy or union over the others [...]», with reference to ancient Greece in particular, the meaning here being very close to the one Gramsci was familiar with through use by Italian socialists. Such is also the use among the *BNC* entries relating to ancient through to early medieval British history. On this latter, the *BNC* contains very interesting comments linking political and military power with the concepts of overlordship and hegemony for some of the major regions of what was eventually to emerge as England and Scotland. "Overlordship" is akin to "hegemony", but explicitly includes the formal recognition of a hierarchy between rulers or petty kingdoms, i.e. suzerainty. Schematically, it may also be suggested that "hegemony" and "domination" are used *almost* synonymously, "domination" having more military overtones and "hegemony" a more political – "civil" or "proto-state" – sense, except when hegemony is defined in the Greek sense of military hegemony. An example of this is seen in the comment, referring to interpretations of Ecgfrith's reign that «there was undoubtedly a tendency to push back in time the establishment of a far-flung military hege-

mony». The contrast made by the same author between the two concepts "dominance" (or "domination") and "hegemony", the latter linked but not equivalent to military power, emerges from the explanation that «the creation of a Midland hegemony was achieved by a remarkable series of expansionist campaigns [...]» and the inconceivability that «Eadwine was able to extend his hegemony southwards without first achieving domination of the Mercians» (Kirby 1992: 68). The political-state aspect of hegemony is emphasized by another author who, in a comment on late antiquity, notes that Theudebert claimed «his hegemony [...] stretched from Visigothic Spain to Thuringia, from the North Sea to the Danube and Pannonia» (Wood 1994).

Given the origins of "hegemony" in the ancient world, it is not surprising that there is no detectable influence of Gramsci in these extracts. The use in English of the concept by the historians here cited appears to be an unmediated translation of a meaning originating in classical antiquity. Further, the same historians often conceive hegemony to be one aspect of a wider use of power within suzerainty or overlordship, opposed to or complementing dominance by force. In this sense there is sometimes fairly full compatibility between the uses of the term in these historiographical extracts and some of Gramsci's, with the proviso that, for Gramsci, hegemony includes force allied to consent (cf. the centaur metaphor taken over from Machiavelli), with the latter normally predominating. One may note what is either a natural conservatism on the part of the historians, militating against innovative uses of the concept or, indeed, a lack of necessity felt for such innovation.

2.2 Use of the concept "hegemony" in the analysis of present-day society

2.2.1 Explicit Gramscian usages in the BNC

The ways in which different typologies of society are ruled are different, and thus so are the ways in which hegemony operates, and indeed what it – and what dominance – are in such societies. Thus, moving forward in time from the pre-feudal societies of section 1.1 to present-day "Western" society, we note a radical shift in the meaning of "hegemony", as is indicated in a number of *BNC* extracts that make specific reference to Gramscian uses of "hegemony". Young, for example, states that «as Gramsci pointed out ..., *hegemony* is not universal and 'given' to the continuing rule of a particular class» (Young 1991), while Furlong *et al.* state that «Gramsci's most original contribution to Marxism lies in his analysis of the ways in which the state transforms coercive force into a structured more consensual domination to which he gives the name 'hegemony'» (Furlong, Cox & Page, 1985). The latter authors thus explain, at least to a wide readership in the social sciences, how "hegemony" has been incorporated (translated) into Anglophone sociological discourse. They also define hegemony: «For Gramsci, class domination is not achieved through the state being dominated by the ruling class; it is achieved through a complex process of coercion and consent. This is achieved via the use of force (individuals being coerced into accepting the capitalist mode of production) and hegemony. Hegemony implies the mobilisation of the

active consent of those dominated by a ruling class through the use of intellectual, moral and political persuasion and leadership» (as elsewhere in this paper, we leave aside eventual differing interpretations of Gramsci, here whether acceptance of the capitalist mode of production is coercive or consensual.) The fundamental difference between rule in modern and pre-feudal societies emerge clearly, with the meaning attached to "hegemony" – i.e. its translation into a modern setting, with explicit reference to Gramsci's conceptualization – being very different in the two types of society.

Another extract from Furlong *et al*. illustrates one particular school of thought: «the capitalist ruling class are able to ensure their dominance over society and economy through the unequal competition between different ideologies. In this way, thought and action are conditioned to serve the interests of capitalism through an ideological hegemony» (Furlong, Cox & Page 1985: 266). This has a Gramscian ring to it, although Gramscian scholars will not be surprised that the syntagm "egemonia ideologica" is nowhere to be found in the *Prison Notebooks* (searchable electronic Italian version consulted). What one sees there instead are explicit references to «dominant ideology/ies»[8], and to «a struggle of political 'hegemonies'»[9]. The notion of "ideological hegemony" introduced here by Furlong and co-workers is, then, an extension and development of the conceptual nexus contained in the *Notebooks* (and possibly a modification of the interrelationship between its various terms), i.e. a translation of Gramsci's ideas which, it may be said, seems to remain within his paradigm[10]. Other authors included in the *BNC* use yet another term in speaking of a professional development that merely serves «the interest of the dominant hegemony» (McCormick & James 1990: 40). Given that Gramsci's reference to struggles between hegemonies, it is legitimate to think that a particular hegemony is indeed dominant even though, again, the syntagm "egemonia dominante" is not in the *Notebooks*. One does, however, find there a comment on a situation (termed Caesarism or Bonapartism)[11] in which «the forces in conflict», thus including their rival hegemonies, «balance each other … in such a way that the conflict can only terminate in their reciprocal destruction»; in other words there is a struggle for dominance. A similar concept of competing hegemonies is found in the *BNC* in a work on women, medicine and sexuality in Britain, in which Frank Mort writes of «a much more unstable hegemony […] successfully challenged by competing groups» (Mort 1987: 116). While not using Gramscian syntagms, it may be said that the authors of these extracts creatively translate Gramscian meanings into their particular setting.

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[8] For the singular see Notebook 4, §7 (first draft) and Notebook 11, §37 (final version), the definitive latter version being in Gramsci 1995: 293. For the plural see Gramsci 1996, p. 33 (i.e. Notebook 3, §34), which gives the precise translation ("dominant ideologies" rather than the "ruling ideologies" preferred in Gramsci 1971, 276).
[9] Notebook 11, §12; see Gramsci 1971, 333.
[10] Cf. Liguori's essay "Ideologia" in the authoritative collective volume of Rome's "Seminario gramsciano", *Le parole di Gramsci* (Liguori 2004, 131-49, especially pp. 142-3 and 147).
[11] Notebook 9, §133; the rewritten version (Notebook 13, §27: Gramsci 1971, 219) omits the "Bonapartism" of the first draft, retaining only "Caesarism".

2.2.2 Non-Gramscian uses of "hegemony" in the BNC

Different from Furlong *et al.*, what appears to be a minority of the sociologists of modern societies use "hegemony" to mean merely "dominance", a use – at odds with most previous ones in English – which, given the entire history of the term, leaves the present writer somewhat nonplussed. As representative quotations, one may cite Smith and Hollis's contention that «the critical mechanism employed by Neo-Realism is termed 'hegemonic stability' ('hegemony' meaning 'domination', from the Greek *hegemon*, a leader)» and Sheard *et al.*'s explanatory glosses «The structuration of the business class as a whole has, to a considerable extent, been determined by the hegemony [dominance] within it of the establishment families», and «containment of capitalism within a patrician hegemony [ideological dominance] which never [...] actively favoured the aggressive development of industrialism or the general conversion of society to the latter's values and interests» (Smith & Hollis 1990; Sheard, Stanworth, Bilton, Jones & Bonnett 1992). Another synonymous use of the two terms comes in a collectively authored volume: «The Conservative hegemony of the interwar years still awaits an adequate explanation, and the Conservative dominance between 1951 and 1964 [...] has escaped the white heat of historical investigation» (Green 1991). Sometimes, instead, one wonders whether dominance and hegemony, rather than being considered as synonyms, have perhaps been interchanged, as in R.J. Johnston's comment «The reason for ... the consequent Conservative dominance of Dukeries' politics, was the colliery companies' hegemony» (Johnston 1991). "Dominance" might possibly here be used loosely in a non-technical sense, but one important view of mining holds that, before nationalization, most British miners regarded the colliery companies as exerting coercive domination rather than hegemony based on consent. Johnston, while using the terms "coercion" and "consent", then reiterates the view that the employers were hegemonic, thereby partially confirming that his non-Gramscian use of the concept.

2.2.3 The spread of Gramscian influence

As compared with Section 2.2.2, where a radically different conceptualization of hegemony emerges is in a volume edited by John Allen and Doreen Massey. Through the reviews *Marxism Today* in the 1980s and *Soundings* today, Massey has long been involved with Gramscian sectors of the British left, and "hegemony" as used in this book is indeed the (or "a") Gramscian translation of it into British culture. In contrast to the examples in 1.2.2, the Marxist economist Laurence Harris, author of one of the book's essays, introduces a distinction between "hegemony" and "dominance", making them near-rivals. Especially in the light of the other usages of "hegemony" in the *BNC* extracts from this book, "or", in the comment that «This system in turn rests on and reflects the domination (or hegemony) of particular nations» (Harris 1988: 33)[12], is to be read as a choice between alternatives, not an explanatory gloss. His point here is, seem-

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[12] Allen & Massey (eds.) 1988; the essays included in the BNC extract are by Laurence Harris, Doreen Massey and John Allen, in that order.

ingly, that the hegemony of a particular national economy within the world economy *leads* other nations to adopt features of the economically hegemonic nation, whereas dominance may not imply this. In the score of times "hegemony" and "hegemonic" are used in the *BNC* extracts from the book, usage conforms fairly well to the Gramscian distinction between dominance and hegemony, with perhaps three examples of overlap.

Moving from economics to education, we have a classic example of implicit Gramscian (opposed here to Althusserian) influence in Thomas's observation: «Traditional Marxist explanations, such as that of Althusser […] had seen education as reproducing the relations of dominance and subordinacy necessary to the maintenance of the capitalist state [… L]ater Marxist explanations […] move away from a deterministic model towards a looser one, which emphasizes hegemony and cultural resistance» (Thomas 1990: 15). The distinction between dominance and hegemony is fundamental, with a strong implicit reference to Gramscian concepts (Thomas 1990). The extended title of Mort's volume, commented on above, indicates a very interesting contraposition: "Dangerous sexualities. The Sanitary Principle in Dominance: Medical Hegemony and Feminist Response 1860-1880. 1. Medical Hegemony And Social Policy 1850-1870" (Mort 1987). Hegemony, of the medical hierarchy here and "purity" elsewhere, is apparently part of an overall "dominance". This dominance (or domination)-hegemony coupling may be compared with the similar juxtaposition of Gramsci's: «the supremacy of a social group manifests itself in two ways, as 'domination' and as 'intellectual and moral leadership'» (Gramsci 1971: 45) over the adversary and the allied groups respectively. The context is that of the Risorgimento, "leadership" being linked through parliamentary "transformism" to «the action of intellectual, moral and political hegemony»[13]. This latter phrase is almost certainly the source of the definition of hegemony by Furlong *et alii* (see above), who also note, in a similar conceptual juxtaposition, that «the power bloc is working to maintain the hegemony of the dominant class» (Furlong *et alii*, 1985: 69).

3. *Creative translation: the new fields of application of "hegemony"*

Section 2 of this paper has tried to illustrate the various current meanings of "hegemony" in Anglophone culture and, by comparison with the *Prison Notebooks*, show the influence there of Gramsci's writings. We now go on to single out a number of new fields, relying again on the *BNC*, in which the concept of hegemony is presently being used in Britain, where hegemony manifests itself and where there are hegemonic struggles. This exercise helps demonstrate the application in a non-Italian culture of a concept, not uniquely but partially, and probably to a large extent, influenced by Gramsci. The proviso must however be added that, without a detailed analysis of the whole of the various extracts in which "hege-

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[13] See the extended note in Notebook 19, §24, translated as "The problem of political leadership in the development of the nation and the modern state in Italy" in Gramsci 1971, 57-58.

mony" and its adjectival forms occur, the immediate context of a few lines might on occasion lead to some uncertainty. Here we select just some of the fields where the use of hegemony seems innovatory as compared with the *Prison Notebooks* and which thus represent, as noted, not the straightforward use of the word but a creative translation of the concept, through extension of its connotations, into a target culture. Among the representative examples are the fields of the social sciences and sexuality, gender and ethnicity (where not included above); religion; the arts, including various literary and musical genres; institutions and professions, including feminist critiques of hierarchies of power and knowledge; fashion and food; and science and technology.

Referring to the most widespread ideology of all, religion, rival "catholic nationalist" and "protestant-loyalist" hegemonies figure in an analysis of Northern Ireland (Fulton 1991). Critiques of academic power structures, and the claimed subaltern position of their authors, emerge forcefully in the comment that none of the «elements of Women's Studies material» introduced «into the curriculum which [...] has also made space for Black Studies, the teaching of race relations and working-class history [...] has posed any particular threat to the hegemony of traditional discipline and patterns of academic thought and women can be incorporated as easily as the rest» (Lovett 1988: 200). On racism and ethnicity, it is observed that ideology has created «the perceptions and beliefs in individuals deemed necessary to reproduce the political and economic structures of class and/or ethnic hegemony». Consequently «forms of discourse and power [...] establish a pervasive framework of values, beliefs, ideals and aspirations. As a result, the ideology of the dominant class – or 'race' – comes to be accepted as self evident 'common sense' by large sections of society" (Donald & Rattansi 1993: 79); this particular notion of "common sense" is quite evidently of Gramsci derivation.

In literary studies we read of one genre fighting for «its own hegemony in literature; wherever it triumphs, the older genres go into decline» (Bakhtin 1981: 3), and «anthropology, psychoanalysis, philosophy, history, cybernetics, information theory, semiotics and, of course, linguistics have all left their mark on structuralist discourse about literature. The hegemony of the linguistic model (the premise of all structuralist thought) acquires a special significance in the sphere of literature» (Jefferson & Robey 1986). On fashion and food, Diana Simmonds refers to the «hegemony of dowdiness» and that of «French cuisine (cuisine ancienne)» (Simmonds 1991: 129). Just one of many comments on hegemony in the music sphere (here relating also to ethnicity) is Sebba's «The interpretive community formed around Rasta language and symbols, presided over and tutored in dread ethics by Marley and other outernational reggae artists, simply could not withstand these changes. Its cultural and political hegemony began to dissolve' (Gilroy 1987: 190)» (Sebba 1993: 8). "Hegemony", as used for literary and musical culture, is somewhat innovatory compared to Gramsci, who in these fields discusses hegemony, not so much explicitly as implicitly, often in terms of a national-popular culture partly characterized by melodrama and its manifestations in either novels or nineteenth-century opera.

4. *Some general conclusions*

This paper has analysed the uses of the terms "hegemony/egemonia" and their corresponding adjectives in the *Prison Notebooks* (*Quaderni del carcere*) of Antonio Gramsci and the *British National Corpus.* First, one notes a natural conservatism regarding the use of hegemony in one field (ancient through to early mediaeval history) that seems exempt from Gramscian influence. Second, in the *BNC* categorization of the social sciences and world affairs, Gramsci is sometimes explicitly quoted on hegemony, while at other times his influence, although evident, is implicit; in a small minority of cases, however, the use of "hegemony" is quite at odds with that of Gramsci. Third, of interest for the translation of the concept of hegemony from his paradigmatic discourse to those of Anglophone culture are the modifications, sometimes quite subtle, that the concept undergoes in this latter culture in fields analogous to those he analysed. Finally, what is of great interest for the history of ideas and the question of translation between paradigms are the ways in which, in extending the first Gramscian uses in Anglophone culture of the concept "hegemony" in fields common to those of the *Notebooks*, "hegemony" is then fruitfully employed in fields other than those in which Gramsci originally used it.

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ARGUMENTATION ACROSS CONTRASTS IN M. DE UNAMUNO'S "TWO MOTHERS"

OLGA CHESNOKOVA

The article deals with the role of contrasts in the argumentative strategies created by the short novel *Dos madres / Two Mothers* by the great Spanish writer, poet, philosopher and educator Miguel de Unamuno (1864-1936).

According to Bakhtin (2002: 39), a novel "is plasticity itself, opening many possibilities of dialogicity". Unamuno's short novel *Two Mothers* seems very attractive for reflecting on the argumentation and word meaning, as the collisions of this text suppose and even predetermine the interactions in an argumentative dialogue, as there are many contradictory events and emotions to be expressed and argued. The short novel *Two Mothers* belongs to Unamuno's cycle *Tres novelas ejemplares y un prólogo / Three Exemplary Novels and a Prologue* (1920). As well as his great predecessor and compatriot Miguel de Cervantes Saavedra, Miguel de Unamuno called his short novels *exemplary*, as there may be discovered many lessons and much wisdom. Personality, love, suffering, pity, faith, hope, charity, destiny of Spain – these are constant topics of Unamuno's writings as a whole, as well as of the *Three Exemplary Novels and a Prologue*.

The descriptions of space and time commentaries in these exemplary novels are very scanty. Still it doesn't deprive characters of any historical and social authenticity, but, on the contrary, it makes even more impressive their personalities, the internal reality of their souls. The textual organization of *Two Mothers* includes narrative fragments and theatrical dialogues. The characters are: Don Juan; Raquel, a childless widow; Berta Lapeira, Don Juan's fiancée and his wife afterward. The plot is based on the "one man - two women" triangle. Don Juan is in love with Raquel, the childless widow. Raquel is sterile and to satisfy her gnawing hunger for motherhood she decides to look for a young and healthy fiancée for her beloved Don Juan. It is Berta Lapeira, who according to Raquel, has to become mother of Juan's child. Berta gives birth to a daughter, who is also named Raquel. Rushing about the two women, Juan perishes in an accident. Raquel captures all his possessions and persuades Berta and her parents to let her have Juan's daughter. As is shown by Lotman (1970: 357), any artistic text possesses multilayer intertextual relations with other texts. The text *Dos madres / Two Mothers* reveals clear allusions to the Old Testament, to Rachel's Story (Genesis 29-30; 35) and to the story of the Two Mothers and King Solomon's judgment.

So, the main event of the text is the struggle of two women for Don Juan and for his will. The conversations between the characters as well as the narrator's dialogue with the

reader constitute a really inspiring linguistic material for studying word meaning in dialogic interaction and argumentation.

Reading the text, one may come across numerous expressions of contrasts and oppositions. As far as Unamunian mentality and Spanish mentality on the whole are concerned, as mentioned by Del Rio (1956: 20), "contradiction and conflict have become part of the Spanish being, and Unamuno, well prepared for it by temperament and education, chose to make of it the center of his spiritual life".

So, the hypothesis consists in a unique role of the contrasts which originally organize the text *Dos madres / Two Mothers* and may be considered as its specific argumentative strategy. Therefore, the investigation was aimed at studying contrasts in figures of speech, figures of thought, arguments and counter-arguments in the text.

In the very beginning of the text we observe the narrator's reflections on the essence of the relations between Don Juan and Raquel, where the antonyms *vida – muerte / life – death* structure their tragic sense:

> Su amor era un amor furioso, con sabor a **muerte**, que buscaba dentro de su hombre, tan dentro de él, que de él se salía, algo de más allá de la **vida** (43)[1] / Her love was a violent love that savored of **death**, that searched within her man, so very deep within him, that it emerged from him like something beyond **life**. (72).

Topics of maternity and paternity are semiotically important for the plot. Kinship terms *padre – madre / father – mother* are rather frequent in the text. Their opposition in dialogues and in the narrator's discourse also structures and aesthetically marks the intrigue. In the following segment, we find the opposition of nouns *mother – father*, in a persuasive discourse of Raquel addressed to Don Juan, when Raquel, as it is typical for practically all her utterances, justifies her own norms and convinces Juan of the unjustifiable truth of her statements. Raquel's utterances show that she chooses formulations that attribute positive connotations to their ethically unacceptable content:

> Raquel.- <…> Hazte **padre,** Juan, hazte **padre**, ya que no has podido hacerme **madre** (45) / Raquel. <…> Juan, become **a father** since you have not been able to make me **a mother** (75).

Obtaining the results in the argumentative struggles of the characters comes across their feelings and emotions, which are complicated and intricate, cf. the narrator's reflection on the contradictory emotions, gripping Raquel:

> Al decir esto se reía con **una risa** que parecía a **llanto** (46) / As she said this she laughed; her **laugh** sounded like **a sob** (77).

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[1] References in Spanish according to Unamuno 1999, in English according to Unamuno 1956, in Russian according to Unamuno 1981.

In many fragments of the text there can be discovered contrasts based on concepts *heaven – hell, angel – devil (demon).* In many sequences of the text Berta is being defined as *an angel, angelic*, while Raquel is called *a demon,* or *demonic*:

> Y a la hija, a **la angelical Berta**, un angelito caído le susurró en el silencio de la noche y del sueño, al oído del corazón: "Te teme" (49) / And to their daughter, the **angelic Berta**, a little fallen angel whispered, speaking to the ear of her heart in the silence of the night and of dreamland: "He fears you" (84).

> Berta. ¡Yo no! Esa mujer es **un demonio... un demonio** que te tiene fascinado (62) / Berta. Well, I don't! That woman is **a demon ... a demon** who has fascinated you (112).

As is typical for contrasts and antonyms, they tend to be textually associated. The following example with the same adjective *redentor / redeemer*, referring to the opposite concepts, confirms it:

> El pobre Juan, ya sin don, temblaba entre las dos mujeres, entre su **ángel** y su **demonio redentores** (51) / Poor Juan, now without the "Don", trembled between the two women, between his **angelic** and his **demonic redeemer** (88).

As is usual for Unamuno's style, contrasts and opposite word meanings don't form strict borders, but melt into each other. Thus, arguing the attributes *angel – devil* locks in the definition *fallen angel* and Raquel's attempt to convince Juan of making Berta fall:

> Raquel. – Quien sabe...Pero antes dame un hijo...¿Lo oyes? Ahí está la **angelical** Berta Lapeira.¡**Angelical!** Ja...ja...ja...
> Don Juan. – ¡Y tú, **demoníaca**!- gritó el hombre poniéndose en pie y costándole tenerse así.
> Raquel. – **El demonio también es un ángel**, michino...
> Don Juan. – Pero un **ángel caído**.
> Raquel. – **Haz, pues, caer a Berta; ¡hazla caer!**(47) /
> RAQUEL. Perhaps ... But first give me the child ... Do you hear? There you have the **angelic** Berta Lapeira, **Angel!** Ha ... ha ... ha ...
> DON JUAN. And you, a **devil!** ... (shouting, standing up and struggling to remain so.)
> RAQUEL. **The devil is also an angel**, darling.
> DON JUAN. But **a fallen angel** ...
> RAQUEL. **Then make Berta fall; make her fall!** (80).

The opposition and mutual attraction of the concepts *heaven – hell* is another verbal manifestation of the nerve-strain of the characters and another verbal resource of their argumentative strategies. Through this opposition Raquel justifies her actions saying that hell is a sterile womb:

> Raquel. – ¿Sabes tú lo que es el **cielo**? ¿Sabes lo que es el **infierno**? ¿Sabes dónde está el **infierno**?

Don Juan. – En **el centro de la tierra**, dicen.
Raquel. – **O en el centro de un vientre estéril, acaso**... (46) /
RAQ UEL. Do you know what **heaven** is? Do you know what **hell** is? Do you
know where hell is?
DON JUAN. They say that in the center of the earth.
RAQ UEL. Or perhaps in the center of **a sterile womb**... (77-78).

As well as it happens with the nouns *angel – devil*, an analogous example of locking contrasts
can be found with the nouns *heaven – hell*:

Don Juan. – Que eres mi **cielo.**
Raquel. – Ortas veces dices que tu **infierno...**
Don Juan. – Es verdad. (58) /
DON JUAN. You are my **heaven**...
RAQ UEL. Sometimes you say that your **hell**...
DON JUAN. That's so. (103).

The concepts of "*body – soul*" as the symbols of corporal and spiritual are also opposed in a
number of contexts:

Don Juan. – ¡Mejor, Raquel, mejor! Muerto, sí; muerto de miseria y de po-
dredumbre. ¿No esto miseria? ¿No es podredumbre? ¿Es que soy mío? ¿Es
que soy yo? ¿Por qué me has robado **el cuerpo** y **el alma**? (55) / DON JUAN.
It would be better so, Raquel, better! Dead, yes; dead from misery and cor-
ruption. Isn't this misery? Isn't this corruption? Am I my own master? Why
have you stolen my **body** and **soul**? (97).

Raquel. – ¡Hijo mío, hijo mío, hijo mío...! No te robé yo; me robaste tú el
alma, tú, tú! Y me robaste el **cuerpo**... (56) / RAQ UEL. My child, my child, my
child ... I didn't steal you; it was you who stole my **soul**, you, you. And you
stole my **body** ... (98).

As well as it happens with other contrasts, the concepts and names *body – soul* are also
locked. Linguistically, it is the Spanish Phraseological unit *en cuerpo y alma,* which means
completely, entirely, fully:

Y se decía: "Arrancarle ese hombre y ver cómo es el hombre de ella, el hom-
bre que ha hecho ella, el que se le ha rendido **en cuerpo y alma** (51) / She
said to herself: "To snatch away this man and see what the man has surren-
dered himself to her, **body and soul** (87).

But not only abstract concepts are being opposed and aesthetically marked in the text. Quite
current for every day speech antonymous spatial concepts *behind – before* are melting into
each other in the narrator's comparison of the attitude of the two women towards Juan with
the same sensation of driving him to a perdition:

El pobre Juan, ya sin don, temblaba entre las dos mujeres, entre su **ángel** y su
demonio redentores. Detrás de sí tenía a Raquel, y **delante,** a Berta, y **ambas**

> **le empujaban**. ¿Hacia dónde? Él pesentía que hasta su perdición. (51) / Poor Juan, now without the "Don", trembled between the two women, between his **angelic** and his **demonic redeemer**. **Behind** him was Raquel and **before** him Berta, and **both were driving him on. Where to? He saw that it was toward perdition**. (88).

A very peculiar pun is based on Spanish antonyms *claro – oscuro / clear – dark.* The pun is based on these adjectives' relation with the concept *light* and on the Spanish adverbial use of the word *claro* as a form of agreement. An exasperated Berta repeats *claro* of Juan's answer if he really wants to marry her, and immediately adds opposite adjective *oscuro*, denying Juan's expression of agreement and in this way presenting two divergent answers to the same question. So, antonyms *claro – oscuro* become the argument and the counter-argument, respectively.

> Berta.- ¡Acabáramos! ¿Quieres, pues, casarte conmigo?
> Don Juan.- **¡Claro!**
> Berta.- **¿Claro? ¡Oscuro!**¿Quieres casarte conmigo?
> Don Juan.- Sí. (54).

Unfortunately, both in the English and Russian translations this delicate pun is lost.

> BERTA. Will we ever understand each other – you wish to marry me?
> DON JUAN. That's **clear!**
> BERTA. **Clear? Not so clear!** Do you want to marry me?
> DON JUAN. Yes! (90-91).
> Берта. Наконец-то! Значит, ты хочешь на мне жениться?
> Дон Хуан. **Ясно!**
> Берта. **Ясно? Совсем не ясно!** Так ты хочешь на мне жениться?
> Дон Хуан. Да. (22).

A certain persuasive effect of many dialogue interactions is based on the meaning and stylistic connotations of the Spanish nouns *esposa – mujer / spouse – wife – woman,* which, being stylistic synonyms (Moliner 1986, t. 2: 472), make contextual antonyms and also serve as argument and counter-argument in the text. Raquel opposes herself to Berta as a woman (a beloved woman of Juan) contrary to Berta, who is his *wife* or *spouse*:

> Raquel.- Mira, Juan. Dentro de poco, tal vez antes de que os caséis, y en todo caso poco después de vuestra boda, la pequeña fortuna de los padres de Berta, la de tu futura **esposa..., esposa**, ¿eh?, **no mujer**, ¡**esposa**...! la de tu futura **esposa**, sería mía..., es decir nuestra... (54-55) / RAQ UEL. Just think, Juan, within a short time, perhaps before you are married, or at any rate a little while after your wedding, the small fortune of Berta's parents, the fortune of your future **spouse… spouse**, eh? **not wife … spouse!** ... the fortune of your future **spouse** will be mine... or rather, ours... (95).

Sad to say, once again the subtle pun based on the shades of meaning and connotations of these names in the original Spanish text is also lost in the existing English and Russian translations:

> Raquel. – <...> ¿No soy tu **mujer**?
> Don Juan. – Sí, tú eres mi **mujer** ...
> Raquel. – Y ella será tu **esposa**. **¡Esposa!**, así dicen los zapateros: "Mi **esposa!**"
> Y yo seré tu madre y la madre de vuestro hijo..., de mi hijo (56) /
> RAQ UEL. <...> Am I not your **woman**?
> DON JUAN. Yes, you are my **woman** ...
> RAQ UEL. And she will be your wife. **Woman!** as the shoemakers say: "My **woman!**" I will be your mother and the mother of your child... of my child... (98-99) /
> Ракель. Разве я не твоя **жена**?
> Дон Хуан. Да, ты моя **жена**...
> Ракель. А она будет твоей **супругой. Супругой**! Мастеровые так и говорят: «Моя **супруга**!». И я буду твоей матерью и матерью вашего ребенка...моего ребенка (26).

The grammatical contrast of singular and plural also acquires argumentative force and aesthetic function. No wonder, that it concerns, for instance, such aesthetically relevant nouns for the text as *amor / love*, *hombre / man*.

> **Amor-amores.** De tal modo, que cuando el pobre náufrago de **los amores** – que no del **amor** – recaló en el Puerto de la viuda estéril, alegrándose como de una ventura del hijo de sus amigos, sin sospechar que aquel Puerto era un Puerto de tormentas (48) / Therefore, when the poor man wrecked by **love-affairs**, not by **love** – sighted the port of the sterile widow, they rejoiced at the good fortune of their friend's son, without suspecting that that port was a stormy one. (82).

> **Hombre-hombres.** Raquel. – <...> ¿Y cómo lleva a Juan?
> Berta. – **Los hombres**...
> Raquel. – ¡No, **el hombre, el hombre!** (60) /
> RAQ UEL. <...> How do you get along with Juan?
> BERTA. **Men** ...
> RAQ UEL. No, the **man**, the **man!** (107).

Locking contrasts in the text of *Two Mothers* is well seen in the oxymoron *fingimientos sinceros / sincere pretensions*, in the most common form of oxymoron involving an adjective-noun combination. Oxymoron itself is a figure of speech that combines two normally contradictory terms. Pretension and sincerity are opposite qualities. They inject a sense of irony in Raquel's statement about marriage as a school of sincere pretensions. Raquel doesn't appeal to reason. It is an argument to a psychological state of Berta, her communication partner.

> Hay **fingimientos muy sinceros**. Y el matrimonio es una escuela de ellos (60)
> / There are very **sincere pretensions**. And marriage is their school (106).

All these linguistic data seem to indicate that the text of *Two Mothers* is organized by a set of oppositions. A very interesting, though non productive phenomenon of word meaning, typical for all languages is enantiosemy (opposite meanings of the same word).

In the text we find a typical Spanish noun revealing enantiosemy, namely *vencimiento / victory* and *defeat* (Moliner, 1986, t.2: 1453). The peculiar feature of the Spanish noun *vencimiento* is that it may be a synonym and an antonym of the noun *victoria*, depending on the communicative intention. In the original text it is opposed to the noun *victoria*, which becomes its counter-argument:

> Berta, por su parte, sentíase como transportada. ¡Había vencido a Raquel!
> ¡Pero a la vez sentía que tal **victoria** era un **vencimiento**! (61) / Berta, on her part, was in transports. She had conquered Raquel! But she felt that the **victory** was at the same time **a defeat**. (110).

Contrasts and oppositions of the text tend to concentration and association. In the following segment we discover at least three pairs of oppositions: *wife – woman, heaven – hell* and a very special opposition "For heaven and for me!" that evokes such questions as, for instance, what for, according to Raquel, Juan has to become a father and to have a child, what does Raquel literally say, what does she intend to communicate, for whose sake Juan has to become a father. The formulation "For heaven and for me!" obscures and mystifies Raquel's formulations of goals for Juan's paternity and reveals her manner of persuasion and argumentation:

> Raquel. – ¿Celos? ¡Mentecato! ¿Pero crees, michino, que puedo sentir celos de tu **esposa**...? ¿De **tu esposa**? Y yo, tu **mujer**...? ¡Para casar y dar gracias a los casados y que **críen hijos** para el cielo; para el cielo y **para mí**!
> Don Juan. – Que eres mi **cielo.**
> Raquel. – Otras veces dices que tu **infierno**... (58) /
> Don Juan. Jealous?
> Raquel. Jealous? You fool! Do you think, darling, I could be jealous of your **wife**?... Of your wife? I, your **woman**?... For wedlock, to give God's blessing to married people and to have them bring up children for God's kingdom! **For heaven and for me!**
> Don Juan. You are my **heaven...**
> Raquel. Sometimes you say that your **hell**...
> Don Juan. That's so. (103).

The Unamunian Raquel is a character of extremely strong will. According to the plot, she has to persuade and convince other characters of the fairness and correctness of her statements, and other people become convinced simply because of the argumentative force of these statements. One of their verbal resources is what may be called *Fuzziness of Deixis*. Thus, possessive pronouns are very active in Raquel' utterances, but at the same time so

vague, that they permit various interpretations. This fuzziness of deixis, mainly based on personal and possessive pronouns, may be interpreted as an argumentative strategy applied by Raquel:

> Raquel. – ¡Claro que digo bien! ¿O es que crees que yo no sé que **tu** fortuna, como **tú todo**, no es sino **mía**, enteramente **mía**? (44) / RAQ UEL. Of course it's right! Or perhaps you think that I don't know that **your** fortune, as well as everything else that's **yours**, belongs only to **me**, entirely to **me** (74).

> Raquel. – ¡Gracias a Dios! ¿No le pregunté si venía acá a buscar la voluntad de Juan? ¡Pues la voluntad de Juan, de nuestro hombre, es ésa, es hacerse padre!
> Berta. – ¿**La suya**?
> Raquel. – Sí, **la suya**.¡La suya, porque es la **mía**! (61) /
> RAQ UEL. Thank God! Didn't I ask you whether you came here to look for Juan's will ? Well, the will of our Juan, of our man, is just that to become a father!
> BERTA. **His?**
> RAQ UEL. Yes, **his. His**, because it is **mine**! (108).

In the above quoted examples there are being shaded such items, as whose fortune Juan's possessions are, whose will Juan's will is, etc.

Throughout all the text Raquel justifies her own norms. But her statements cause the discordance of word meaning. It has been already seen in the fuzziness of deixis.

The text has multiple examples of expressions not be interpreted logically. Here are some of them.

- **Juan's possibility "to give" a child to a sterile widow.** Raquel. – ¡Bien! Pero **tú puedes darme un hijo.** (45) / Raquel. All right! But **you can give me a child**. (75).
- **Raquel's intention to make Juan a man and a father**: Raquel. – ¡No, no es así! ¡**Yo voy a hacerte hombre**; yo voy a hacerte padre!

> Don Juan. – ¿**Tú?**
> Raquel. – ¡ Sí, **yo,** Juan; **yo, Raquel!**
> Juan se sintió como en agonía. (55) /
> RAQ UEL. No, it is not! **I'm going to make a man of you! I'm going to make you a father!**
> DON JUAN. You?
> RAQ UEL. Yes, I, Juan! I, Raquel! (Juan felt the pangs of death.) (96).

- **Raquel's intention to be Juan's mother and the mother of Juan's child.** Y yo seré tu madre y la madre de vuestro hijo..., de mi hijo (56) / I will be your mother and **the mother of your child… of my child** (98-99).

Such expressions show some divergent senses realized by their key words. From the biological and ethical points of view, Raquel's utterances are devoid of sense, but from her own

point of view they just show practical steps of the realization of her plans and don't appeal to reason.

From the point of view of the typology of arguments, this discordance of meaning takes place in *argumenta ab impossibili, argumentum ex silencio, argumenta ad personam,* etc. The following example is especially vivid as it doesn't just show the different characters' interpretations of the word *thief* (who is the thief: Raquel or Berta?), but also illustrates how the discordance of meaning coincides with a very frequent figure of speech for contrasts, antithesis "live like beggars, or on peaceful terms with a thief ":

> Berta. – **¡Ladrona! ¡Ladrona! ¡Ladrona!**
> Raquel. – Ésas son palabras, y no sabes quién le ha robado a quién. Acaso la **ladrona** eres tú...; las **ladronas** sois vosotras, las de tu condición. Y no quiero que hagáis de mi Quelina, de mi hija, una **ladrona**, como vosotras... Y ahora piénsalo bien con tus padres. Piensa si os conviene vivir **como mendigos o en paz con la ladrona**. (70-71)./
> Berta. **Thief! Thief! Thief!**
> Raquel. Those are mere words, and you don't know who has robbed whom. Maybe you're the **thief** ... all of you, people in your position. I don't want you to make my Quelina, my daughter, a **thief** like yourselves ... And now talk it over with your parents. See if it would suit you better to live like **beggars, or on peaceful terms with a thief** ... (130).

To sum up, the antonyms, antithesis, oxymoron, enantiosemy, contrasts based on stylistic synonyms, the discordance of meaning in different characters' interpretations form a whole set of oppositions of the text *Two Mothers*. These oppositions are oriented to the events and to the emotions.

The text itself and the contrasts artistically represented by Unamuno form a special and distinctive argumentative strategy and reveal to us the very minute instances of our spiritual life, the depths of our souls. And one of the infinite manifestations of the human soul can be seen through their contradictory sides.

An outstanding Russian thinker Mikhail Bakhtin in his famous book *Aesthetics of Verbal Creativity* (1986) stated that any literary text is an open one and enters a dialogue interaction with the reader. Bakhtin (1986: 283) also points out that in any society and in any linguistic group there are so called *vlastiteli dum / dominant influences*, whose linguistic choice makes a special impact upon the others. For Spanish mentality Miguel de Unamuno is one of such "dominant influences".

In Foreign Language Teaching the use of such masterpieces of literary texts, as *Dos madres / Two Mothers* by the great Spanish thinker Miguel de Unamuno, in combination with the achievements of modern argumentation theory does enrich humanistic approach to Foreign Language Teaching.

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ON THE PUBLIC ACKNOWLEDGMENT
OF THE ANALYTIC-SYNTHETIC DISTINCTION

MICHEL DUFOUR

The debate about the reliability of the analytic-synthetic distinction has a long story, for several connected controversies are similar enough to give the impression of a single epic. During the Classical Age it was central to philosophical debates about the theory of knowledge and especially the relations between concepts or "ideas". Last century, it had its own "linguistic turn" and became rather part of the philosophy of language for it appeared mostly relevant to semantics since depending on the concept of meaning.

Contemporary text-books often introduce the analytic-synthetic distinction by means of the common distinction made between statements true "by definition" and statements empirically true, either by experience or hear-say. It is worth notice that the same examples are often used to illustrate or illuminate a definition which, at first, may look a bit obscure. The fact that people generally agree that the truth of the examples of analytic statements has something specific is interpreted as evidence of the acknowledgement of a radical difference between analytic truths – also said to be self-obvious – and the others. This paper focuses on the question of the obviousness claimed for analytic truths, an important point in the debates following the seminal paper claiming to dissolve the analytic-synthetic distinction, namely Quine's celebrated *Two dogmas of Empiricism* (1951).

Both the classical and the contemporary approaches set the problem at a high level of abstraction. The fist one – at least in Kant's wake – by asking if some truths are purely conceptual, when the second, influenced by the analytic philosophy, wonders if a statement can be true only in virtue of its meaning, that is from the impersonal point of view of the semantic of a language. But it seems that the issue of analyticity needs a more pragmatic solution, for it is easy to find examples where users of a same language disagree about the analyticity of a statement. In other words, it happens that statements claimed to be analytic are not acknowledged as such by everybody. Is this disagreement just an accidental misunderstanding or is it meaningful for the very analytic-synthetic distinction? Hence a puzzling question: what would happen if nobody actually grants the analyticity of a proposition previously claimed to be analytic? This may be the case, for instance, if a new generation does not hold as analytic a statement held as such by an older generation. Here, two extreme views can be opposed: on the one hand an objectivist conception holding analyticity to be independent from anybody's opinion (this could happen on a strict interpretation of analyticity, "depends only on the meaning of words") and, on the other, a relative-epistemic view saying that "propositions are analytic only for those who think they are". Ac-

cordingly, only the objectivist has to face the possibility of the paradoxical case of an ana-
lytic proposition that nobody acknowledges as such.

But its impossibility in the relative-epistemic view does not entail that analyticity is a
subjective and contingent notion. It rather suggests a conception of analyticity less bold
than the objectivist, and then universalist, view claiming that any rational being should ac-
knowledge it, for it demands to make an explicit existential statement requiring that to be
analytic a proposition must be acknowledged as such at least by someone.

Up to now, almost nothing has been said about the other criteria allowing the ana-
lytic-synthetic distinction. This leaves open the possibility of a denial of the analyticity of a
statement by everybody, or at least by all living people.

Two classical views

As this paper is not intended to bring a contribution to the history of ideas but to discuss a
point from a philosophical point of view, we shall briefly examine only two of the classical
views about analyticity. More historical details can be found in J. Proust's book (Proust
1986). We chose these examples not only because of their famous conception of analytic-
ity but also because it is somewhat different from more contemporary views. However, our
crucial question can already be raised here.

Let us turn first to Leibniz's version, strongly connected with some major claims of
his philosophy of science and truth. Although he brought numerous contributions to the
scientific revolution of his time, Leibniz kept on sticking to the ancient and medieval view
of science, understood as *scientia* based on certainty and demonstration, as shown in the
introduction to his encyclopaedic project where science is defined as «certain knowledge
of true propositions» (Leibniz 1961: 43). Accordingly, in a perfect science no room is left
for uncertainty and induction since demonstration (deductive proof) remains the very
model of scientific reasoning.

In his famous paper on *First truths* (Leibniz 1976), Leibniz makes a distinction be-
tween these truths which «predicate something of themselves or deny the opposite of its op-
posite» and all the others which can be reduced to the first ones by means of definitions or
a conceptual analysis. Since first truths are self-predicating, they and the truths of the same
kind (definitions, truths set by conceptual analysis) amount to identities. Very explicitly,
Leibniz remains faithful to the metaphorical Aristotelian formulation, still popular at his
time, saying that in any of those truths «the predicate or consequent always inheres in the
subject or antecedent».

In the case of first truths, the identity is plain. But the germane truths can also be seen
as (partial) identities since the metaphorical "inclusion" of the predicate into the subject
amounts to an identity between the predicate and part of the subject, a "part" being, for in-
stance, a property.

Leibniz's celebrated project of a universal language (the famous Universal Characteristics) intended to bring about universal understanding, peace, friendship, etc. by making any talk clear. It largely relied on the project of discovering truth by analysis, that is by the acknowledgement of "identities". But this is not always easy when you take into account another Leibnizian dichotomy between the various truths.

When the distinction between first and second truths is logical – since reasoning consists in making connections between ideas and judgements – the other one is rather epistemic: it separates rational truths, which are necessary, from factual truths which are contingent. Rational truths are themselves of two kinds: some are "eternal" (including the truths of logics, geometry and metaphysics) when the others are "positive". Positive truths are chosen by God – for instance the laws of nature – and we can learn them *a priori* or *a posteriori*.

Although he claims that all truths are necessary, Leibniz makes an important difference between rational and factual ones: the chain of identities, the chain followed by what he calls "analysis", is finite in the case of rational truths but infinite in the case of factual truths. Hence, the latter are contingent only for men since God knows their "demonstration" and, therefore, their necessity, both logical and ontological.

So, Leibniz makes only an epistemic distinction between "analytic" and factual truths since what makes "A is B" analytic is the possibility for human beings to know the "identity" between being A and being B. To use a more contemporary expression, but going back to the Leibnizian idea of substitution *salva veritate*, an analytic proposition sets an equivalence (rather than an identity) between being A and being B. But Leibniz makes a clear distinction between what we can call "human analyticity" and "metaphysical analyticity": to be humanly analytic a true proposition must link predicate and subject (or at least part of the subject) by a chain of identities which is not too long for the limited human mind. Otherwise, only God can perceive its analyticity.

And this answers our paradox. If you grant that God is "someone", the possibility of an analytic proposition that no one would acknowledge as such is precluded. Accordingly, what we have called the existential requirement about analyticity, namely the existence of at least one rational being acknowledging the analyticity of the statement is satisfied in Leibniz. At least God – supposed to be a perfectly rational being – knows! But Leibniz's metaphysics allows that no human being acknowledges the analyticity of an analytic statement. This case is even very common since it happens with any factual statement.

In classical philosophy, the analytic-synthetic distinction is often associated with Kant. This notion is even fundamental in his philosophy since at the root of his theory of knowledge we find the famous "synthetic *a priori*", depending on this distinction.

In the introduction to the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant defines an analytic statement as a statement where «predicate B belongs to the subject A as something that is included (but *hidden* or *implicit*) in concept A» (Kant 1986: § 4). On the contrary, a statement B is synthetic if and only if «B is outside of concept A, although it has a connexion with it».

In a very Leibnizian tone, Kant adds that a statement is analytic « when the connection between subject and predicate is thought by identity ». Here again, the relation of identity is at the root of the notion of analyticity.

It is important to stress that Kant's analyticity is explicitly a matter of thought: it is not objective in the sense of independent of the activity of the mind. Moreover, the *Critique of Pure Reason* being a book about the human mind, a call to God's knowledge would not be relevant to make a decision about the possibility of an analytic statement that no human being would acknowledge.

However, an aspect of Kant's text deserves attention. Kant makes a double shift (forwards and then backwards) from a logical point of view – since analyticity is introduced as the property of a judgment – to a psychological stance since he claims that the link between subject and predicate is *thought* by an impersonal mind. Although Kant sometimes supports an anti-psychologist view of logic – for instance in his *Logic* (Kant 2007: 12) – he assumes here a more psychological stance, even if the psychology he is dealing with is transcendental and not empirical. In the context of his research for universal *a priori* properties of the human mind, this double move from logic to psychology suggests a strong connection between logic and rational psychology which makes impossible an analytic judgment without a rational mind expressing it. Hence, the impossibility of an analytic statement that nobody – no human mind – acknowledges as such. This is why discussing the empirical possibility of a punctual mistake or disagreement about the analyticity of a statement would even be irrelevant to his normative project. Moreover, the question of border cases – judgements that could be both analytic and synthetic – cannot be raised since the analytic-synthetic distinction is based on the application of the exclusive inside/outside dichotomy to the relation between predicate and subject. However, the puzzling concept of "synthetic a priori" may well appear as a kind of monster belonging to both sides.

But Kant's examples do raise the question. He contends that "Every body is extended" is analytic and "Every body is heavy" is synthetic. Both judgments are loaded with the physics (the "natural philosophy") of Kant's time, the necessity of the extension of a body being the topic of an ongoing debate. Thinking that extension is obviously the most essential property of matter, Descartes identified it as *res extensa*. But impenetrability, not extension, was the most essential property of any material thing according to Newton whose law of gravitation quantifies the universal synthetic truth that "Every body is heavy". And although Kant remains faithful to Descartes in writing that the "decomposition of the concept of body" leads to extension, nowadays we may be doubtful since microphysics has blurred the very notions of body and extension. Does the analysis of the concept of body still lead to extension, especially when applied to micro objects? One of the problems with this question is that the very concept of "body" sounds old fashioned and even slightly irrelevant in some fields of physics. The analyticity of Kant's example may have become contextual and, perhaps, even open to disagreement.

However, Kant's view about analyticity is not that simple, for he allows the possibility of a disagreement, doubt, or ignorance about the analyticity of a statement since the in-

clusion of the predicate in the subject may not be salient. It may be only implicit, hidden (*versteckte Weise*). And this is why an analytic judgement is "explicative" and, therefore, according to the etymology of the word, requires an "unfolding" of the subject. This is not the case with a synthetic judgement which is "extensive". And so, even if you accept the inside/outside alternative as the only possible model for the relation between subject and predicate, the fact that this relation may be hidden can make somebody hesitate or disagree about the right option. The analyticity of a judgment may not be obvious, and people may be wrong about it. Why not everybody?

Finally, according both to Leibniz and Kant a statement can be analytic without being acknowledged as such by someone. But Kant does not call to God's eye view to explain how a statement can be analytic even if everybody denies it: his normative philosophy of rationality offers no *a priori* reason to preclude this empirical possibility opened by the fact that analyticity can be only implicit.

New views on an ancient topic

Leaving aside some important contributions from the XIXth century, let us turn now to last century debates. Now, the key-words have become "meaning" and "statement", rather than "concept" and "judgment".

The most influential challenge to the analytic-synthetic distinction comes from Quine's answers to Carnap, especially in his famous paper *Two dogmas of empiricism* (Quine 1951), assaulting the analytic-synthetic distinction on the basis of the following definition: «A statement is analytically true if it is true only by virtue of its meaning alone». This definition, coming from Carnap (1956), reflects an important shift in the concept of analyticity: divorced from rational psychology it got married with semantics.

Quine's major objective is ontological: he claims there are no analytic statements since there is no such thing as those mysterious metaphysical entities called "meanings", making some statements true independently of any fact about the world. His target is not only analyticity but a cluster of concepts circularly connected, for one explains the other. Among them, we find analyticity, synonymy, necessity, meaning. For instance, the notion of meaning can be explained by claiming that words and statements have translations, or synonyms, sharing with them something that is their meaning. And the test establishing a sameness of meaning, a synonymy, depends on the possibility to substitute one expression to the other without changing the truth value or the reference of the expression. This is why Quine's various strictures on synonymy and analyticity are driven from the successful, or unsuccessful, effects of substitutions on the truth of propositions supposed to be analytic. Of course, the concept and the test for synonymy reminds us of Leibniz's analyticity based on "identity". Finally, claiming to have shown that none of the suspect notions – "true by defi-

nition", synonymy, necessity – can make sense of how a statement can be true in virtue of its meaning alone, Quine holds that the analytic-synthetic distinction is nothing but a dogma.

Quine (1960) grants the possibility of a disagreement about the analyticity of a statement and explains it may happen if people attribute different meanings to a statement or a word, or misunderstand its meaning. And since analyticity is just a semantic notion, no conclusion can be drawn about the status of a statement from such a disagreement: the claim that a statement is analytic is no warrant it is.

As Leibniz, Quine makes an important distinction between several kinds of analytic propositions. Leibniz made a distinction between truths which are a matter of logic or geometry or metaphysics and the truths he called "positive" (the truths chosen by God). Quine makes a distinction between logical truths (tautologies) and another class of true statements, including the celebrated "No bachelor is married", held to be analytic but not in virtue of God's choice but of a human choice, namely the conventional definition of "bachelor".

According to Quine, except in the case of a stipulative definition, synonymy set by convention relies on prior relations of synonymy. In this case, the analyticity of the statement is not established and the possibility of an explanatory regression is open. The case of a stipulative definition does not fare better since the truth of such a statement cannot be established or warranted for ever by a *fiat* for this (new) meaning may have to be re-evaluated.

Moreover, a synonymy based on the interchange of words is possible only when relativized to a language. Granting that two terms may not be perfectly synonymous if their connotations, poetical flavour, etc. are taken into account, Quine wonders if interchangeability *salva veritate* is a sufficient condition for what he calls "cognitive synonymy", that is a synonymy such that an analytic statement can be reduced to a logical truth by substitution of synonym for synonym. Again, this test reminds us of the Leibnizian derivative truths, reducible to first truths. Unfortunately, Quine says, the agreement of two terms by coextension may rest not on their meaning but on an accidental matter of fact, as in the case of "creature with a heart" and "creature with a kidney". So, substitutability *salva veritate* – at least in the case of an extensional language – is generally not a sufficient condition for synonymy. Therefore, more has to be said to make substitution a sufficient condition for (cognitive) synonymy and this is the path leading to Quine's holism, no meaning being self-sufficient but depending on all the other statements. This would refute the view that synonymy holds by virtue of meaning *alone* and not by virtue of shared information.

On this ground, Quine claims that no truth is *a priori*: any truth may fail, including logical truths. And bachelors may be married and bodies not extended. But we can have, and do have, some favourite truths, the last ones to surrender. And the statements we make true by definition are true as long as we want them to last. And a statement that looks analytic is not necessarily true but only as long as we want to hold it necessarily true. Finally, Quine's answer to our leading question is that it is impossible that an analytic statement is not held, or has not been held analytic by someone since analyticity is made by us.

Replies and comments

Grice and Strawson's common reply (1956) to Quine puts forth the fact that when people use the analytic-synthetic distinction they apply it to more or less the same cases, and hesitate about the same cases. Moreover, when a new case is discussed people would tend to apply the distinction in the same way: there are *kinds* of cases to which the distinction is applied, even if it is sometimes applied wrongly. They conclude that since a distinction is made you can't deny there is a distinction between analytic and synthetic statements.

This point recalls Kant's approach to analyticity for it does not pay much attention to the singularity of a possible local disagreement but rather stresses the common ability to make the distinction, and the general agreement about statements which are analytic. Grice and Strawson contest Quine's theses from the point of view of common sense. But their criticism is not based on transcendental Kantian arguments but rather on statistical, hence empirical, alleged observations. They do not resist Quine's theses head on, but accuse him to make a methodological mistake leading to wrong arguments. This mistake begins with the call to the philosophical technical notion of "cognitive synonymy" used to show that synonymy established on interchangeablility is not reliable to explain analyticity.

According to them, the trouble with Quine's argument is that instead of looking at the actual uses of the expression "means the same", he takes it to mean "coextensional" that is "true of the same objects". Quine thinks about synonymy and analyticity as logicians or philosophers do, not as lay people do. So, although he is right about the fact that coextensionality is not a sufficient condition for synonymy, he is wrong when he adopts the technical point of view of philosophers to dismiss the common use of the analytic-synthetic distinction. Synonymy is sometimes claimed for words or expressions for which the criterion of coextensionality clearly does not work or cannot be practically established. So, there is no reason to believe that the common conceptions about "sameness of meaning" should conform to the requirements of formal analysis. Finally, Grice and Strawson underline that if the notion of sentence-synonymy is to be given up as senseless, the very notion of sentence-significance should also be abandoned since we could not say if two sentences have the same meaning or not.

Finally, they conclude that Quine's holistic conception of meaning is not only consistent with, but suggests an amended account of statement-synonymy. The debate should be shifted since the main problem is not the ontological question of the existence of "meanings" but the meaning of correlated terms as "synonymous" or "means the same". A clear distinction between the philosophical and the "common" uses of these notions should be made.

In a defence of Quine, Harman (1967) grants that the philosophical talk about "sameness of meaning" differs from ordinary talk, since philosophers take synonymy to hold by virtue of meaning alone and not by virtue of shared information or background or peripheral information. But he objects that Grice and Strawson are weakening Quine's thesis when they put on a par the philosophical and the common use of words or expressions like "synonym"

or "mean the same". From the philosophical technical point of view, what is at stake is the claim made by proponents of the analytic-synthetic distinction when they argue that the truth expressed by some statements can be explained by the very notion of meaning : clearly, to support the analytic-synthetic distinction amounts to the claim that in some cases (the analytic case) meaning alone can justify this truth.

Harman's argues that Grice and Strawson's objections are misplaced. The empirical fact that between different kinds of terms, or statements, people acknowledge or feel a difference fitting more or less the analytic-synthetic distinction is not a decisive point. This distinction should stay a technical matter linked to the very possibility that the truth of a statement depends only on the meaning of their terms. Therefore, it is not relevant to criticize Quine's approach on the ground that his view of synonymy is too narrow. According to Harman, the fact that some people may classify old, or new, cases as analytic or synthetic is no evidence that the distinction they make is the same as the distinction made by philosophers to try to explain the concept of meaning. To believe that it is one and the same distinction amounts to a circular argument between the existence of analytic truths and their obviousness.

As Quine, Harman does not deny that some truths may appear analytic, but unlike Strawson, Grice and, for instance, Putnam (1975 a), he resists the confusion of an epistemic analyticity (i.e a felt analyticity) with the philosophers'technical one. This distinction between the epistemic and the semantic or philosophical definition of analyticity has clearly some bearing on the acceptability of the empirical obviousness of analyticity – i.e. an epistemic notion – as a criterion to make sense of the analytic-synthetic distinction for it immediately raises a methodological question about the relevance of personal feelings about the status of some statements to make a decision about the possibility of a statement "true by virtue of meaning alone". And if feelings do not matter, calling to the celebrated "unmarried bachelor" or "extended body" to make people understand the meaning of "analytic" may be confusing.

If the epistemic and the philosophical notions have to be kept apart, the case of philosophers who are prone to identify both notions is troublesome, for Harman claims that taking into account the epistemic version of analyticity amounts to claiming that, nowadays, there are still witches, but witches without supernatural powers. Hopefully some of those philosophers have changed their minds. After having accepted a distinction in the psychological impact of some statements as evidence of understanding the analytic-synthetic distinction, they finally changed their minds when they discovered that statements they believed analytic were synthetic in other contexts. They became sceptic about the distinction or, at least, about its generality and its stability.

A clear cut distinction between the two notions of analyticity makes possible that nobody acknowledges as (epistemically) analytic a (philosophically) analytic statement, or as synthetic a synthetic statement! But although the distinction between the philosophical and the epistemic notion points at a possible equivocation, the use of different criteria allows clearing it up. And for each type of analyticity, someone will be required to decide if a particular statement is or is not analytic according to such or such criterion. This double analyticity, requiring dif-

ferent types of assessments, possibly made by different people, reminds us of Leibniz's two judgments (human and divine) making the distinction between rational and factual truths.

Finally, Harman suggests that the success of the analytic-synthetic distinction may be the result of a confusion taking a mere similarity in meaning for a strict identity. Instead of taking into account that we slightly adjust the meaning of our terms in a changing context, for instance to optimize the understanding, to improve a translation, etc. the proponents of the analytics-synthetic distinction take it the other way. They hold that since there is no change of meaning in various situations, some conceptual relations are unaffected by changing situations and, therefore, depend only on what has not changed, namely the unchanging meaning of the terms used.

Granting the distinction between epistemic and semantic analyticity, we may wonder if the conclusions drawn from one point of view have no bearing on the conclusions coming from the other. In other words, how far can we go in divorcing the two approaches conflated by the proponents of the analytic-synthetic distinction? This question has an echo in the ambiguity that we found in Kant. We remember that he uses a situation which seems strictly logical (the inclusion of a predicate into a subject) to draw an *a priori* conclusion about the structure of the human mind. This move can be understood if we remember that, in his time, the laws of logic were commonly interpreted as laws of the human thought. Hence the acceptability of the shift from logical properties (about the structure of concepts) to normative psychological properties, a move typical of Kant's transcendental philosophy, also found in his introduction to the analytic-synthetic distinction even if, following his own terminology, the concepts involved in analytic statements are not always transcendental. Kantian analyticity is even based on the link between logic and (transcendental) psychology, as shown by the fact that his analyticity is not a matter of meaning but of thought.

Recently, Boghossian (1996) used the possibility to split analyticity into an epistemic and a semantic notion, to hold a mixed view. He claims that in spite of what he calls the "metaphysical" view undermined by Quine, an epistemic version could be saved. His thrust is that, in some cases, the meaning of my words derives from my intentions as to how to use them; and this would be enough to assert that when used in this last way the resulting statement is analytic since true independently of anything about the world.

In his reply to Boghossian, Harman maintains that you can't radically separate the two notions: to hold the epistemic view amounts to holding the metaphysical one. The main problem with Boghossian's stance would be that deriving the meaning of a word from an intention amounts to derive it from a postulate or a convention, and this is not enough to assure the truth of an assertion.

It seems that Grice-Strawson and Harman agree that part of the misunderstanding and, perhaps, of the very problem of analyticity lies in the divergence between Quine's technical criticism and the intuitions of ordinary people. But is it true that ordinary people have intuitions about analyticity? This question leads us back to the first one we asked about the

obviousness of the analyticity of a statement. This may appear as a mere factual detail of this very abstract debate, but it may matter for there is a strong disagreement about it. Grice and Strawson claim that ordinary people can easily be brought to make and understand the analytic-synthetic distinction. But Harman (1994) challenges this point by arguing that ordinary people do not make this distinction «difficult to teach to students, as they confuse it with all sorts of other distinctions». And this raises again the very practical question of the criteria acceptable and actually used to qualify a statement. If analyticity is introduced to students, or other people, by a definition illustrated by examples such as "Every body is extended" or "All bachelors are unmarried", a popular approval both about the truth and the specificity of these statements will support primarily the epistemic approach and only indirectly the semantic (philosophical) one. And this will support both the Grice-Strawson's view about a wide acknowledgment of the analytic-distinction, but also Harman's point since acknowledging the truth and the obviousness of some statements does not entail that the philosophical meaning of "analytic" is understood. When you read the papers of the various authors discussed here, nothing very clear or precise is said about the practice and interpretation of this kind of "experimentation". Philosophers stick to their definitions, but when they talk about the public understanding of analyticity nothing is very clear about its expression and its interpretation.

A trouble for the analytic-synthetic distinction – unless you anticipate it with a contextualized notion, for instance a monster like "local analyticity" – is that you may get both a wide assent to the analyticity of a statement and some suspicion, usually expressed by "Isn't it context dependent"? Putnam (1975 a) writes about «border cases» but tries to improve this sweeping formulation by adding: «what matters is that the AS distinction is construed as a dichotomy». Rather than universal, border or mixed cases, some statements seem clearly analytic in some contexts and clearly synthetic in others. Hence a possible ambivalence about their status: they are obviously analytic (or synthetic), but in a limited area or for the time being. And this may be the reason why metaphorical meanings are sometimes devastating for analyticity.

So, the analyticity of a statement may appear both obvious and relative. Hence a situation compatible with Grice-Strawson's view and Harman's as well: people often grant the obvious truth of statements like "Every body is extended", "Iron is a metal", "Cats are animals", "Women are females" and so forth, but remain suspicious, foreseeing the possibility that in some weird cases this is not true. And this may be another reason why many authors, including Leibniz and Kant, acknowledge that analytic statements are easy to grasp but sometimes have a dark side, hidden or accessible only to another eye.

The analytic style in argumentation and dialogue

For dialogue or argumentation theory, what are the consequences of the analyticity of some statements? First, we know that the analytic-synthetic distinction is not sponta-

neously made by lay people and that there may be some disagreements about it. But the obvious truth of some statements can explain the style of some dialogues or arguments – let us say they are "analytic" – which can be recognized in some fields of human communication. Let us sketch some of their fundamental features.

The statements taken to be analytic are common dogmatic truths and are presupposed to be shared by any people intervening in the verbal exchange. Of course, the word "dogmatic" should be given its ancient meaning of "systematic", any pejorative connotation being left aside. Analytic statements can be rightly called "first truths" as in Leibniz (that is non derivable from other propositions) or "central truths" – to use Quine's metaphor which has the virtue to raise the pragmatic question: «central to what or whom? »[1].

Leaving aside the problem of determining if these statements are accepted because true or held true because previously accepted, it is important to stress that they are looked upon as lasting definitions established by a set of necessary and sufficient conditions. Granting that none of the terms involved in these statements is ambiguous, situations like Harman's witches without supernatural powers should be prevented. These strict conditions of analyticity set a frame, working as a normative system, whose typical stability will make its confrontation with empirical truths more salient.

The previous conditions remind the first steps in the building of an axiomatic system, but also the requirements expected by classical philosophers from a "perfect language" as the project that Leibniz associated with his optimistic "Calculemus!", supposed to solve any problem in human communication. An analytic system actually works very much like a "calculus" or a systematic argumentative field where deductive proofs are supposed to lead to the indisputable settlement of a controversy.

Analytic statements work as principles and so, cannot be challenged without threatening the stability of the whole system. Moreover, an assault or a doubt about the necessity of one of them would have devastating inferential consequences since analytic propositions like "A is B" can also be used as inferential rules making elementary arguments like "x is A, therefore x is B" deductively valid.

As suggested by Quine's argument, denying that some statements are analytic or necessarily true allows asking for some new or renewed evidence of their truth. In this case, a dialogue can always be reopened and an argument may become endless since a doubt can always be raised about the truth of any justification or the validity of any inference. A well-known strategy to avoid it is asking for rigid definitions to block the meaning of key terms and prevent any regression in the justification of inferential moves. But to use this strategy amounts to acknowledging that the meaning of the redefined words or expressions was floating or that not everybody may take an alleged analytic statement to be analytic.

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[1] Putnam (1975 b: 253-257) discusses it briefly.

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Negative Oppositions in Argumentation

Maria Cristina Gatti

1. *Introductory remarks*

The aim of this paper is to present the first results of an ongoing research, which intends to bring to light the relevant contribution of negation to the structural organization of argument schemes.

The theoretical perspective here adopted will be the approach to the analysis of argument schemes developed within the Argumentum Model of Topics (AMT), characterized by a particular explanatory capacity in eliciting the inferential as well as the endoxical components hidden in argumentative moves (Rigotti 2006; Rigotti & Greco Morasso 2006; Rigotti 2007; Rigotti 2008, this volume; Rigotti & Greco Morasso, forthcoming). In this approach the relevant contribution of the Topic tradition to an exhaustive identification of the mostly implicit components of an argumentative move is presented in all its heuristic force, showing at the same time its strict connection with the contemporary debate on argumentation schemes, in particular with the theoretical and methodological perspectives of the Pragma-Dialectical account (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 1992; van Eemeren & Houtlosser 2004).

In outlining the particular ontologico-semantic organization of the argumentative moves structured on negative oppositions we intend to bring to light how insightful it is from a methodological point of view to adopt an in-depth semantic analysis for the individuation of the inferential connections activated by the argument (see paragraph 2.1), as well as for the identification of the conditions to be met for its valid or fallacious use (see paragraphs 2.2 and 3).

2. Loci ab oppositis *in the taxonomy of loci*

Negation can affect an argumentative move in different ways. It can occur in the standpoint, which in this case corresponds to a negative state of affairs, for whose acceptance by the addressee the arguer intends to argue (*I am not going out. It's raining*). It can appear in the argument (*You are wrong. She is not at home now*), when negative is the state of affairs proposed in order to support the reasonableness of the claim. Negation can, again, occur both in the standpoint as well as in the argument (*Mary doesn't vote. She isn't yet eighteen*), when both states of affairs presented in the claim and in the argument are negative.

Negation can indeed affect the structuration of an argumentative move still in a different way, when it intervenes in the form of a negative opposition in shaping the semantico-ontological relation which links the standpoint to its argument.

In relation to the 'topical potential', i.e. the set of argumentative moves an arguer has at disposal to prove the acceptability of his claims (van Eemeren & Houtlosser 2002: 139), negative oppositions are extremely significant for the role they play in the constitution of a considerable number of *tópoi*, known as *loci* from opposites (*ab oppositis*), which according to the classical taxonomy belong to the broader class of extrinsic loci.

Before taking into account the particular inner structure of this sub-group of loci, it may be useful to outline briefly the Aristotelian notion of *locus*[1], characterised by the author in his *Topics* "as a method for finding out an appropriate argument in relation to any standpoint" (*Topica* 100a 1, Ross 1958 ed.; Rigotti 2008)[2].

Assuming as point of departure the deep understanding of the nature of loci developed within the Argumentum Model of Topics, a *locus* can be described as a "semantico-ontological relation linking the class of states of affairs to which the standpoint belongs to another class of states of affairs in the same or in another possible world" (Rigotti 2008, § 1)[3].

Each semantico-ontological relation corresponding to a locus – or using the Medieval scholars' terminology each *habitudo* (Rigotti 2008, § 1) – generates a series of inferential connections or maxims (*maximae*)[4], each of which activates a logical form of *modus ponens* or *tollens* (Rigotti 2008, § 3)[5].

The inferential dimension so far described does not exhaust the structural organization of a locus. Its inferential component remains indeed unactivated, if it is not integrated through a further component, this time of endoxical nature – in Pragma-dialectics characterised as "material" (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 2004) – which is responsible of the persuasive effectiveness of the argumentative move. In order to meet the audience demand (van Eemeren & Houtlosser 2002), the inferential process generated by the maxims of the locus has in fact to be anchored to opinions (*endoxa*)[6] already accepted by the audience, entering the cultural *common ground* (Clark 1996) the arguer shares with his addressee[7].

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[1] For a deeper understanding of the proper nature of this not simple notion see Rigotti, this volume § 3 and § 4.

[2] On the conceptual and theoretical framework of Topics and its relevance for contemporary Argumentation Theory see Rigotti 2006, 2007.

[3] This is the first of the three levels distinguished by the Argumentum scholars within the procedural component of an argument scheme (Rigotti & Morasso, forthcoming § 3).

[4] In this sense a locus can be defined as "a class of maxims generated by the same ontological relation" (Rigotti & Greco Morasso, forthcoming; Rigotti 2008). In relation to the ancient notion of *maxima* the Argumentum scholars signal its closeness to the contemporary notion of procedural starting point (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 2004), to Toulmin's warrant (Toulmin 1958), to Kienpointner's Schlussregel (Kienpointner 1992) and to the notion of argumentative principle (Garssen 2001).

[5] The maxims and the logical forms activated by them are respectively the second and the third level the AMT scholars distinguish within the procedural component of an argument scheme (Rigotti & Morasso forthcoming, § 3).

[6] For Aristotle's definition of *endoxon* see *Topics* 100b.21 (Ross 1958 ed.).

[7] We are surely indebted to the Argumentum researchers for the reintegration in argumentation theory of this fundamental Aristotelian notion, practically neglected in the tradition of topics, probably because of the lack of explicit examples of endoxa in Aristotle's *Topics*, where it is left to the reader to reconstruct them from the listed *tópoi* (Rigotti & Morasso, forthcoming § 3.5).

The *endoxon* intervenes in the argumentative strategy as a general premise, whose association to a second premise of factual[8] nature generates a first conclusion. This first conclusion derived from the endoxon-based line of reasoning is then exploited by the procedural component of the locus, which associates it as a minor premise to the maxim, which plays the role of major premise, obtaining thus the final conclusion, corresponding to the standpoint or claim of the argumentative move.

The organizational structure of a locus may be considered so far outlined in its main features. We can now turn to the specific group of loci at issue in our work, loci from opposites, traditionally typologized under the broader group of extrinsic loci.

2.1 Intrinsic vs. extrinsic loci

In the taxonomy inherited from the Topics tradition, arguments are classified according to their different proximity to the standpoint.

If we look at the way in which standpoints and arguments are linked to each other in the semantico-ontological relations at the basis of a locus, their different kind of proximity allows to identify two main groups, corresponding to the ancient distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic loci[9].

In his *Summulae Logicales* Peter of Spain, a Medieval scholar we are particularly indebted to for the systematization of the Aristotelian doctrine of Topics, describes this distinction as follows:

> Locus differentia maximae dividitur per locum intrinsecum, extrinsecum et medium. *Locus intrinsecus* est ille, quando sumitur argumentum ab eis quae sunt desubstantia rei, ut a definitione. *Locus extrinsecus* est ille, quando sumitur argumentum ab eis, quae omnino separata sunt a substantia rei, ut ab oppositis, ut si quaeretur utrum Socrates sit albus et probetur sic «Socrates non est niger, ergo Socrates est albus.
>
> (*Summulae logicales*, 5.08, Bochenski 1947 ed., 46)
>
> [The locus difference of maxim is divided into intrinsic, extrinsic and middle locus. The intrinsic locus is that one, in which case the argument is taken from factors pertaining to the substance of the situation (in the

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[8] The identification within the "material" component of endoxical and factual premises highlights a relevant aspect of arguments, that is their context-boundedness (Rigotti 2006; 2007). They are always embedded in a specific interaction field, situated within a broader communication context which determines their argumentative efficacy. On communication context see Rigotti & Rocci 2006.

[9] The topical tradition forsees also a third group of loci, called *medi* or *mixti*, situated at the border (*in confinio*) between the intrinsic and extrinsic ones. With respect to the two interpretations of the Aristotelian Topics offered respectively by Cicero (Stump 2004b ed.) and by Themistius, the taxonomy of loci in intrinsic, extrinsic and complex adopted by the Argumentum scholars is closer to Themistius'interpretation, followed by Boethius (Stump 2004a ed.); see Rigotti & Greco Morasso 2006.

standpoint), as the locus from definition. The extrinsic locus is that one, in which case the argument is taken from factors that are completely separated from the substance of the situation (in the standpoint), as the locus from opposites; thus if it would be asked whether Socrates is white, it would be considered right also this: «Socrates is not black, then he is white».]

In intrinsic loci arguments refer to states of affairs that are constitutive of the possible fragment of world mentioned in the standpoint or that coexist with it (Rigotti 2006; Rigotti 2007; Rigotti & Greco Morasso 2006). Exploiting the linguistic notion of syntagm, opposed to that of paradigm, introduced in modern linguistics by Structuralism to differentiate the relations between contiguous elements *in praesentia* from the relations of alternativeness or *in absentia* (Seiler 1996; Rigotti 1992), the semantico-ontological relations at the basis of intrinsic loci are of syntagmatic nature, since in this case the arguments evoke aspects that are ontologically related to the syntagmatic context of the thesis[10].

Let's consider for example the following argumentative move *This Scotch whisky is highly flavoured. It is made with malted barley dried over a peat fire.* The high quality of the product mentioned in the standpoint is supported through the particularly high quality of its material cause, a factor which is evidently ontologically linked in a direct way to the fragment of reality referred to in the standpoint, inasmuch as it conditions it.

Let's consider now a further argumentative move, seemingly very simple *Our daughter did not pass her last exam. Then she failed*! and let's compare it with the previous one. In this example the proximity of the argument to the standpoint is not the same. The state of affairs mentioned in the standpoint, to fail an exam, is in a relation of alternativeness to the situation of passing an exam, negated in the argument, i.e. it is linked to it through a relation *in absentia*, more precisely of contrary opposition. Linguistically speaking the aspect evoked by the argument is here ontologically related to the paradigmatic context of the claim (Rigotti 2006; Rigotti 2007).

Contrary opposition represents together with contradictory, privative and relative opposition one of the different negative oppositions that loci from opposites are built on; they include loci from contraries, from relatives, from privatives and from contradictories as further sub-groups. Peter of Spain introduces them as follows:

Quid sit locus extrinsecus dictum est prius. Locorum extrinsecorum alius ab oppositis, alius a maiore, alius a similitudine, alius a proportione, alius a transumptione, alius ab auctoritate. Item oppositionum quattuor sunt

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[10] For a typology of arguments included in the group of extrinsic or paradigmatic loci, see Rigotti 2006; Rigotti 2007; Rigotti & Greco Morasso 2006.

species, scilicet: oppositio relativa, oppositio contraria, oppositio privativa, oppositio contradictoria.

(*Summulae logicales*, 5.32, Bochenski 1947 ed., 53)

[What has to be meant for extrinsic locus was previously said. Extrinsic loci include locus from opposites, locus from major and minor, locus from similarity, locus from proportion, locus from metaphor, locus from authority. And so four are the species of opposition, i.e. relative opposition, contrary opposition, privative opposition, contradictory opposition.]

It comes here clearly to light the not secondary role played by the Aristotelian doctrine of oppositions[11] for the constitution of a considerable number of extrinsic loci.

In this work we have chosen to focus our attention on locus from contraries. In *Summulae Logicales*, after some preliminary words on the negative opposition of contrariety and on the difference between mediate and immediate contraries:

Contrarietas est contrariorum oppositio, ut albus-niger. Et sciendum quod quaedam sunt contraria mediata, ut albus-niger, inter quae sunt medii colores, quaedam sunt immediata, ut sanum et aegrum circa animal.

(*Summulae logicales*, 5.34, Bochenski 1947 ed., 53)

[Contrariety is the opposition of contraries, such as black-white. And it must be known that some are mediate contraries, such as black-white, between which there are middle colours, and others are immediate, such as healthy and sick with respect to the animal.]

the author passes to the definition of locus from contraries, which is characterised by describing first of all the *habitudo*, that is the semantico-ontological relation at its basis, and then the inferential connection or maxim generated by it, which can activate different logical forms, depending on the constructive or destructive use; with respect to the destructive use of the maxim, the validity conditions are specified for its non fallacious application, restricted to the case of immediate contraries:

Locus a contrariis est habitudo unius contrariorum ad reliquum; constructive sic: «hoc animal est sanum, ergo non est aegrum», vel sic: «hoc corpus est album, ergo non est nigrum». Locus a contrariis – maxima: posito uno contrariorum ab eodem removetur reliquum. Destructive tenet in contrariis immediatis cum constantia subiecti, ut «hoc animal non est sanum, ergo est aegrum». *Locus a contrariis immediatis* – maxima: remoto uno contrariorum immediatorum ponitur reliquum manente subiecto.

(*Summulae logicales*, 5.34, Bochenski 1947 ed., 53)

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[11] For a further analysis of negative oppositions, see also § 2.2.

[*Locus from contraries* is the relation of one of the contraries to the other one; constructively so: «this animal is healthy, then it is not sick», or so: «this body is white, then it is not black». Locus from contraries – maxim: given one of the contraries, the other one is excluded from it. Destructively it holds with respect to immediate contraries with the same subject, such as «this animal is not healthy, then it is sick». *Locus from immediate contraries* – maxim: excluded one of the immediate contraries, the other one is given, remaining unchanged the subject.]

Peter of Spain's words are an emblematic documentation of the necessity of a semantic approach not only for the identification of the ontology of the standpoint, but also for the elicitation of the condition to be met for a valid use of the locus itself.

Before passing to consider in the next paragraph the different types of semantic paradigm generated by contraries – particularly interesting for the logical implications they can give rise to when submitted to negation, which are responsible for the valid or fallacious use of the locus in question – we will now outline briefly the complex inferential structure which underlies an apparently simple argumentative move as the locus from contraries proposed in our above-mentioned example.

Arguments have indeed a considerably complex inner structure, which results from the intertwining of two components, a topical and an endoxical one (Rigotti & Greco Morasso 2006; Rigotti 2006; Rigotti 2007), with distinct and complementary functions.

To represent it we adopt here the graphical notational system used within the AMT approach, which precisely identifies the maxim at work and makes explicit the point of crossing between the line of reasoning descending from the endoxon and the line of reasoning descending from the maxim.

As the diagram in Figure 1 shows, the maxim *In a contrary opposition, the truth of one extreme implies the falsity of the other one and vice versa,* directly engendered by the *locus* from contraries, intervenes as major premise in a syllogistic reasoning. In order to generate the final conclusion *Our daughter failed*, which corresponds to the standpoint to be supported, the maxim needs the following minor premise, *On occasion of our daughter's last exam it was false that she passed it*. This minor premise corresponds to the first conclusion of another syllogistic reasoning, descending fom the endoxon, *On occasion of an exam, to pass or to fail are the two mutually exclusive alternatives for a student*, which anchors the argumentative move under consideration to an opinion already accepted by the public, which belongs to the common ground the arguer shares with his addressee. It is thanks to the endoxon that the locus is able to meet the audience demand and thus to reach its persuasive effectiveness. This first conclusion of the endoxical syllogism, obtained from the endoxon through the minor premise of factual nature, *Our daughter did not pass her last exam*, is exploited by the maxim, which activates here the logical form of *modus tollendo ponens* ($P \lor Q, \neg P \vdash Q$), *In a contrary opposition the falsity of one extreme implies the truth of the other one*, valid only with immediate contraries, and generates the final conclusion, *Our daughter failed*, which coincides with the standpoint that was to be supported.

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┌─────────────────────────────────────┐
│              Endoxon                 │
├─────────────────────────────────────┤
│ On occasion of an exam, to pass or   │
│ to  fail  are  the  two  mutually    │
│ exclusive alternatives for a student │
└─────────────────────────────────────┘

┌─────────────────────────────────────┐      ┌─────────────────────────────────────┐
│           Minor Premise             │      │              Maxim                  │
├─────────────────────────────────────┤      ├─────────────────────────────────────┤
│ Our daughter did not pass her last  │      │ In a contrary opposition, the truth │
│ exam                                │      │ of an extreme implies the falsity   │
│                                     │      │ of the other one and vice versa     │
└─────────────────────────────────────┘      └─────────────────────────────────────┘

┌───────────────────────┐  ┌───────────────────────┐
│   First Conclusion     │  │    Minor Premise      │
└───────────────────────┘  └───────────────────────┘

        ┌─────────────────────────────────────┐
        │ On occasion of our daughter's last  │
        │ exam, it was false that she passed  │
        │ it                                  │
        └─────────────────────────────────────┘

        ┌─────────────────────────────────────┐
        │          Final conclusion           │
        ├─────────────────────────────────────┤
        │         Our daughter failed         │
        └─────────────────────────────────────┘
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Figure 1: *Representation of locus from contraries according to the AMT*

2.2 Negative oppositions and semantic paradigms

Before proceeding to better specify the previously mentioned conditions of applicability of the locus from the contraries, strictly bound to the logical implications which arise from the interaction of negation with the semantic paradigm of the elements in contrary opposition, it can be useful to focus our attention on the typology of negative oppositions inherited from the classical tradition and to elucidate their relation with the linguistic notion of semantic paradigm.

If we look at negative expressions such as *black-white*, *rich-poor*, *good-bad*, *odd-even*, *major-minor*, *double-half*, *hot-not hot* etc. they are not homogeneous with respect to the kind of negative opposition they manifest[12]. Negative terms can in fact oppose each other in different ways, traditionally known as correlation, contrariety and contradiction[13].

Correlatives (called by Aristotle *tà prós ti*[14]) are opposite terms connected through a relation of mutual implication: it is not possible for a given entity to be for example *major* or *double*, without being *major* or *double* of something else. We are here in front of what contemporary semantics names conversive predicates, i.e. properties which identify the same state of affairs by interpreting it in an opposite direction (Mel'čuk 1974 and 1999: 83; Gatti 1992: 172-173; Gatti 2004: 35).

Contraries (*tà enantía*[15]) are terms which oppose each other such as for example *black* to *white*, *good* to *bad*, *odd* to *even*. In some cases contraries do not admit any intermediate term, for instance a number can be either *odd* or *even*. In other cases between the two extremes of the contrary opposition it is possible to have intermediate values[16], which are sometimes lexicalized, as for instance *grey* in the opposition *black-white*.

Contradiction (*antífasis*[17]) is the most radical negative opposition. Elements in contradictory relation, i.e. *white-not white*, *odd-not odd*, *major-not major* etc., analogously to contraries and correlatives cannot be simultaneously true, according to the principle of contradiction[18], but differently from the latter, they cannot be also simultaneously false, being ruled by the law of exlcuded middle[19]. In other words the contradictory opposition cannot have mediate terms among its extremes.

Correlatives, contraries and contradictories are from a logico-semantic point of view predicates belonging to semantic paradigms (Gatti 2004: 40) of a different type.

Particularly relevant for the fallacious implications which can arise from their interaction with negation are the semantic paradigms with polarized structure generated by the contrary opposition.

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[12] In lexicology these expressions are normally reconducted to the indeed generic linguistic category of antonymy (Mel'čuk 1974 and 1999: 83-84; Gatti 1992: 172-173).

[13] The Aristotelian typology of negative oppositions, presented in *Categoriae* 10 and *De Interpretatione* 6 (Minio-Paluello 1949 ed.; Gatti 2004: 34-41) deeply influenced, through Boethius's mediation, the medieval doctrine of oppositions. The privative opposition (*stéresis*), which appears in *Categoriae*, 10, 11b 18 as a distinct group of negative opposition, denoting properties, as for example *blind* and *sighted*, which are present or absent by nature, in *Metaphysica*, I, 4, 1055a 33 (Jaeger 1957 ed.) is reconducted to the contrary opposition.

[14] See *Categoriae*, 10, 11b 18.

[15] See *Categoriae*, 10, 11b 18.

[16] See *Categoriae*, 10, 12a 1-4 and *Metaphysica*, I, 4, 1055b 2-3. We have in this case *contraria mediata*, opposed to *immediata* (*Summulae logicales*, 5.34, Bochenski 1974 ed., 53-54).

[17] See *De Interpretatione* 6, 17a 25-26.

[18] See *Metaphysica*, Γ, 6, 1011b 13-22.

[19] See *Metaphysica*, Γ, 7, 1011b 23-24.

3. *Contraries under negation and the "polarity temptation"*

The logical implications which are licensed by the denial of predicates in contrary opposition are strictly bound to the nature of the semantic paradigm contraries belong to.

It can be useful to recall here briefly the definition of semantic paradigm. As it was previously seen, a semantic paradigm is a set of predicates in relation of alternativeness (Rigotti 2005b: 73). Alternativeness implies reciprocal exclusion (Rigotti 1988: 348-349). Let's consider, for instance, the semantic paradigm of colours. If we assert that a certain colour pertains to a given entity, by uttering for example *This jacket is blue*, this implicitly excludes its being black, or white, or yellow, or any other colour included in the chromatic paradigm. On the contrary by negating the inherence of that colour to the entity under consideration through the utterance *This jacket is not blue*, it will be indeed implicitly affirmed that it can be either red, or green, or yellow or any other colour of the paradigm under consideration (Rigotti 2005b: 73-74; Gatti 2004: 41-51). Thus when a predicate belongs to a multiple paradigm, its denial implies the affirmation of the disjunction of all the other predicates in relation of alternativeness to it within the semantic paradigm:

$$\neg P \to P_1(x) \lor P_2(x) \lor P_3(x) \ldots \lor P_n(x).$$

The inner structure of a semantic paradigm significatively influences the logical entailments licensed by the interaction of negation with its elements[20]. If the paradigm is not multiple but binary, the negation of one element coincides with the affirmation of the other one in alternative to it; when we say for example that a light is not on, we evidently affirm that it is off.

Let's now turn our attention to paradigms with polarized structure, generated by the contrary opposition. With respect to them, a primary role is played by the above mentioned traditional distinction between mediate and immediate contraries, which is to abscribe to the gradable or not gradable nature of the predicates involved in the contrary opposition. If the predicates are gradable, the paradigm with polarized structure is continuous, i.e. it's possible to find intermediate scalar values between the two polarized extremes. It follows that in a multiple continuous opposition (*good-bad*, *rich-poor*, *white-black*, *friend-enemy,* etc.), the denial of one extreme does not coincide necessarily with the affirmation of the opposite one; the opposite extreme is "just one of the possible alternatives" (Rigotti 2005b: 74) offered by the continuous paradigm among other alternative values, which are situated in the intermediate zone of "neither... nor" (Sapir, 1951: 133; Gatti, 2004: 112). Thus to be not rich, or not good, or not friend does not necessarily coincide with being poor, or bad or enemy.

When the predicates in the paradigm with polarized structure are not gradable, the contraries are immediate (*odd-even*, *married-unmarried*, etc.) and in this case the negation of one extreme coincides with the affirmation of the other one, as in all binary paradigms: if for example a number is not odd, it will be even and viceversa.

The different inner structure of semantic paradigms with polarized structure becomes thus relevant for the identification of some fallacies, which arise when these paradigms are submitted to negation.

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[20] For the interaction of negation with semantic paradigms, see Gatti 2004: 47-48 and 107-118.

It is first of all necessary to notice that overlapping between semantic and lexical paradigms seldom occurs. The intermediate states between scalar values in contrary opposition are sometimes lexicalized through corresponding terms, as for instance *grey* between *white* and *black*, or *medium* between *big* and *small*, or *lukewarm* between *warm* and *cold*. In many other cases this process of lexicalization does not take place. In English there is for example no mediate term between *friend* and *enemy*, as well as in Russian between *drug* and *vrag*, or in German between *Freund* and *Feind*, or in Italian between *amico* and *nemico*, although from a semantic point of view someone who is not friend is not necessarily enemy and viceversa. Notwithstanding the fact that the semantic paradigm here in question is multiple, the absence of lexicalization of the intermediate values induces to treat it as a binary paradigm, allowing the negation of one extreme to coincide with the affirmation of the opposite one. Consequently "someone who is not friend becomes enemy and the enemy of the enemy is erroneously viewed as friend" (Rigotti 2005b: 74).

Through the previous in-depth semantic analysis of the different logical implications licensed by the interaction of negation with the various types of semantic paradigm, the validity conditions for the application of the maxims generated by the locus from contraries are now more precisely identified. It is in fact now clearer why the maxim of the locus from contraries in its destructive use is valid only for immediate contraries (*Summule logicales* 5.34, Bochenski 1947: 53).

The polarity temptation (Rigotti 2005b: 75), that is this fallacious interpretation of the logical implications deriving from the negation of mediate contraries, erroneously treated as immediate opposites, is a strategy often used at psycho-socio-political level "in the process of group constitution and identification" (Rigotti 2005b: 75; Seiler 2004)[21].

A historical documentation of the manipulative nature of this polarizing temptation can be found in our recent past, when according to the principle "The enemy of my enemy is my friend" during World War II many European countries became allies of Stalin in order to withstand Hitler's power. The historical events immediately following the Yalta Conference clearly showed how misleading this view was.

A polarized vision of the world, dichotomized between two opposite spheres, a good and a bad one, with no intermediate possibilities, although not peculiar of totalitarianism (Weiss 2005)[22], has found indeed a systematical application in totalitarian discourse[23]. We can have an example in

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[21] This fallacy, traditionally known as false-dilemma, or also as black and white fallacy, is a reasoning based on a disjunctive syllogism, proceeding from a false disjunctive premise, in which the disjuncts are not mutually exclusive elements. For a deeper insight into false-dilemma see Hamblin 1970, 45-46; Engel 1999, 140-142.

[22] As Weiss states, this axiological polarization of the world «is no peculiarity of totalitarian systems» but «the leading principle which is superimposed to every kind of political propaganda: any real propagandist simply cannot do without such a binary, Manichean approach. [...] This approach is in a trivial sense manipulative, since a dualistic view of the world excludes the existence of a third (fourth, fifth ... and n-th) referential world which belongs neither to the we-group nor to the 'others' and which has its own corresponding system of values, be it on an intermediate stage or on an independent level.» (Weiss 2005: 254). On this polarizing tendency, which «tends to force every entity [...] under a two-valued classification scheme, creating a setting where everything is black or white without the existence of shades of grey» see also Horn 2003: 270-271.

[23] For a comparison between the totalitarian discourse in Soviet and Nazi propaganda, see Weiss 2005.

the following slogans taken from Soviet propagandistic posters, appeared between the Twenties and the Forties[24]:

> Мы превращаем пустыни в цветущий край,
> они превращают города и села в пустыню.
>> [We transform deserts into a blooming region,
>> they transform cities and villages into a desert.]

> Два мира, два плана.
> Мы насаждаем жизнь, они сеют смерть.
>> [Two worlds, two plans.
>> We spread life, they sew death.]

> Тов. Ленин очищает землю от нечисти.
>> [Com. Lenin cleans the world from garbage]

> Каждый удар молота – удар врагу
>> [Every hammer blow is a blow to the enemy]

It is interesting to notice that the polar opposition *good-bad* here does not appear in explicature but is left to be inferred from the list of actions of opposite sign explicitly stated, which can be reconducted to the hyperonimical semantic paradigms of good actions – превращать пустыни в цветущий край (to transform deserts into a blooming region), насаждать жизнь (to spread life), очищать землю от нечисти (to clean the world from garbage) – and bad ones – превращать города и села в пустыню (to transform cities and villages into a desert) and сеять смерть (to sew death). The world is thus presented as divided in two groups, the world of we (мы), the good ones, which are represented through their positive activities, opposed to the world of they (они), the not good and therefore bad ones, engaged in activities of opposite sign, and which are to be rejected as enemies.

We cannot avoid to mention, finally, the manipulative exploitation of the polarity temptation at vocabulary level, emblematically described by Orwell in *Nineteen Eighty-Four* as one of the strategies foreseen in Newspeak[25] for the reduction of the horizon of thought through vocabulary reduction. But let's give the word to the author:

> Newspeak was designed not to extend but to *diminish* the range of thought,
> and this purpose was indirectly assisted by cutting the choice of words down
> to a minimum. (Orwell 1999: 313).

In this process of vocabulary reduction an important role is played by the negation of adjectives in polar opposition:

> In addition any word [...] could be negated by adding the affix –*un*. [...]
> Thus, for example, *uncold* meant 'warm' [...]. By such methods it was found

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[24] See http://www.davno.ru (last consultation December 2008).
[25] For the principles of Newspeak, see Orwell 1999: 312-326. A deep insight into новояз, the Soviet version of Newspeak, is offered in Сарнов /Sarnov 2002 and Thom 1987.

> possible to bring about an enormous diminution of vocabulary. Given for in-
> stance the word *good*, there was no need for such a word as *bad*, since the re-
> quired meaning was equally well – indeed better – expressed by *ungood*. All
> that was necessary, in any case where two words formed a natural pair of op-
> posites, was to decide which of them to suppress. *Dark*, for example, could
> be replaced by *unlight*, and *ligh*t by *undark*, according to preference. (Orwell
> 1999: 315).

The scalar nature of the adjectival forms under consideration is here evidently eluded (Gatti 2004: 68-69) and the alleged plain sinonymy of these negatively prefixed forms with their polar extreme is clearly to reconduct to a fallacious interpretation of the implications licensed by the negation of mediate contraries.

4. *Conclusions*

Much work remains to be done for a complete description of the various types of opposi-tive loci, but already from this first step of our research it is not possible to avoid to notice the heuristic validity of a semantic-oriented approach to the analysis of argumentative loci.

The doctrine of oppositions and the adoption of the notion of semantic paradigm have revealed themselves an insightful tool for the individuation of the semantico-ontological structure of the locus here at issue with respect to its paradigmatic context, as well as for the identification of the conditions to be met for its valid or fallacious use.

We wish that "the great enterprise" of the analysis of the ontologico-semantic structure of loci "that is left to the AMT team and to all welcome researchers" which will join them (Rigotti & Greco Morasso, forthcoming) might find in the considerations offered in this paper an effective, although in any case initial, contribution.

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L'Implicite – caractéristique foncière de l'argumentation littéraire

Carmen Nedelea Plesa

1. *L'objet*

L'objet de l'étude que je propose est de présenter le discours littéraire comme un discours argumentatif, dont l'argumentation est basée sur bon nombre de stratégies visant à impliciter un certain message sérieux à travers les assertions feintes par lesquelles l'auteur influence le lecteur.

2. *Le cadre théorique*

Le cadre théorique de notre démarche est la pragmatique anglaise et américaine basée sur les notions de l'intention du locuteur et l'effet chez le récepteur qui reconnaît l'intention communicative. L'approche gricéenne est basée sur la notion d'implicature et particulièrement sur les notions d'implicature conversationnelle et d'implicature conventionnelle.

Dans son analyse du statut logique du discours littéraire, Searle a montré que le locuteur d'un énoncé qui apparaît dans un discours de fiction feint de faire une assertion. Pour accomplir son acte de feindre sans intention de tromper, le locuteur accomplit effectivement un acte locutionnaire d'enonciation, ce qui permet à Searle de remarquer que si l'acte illocutionnaire est feint, l'acte d'enonciation est réel: il fait semblant de faire des assertions. Mais, à travers les assertions feintes, l'intention du locuteur consiste à fournir au lecteur un message sérieux.

Notre étude se propose de donner une réponse à cette question analysant le message sérieux de l'auteur comme un contenu implicite et le discours littéraire comme un discours argumentatif. Si une argumentation naturelle est la plupart du temps logiquement incomplète, les prémisses n'en sont que rarement explicitées, le discours littéraire amène rarement à une conclusion explicite bien que les prémisses soient explicitées.

3. *Le discours littéraire – un discours argumentatif*

Le discours littéraire est un discours argumentatif parce qu'il est toujours construit pour un destinataire, le lecteur. L'argumentativité est un trait inhérent de tout discours littéraire qui apparaît ainsi comme un ensemble de stratégies discursives qui rendent raison d'un ou de

plusieurs messages, un ensemble de mécanismes qui enchaînent des propositions dans le but d'étayer la structure logique du discours comme un acte d'argumenter.

Un locuteur argumente lorsqu'il présente un énoncé comme destiné à en faire admettre un autre. Cette divergence entre la signification de la phrase et le sens communiqué par l'énoncé est expliquée par la notion d'`implicature. Par là, il faut comprendre que le locuteur donne à entendre à son auditeur plus que sens littéral de la phrase. La notion d'implicature est basée sur la distinction fondamentale entre ce qui est dit et ce qui est implicité dans un énoncé. Donc, l'implicite du discours est une caractéristique foncière de l'argumentation et le discours littéraire, destiné à chercher l'implicite, peut être interprété comme discours argumentatif. C'est aux destinataires d'expliciter le discours, d'en découvrir les chaînons manquants, essentiels pour sa signification, pour l'amener à une conclusion.

4. *Un modèle pragmatique de l'implicite littéraire*

L'analyse de l'implicite dans le discours littéraire a établi un modèle pragmatique de l'implicite littéraire qui contribue à expliquer les mécanismes par lesquels l'auteur fournit au lecteur un message sérieux et le pousse à y adhérer. Dans le discours littéraire, chaque instance narrative a pour spécifique un mécanisme d'implicitation. Je propose une typologie de l'implicite littéraire: l'implicite de l'auteur, l'implicite du narrateur, l'implicite du personnage et l'implicitation du lecteur. Les catégories d'implicite littéraire sont perçues en fonction des stratégies visant à impliciter et l'intention communicative joue un rôle important parce que les degrés d'implicitation sont imposés par l'auteur.

5. *Le discours littéraire – un discours argumentatif de la part de l'auteur*

La notion d'implicite est liée à l'intention communicative de l'auteur et à l'idée que le lecteur peut reconnaître/découvrir les intentions parce que le discours littéraire a des conventions constitutives. Les conventions littéraires sont historiquement déterminées et les œuvres peuvent signifier différemment par rapport aux lecteurs des époques différentes. L'auteur même établit un rapport différent à ces conventions dans ses œuvres, son attitude est toujours implicitée: il peut respecter les conventions narratives (alors, elles sont déclenchées par le lecteur comme présuppositions qui appartiennent à la connaissance d'arrière-plan) ou il peut transgresser les conventions et impliciter les nouvelles règles de jeu littéraire (les règles sont actualisées par le lecteur comme implicature conventionnelle).

L'attitude de l'auteur est toujours implicitée parce qu'il n'existe aucune règle qui détermine à partir de quel écart (par rapport à des conventions narratives), une œuvre peut encore être dite narrative. Je propose de concevoir les conventions narratives comme règles non conversationnelles de nature esthétique dont l'actualisation est déterminée du point de vue culturel parce qu'elles valident le comportement des lecteurs et des auteurs qui appartiennent à une communauté culturelle ou à une époque. Ces conventions narratives

configurent une rhétorique des instances de discours, une logique d'action qui influence le codage et le décodage du texte.

Dans le texte littéraire, les situations communicatives sont artificielles, les créations de l'auteur, déterminées par les conventions constitutives du discours littéraire et elles s'approchent par degrés différents de la communication ordinaire. Le point de départ c'est que dans le texte littéraire, toutes les phrases appartiennent à un seul locuteur, l'auteur, qui a la capacité de multiplier son identité. Les discours du narrateur et du personnage sont polyphoniques parce qu'ils rendent manifestes les intentions de l'auteur. Donc, le discours littéraire exprime une intentionnalité de deuxième degré. Toute interprétation du discours du narrateur ou du personnage suppose toujours la relation fondamentale auteur-lecteur, parce que les stratégies narratives et conversationnelles dépendent des intentions de l'auteur.

Dans les théories actuelles sur la fiction littéraire, l'auteur n'a pas un rôle important, on parle de la mort de l'auteur et les théoriciens semblent autoriser le lecteur à produire un nombre infini d'interprétations. On pense qu'une fois le texte séparé de son locuteur, de son intention et de son contexte, il se trouve dans un espace infini d'interprétations possibles. Bien sûr, la lecture d'une œuvre est déterminée par les compétences du lecteur, de son contexte idéologique et historique, mais la lecture ne dépend pas seulement de son propre système de signifiés, parce que le lecteur ne peut pas déclencher des inférences arbitraires. Chaque lecture est le résultat d'un calcul interprétatif.

L'interprétation du texte ne signifie pas pour le lecteur chercher dans le texte ses propres intentions, ni découvrir les intentions de l'auteur empirique, mais c'est une dialectique entre la stratégie de l'auteur et la réponse du lecteur.

L'analyse pragmatique a relevé l'idée que les problèmes de l'auteur et du lecteur sont différents: la démarche de l'auteur est prédictive, tandis que celle du lecteur est heuristique parce qu' il doit produire des déductions pragmatiques qui dirigent la lecture et l'interprétation. Je pense qu'il est nécessaire que le comportement du lecteur soit déterminé par des règles bien qu'elles ne soient pas respectées. Il est important que l'auteur suppose l'existence d'un lecteur qui respecte ces maximes.

Le comportement communicatif de l'auteur et aussi celui du lecteur se définissent par l'intentionnalité et la rationalité, chacun utilisant une certaine stratégie, déterminée par l'image postulée de l'autre. Chaque lecteur construit pendant la lecture une image de l'auteur, le résultat d'une activité déductive, l'auteur suppose aussi l'existence d'un lecteur capable de réaliser les processus coopératifs qu'il propose. L'auteur doit anticiper les réactions du lecteur, en créant la possibilité de choisir la solution interprétative qui convient. En effet, l'option pour un certain codage est la modalité de guider le décodage. Pour choisir la stratégie propre à une certaine situation communicative on suppose que l'auteur connaît les effets que l'œuvre produit sur le lecteur et aussi il doit avoir une bonne connaissance de l'interlocuteur, de sa capacité d'interpréter les énoncés.

Pendant la lecture d'un texte écrit, la référence aux circonstances de l'énonciation a d'autres fonctions que dans la conversation orale, parce que celui qui a produit le texte n'est pas présent et les hypothèses du lecteur sur le sujet de l'énonciation ou sur ses intentions de-

viennent plus risquées. Lorsqu'un texte n'est pas produit pour un certain récepteur, mais pour une communauté de lecteurs, l'auteur sait que le texte ne sera pas interprété conformément à ses intentions, mais selon une stratégie complexe d'interaction qui implique le lecteur et ses compétences. Chaque lecture est une transaction difficile entre la compétence du lecteur réel et la compétence postulée par un texte pour une communication réussie.

Il est difficile de reconnaître les intentions de l'auteur empirique et elles ne sont pas importantes pendant l'activité interprétative. Pendant la lecture on peut attribuer à l'auteur des informations qu'il n'a pas implicitées. Il ne peut pas empêcher certaines interprétations bien que son intention ne soit pas de les déterminer. Il y a des situations où l'auteur empirique a le droit de se manifester comme lecteur modèle, mais il ne peut pas désapprouver les analogies sémantiques autorisées par les mots utilisés.

Les modalités de rendre manifeste l'intention communicative sont diversement déterminées par les effets que l'auteur se propose. Au moment où il n'y a pas de commentaires explicites, il est difficile d'identifier l'intention communicative de l'auteur. Mais il est très important que, pendant la lecture, le lecteur ne cherche pas les intentions de l'auteur empirique, mais de l'auteur implicite, dont la stratégie communicative est rétablie.

On peut analyser les stratégies d'implicitation de l'auteur comme stratégies argumentatives en deux cas dans lesquels l'auteur ne respecte pas la maxime de qualité: la communication auteur/lecteur est directe (titre, convention narrative, nom propre) et des contextes où la communication est moyennée par le discours du narrateur et du personnage.

Le fragment que je propose pour l'analyse fait parti du roman *Le monde en deux jours* écrit par George Bălăiţă [*Lumea în două zile*, Bălăiţă 1975] et c'est un dialogue entre le personnage central Antipa et un chat étrange, Murr:

> Et je rencontrerai le matou du vieillard de vis-à-vis. Nous serons dans le passage ou sur la terrasse de l'hôtel. Je crois qu'il y aura du vent.
> Bonsoir, monsieur le professeur, dira le matou (je n'ai jamais compris pourquoi cette fripouille aux yeux jaunâtres et ensommeillés m'appelle monsieur le professeur).
> Bonsoir je répondrai parce que j'aime bien bavarder avec lui.
> Nous sommes les seuls à porter de la fourrure si vous me permettez l'observation monsieur le professeur.
> Je crois que tu as raison, monsieur Murr.
> Oh, Murr! vous me gâtez, monsieur le professeur. Mais, dites-moi, s'il vous plaît, ne croyez-vous pas que quelqu'un puisse nous demander ce que c'est cette fourrure?
> Si on nous demande seulement, ça ne fait rien, répondrai-je.
> Vous avez raison, monsieur le professeur. Permettez-moi de me retirer; je dois retrouver madame Simchas.
> A bientôt cher Murr.
> Mes respects, monsieur le professeur. Mais, excusez moi, je vous retiens avec une autre question: comment va-t-elle, votre petite chienne Eromanga?
> Elle regarde assez souvent votre immeuble.

O, vous plaisantez, monsieur le professeur, excusez moi, mes respects!
Au revoir, Murr chéri.

L'argumentation part d'une situation originellement conflictuelle, implicitée par l'auteur: les deux personnages appartiennent à deux espaces fictionnels différents. Ce conflit est résolu dans la configuration conclusive de l'argumentation, dans son implicite communicationnel. Le dialogue est imaginé par Antipa, qui a une position privilégiée et il en pourra profiter, mais à la fin, on inverse les rapports entre les personnages. La conversation amène une orientation argumentative inverse parce qu'elle est fondée sur les contenus implicites manipulés légèrement par le matou.

Dans le fragment, il y a deux situations argumentatives où on démontre deux thèses différentes:
1. l'argumentateur est le matou et le destinataire Antipa, la thèse démontrée c'est la certitude identitaire d'Antipa;
2. l'argumentateur est l auteur est le destinataire est le lecteur, la thèse démontrée est la certitude de la lecture.

Chaque discours (du matou et d Antipa) est orienté vers le récepteur dont il vise à modifier l'attitude: pour Antipa, d'emporter l'adhésion, pour le lecteur, d'induire un changement de lecture.

L'objet de l'échange verbal au niveau des personnages est la négociation des identités, à la fin duquel Antipa change de rôle. Dans la première partie du roman, Antipa est paresseux et rêveur, il semble vieux bien qu'il n'ait pas encore 30 ans. La deuxième partie du roman relève d'autres traits de son caractère: fermeté, indifférence, disposition pour le jeu.

La situation argumentative est composée de plusieurs échanges et elle a pour caractéristique de commencer par un échange d'ouverture et de terminer sur un échange de clôture. Les échanges d'ouverture sont confirmatifs et visent simplement à entretenir ou à confirmer une relation établie ou marquent l'intention de parler.

On remarque la déférence excessive du matou qui utilise pour désigner l'interlocuteur: monsieur le professeur. Les incursions de matou configurent un comportement stratégique parce que la politesse négative est spécifique aux relations entre insider et outsider. Le chat a implicité qu'Antipa est un outsider: il ne s'agit pas d'une supériorité sociale, mais plutôt ontologique. Pour le chat, Antipa est un outsider parce qu'il est le personnage du roman *Le monde en deux jours*, tandis que le chat appartient à l'œuvre fantastique de E.T.A. Hoffmann. La description définie déclenche une présupposition existentielle: 'il y a un professeur' et à partir du contexte communicatif, il est Antipa. Cette présupposition contredit une information de connaissances d'arrière-plan, de narrateur et de lecteur: Antipa n'est pas professeur. Cette contradiction signale que le chat a exploité la maxime de qualité dans le but de transmettre comme implicature conversationnelle le changement identitaire d'Antipa. Antipa accepte le rôle d'interlocuteur bien qu'il constate dans son commentaire évaluatif une transgression de maxime de qualité: "Bonsoir, je répondrai, parce que j'aime bien bavarder avec lui". Bien qu'il ait calculé l'implicature, il ne rejette pas le discours de l'argu-

mentateur, il ne crée pas un contre discours. Le discours du matou est orienté vers Antipa et vise à emporter son adhésion.

Le matou utilise une stratégie conversationnelle, il réduit le potentiel agressif de l'assertion envers l'interlocuteur; il reconnaît qu'il ne peut rien imposer à son interlocuteur: "si vous me permettez l'observation".

Les présuppositions manipulées par le chat ne renvoient pas à des croyances d'arrière-plan parce que ce n'est pas un dialogue centré sur l'échange d'information, mais sur le changement d'identité d'Antipa.

Antipa ne contredit pas les présuppositions, il les accepte, bien que le locuteur asserte un énoncé dont les présuppositions sont fausses: "je crois que tu as raison, monsieur Murr". Il ne produit pas ces énoncés pour induire son auditeur en erreur, si leur sens ne peut se réduire à leur littéralité c'est qu'il communique des implicatures. En utilisant le nom du chat monsieur Murr, Antipa s'inscrit dans le jeu ontologique en l'acceptant. Le nom propre est une description définie qui déclenche une présupposition existentielle: 'il y a un chat qui s'appelle Murr', mais il appartient à un autre espace fictionnel qu'Antipa, à l'œuvre fantastique de E.T.A. Hoffmann.

Les appellatifs utilisés par Antipa se modifient au cours de la conversation: "monsieur Murr, cher Murr, Murr chéri", tandis que les interventions du chat sont les mêmes. La situation communicative vise à neutraliser la distance ontologique qui existait au début entre les interlocuteurs.

Dans l'échange de clôture, les interlocuteurs respectent les normes de la politesse négative et on peut expliquer l'option pour une modalité stratégique d'abandonner l'interlocuteur par des motivations conjoncturelles. Le protocole final est suivi par une construction restrictive qui précède une demande: "excusez-moi, je vous retiens avec une autre question". C'est une stratégie spécifique de la politesse négative: la sollicitation sur un sujet tabou est précédée par un verbe de permission, qui rend impossible une réponse négative. La question déclenche une présupposition existentielle: 'il y a une petite chienne Eromanga' et cette petite chienne appartient à un niveau ontologique différent de celui des interlocuteurs.

La réponse d'Antipa est coopérative malgré la violation de maxime de qualité parce que le but est d'impliciter le changement du code utilisé par les personnages, le discours sérieux est remplacé par une plaisanterie. A l'hypothèse que le locuteur veut coopérer, mais il ne peut pas donner toute l'information, on peut calculer l'implicature: 'la petite chienne suivit le matou'. Il y a aussi une exploitation de maxime de qualité et l'implicature est calculée par l'interlocuteur "vous plaisantez, monsieur le professeur".

A ce moment, le changement de discours est possible parce que les locuteurs ont les mêmes règles communicatives et la même conception pour les exploiter. La plaisanterie est une modalité de reconnaître l'appartenance des personnages au même espace ontologique et marque l'adhésion d'Antipa. L'argumentation implicite du matou déconstruit l'identité d'Antipa et la reconstruit en d'autres termes.

Dans l'autre situation argumentative qui implique auteur/lecteur, on suppose que l'auteur ne respecte pas la maxime de qualité par les contradictions déterminées de la

transgression des niveaux ontologiques pour inférer un code de lecture pour la deuxième partie du roman.

L'habileté ou inhabileté conversationnelles, le comportement communicatif, les stratégies utilisées par les personnages sont déterminés par l'intention communicative de l'auteur.

Dans ce contexte communicatif, l'intention de l'auteur est de mettre en doute la certitude ontologique du personnage Antipa parce que la déficience communicative d'Antipa implicite l'altérité comme caractéristique du personnage.

En exploitant la maxime de qualité, l'auteur implicite une modalité de lecture parce qu'il y a une affinité évidente entre le fragment et le dialogue entre Murr et Etlinger de l'histoire écrite par E.T.A. Hoffmann. Le nom du chat signale l'homologie entre les deux fictions implicitant la mémoire d'un livre. Il s'agit d'une implicature parce que l'auteur ne respecte pas la maxime de quantité (il ne donne pas toute l'information) et la lecture est déterminée par la compétence du lecteur de calculer l'implicature.

Le nom du personnage est une convention, un signe pour les intentions et les compétences communicatives de l'auteur dans le champ littéraire. On peut déceler à ce niveau la stratégie intertextuelle de l'auteur. L'intertextualité de l'écriture détermine une sélection culturelle de lecteurs parce qu'elle oblige une lecture intertextuelle.

Au moment où un auteur nomme le personnage, il construit une description définie, le nom étant une abréviation. Plusieurs fois, la signification du nom reçue dans le discours de l'auteur est différente de la signification littérale de la description. Pour actualiser la signification du nom, le lecteur doit actualiser les implicatures. La compétence du lecteur d'utiliser correctement le nom de personnage pendant la lecture est gagnée par un emprunt de référence. Le rapport entre le nom du personnage et la description définie sur laquelle il se fonde est pragmatique.

L'intention avec laquelle l'auteur utilise le nom du personnage dans le texte littéraire n'est pas seulement de désigner le personnage, mais d'actualiser par le nom une autre histoire littéraire. On peut reformuler la théorie de l'emprunt de référence en termes d'implicatures qui sont actualisées dans un certain contexte communicatif. On peut expliquer d'une telle manière la possibilité que le lecteur peut reconnaître l'intention avec laquelle l'auteur utilise le nom du personnage, en déclenchant les implicatures.

Les noms du chat et de la petite chienne sont des signaux narratifs, intertextuels, qui emportent une histoire préexistante, le lecteur est obligé d'actualiser les informations latentes. Les informations narratives qui proviennent d'un autre texte littéraire sont actualisées comme des implicatures parce qu'elles s'ajoutent à la signification de la phrase et ne se substituent pas à la signification littérale. Si le lecteur n'actualise pas les implicatures associées au nom du personnage, on peut continuer la communication, mais non pas dans la direction désirée par l'auteur.

La fonction de l'implicite générée par l'intertextualité du nom est d'établir une complicité valorisante entre l'auteur et le lecteur que le texte présuppose. Cette complicité détermine l'actualisation de la signification implicitée et permet la reconnaissance de

l'intention parodique. Cette situation argumentative est inédite parce que l'existence de l'argumentateur/auteur est présupposée.

Alors, on ne peut pas ignorer le rôle de l'auteur parce qu'il établit les règles du jeu littéraire et il est implicitement intégré à la fiction ; l'auteur peut empêcher la lecture arbitraire du texte littéraire parce que son discours est argumentatif. Les intentions illocutionnaires sérieuses (d'influencer le lecteur) sont transmises à de différents degrés comme implicatures ou présuppositions. Il y a des textes où les messages de l'auteur sont plus proches de l'explicite, mais il y en a d'autres plus créatifs où il est très difficile de déterminer l'intention de l'auteur. L'identification de ces messages est déterminée par les degrés dans lesquels l'œuvre respecte les conventions narratives.

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Rassegna di Linguistica Generale

a cura di Mario Baggio e Maria Cristina Gatti

Anne-Marie Chabrolle-Cerretini, *La vision du monde de Wilhelm von Humboldt. Histoire d'un concept linguistique*, ENS Éditions, Lyon 2007, pp. 158

Questa densa monografia è dedicata all'importanza della *Weltansicht* nella concezione di Humboldt. La prima parte dell'opera ripercorre le origini del concetto negli anni a cavallo fra il Diciottesimo e il Diciannovesimo secolo. L'Autrice fa emergere il contesto culturale e ideologico nel quale si delineò la riflessione intorno alla «diversité linguistique» (p. 10). La parte successiva descrive i tratti costitutivi del concetto di *Weltansicht*, che compare per la prima volta nel discorso *Über das vergleichende Sprachstudium in Beziehung auf die verschiedenen Epochen der Sprachentwicklung*, pronunciato all'Accademia di Berlino nel 1820. L'analisi è integrata da un regesto delle diverse traduzioni del termine in francese (prevale tuttavia *vision du monde*) e in altre lingue, tra cui l'italiano, che impiega per lo più *visione del mondo*. L'Autrice peraltro osserva che in francese spesso i medesimi traducenti rendono anche termini come *Weltanschauung*, *Weltauffassung*, *Sprachsicht*.

Nella terza parte sono tracciati i principi metodologici della linguistica comparata secondo Humboldt e gli humboldtiani. L'Autrice rileva come la modernità dello studioso tedesco si concentri tutta proprio nel concetto di *Weltansicht* «que nous pouvons définir, aujourd'hui, comme un lien vivant [...] qui intègre d'une part le rapport avec la pensée et le monde extralinguistique et, d'autre part, le lien avec une communauté humaine, une nation» (p. 133). La nazione conferisce l'essenza della propria individualità alla lingua, così come, grazie alla lingua, la nazione si costituisce come tale ed è

capace di fecondare l'interazione continua e creatrice tra pensiero, lingua e mondo.

Giovanni Gobber

Lia Abuladze, Andreas Ludden, *Lehrbuch der georgischen Sprache*, Helmut Buske, Hamburg 2006, pp. XII-400

Negli ultimi decenni, molti studenti di cartvelologia nelle università europee occidentali hanno mosso i primi passi sulla classica *Einführung in die georgische Sprache* di Kita Tschenkéli, uscita a Zurigo nel 1958 in due volumi, uno teorico, l'altro applicativo, con molti esercizi basati soprattutto sulla lingua letteraria. Alla *Einführung*, che rimane una pietra miliare per chi intenda avviare uno studio sistematico del georgiano moderno, si affianca ora – inteso quasi come versione minore e aggiornata – il manuale di Abuladze e Ludden. Esso offre un'efficace introduzione alla fonetica e alla fonologia, che precede 33 lezioni articolate ciascuna in un testo con commento grammaticale e lessicale, in una serie di esercizi e in una traduzione (in tedesco) del testo, la quale serve per un'utilissima retroversione. Le prime 21 lezioni contengono testi dialogici su temi dell'esperienza quotidiana di un giovane studente universitario; nelle undici seguenti vi sono per lo più monologhi di andamento narrativo o descrittivo, che espongono la storia culturale e politica della Georgia.

La terza parte del manuale consiste nella descrizione dei fondamenti della grammatica georgiana contemporanea; seguono 78 tabelle con i paradigmi dei verbi più importanti (pp. 245-323). Infine, dopo la soluzione degli esercizi, vi è un glossario georgiano-tedesco. Uno strumento indispensabile è il *compact disc* (otteni-

bile separatamente), nel quale sono registrati i testi delle 33 lezioni.

L'opera è rivolta a futuri studiosi di cartvelologia già in possesso di nozioni di linguistica generale. Non si tratta di un manuale di facile utilizzo; tuttavia, grazie a una dosatura saggia di tradizione e di innovazione, esso propone un percorso di apprendimento di rara efficacia.

Giovanni Gobber

Jurij D. Apresjan, O semantičeskoj motivirovannosti leksičeskich funkcij-kollokatov (Motivazione semantica delle funzioni lessicali-collocazioni), "Voprosy Jazykoznanija", 2008, 5, pp. 3-33

L'Autore, una delle voci più autorevoli della linguistica russa contemporanea, ridefinisce in questa sede la natura semantica dei lessemi verbali che intervengono in alcuni tipi di collocazioni, presentate da Igor' Mel'čuk e Aleksandr Žolkovskij nell'ambito della teoria fraseologica delle funzioni lessicali(FL). Nella versione originale di questa teoria, che costituisce una componente rilevante del modello linguistico SmyslÛTekst(SensoÛTesto), i manifestanti verbali delle funzioni lessicali di tipo sintagmatico Oper, Labor e Func venivano presentati come semanticamente vuoti e la loro scelta semanticamente immotivata.

Apresjan, riprendendo quanto già esposto in un articolo precedentemente pubblicato in "Voprosy jazykoznanija" (2004, n. 4), modifica quanto finora sostenuto in merito allo statuto semantico di queste entità linguistiche. Si tratta, a ben vedere, di verbi semanticamente pieni, dotati di «sobstvennoe leksičeskoe značenie» (p. 7), la cui scelta quale manifestante di una funzione lessicale in rapporto ad un dato argomento è semanticamente motivata. Essa dipende infatti dalla natura azionale sia del verbo che interviene quale strategia di manifestazione della FL, sia del predicato a cui è riconducibile il sostantivo che funge da argomento della FL data. Ciò consente al lessi-

cografo di formulare previsioni attendibili relative al lessema verbale che dovrà comparire in una certa collocazione.

Maria Cristina Gatti

Stefan Rabanus, Eva Smolka, Judith Streb, Frank Rösler, *Die mentale Verarbeitung von Verben in idiomatischen Konstruktionen*, "Zeitschrift für germanistiche Linguistik", 36, 2008, 1, pp. 27-47

Analisi sperimentali svolte nell'ambito di un'indagine sulle modalità di memorizzazione e di elaborazione dei verbi in sede mentale portano gli Autori a rilevare che i verbi usati in espressioni idiomatiche (S*ie haben mit Kanonen auf Spatzen geschossen*) e letterali (*Der Jäger hat auf das Reh geschossen*) attivano associazioni mentali analoghe.

Tali risultati sperimentali si oppongono a ipotesi precedentemente avanzate in sede di riflessione psicolinguistica, secondo le quali i verbi usati in frasi idiomatiche attiverebbero associazioni mentali diverse da quelle attivate dai medesimi verbi nell'uso letterale.

I risultati conseguiti da queste recenti indagini consentono pertanto agli Autori di concludere che per i verbi con significato sia idiomatico che letterale non mutano le modalità di elaborazione a livello mentale.

Maria Cristina Gatti

Laura Mariottini, *La cortesia*, Carocci (Le Bussole, 280), Roma 2007, pp. 112

Con il termine "cortesia" si indicano tutte quelle strutture ricorrenti nella lingua scritta e parlata che manifestano un comportamento comunicativo cooperativo e rispettoso. La cortesia serve, quindi, a facilitare le relazioni sociali e a canalizzare e compensare l'aggressività, ossia l'insieme delle azioni che potrebbero costituire un'offesa per i destinatari. Essa non deve intendersi solo come un insieme di norme, ma anche e soprattutto come un insieme di strategie che determinano la scelta di certe forme linguisti-

che piuttosto che di altre. Si tratta, dunque, di un fenomeno che è parte della funzione interpersonale del linguaggio, focalizzato sul comportamento sia verbale sia non verbale e sulla di particolari indicatori linguistici.

Lo scopo del volume, che si presenta come uno strumento sia di riflessione analitica sia di formazione per studenti, insegnanti, traduttori, è di fornire un valido strumento per partecipare in maniera più consapevole allo scambio comunicativo. Il libro è diviso idealmente in due parti: una teorica, nella quale si presentano i più importanti approcci nell'ambito degli studi sulla cortesia, e una incentrata sugli ambiti di applicazione.

Nel primo capitolo vengono presentate le teorie pragmalinguistiche, quelle cioè che nascono a partire dagli studi di filosofia del linguaggio di Austin e di Grice. Tra queste, si ritengono fondanti quelle di Lakoff, di Leech e, in particolare, di Brown e Levinson, il cui modello è tuttora considerato lo strumento di analisi della cortesia più elaborato e più noto. Brown e Levinson sviluppano nozioni provenienti dalla sociologia, come in particolare il concetto goffmaniano di "faccia", che descrive due particolari esigenze della persona: il bisogno di non essere ostacolata e quello di essere approvata. Obiettivo del lavoro dei due studiosi è l'elaborazione di un modello di comunicazione universale basato sull'interrelazione/interdipendenza della "faccia positiva" e della "faccia negativa" dei partecipanti a uno scambio comunicativo, e, soprattutto, sulla loro esigenza di preservare reciprocamente la "faccia".

Nel secondo capitolo l'Autrice analizza le ricerche sulla cortesia di "seconda generazione", molto critiche nei confronti delle teorie precedenti. La più significativa tra le obiezioni rivolte agli autori citati è quella di proporre modelli etnocentrici e universalistici, basati su una nozione di cortesia strategica, nella quale il parlante può decidere di adottare o meno determinati comportamenti e strumenti linguistici. Tali modelli non si adattano a tutte le

lingue/culture: a quella giapponese, per esempio, cinese, tailandese, coreana e ad alcune culture europee, nelle quali la cortesia è stabilita da norme sociali e grammaticali ed è una regola prescritta e quindi obbligatoria. Gli studi esaminati abbandonano il pragmalinguismo e abbracciano il sociopragmatismo, introducendo alcune nozioni fondamentali della sociologia, come il contesto e la situazione comunicativa. L'Autrice illustra i modelli di alcuni ricercatori operanti in ambiti linguistici non anglofoni, che mettono in discussione le pretese di universalità della cortesia postulate da Brown e Levinson. Tra questi, il modello di Matsumoto, che, riflettendo sul sistema onorifico del giapponese, evidenzia il fatto che la nozione bipolare di faccia, costruita in termini strategici e fortemente volitivi, non si adatta ai principi che regolano la retorica interpersonale nipponica, nell'economia della quale la scelta delle forme linguistiche, oltre al contenuto proposizionale, veicola informazioni di carattere sociolinguistico, che definiscono il tipo di relazione in corso.

Il terzo capitolo tratta le teorie di "terza generazione" o della pragmatica socioculturale, sviluppatesi nel mondo ispanico, che mirano a proporre un quadro teorico nuovo da utilizzare per tutte le lingue in tutte le culture. È necessario, secondo questo indirizzo di ricerca, unire l'elemento linguistico all'extralinguistico, vale a dire inserire lo studio della cortesia in quel particolare ambito della pragmatica maggiormente sensibile alla nozione di contesto che è l'ambito socioculturale. All'interno di tale area si includono non solo le caratteristiche dei partecipanti, la descrizione della situazione comunicativa, l'analisi dell'interazione, ma anche le variabili sociali che influenzano le scelte linguistiche. Nel volume si dedica particolare attenzione all'approccio proposto da Diana Bravo, la quale sostiene l'ipotesi contestuale della cortesia e propone categorie di analisi vuote – autonomia e affiliazione – che vanno riempite con le norme socioculturali della lingua/cultura studiata.

Nel quarto capitolo si ravvisa nell'analisi conversazionale un quadro teorico denso di spunti interessanti. Se si coglie l'aspetto co-costruttivistico e dinamico dell'interazione, ci si rende conto del fatto che le definizioni di cortesia proposte in precedenza non si adattano facilmente al modello interazionale: l'insieme delle strategie e l'effetto sul destinatario sono elementi propri dei modelli statici, sono punti di arrivo della cortesia, descrivono il risultato, non pongono l'attenzione sul processo e sui cambiamenti che il comportamento cortese può subire nello scambio concreto. Dunque, se si vuole affrontare il tema della cortesia dinamica, si deve tener conto del dinamismo che contraddistingue la conversazione e si devono prendere in considerazione anche i cambiamenti di prospettiva e di atteggiamento che in essa avvengono, concretizzati, per lo più, nei meccanismi di presa del turno, nelle formule di chiusura e nella dinamica delle coppie adiacenti.

Gli ultimi due capitoli gettano uno sguardo su due possibili campi di applicazione degli studi sulla cortesia: la traduzione e le interazioni *online*, in modo specifico le *chat*. Queste ultime, per la loro natura ibrida tra oralità e scrittura, presentano norme di interazione linguistica e sociale distinte rispetto alle altre modalità comunicative. Gli utenti delle *chat* formano delle comunità di parlanti, all'interno delle quali vigono le norme che essi stessi negoziano. I comportamenti cortesi o scortesi, quindi, conclude l'Autrice, sono sia di natura universale, dettati dal galateo della rete, sia di natura particolare, decisi da ogni singola comunità e dai ruoli che i partecipanti ricoprono al loro interno.

Chiara Beccalossi

STEFANIA CAVAGNOLI, *La comunicazione specialistica*, Carocci (Le Bussole, 290), Roma 2007, pp. 111

Il volume, che si rivolge principalmente a studenti di linguistica, offre una panoramica sui principali temi relativi alla comunicazione specialistica basandosi su un approccio interdisciplinare, che considera come naturale punto di partenza la linguistica e interagisce con gli studi sulla comunicazione, sulla sociologia, sulle discipline scientifiche e sul diritto.

Il primo capitolo si occupa del problema definitorio, riscontrando nella ricerca italiana, di cui si presentano le posizioni più rappresentative, la mancanza di una definizione e denominazione univoca del tema trattato, ovvero quello della lingua o linguaggio utilizzato nella comunicazione fra esperto ed esperto o fra esperto e non esperto, o ancora, fra esperto e futuro esperto (la cosiddetta comunicazione didattica). La riflessione verte sul rapporto osmotico tra lingua comune e linguaggi specialistici, due serbatoi linguistici tra i quali avviene uno scambio continuo, sebbene non costante. In questo rapporto è la lingua comune la parte determinante, dato che i linguaggi specialistici non possono prescinderne e ne sono considerati sia una varietà diafasica, sulla base del rapporto esistente fra i parlanti in una determinata situazione, sia una varietà diastratica, sulla base dei rapporti fra gruppi di esperti e non esperti, nella dimensione verticale della comunicazione.

Il secondo capitolo affronta il tema del testo specialistico, ritenuto il punto di partenza preferenziale per l'analisi della comunicazione specialistica in quanto unità fondamentale dei rapporti disciplinari e linguistici che regolano la trasmissione di informazioni di settore. In linea con le tendenze della linguistica testuale, il testo viene considerato la base del processo comunicativo, in quanto contiene gli elementi lessicali, morfologici e sintattici da analizzare nello studio delle microlingue. A questo proposito, l'Autrice sottolinea l'utilità, soprattutto in prospettiva interlinguistica, di una classificazione dei testi specialistici, tradizionalmente distinguibili in base alla loro forma, al contenuto o alla funzione per cui sono prodotti, a seconda delle esigenze dei fruitori dei testi stessi e del rapporto esistente tra i testi e le situazioni.

Il terzo capitolo si addentra nelle caratteristiche morfosintattiche (alta frequenza di processi di nominalizzazione, passivazione e deagentivazione, ellissi, paratassi, ecc.) e lessicali (terminologia/e) di tali testi, considerandone anche gli aspetti pragmatici, disciplinari e culturali. L'Autrice propone una prima suddivisione tra scienze naturali e scienze cosiddette umane, più internazionali e con un bacino di riferimento più ampio le prime, più nazionali e quindi con una minore condivisione di saperi e modalità processuali le seconde. Sebbene queste ultime applichino schemi conoscitivi e descrittivi simili, il contenuto dell'analisi scientifica è meno oggettivo e più legato a dimensioni culturali e sociali proprie di una determinata tradizione.

Nel quarto capitolo vengono descritti gli aspetti sociolinguistici e pragmatici della comunicazione specialistica considerando l'asse verticale sul quale si muovono gli attori della comunicazione e fornendo una selezione di diversi schemi di suddivisione in livelli e protagonisti, a seconda che si considerino come punto di riferimento dell'analisi i partecipanti allo scambio o lo stile della comunicazione.

Il quinto capitolo tratta i problemi e i miti della comunicazione specialistica: le difficoltà della redazione di testi divulgativi il più possibile comprensibili ed il principio della neutralità emotiva.

Nel sesto capitolo si descrive il linguaggio giuridico, come esempio di linguaggio specialistico. Se ne illustrano anzitutto le caratteristiche (complessità sintattica, nominalizzazione, uso di termini specifici ma anche di parole della lingua comune con accezione diversa, presenza di forme arcaiche e latine, ecc.), per poi considerare alcuni problemi relativi alla gestione di testi a carattere giuridico, nei quali il principio della chiarezza concettuale va spesso a scapito della chiarezza espositiva.

Chiara Beccalossi

FEDERICA VENIER, *Il potere del discorso. Retorica e pragmatica linguistica*, Carocci, Roma 2008, pp. 128

L'Autrice delinea i rapporti tra la retorica aristotelica e la pragmatica linguistica per ricostruire la storia "della sovrapponibilità degli interessi" e degli oggetti dei due campi di studio, evidenziando in particolare quei nuclei teorici che fanno sì "che retorica e pragmatica linguistica possano essere intese come tentativi molto spesso congiunti di risolvere una serie di questioni sorte nel corso della riflessione sul linguaggio e la comunicazione" (p. 21).

Nella prima parte, *L'eredità di Aristotele* (pp. 19-64), la proposta aristotelica di un "metodo" che regolasse e controllasse i modi pubblici dell'agire comunicativo viene dapprima inquadrata e di seguito visitata nelle sue riprese nei modelli pragmatici di Austin (1962), Perelman e Olbrechts-Tyteca (1958) e Grice (1967). L'Autrice conclude il capitolo presentando le interpretazioni "storiografiche" di Garin, Barilli e Compagnon e quelle linguistiche di Coseriu e Benveniste circa la rinascita della retorica nella seconda metà del secolo scorso e l'interdisciplinarietà degli interessi coinvolti.

Nella seconda parte, *Retorica e pragmatica a confronto* (pp. 67-100), l'Autrice analizza gli elementi che consentono di accostare le due discipline assumendo come termini di confronto le categorie retoriche e pragmatiche di oratore e parlante, di *logos* e discorso, di uditore e ascoltatore. Tali categorie permettono sia di evidenziare i punti di contatto e integrazione, sia di sottolineare i margini di differenza tra le due discipline.

Nelle *Conclusioni* (pp. 101-103) viene sintetizzata la tesi evidenziata a più riprese nel corso della trattazione: retorica e pragmatica, pur condividendo come oggetto di indagine l'idea di discorso come attività del locutore mirante a un obiettivo determinato, restano due discipline autonome e distinte. Esse infatti, conclude l'Autrice, guardano allo stesso og-

getto da due diverse prospettive: la pragmatica da quella del parlante e la retorica da quella dell'ascoltatore. Appaiono pertanto riduttive sia le posizioni di coloro che tendono a vedere la retorica come un ambito subordinato alla pragmatica, sia le posizioni di coloro che ritengono che l'esecuzione di un qualunque atto linguistico consista di fatto in una sorta di persuasione del destinatario. Venier sostiene infatti che la nozione di perlocuzione di un macro-atto retorico, qual è quello costituito dal discorso del retore, non è sovrapponibile a quello di perlocuzione di un micro-atto, qual è quello oggetto della pragmatica. Ritiene inoltre che non si debba pensare all'attività linguistica come a qualcosa di genericamente riconducibile alla persuasione perché non pochi sono gli atti fondati proprio sull'ottenimento di un fine in assenza di persuasione. Del resto, la caratterizzazione degli obiettivi perlocutori non è, di per sé, una condizione necessaria né sufficiente al raggiungimento dello scopo illocutorio.

Maria Paola Tenchini

JOHN WOODS, Beyond Reasonable Doubt: An Abductive Dilemma in Criminal Law, "Informal Logic", 28, 1, 2008, pp. 60-70

Nei processi penali basati sul *common law* l'imputato può essere giudicato colpevole dalla giuria sulla base di prove indiziarie anche qualora sussista un motivo ragionevole per l'assoluzione. Tale principio del diritto anglosassone sembra essere in contraddizione con il concetto di onere della prova "oltre ogni ragionevole dubbio" che l'accusa deve soddisfare in caso di procedimento penale. Infatti da una parte l'accusa di colpevolezza non è dedotta, ma unicamente abdotta dalle prove indiziarie. Tali prove infatti costituiscono le premesse di un ragionamento, chiamato abduzione o ragionamento per segno, che è solamente plausibile e non ha una forza probatoria pari alla deduzione. La conclusione in tale tipo di argomento risulta essere infatti

solo la spiegazione più plausibile di un fatto e può essere confutata qualora possa essere fornita una migliore spiegazione. D'altra parte, la controparte in un processo normalmente produce un argomento a sostegno di una spiegazione dei fatti contraddittoria o contrastante con quella dell'accusa. Tale dilemma è affrontato dall'Autore analizzando a livello dialettico i ragionamenti delle due parti in un processo. Spesso infatti le prove esaminate dall'accusa per spiegare la colpevolezza dell'imputato sono differenti da quelle usate dalla difesa per provare la sua innocenza. Per tale motivo, le versioni dei fatti, così come le argomentazioni, spesso non sono neppure comparabili. Nel modello dialettico esposto dall'Autore, l'incommensurabilità degli argomenti è superata proprio dal concetto argomentativo di "oltre ogni ragionevole dubbio". Anche se ragionevoli, le versioni dei fatti presentate dalla difesa possono non essere spiegabili con l'innocenza dell'imputato, oppure possono fondare la sua innocenza in modo più debole rispetto agli argomenti dell'accusa. Per tale ragione, in un contesto dialettico come quello giuridico, l'apparente contraddizione logica si risolve in termini puramente argomentativi.

Fabrizio Macagno

JOSEP MARCO, *The terminology of Tranlation. Epistemological, conceptual and intercultural problems and their social consequences*, "Target" 19/2, 2007, pp. 255-269

La terminologia utilizzata in traduzione ha sempre fatto discutere gli studiosi, a cominciare dalla denominazione della disciplina stessa. Da una parte, infatti, il debole statuto epistemologico della disciplina non crea consenso tra gli specialisti; dall'altra la relazione tra concetti e metalinguaggio è tutt'altro che univoca. Spesso si utilizzano sinonimi per indicare uno stesso concetto e, viceversa, concetti del tutto differenti vengono denominati attraverso sinonimi.

Questa situazione si spiega, in primo luogo, con il fatto che il metalinguaggio scientifico, in generale, è strettamente legato a una disciplina e a una scuola di pensiero; in secondo luogo, spesso, le scelte terminologiche, risultato di una tradizione nazionale, non vengono condivise a livello internazionale, un po' per la scarsa comunicazione tra gli studiosi, un po' perché le tradizioni in parte si sovrappongono; infine, più nello specifico per quanto riguarda la traduzione, la ricerca, la pratica del tradurre e la formazione del traduttore non vanno di pari passo.

Per esemplificare questa situazione definita "caotica" (p. 255), l'A. analizza l'uso dei termini "procedure", "technique", "strategy" e "shift" nel corso della storia della disciplina, mostrandone somiglianze e differenze spesso trascurate dagli specialisti (pp. 258-264). Infine, si sofferma sulle conseguenze sociali di questa situazione evidenziando una contraddizione tra il grado di importanza che, come mostrano alcuni dati raccolti, gli specialisti danno alla conoscenza formale e terminologica della disciplina e l'utilizzo che realmente si fa di questa conoscenza (p. 264-265).

Vittoria Prencipe

Mary Snell-Hornby, "What's in a name?" On metalinguistic confusion in Translation Studies, "Target" 19/2, 2007, pp. 313-325

La pluralità di approcci e il numero delle lingue coinvolte in una ricerca può portare confusione per quanto riguarda il metalinguaggio di una disciplina. Nel caso dei Translation Studies, l'eterogeneità degli approcci alla ricerca – letterario, linguistico, informatico – e il numero delle lingue in gioco, porta alla necessità di creare un metalinguaggio il più univoco e largamente utilizzabile possibile, che prescinda, cioè, dalle singole lingue e culture. L'A. suggerisce tre modalità per raggiungere questo scopo, evidenziando i limiti e i vantaggi di ognuna.

Una prima possibilità è data dall'utilizzo di parole comuni, ridefinite e adattate al nuovo contesto, procedura che non esclude, però, il rischio di malintesi, come nel caso di "norm" (pp. 314-317); in alternativa si può coniare un termine nuovo, processo che potrebbe portare a un risultato poco comprensibile per chi non condivide la lingua, la cultura e il contesto comunicativo dell'autore; infine, si possono riprendere parole da lingue non più in uso, come il latino e il greco e riadattarle al nuovo contesto, ridefinendole (pp. 319-320). Quest'ultima strategia permetterebbe di non dover tradurre la parola in questione nelle diverse lingue, evitando il problema dei "falsi amici" o dell'uso di sinonimi utilizzati per identificare concetti del tutto differenti.

È proprio quest'ultimo atteggiamento che l'A. discute con più attenzione, facendo riferimento al proprio lavoro di edizione del Handbuch Translation (pp. 320-322).

Vittoria Prencipe

Sonia Vandepitte, *Remapping Translation Studies: Towards a Translation Studies Ontology*, "Meta" LIII/3, 2008, pp. 570-588

Lo sviluppo della ricerca all'interno dei Translation Studies (TS), a partire dalla seconda metà del XX sec. fino ad oggi, ha portato al moltiplicarsi di approcci, modelli, concetti e terminologia, spesso in contraddizione gli uni con gli altri.

Le stesse sintesi proposte da M. Baker, "Bibliography of Translation Studies" in M. Baker (ed.) Routledge Encyclopedia of Translation studies, 1998; J. Williams, A. Chesterman, The Map. A Beginner's Guide to Doing Research in Translation Studies, 2002; e la "EST-Directory 2003", presentano una partizione degli ambiti dei TS spesso contraddittoria e, a volte, priva di basi consistenti.

Tenendo come punto di partenza i lavori sopra citati, l'A. propone un thesaurus che riunisce in un sistema coerente e consistente tutta la terminologia, gli ambiti, le metodologie, individuate negli anni in questo campo di ricerca.

Il thesaurus costruito in lingua inglese, presenta una struttura aperta a qualsiasi altra cultura e costituisce il punto di partenza per disegnare una nuova mappa dei TS sulla falsariga di quella proposta da Holmes più di trent'anni fa e ritenuta ormai superata.

Vittoria Prencipe

JERZY BRZOZOWSKI, *Le problème des stratégies du traduire*, "Meta" LIII/4, 2008, pp. 765-781.

Analizzando il termine "strategia" a partire dalle più comuni definizioni riportate su alcuni dizionari di lingua francese e inglese, l'A. mostra come nell'ambito dei Translation Studies, l'utilizzo di questo termine sia spesso approssimativo.

Il tradurre, infatti, è considerato una pratica asistematica e, al livello di scelte strategiche, fattori consapevoli e inconsapevoli interagiscono gli uni con gli altri. Pertanto, nel caso specifico, la nozione di "strategia" è da rivedere.

L' A. propone un'analisi che prevede l'intersezione di un livello cosiddetto strategico, considerato onnicomprensivo ("globale"), con livelli più specifici ("bassi"), come quello delle "tecniche" del tradurre, chiamate da alcuni "universali", che danno vita a "figure" traduttive, le quali andrebbero studiate più attentamente in relazione a tutti i cambiamenti ai quali un testo tradotto è sottoposto.

Vittoria Prencipe

Rassegna di Glottodidattica

a cura di Bona Cambiaghi

Chantal Calì, *Didactique des langues tierces, didactique du plurilinguisme: une nouvelle approche pour optimiser l'enseignement/apprentissage des langues et maintenir la diversité linguistique en Europe*, "Synergies. Europe", I, 2006, pp. 119-128.

La didattica del plurilinguismo, innescata dalla didattica delle terze lingue già presenti in alcuni curricula europei, non può non fare allusione alle nozioni di competenze parziali, di interlingue, di lingue passerelle, di basi di transfert, e quindi si riferirà a modelli dinamici, quali l'MDM del multilinguismo di Herdina e Jessner (2002), il modello ecologico di Aronin e Laoire (2004) e ad altri, tutti caratterizzati dalla messa in azione di strategie metacognitive e creative importanti.

Tuttavia l'elaborazione più generalizzata di curricula multilingui, che favorirà l'emergere di un plurilinguismo reale e diversificato, sarà lenta e faticosa.

Bona Cambiaghi

Jean Duverger, *Les sections bilingues francophones en Europe centrale et orientale: repères, enjeux, perspectives*, "Education et sociétés plurilingues. Educazione e società plurilingui", XXIII, 2007, pp. 31-39.

Il lavoro delle sezioni bilingui con il francese come seconda lingua d'insegnamento nelle discipline non linguistiche in diversi paesi dell'Europa centrale e orientale (che ha una sua storia ormai ventennale) deve diventare paradigmatico di tutta l'educazione al plurilinguismo nell'Europa dei 27 paesi.

Negli Stati Uniti d'Europa si richiede ormai una nuova didattica, che sappia sviluppare approcci contrastivi-comparativi mirati a sviluppare competenze metalinguistiche sempre più forti, che sappiano mettere in gioco l'intercomprensione tra lingue vicine, che utilizzino sistematicamente gli strumenti del Consiglio d'Europa, quali il "Quadro" e il "Portfolio", e, attraverso una vera e propria pedagogia del *progetto,* sappiano condurre da un insegnamento bilingue ad uno plurilingue.

La bibliografia e la sitografia del pur breve articolo sono preziose.

Bona Cambiaghi

Mauro Pichiassi, *Apprendere l'italiano L2 nell'era digitale. Le nuove tecnologie nell'insegnamento e apprendimento dell'italiano per stranieri*, Guerra Soleil, Perugia 2007, pp. 212.

Le nuove tecnologie e la multimedialità stanno cambiando profondamente il mondo dell'educazione e della formazione linguistica. Esse rappresentano una risorsa non solo per coloro che vogliono apprendere un'altra lingua, ma anche per coloro che vogliono approfondire la propria. Mauro Picchiassi propone con questo volume – suddiviso in 7 capitoli – "una panoramica degli aspetti e delle caratteristiche dei cambiamenti in atto nella scuola e nelle università" (frontespizio).

Nel primo capitolo (pp. 1-23) egli presenta la genesi delle tecnologie didattiche e sottolinea che l'attuale rivoluzione tecnologica è da molti intesa come "la terza fase dopo l'introduzione della scrittura e della stampa" (p. 2). La trasformazione radicale avvenuta nella nostra società ad opera delle nuove tecnologie non poteva non coinvolgere anche il mondo della scuola, nonostante un alternarsi di "momenti di attrazione e momenti di rifiuto" (p. 21). Alla scuola spetta tuttavia il ruolo di una "centralità educativa" (p. 23) che con l'uso delle nuove tecnologie possa "favorire l'acquisizione di conoscenze; promuo-

vere capacità di sistematizzazione delle esperienze; fornire strumenti critici per l'interpretazione e la trasformazione della realtà" (p. 23).

Il secondo capitolo (pp. 25-43) affronta le teorie e le modalità dell'apprendimento multimediale, intendendo per multimedialità "la somministrazione del materiale in più formati di presentazione" (p. 25), come testo con illustrazioni, illustrazione con elementi sonori, filmati ecc., mentre il terzo capitolo (pp. 45-74) è dedicato all'ipertesto.

Nel quarto capitolo l'A. analizza le attività e i vari aspetti della didattica linguistica con il supporto del computer, come la lettura, la scrittura, l'analisi testuale, i corpora e i dizionari elettronici.

Il quinto capitolo (pp. 117-138) presenta e analizza i criteri per la valutazione del software didattico per l'italiano L2, passando in rassegna vari aspetti metodologici e tecnici come *adeguatezza dei contenuti al livello linguistico degli allievi*; *la chiarezza e correttezza dei contenuti*; *l' organizzazione dei contenuti*; *lo spazio adeguato a tutte le attività linguistiche*; *l'approccio didattico*; *la facilità d'uso*; *la struttura ipertestuale*; *l' interattività* ecc.

Il sesto capitolo (pp. 139-154) si occupa invece della didattica con Internet, presentando attività didattiche e potenziali problemi connessi all'uso del web e indicando criteri per valutare i siti didattici.

Il settimo capitolo (pp. 155-193) è dedicato all'e-learning e ne analizza le modalità di apprendimento e le caratteristiche, come la *flessibilità*, la *modularità*, l'*usabilità*, l'*interattività*, l'*aggiornabilità* e la *trasversalità*, oltre ai protagonisti (docente, studente e tutor).

Conclude il volume un'appendice che segnala gli indirizzi dei siti dei corsi di Italiano on line e la rete per la didattica.

Erika Nardon-Schmid

MARIE-CHRISTINE JAMET, *À l'écoute du français. La compréhension orale dans le cadre de l'intercompréhension des langues romanes*, Gunter Narr, Tübingen 2007, pp. 200.

«Et si l'intercompréhension était une anti-Babel?». È con questa immagine, sorta di *fil rouge* che percorre tutto il testo, che l'A. introduce il suo lavoro sull'intercomprensione delle lingue romanze, il cui tema ruota intorno al convincimento che parlare lingue diverse non costituisce più una punizione divina, ma un *atout* per potersi comprendere, purché esse appartengano alla stessa famiglia. Se queste somiglianze sono già state sfruttate per l'abilità ricettiva scritta anche in termini di metodi didattici, l'A. si propone di dimostrare, analizzando in particolare la coppia francese/italiano, che esistono le condizioni per un'intercomprensione anche dell'orale.

Il volume, che unisce la teoria allo studio di casi, si divide in due sezioni: la prima riguarda le parole isolate (capp. 1 e 2) e la seconda le parole in un discorso (capp. 3, 4 e 5). Dopo avere analizzato aspetti prettamente fonetici che possono essere implicati in caso di intercomprensione francese-italiano (cap. 1), il capitolo 2 presenta un'esperienza di riconoscimento di parole isolate francesi, condotta su locutori italofoni, i cui risultati aprono all'ipotesi di un "indice de transparence sonore" (p. 61). Poiché la lingua non funziona per parole isolate, la ricerca della Jamet prosegue focalizzandosi sulle parole all'interno di un discorso. Di conseguenza il capitolo 3 si concentra sulle specificità del discorso orale, mentre il capitolo 4 analizza il processo di comprensione, i suoi meccanismi e le strategie attivate. Si arriva così allo studio di due casi (cap. 5): la somministrazione a due locutori italofoni adulti di documenti orali complessi registrati dalla radio.

Nella *Conclusione* (pp. 174-179) l'A. esplicita le ricadute pratiche, preoccupazione ricorrente in tutto il volume, di questo suo "parcours pré-didactique" (p. 179) nella speranza di avere fornito qualche principio fondante per un metodo di intercomprensione per l'orale.

Assai vasta la *Bibliographie et sitographie* (pp. 180-196) divisa per temi (quali *Linguistique romane*; *Phonétique, phonologie, prosodie*; *La langue parlée*; *Langue, discours et compréhension*; *Psycholinguistique, linguistique appliquée et compréhension*; *Acquisition/apprentissage et didactique*; *Intercompréhension, enseignement du français en Italie* e *Matériel pédagogique d'intercompréhension des langues romanes*).

Gli *Annexes*, particolarmente ricchi, sono tutti consultabili su Internet.

Patrizia Mauri

EDITH COGNINI, *Vivere la migrazione tra e con le lingue: funzioni del racconto e dell'analisi biografica nell'apprendimento dell'italiano come lingua seconda*, Wizarts, Porto Sant'Elpidio, 3, 2007, pp. 279 ("Lingue sempre meno straniere").

Il volume, inserito in una collana dal titolo assai evocativo, partendo da un'indagine sugli aspetti metalinguistici e socio-psicologici circa l'acquisizione\apprendimento dell'italiano in contesto migratorio, si propone di valutare quanto il racconto e l'analisi biografica possano aiutare nell'acquisizione dell'italiano L2 in una prospettiva interculturale.

L'A. si interroga sul valore delle grandi lingue di mediazione mediante indagini sul campo, osservazioni partecipanti del setting, uso di questionari standard, studi di caso e interviste narrative.

Valuta i dati raccolti sia di natura quantitativa che qualitativa entro processi di decostruzione degli atteggiamenti e di co-costruzione narrativa come parti significative per la valutazione delle competenze linguistico-comunicative e interculturali del soggetto plurilingue.

Una bibliografia ragionata divisa in 5 sezioni termina il volume.

Bona Cambiaghi

MARCO MEZZADRI, *Italiano L2: progetti per il territorio*, Cartemoderne UNINOVA in collaborazione con Guerra Edizioni, Parma 2008, pp. 253.

"Perché insegnare la lingua italiana agli alunni stranieri nell'Italia di questo inizio del XXI secolo?" (p. 7). Con questa domanda l'A. apre l'introduzione al volume che qui presentiamo, la cui struttura intende fornire stimoli, spunti di riflessione ed esempi per aiutare il lettore a costruire una risposta alla domanda iniziale.

Le parole-chiave da cui Mezzadri muove e su cui si fonda per impostare l'intero lavoro sono *educazione linguistica*, *educazione alla cittadinanza democratica*, *plurilinguismo* e *pluriculturalismo*, parole che caratterizzano il sostrato scientifico sia della prima parte, dedicata alle *Coordinate teoriche*, sia della seconda parte, riservata invece alle *Esperienze*.

I quattro capitoli costitutivi della prima parte inquadrano il tema dell'insegnamento/apprendimento dell'italiano come lingua seconda nella scuola italiana da più punti di vista: da quello normativo, con riferimenti anche al *Piano educativo personalizzato* (PEP) e a *La via italiana per la scuola interculturale e l'integrazione degli alunni stranieri*; a quello dell'educazione bilingue, con aperture al CLIL e alla teoria dell'interdipendenza; a quello della valutazione degli apprendimenti, con interessanti rimandi al *Quadro comune europeo di riferimento* e proposte di applicazione dei descrittori in classe; fino alla proposta di un modello di intervento per la didattica dell'italiano dello studio.

Le riflessioni teoriche e le proposte applicative trovano infine un riscontro concreto nella seconda parte del volume, in cui l'A. presenta sette progetti realizzati nel territorio di Parma, con scuole ed enti locali, rivolti non solo agli insegnanti di italiano lingua seconda ma anche agli apprendenti, bambini, adolescenti, adulti.

Chiude il volume una bibliografia ampia ed aggiornata.

Cristina Bosisio

SARA FERRARI, *Le tecnologie dell'informazione e della comunicazione nella didattica dello*

spagnolo, I.S.U. Università Cattolica, Milano 2008, pp. 231 (CD-ROM annesso).

La sempre maggiore diffusione delle nuove tecnologie ha prodotto anche nel mondo della scuola dei profondi cambiamenti sia per l'insegnamento/apprendimento in genere sia per l'insegnamento/apprendimento delle lingue straniere in particolare. Le varie applicazioni che i supporti multimediali permettono hanno modificato le modalità con le quali i giovani comunicano, ricercano informazioni, organizzano dati, ascoltano dialoghi o musica, vedono video ecc. "Tale realtà non può essere ignorata dal sistema scolastico che deve, di conseguenza, attrezzarsi per fornire un adeguato supporto di conoscenze e abilità per tutti, dagli insegnanti agli studenti" (Introduzione, p. 11).

Avvalendosi anche di documenti messi a disposizione in Internet da parte di alcuni colleghi che si occupano di tecnologie didattiche, Sara Ferrari ha redatto per gli insegnanti di spagnolo – ma anche per coloro che vogliono avvantaggiarsi delle esperienze informatiche sperimentate con successo in ambito didattico – un manuale quale supporto "per la progettazione e realizzazione di attività che prevedono l'uso in classe di materiali multimediali e quale stimolo per riflettere sull'effettiva opportunità di utilizzare le tecnologie dell'informazione e della comunicazione in uno specifico contesto didattico" (Introduzione, pp. 12-13).

Il volume è suddiviso in sette capitoli che comprendono *Le tecnologie dell'informazione e della comunicazione* (cap. 1, pp. 17-35), *La manipolazione dei testi* (cap. 2, pp. 37-52), *Gli ipertesti* (cap. 3, pp. 53-71), *Le presentazioni multimediali* (cap. 4, pp. 73-81), *I cd-rom e i dvd per la didattica dello spagnolo* (cap. 5, pp. 83-142), *Internet* (cap. 6, pp. 143-191) e *Integrazione del materiale multimediale nella classe di lingua straniera* (cap. 7, pp. 193-207).

L'Autrice integra le riflessioni teoriche con le attività pratiche inerenti alle tecnologie informatiche per la didattica della lingua spagnola, ma pone anche l'attenzione alla possibilità di realizzazione di progetti pianificati, nonché alla fruizione autonoma di vari percorsi di apprendimento da parte dei ragazzi. Per meglio seguire l'impostazione dell' "imparare facendo" viene allegato al volume un CD-ROM con la soluzione degli esercizi, l'esemplificazione di attività proponibili in classe, i link a molti siti di interesse e un ipertesto in spagnolo che ripercorre i temi trattati nel manuale fornendo un ulteriore supporto per l'insegnante – ma anche per l'apprendente – che voglia avvicinarsi alle tecnologie dell'informazione e della comunicazione in modalità multimediale.

Erika Nardon-Schmid

FLORA DE GIOVANNI, Bruna DI SABATO (a cura di), *Imparare ad imparare. Imparare ad insegnare. Parole di insegnanti ad uso di studenti*, Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, Napoli 2008, pp. 278.

Il volume raccoglie due cicli di lezioni dedicate all'apprendimento e all'insegnamento delle lingue e delle letterature, tenutesi presso l'Università degli Studi di Salerno dal 2005 al 2007.

Dopo una *Presentazione* dettagliata e approfondita dello spirito iniziale e dei contenuti fondativi del Progetto (pp. 5-22), le curatrici organizzano il volume suddividendolo in tre parti: la prima introduttiva, dedicata alle *Riflessioni preliminari* sull'*Imparare ad imparare* (Raffaele Sibilio, pp. 25-32) e sull'*Imparare ad insegnare* (Paolo E. Balboni, pp. 33-40); la seconda e la terza simmetricamente organizzate intorno all'insegnamento e all'apprendimento della lingua (*La lingua*) e all'insegnamento e all'apprendimento della letteratura (*La letteratura*).

Di seguito riportiamo i titoli dei singoli contributi rispettivamente della seconda e della terza parte:

La lingua

Imparare a riflettere sulla lingua, a cominciare dalla propria, Gianfranco Porcelli (pp. 43-61);

Imparare una lingua straniera, Paolo E. Balboni (pp. 63-90);

Insegnare una lingua straniera, Gianfranco Porcelli (pp. 91-114);

Una proposta didattica per l'insegnamento della traduzione specializzata, Patrizia Mazzotta (pp. 115-127);

Insegnare l'italiano come L2 e come LS: analogie e differenze teoriche metodologiche, Matteo Santipolo, (pp. 129-147);

Professione: traduttore, Gabriella Rammairone (pp. 149-161).

La letteratura

Piacere, politica, poetica. Le tre "P" della letteratura, Laura Di Michele (pp. 165-183);

Imparare a leggere un testo, Massimo Fusillo (pp. 185-191);

La letteratura in classe, Remo Ceserani (pp. 193-202);

Insegnare la letteratura: formazione, istruzione e intelligibilità dell'insegnamento letterario, Ivan Verč (pp. 203-219);

Insegnare a leggere in una prospettiva interculturale, Maria E. Brunner (pp. 221-248);

Teaching Literature through Linguistic Analysis, Judith Munat (pp. 249-271).

Cristina Bosisio

Antony Mollica, Roberto Dolci, Mauro Pichiassi (a cura di), *Linguistica e Glottodidattica. Studi in onore di Katerin Katerinov*, Guerra Edizioni, Perugia 2008, pp. 411.

Il presente volume raccoglie ventitre contributi di studiosi italiani e stranieri offerti in onore a Katerin Kanterinov per omaggiarne la lunga attività scientifica e didattica volta ad esplorare e ad approfondire numerose aree di ricerca in una "continua interazione tra linguistica e glottodidattica" (*Presentazione*, p. 7).

Dopo un capitolo introduttivo sul *Profilo biografico e scientifico di* Katerin Katerinov (pp. 9-15), i curatori del volume presentano i contributi in ordine alfabetico per autore. In que-

sta scheda li elenchiamo raggruppandoli secondo i temi annunciati nella presentazione (p. 8):

– linguistica contrastiva e testuale

Spagnolo e italiano: da una lingua all'altra, Manuel Carrera Díaz (pp. 111-119).

Note sull'italiano dei media, Maurizio Dardano (pp. 141-151).

Come si insegnava l'uso dell'articolo nelle prime grammatiche di lingua italiana per polacchi, Elzbieta Jamrozik (pp. 237-253).

Il detto e non detto e la ricostruzione testuale: un problema di consecutio temporum?, Vincenzo Lo Cascio (pp. 271-282).

Polisemia e sinonimia dei mezzi espressivi italiani usati in un espediente retorico largamente diffuso: l'indeterminatezza del flash forward, Tjša Miklič (pp. 297-309).

– teoria glottodidattica

Una scienza dell'educazione linguistica basata sulla teoria dei modelli, Paolo Balboni (pp. 17-39).

Sull'interdisciplinarità della glottodidattica, Bona Cambiaghi (pp. 105-109).

Bimodalità e insegnamento delle lingue oggi, Marcel Danesi (pp. 121-139).

– materiali didattici

I materiali didattici per la didattica dell'italiano LS nel mondo: una ricognizione, Laura Berrettini (pp. 73-92).

Appunti di didattica della pronuncia dell'italiano lingua "altra", Gianfranco Porcelli (pp. 363-373).

– tecnologie

Linguaggio giovanile e varietà dialettali perugine in Internet, Antonio Batinti e Carmen Coli (pp. 59-71).

Tecnologie e formazione alla ricerca della produttività, Enrico Borello (pp. 93-103).

La logistica nell'apprendimento di una lingua, Bondi Sciarone (pp. 375-384).

– formazione degli insegnanti

Educazione linguistica e valutazione della competenza linguistico-comunicativa: al di là delle mode, Monica Barni (pp. 41-57).

La formazione dei lettori di italiano, Cristina Lavinio (pp. 255-269).

L'allievo protagonista del proprio apprendimento. Riflessioni su stili di studio e strategie di apprendimento di italiano L2, Mauro Pichiassi (pp. 341-361).

– politica linguistica

Lingue e identità dell'Europa, Tullio De Mauro (pp. 153-172).

Italia: patrie regionali e patria nazionale, Giovanni Freddi (pp. 217-235).

Certificazioni, economia della lingua italiana nel mondo, Quadro Comune Europeo di riferimento per le lingue: *per una politica linguistica dell'italiano nel mondo*, Massimo Vedovelli (pp. 385-411).

– rapporti tra lingua e cultura

Pubblicità paremiologica e italiano L2: lingua e cultura in contesti didattici, Paola Desideri (pp. 173-199).

Le "culture" nella classe di lingua italiana, Roberto Dolci (pp. 201-215).

I malintesi della cortesia nella comunicazione interculturale, Patrizia Mazzotta (pp. 283-296).

L'umorismo verbale nella glottodidattica, Antony Mollica (pp. 311-339).

Cristina Bosisio

Rassegna di Linguistica Francese

a cura di Enrica Galazzi e Chiara Molinari

Bernard Cerquiglini, *Merci professeur! Chroniques savoureuses sur la langue française*, Bayard, Paris 2008, pp. 328.

On ne peut que se féliciter de la parution de cet ouvrage qui, en dehors d'un véritable esprit de système (l'auteur déclare modestement se situer dans la lignée des «remarqueurs», sous l'égide de Vaugelas donc, plutôt que dans celle des grammairiens illustres à la Damourette et Pichon), réunit quelque 300 chroniques transmises par TV5-Monde et toujours disponibles sur le site de cette chaîne. Au cours de cette émission, sorte de «courrier des lecteurs» au format Internet, et donc dans ce livre où les entrées sont présentées sous l'ordre alphabétique, B.C. aborde essentiellement des questions de lexique (mots et locutions, régionalismes et autres) et d'orthographe (l'éternel débat sur l'accent circonflexe, l'«accent du souvenir» selon le titre d'un autre ouvrage de Cerquiglini, 1995), sans négliger des problèmes de morphosyntaxe (dont l'accord du participe passé avec auxiliaire *avoir*) qui hantent les français, les francophones et les apprenants étrangers. On apprécie, au-delà de la verve qui caractérise ce passionné de la langue française, la prise en compte de la dimension diachronique, qui seule peut expliquer – pas toujours justifier– certains phénomènes. Linguiste et par là observateur objectif, B.C. plaide cependant pour les simplifications orthographiques et pour la féminisation des noms de métiers: souhaitons que ce livre contribuera à une meilleure connaissance de certaines «modernisations» qui ont toujours quelque difficulté à s'implanter en France.

Maria Colombo Timelli

Catherine Bel, Pascale Dumont et Frank Willaert ed., *«Contez me tout» Mélanges de langue et de littérature médiévales offerts à Herman Braet*, Peeters, Louvain – Paris – Dudely, MA 2006.

De ce gros volume, nous ne signalons que les contributions ayant trait à la langue française. Brigitte L. Callay, *Guillaume d'Angleterre 'en essil'* (pp. 129-146): l'*exil* auquel on fait allusion est certainement une *peregrinatio religiosa*, qui n'exclut cependant pas l'intégration des personnages dans les valeurs séculières. Pierre Demarolle, *L'architecture évènementielle dans le 'Saintré'* (pp. 147-157) met en rapport l'agencement des faits, l'enchâssement des évènements dans le roman d'Antoine de La Sale, avec les moyens morphologiques en jeu, notamment le système verbal, parfois déroutant pour le lecteur moderne. Ewa Dorota Żółkiewska, *Le bon Dieu et tous ses saints – dans les fabliaux* (pp. 355-362) analyse les diverses fonctions (stylistique, mimétique, de caractérisation des personnages) remplies par les invocations à Dieu et aux saints, notamment dans les fabliaux de Jean Bodel, Garin, Rutebeuf, Jean de Condé. Siegfried Wenzel, *French Proverbs from the Mouths of English Preachers?* (pp. 543-555), relève dans des manuels pour les prédicateurs et des sermons anglais des XIVe et XVe siècles des proverbes et dictons cités en français, non accompagnés de traduction. Gianni Mombello, *Poèmes en français, en astesan et en flamand de Giovan Giorgio Alione* (pp. 601-624) souligne les rapports du poète astesan G.G. Alione avec la langue, les lettres et la culture françaises entre la fin du XVe et les premières décennies du XVIe siècle. Jacques Charles Lemaire, *Ancien français 'donoier'. Étude de sémantique historique* (pp. 723-736): verbe polysémique en a.fr. (il couvre toute la gamme des actes de la séduc-

tion), de même que le déverbal *donoi*, *donoier* sort de l'usage vers 1350, entre autres à cause de l'homonymie de certaines de ses formes avec celles du verbe *donner*. Jesse Mortelmans, *Quels moyens pour dire le vrai? Sur les origines de la chronique médiévale* (pp. 737-747) souligne la spécificité de certaines formules de véridicité typiques de la chronique et 'signe' d'un genre littéraire qui s'affirme en tant que tel. Yorio Otaka, *Le complémenteur des complétives enchâssées* (pp. 749-753), propose un classement des phrases doublement relatives en longue diachronie, de l'a.fr. au français du XXᵉ siècle. Barbara N. Sargent-Baur, *Encore le 'Chevalier de la Charrete', v.12* (pp. 755-762) revient sur les variantes de ce vers célèbre et propose d'y voir une réminiscence du *Ps.* 68,2, ce qui amènerait à accepter la leçon du ms. G. Lydia A. Stanovaïa, *Le genre en ancien français* (pp. 763-782), aborde, selon une approche guillaumienne, la question sur le plan sémantique, morphologique (suffixes et pseudo-suffixes), et syntaxique. Willy Van Hoecke, *Le développement de l'adverbe 'non' comme marque de la négation 'partielle' en français* (pp. 797-812), retrace l'évolution de cette négation du latin à l'a.fr. au fr. moderne, en mettant surtout en relief les emplois qui se sont conservés contre ceux qui ont disparu.

Maria Colombo Timelli

Danielle Jacquart, Danièle James-Raoul et Olivier Soutet ed., *Par les mots et les textes. Mélanges de langue, de littérature et d'histoire des sciences médiévales offerts à Claude Thomasset*, PUPS, Paris 2005, pp. 894.

Dans ce volume de plus de 60 contributions, signalons plusieurs études linguistiques en perspective diachronique, dans divers domaines.

Lexicologie et lexicographie: H. Gerner, R. Martin, *Le lexique de la langue scientifique à l'aune du FEW* (pp. 357-370); D. James-Raoul, *Défense et illustration de la langue française: la néologie dans les Arts Poétiques (XIIᵉ-XIIIᵉ siècles)* (pp. 451-463); B. Laurioux,

'Olla patella': préliminaires à une étude de la lexicographie alimentaire au Moyen Âge (pp. 465-481); T. Matsumura, *'Guillaume le Maréchal' revisité* (pp. 533-545); O. Soutet, *Observations sur le traitement lexicographique du* si *d'ancien et de moyen français* (pp. 693-703); Fr. Torterat, Si *et* or *comme cohéreurs (para)textuels en ancien et en moyen français* (pp. 763-778).

Linguistique diachronique: M. Banniard, *L'ancien français, mémoire du latin* (pp. 21-36).

Onomastique et toponymie: J.-P. Chambon, *Toponymie et grammaire historique: les noms de lieux issus de* cappella *et* forestis *et la diffusion spatiale de l'article défini dans la Galloromania* (pp. 143-155); J. Chocheyras, *Les lieux dits «La croix rouge» au Moyen Âge et leur signification prophylactique* (pp. 157-175); A. Malgouverné, *Usages et représentation de l'espace montagnard au bas Moyen Âge: l'exemple des lieux-dits du Jura gessien* (pp. 505-520); Chr. Silvi, *Les variations sur le nom dans la 'Mappemonde' de maître Gossuin de Metz* (pp. 679-691).

Phonétique: A. Meiller, *Diphtongaison et non-diphtongaison conditionnées* (pp. 547-550).

Syntaxe: S. Bazin-Tacchella, *'Lequel' dans la traduction française de la 'Chirurgia Magna' de Guy de Chauliac* (pp. 37-53); S. Marcotte, *Subordonnants de la série* lequel *et coordination* (pp. 521-532); A. Queffélec, *Les réponses négatives averbales à pronom sujet en ancien français* (pp. 609-622).

Traduction: J.-P. Bénezet, *Quand* dispensation *n'est pas la bonne traduction de 'dispensatio'* (pp. 55-69); Fr. Vielliard, *L'utilisation de l'"Itinerarium peregrinorum' par l'"Estoire de la guerre sainte': traduction et adaptation* (pp. 807-818).

Signalons aussi la bibliographie des travaux de Cl. Thomasset (pp. 11-19), qui comprend de nombreuses études dans le domaine de l'histoire de la langue, scientifique surtout, au Moyen Âge.

Anne Schoysman

Claudio Galderisi et Cinzia Pignatelli ed., *La traduction vers le moyen français*. Actes du IIᵉ

colloque de l'Association Internationale d'Études sur le Moyen Français (AIEMF), Poitiers, 27-29 avril 2006, Turnhout, Brepols 2007, pp. 460 («The Medieval Translator. Traduire au moyen Age», 11).

En introduisant les textes des 25 communications présentées au IIe colloque de l'AIEMF, C. GALDERISI souligne la centralité du thème de la traduction pour les études sur le moyen français, en rappelant que «deux tiers des traductions médiévales sont faites entre le XIVe et le XVe siècle» (p. 2). L'organisation du volume reflète les trois axes qui ont guidé la réflexion des participants: philologique, linguistique et épistémologique. La série des études linguistiques, les seuls dont nous rendront compte ici, s'ouvre par la relation de G. ROQUES, qui examine le vocabulaire régional de huit traductions de la *Consolatio Philosophiae* de Boèce en précisant ainsi l'origine géographique des différents textes. Le domaine lexical est encore exploré par O.A. DUHL, qui analyse les fonctions de la réduplication synonymique dans la traduction de Jehan Droyon de *La nef des folles* (vers 1498); par M. GOYENS et E. DEVIÈRE, qui abordent le problème des langues de spécialité au Moyen Âge en passant par l'examen du vocabulaire médical dans les traductions des *Problemata* d'Aristote, et par A. SMETS, qui étudie la nature des termes restés en latin dans 14 traductions de traités de fauconnerie en essayant de déterminer les causes de ce maintien. Pour ce qui concerne la syntaxe, A. BENGTSSON s'interroge sur les modalités de traduction de l'ablatif absolu en moyen français à travers l'étude de quelques traductions du XIVe siècle, notamment celles de Jean de Vignay; M. COLOMBO TIMELLI présente de nouveaux témoignages de traités de morphosyntaxe latine (*Ars minor* de Donat et *Quot modis*), imprimés entre 1510 et 1520 et rédigés en latin et en français. D'autres communications considèrent la langue d'une (ou plusieurs) traduction(s) sous de différents aspects: ainsi, S. MARZANO analyse la traduc-

tion du *De casibus* de Boccace par Laurent de Premierfait; C. PIGNATELLI compare les usages linguistiques de deux manuscrits (XIIIe et XVe s.) contenant des traductions de Jean d'Antioche; A. SCHOYSMAN s'arrête sur la traduction du *Débat de la vraie noblesse* de Jean Miélot; A. VALENTINI considère la technique de Simon de Hesdin «translateur» de Valère Maxime. G. DI STEFANO, enfin, présente des réfléxions plus générales sur le bilinguisme des traducteurs et sur les caractéristiques de leur langue, tels les calques et les dittologies.

Barbara Ferrari

JACQUES CHARLES LEMAIRE, *Une version 'lillose' de la 'Complainte de l'enfant banni' de Jean Bouchet*, in SARAH BAUDELLE-MICHELS, MARIE-MADELEINE CASTELLANI, PHILIPPE LOGIÉ et EMMANUELLE POULAIN-GAUTRET ed., *Romans d'Antiquité et littérature du Nord. Mélanges offerts à Aimé Petit*, Honoré Champion, Paris 2007, pp. 531-559.

J.C.L. édite le texte de cette complainte selon le ms. Bruxelles, KBR IV 541, transcrit à Lille en 1568. Le poème de Jean Bouchet, composé en 1500, y est marqué par de nombreux picardismes graphiques, morphologiques et lexicaux, mis en relief et commentés dans l'introduction et dans les notes au texte.

Maria Colombo Timelli

DENISE POULET, *Originalité du picard de Lille et de ses environs*, in SARAH BAUDELLE-MICHELS, MARIE-MADELEINE CASTELLANI, PHILIPPE LOGIÉ et EMMANUELLE POULAIN-GAUTRET ed., *Romans d'Antiquité et littérature du Nord. Mélanges offerts à Aimé Petit*, Honoré Champion, Paris 2007, pp. 699-708.

D.P. met en relief certaines particularités phonétiques et lexicales qui font du dialecte de Lille un parler singulier dans l'aire picarde: cependant, la recherche des causes de ces caractéristiques est une question encore en suspens.

Maria Colombo Timelli

JACQUES FRANÇOIS, DENIS LE PESANT, DANIELLE LEEMAN ed., *Le classement syntactico-sémantique des verbes français*, "Langue française", 153, mars 2007, pp. 128.

Les éditeurs introduisent ce numéro par une présentation de la version papier du dictionnaire des *Verbes français* (*LVF*) de Jean Dubois et Françoise Dubois-Charlier (pp. 3-19), fondé sur un classement syntactico-sémantique dont les principes théoriques sont validés par les recherches proposées dans la contribution suivante, où Iris Eshkol et Denis Le Pesant (pp. 20-32) étudient les prédicats nominaux et verbaux des classes «compliment et remerciement», «manière de parler», «prédiction», «information répondant à une demande». D'autres articles proposent des analyses de verbes ou classes de verbes qui s'appuient sur *LVF*, en faisant parfois des comparaisons avec d'autres dictionnaires ou d'autres approches: sont ainsi étudiés les verbes de sentiment (Rolf Kailuwet, pp. 33-39), le verbe *changer* et ses synonymes (Dominique Dutoit et Jacques François, pp. 40-57), le verbe *voir* (Danielle Leeman et Madona Sakhokia Giraud, pp. 58-73), les verbes de cause (Sophie Hamon et Danielle Leeman, pp. 74-91) et les trivalenciels locatifs, c'est-à-dire les verbes qui présentent deux arguments post-verbaux nominaux, l'un direct, l'autre indirect (Morgane Sénéchal, Dominique Willems, pp. 92-110). La dernière étude est consacrée à l'emploi du pronom clitique *on* utilisé comme sujet humain dans les exemples du *LVF* (Antoinette Balibarò Mrabti, pp. 111-126).

Cristina Brancaglion

DANIÈLE DUBOIS, *Sens commun et sens commun: Expériences sensibles, connaissance(s) ou doxa?*, "Langages", 170, 2008, pp. 41-53.

Cet article analyse le rapport entre les deux acceptions du mot sens, – perception sensible et doxa sémantique –, pour explorer la relation entre les cinq sens communs de la personne et le sens commun. Il examine, dans cet ordre, les singularités lexicales relatives aux couleurs et aux odeurs. Pour ce qui est des couleurs, la catégorie et la désignation dépendent de leur statut sémiotique et cognitif (objet de décor ou bien palette de peintre, par exemple). Elles ne reposent donc pas sur le sens commun, mais sur un processus d'abstraction. À l'inverse, les odeurs, dans la culture occidentale, n'ont pas de nom, et sont dénommées par des termes dérivés, ou des définitions subjectives. Ceci révèle qu'elles n'appartiennent ni a une doxa des sensibles communs, ni à une connaissance scientifique devenue commune.

Jean-Paul Dufiet

VALERIA ZOTTI, *Dictionnaire bilingue et francophonie. Le français québécois*, Schena ed., Fasano 2007, pp. 130.

Dans son volume, V. Zotti réfléchit à la variation lexicale francophone dans la lexicographie bilingue. En d'autres termes, elle cherche à analyser le traitement, dans les dictionnaires bilingues, de lexies qui renvoient à des réalités culturelles, sociales et politiques diverses par rapport aux paramètres de référence européens. Pour ce faire, l'auteure examine la nomenclature de trois dictionnaires bilingues contemporains (*Il Boch. Dizionario Francese – Italiano Italiano – Francese*, 2000; *DIF Dizionario francese – italiano italiano – francese*, 1999; *Il Nuovo Dizionario Garzanti di Francese*, 2003), en portant le regard, tout particulièrement, sur le français québécois. Après avoir souligné le retard de l'intégration des québécismes dans les dictionnaires bilingues, V. Zotti en souligne les faiblesses. Celles-ci concernent notamment la présentation des québécismes, l'emploi des marques topolectales et sociolectales et, enfin, le traitement des traduisants. Cette constatation conduit l'auteure à postuler la nécessité «d'envisager un dictionnaire bilingue attestant aussi les ramifications morphosyntaxiques de la variété du français parlé dans l'une des régions les plus représentatives de la francophonie» (p. 78). Le

rôle et la fonction du dictionnaire bilingue sont ainsi renouvelés: lieu de rencontre des variétés linguistiques du français et de l'italien, le dictionnaire bilingue pourrait ainsi refléter l'identité composite et changeante des langues et des peuples français et italien.

Chiara Molinari

Marie-Berthe Vittoz ed., *Les mots migrateurs: l'interculturel en œuvre*, Synergies Italie, 4 / 2008.

Ce volume de Synergies Italie rassemble les interventions de la journée d'étude du 20 mars 2007 à l'Université de Turin et a pour objet les «mots migrateurs». Ce thème essentiel de la lexicologie et de la lexicographie est analysé dans sa dimension interculturelle et s'articule autour de trois parties. La première, *Voyage dans le temps*, rassemble les articles analysant ce sujet à travers une approche diachronique. La seconde partie, *Voyage dans l'espace*, aborde les migrations linguistiques du point de vue des déplacements spatiaux, tant au niveau de la langue qu'au niveau du discours (guides touristiques, discours journalistique). La troisième partie, *Voyages textuels*, traite des mouvements terminologiques au niveau des langues de spécialité. Ces différentes approches offrent au lecteur des itinéraires transversaux très riches, de véritables «voyages» aussi bien diatopiques que diachroniques qui font émerger le concept de *passage,* à la fois multidirectionnel (emprunts aller-retour) et transculturel (remaniements sémantiques, créations nouvelles).

Valérie Durand

Irmtraud Behr, Dieter Hentschel, Michel Kauffmann et Anja Kern ed., *Langue, économie, entreprise le travail des mots*, Presses Sorbonne Nouvelle, Paris 2007, pp. 500.

Allorché la mondializzazione moltiplica gli scambi tra lingue e culture diverse che le imprese si trovano a dover gestire tanto a livello di risorse umane che di pratiche linguistiche orali e scritte, gli studi sul ruolo delle lingue nell'economia sono ancora poco numerosi.

Il volume miscellaneo che segnaliamo, (26 contributi), affronta i discorsi *sull'*economia e i discorsi *dell'*economia a livello internazionale, in un'ottica pluridisciplinare e contrastiva (tra le lingue poste a confronto il francese, il tedesco, l'inglese, l'arabo, il portoghese, lo slovacco). Il ruolo della componente linguistica (scritta e orale) è esplorato all'interno delle imprese e nell'attività economica (dalla stampa ai curricola scolastici ai discorsi specialistici, informali e di divulgazione), in particolare per le aree della gestione e del marketing.

Di spiccato interesse sono la traduzione economica come fattore di evoluzione di una lingua (p.e. nel caso della traduzione verso l'arabo) e gli scambi sulle pratiche traduttive attraverso le liste di diffusione che si qualificano come luoghi di intensa riflessione metalinguistica condivisa oltre che di solidarietà tra i traduttori di diversi paesi, testimoni privilegiati e talora veri protagonisti della creatività lessicale legata all'evoluzione della realtà socioeconomica.

Non vengono trascurati l'impatto della cultura sulla comunicazione e i malintesi interculturali.

Si tratta di un volume stimolante e di grande interesse per la novità, l'attualità e la ricchezza delle tematiche affrontate.

Enrica Galazzi

Elisa Ravazzolo, *Analyse du discours interactif médiatique. Le rôle de l'animateur d'une émission radiophonique*, Aracne, Roma 2007, pp. 151.

Dans son étude, E. Ravazzolo se propose d'examiner le fonctionnement d'une interaction médiatique, en focalisant tout particulièrement le rôle de l'animateur. L'ouvrage est organisé en quatre chapitres. Le premier chapitre esquisse le cadre dans lequel s'inscrit la recherche et rappelle, par conséquent, les axes principaux de l'ADI (analyse du discours en interaction) proposée par C. Kerbrat-Orecchioni. De nature métodologique, le deuxième chapitre présente

l'émission étudiée, *Radiocom c'est vous*, et décrit les démarches suivies pour la constitution du corpus. Le rôle de l'animateur fait l'objet du chapitre 3: la nature interactive de l'émission, où un invité est censé répondre aux questions posées par les auditeurs, influence de près la fonction de l'animateur. Celui-ci n'est plus responsable seulement de l'organisation globale de l'interaction (gestion des séquences d'ouverture et de clôture et allocation des tours de parole), mais il contribue à l'évolution même de l'échange: il peut approfondir les questions des auditeurs, apporter des informations supplémentaires, rappeler l'invité vers les questions posées, apaiser d'éventuels conflits, etc. Enfin, le dernier chapitre est consacré à l'ethos de l'animateur, étudié par le biais des stratégies linguistiques qui le révèlent. Les émissions étudiées sont présentées en annexe.

Chiara Molinari

PIERRE ENCREVÉ – MICHEL BRAUDEAU, *Conversations sur la langue française*, Gallimard, Paris 2007, pp. 194.

C'est le français dans toute sa variété, historique et actuelle, qui est présenté dans ce bel ouvrage de Pierre Encrevé et Michel Braudeau. Avec la "légèreté et la liberté de ton de la conversation" (p. 12), les auteurs entreprennent un tour d'horizon sur le présent et l'avenir du français, qui est désormais la langue maternelle de quatre-vingts millions de personnes. Les sujets abordés sont nombreux: on part de l'histoire de la langue, réceptacle de trésors littéraires qu'il faudrait lire dans leur orthographe originelle (y compris les grands auteurs du XVIIᵉ), pour se pencher sur son évolution et ses perspectives. Selon Encrevé, "c'est toute la culture française [...] qui est la meilleure chance de la langue (p. 44)", une langue qui jouirait d'un prestige inaltéré. "Le français se porte mieux que jamais" (p. 24), affirme-t-il, corroborant son optimisme par des remarques sur la langue de l'administration (où une simplification majeure est en cours), le langage judiciaire, ("un enjeu démocratique

prioritaire" [p. 61]), la féminisation des noms de métier et la politique linguistique (les échecs de quelques lois protectionnistes ne mettant pas en danger la vitalité de la langue). Le français est ainsi évoqué dans sa mouvance, de la langue des banlieues à la francophonie; en ce qui concerne l'orthographe, finalement, il faut à la fois la "respecter" et la "désacraliser" (p. 110), car elle n'est qu'une convention sociale, une forme éphémère en vigueur à un moment donné, comme en témoignent entre autres les dictionnaires.

Giovanni Tallarico

HELENE BUZELIN, DEBORAH FOLARON ed., *La traduction et les études de réseaux / translation and Network Studies*, «Meta», LII, 4, 2007.

La revue Meta (LII, 4, 2007, sous la direction d'Hélène Buzelin et Deborah Folaron) présente un numéro spécial sur «La traduction et les études de réseaux». Freddie Plassand, avec «La traduction face aux nouvelles pratiques en réseaux», étudie les listes de diffusion et les nouvelles stratégies de résolution de problèmes induites par l'usage d'Internet; Hélène Buzelin, dans «Repenser la traduction à travers le spectre de la coédition», prend pour cadre d'études la pratique de quelques éditeurs et traducteurs du Québec, et pose la question de savoir en quoi la coédition peut modifier nos façons d'étudier la traduction; Anthony Pym («Cross-Cultural Networking: Translators in the French-German Network of *Petites Revues* at the End of the Nineteenth Century») et María Sierra Córdoba Serrano («La fiction québécoise en Espagne: une question de réseaux») se penchent, eux aussi, sur des utilisations stratégiques spécifiques de l'espace interculturel; quant à Laurence Jay-Rayon, elle propose de nouvelles pistes de réflexions avec une analyse de la fonction des réseaux métaphoriques chez Nuruddin Farah et l'exploration des enjeux de leur traduction («Traduire les réseaux métaphoriques chez Nuruddin Farah»). Ce numéro contient également, outre l'excellente introduction d'Hélène Buzelin et Deborah Folaron, d'autres contribu-

tions, telles que celle d'Yves Gambier, «Réseaux de traducteurs/interprètes bénévoles», qui concernent moins spécifiquement la linguistique française.

Yannick Preumont

Raffaele Spiezia, *La lisibilité entre théorie et pratique*, Fasano, Schena editore, Alain Baudry & Cᶦᵉ Éditeur, Paris 2007, pp. 148.

La lisibilité est un domaine qui a suscité beaucoup d'intérêt en ce qui concerne la langue maternelle, mais qui est encore peu exploré en langue étrangère. L'objectif de ce livre est de fournir aux enseignants de langue étrangère un instrument pour déterminer le niveau de compréhensibilité des textes qu'ils vont soumettre à leurs étudiants, en fonction des capacités de déchiffrage de ces derniers. Dans un premier temps, l'auteur présente un excursus historique des recherches théoriques sur la lisibilité linguistique dans les pays anglosaxons et francophones, tant dans le domaine de l'éducation que dans les secteurs de la presse écrite, de la langue administrative et du monde des affaires. Ensuite, il analyse et il évalue les outils techniques déjà disponibles dans les pays francophones, comme les logiciels *Cordial* et *Sato* (*Système d'Analyse de Textes par Ordinateur*), qui permettent de mesurer la lisibilité d'un texte et d'en relever les caractéristiques sur le plan syntaxique et lexical. L'auteur expose enfin les résultats d'une recherche sur 1618 apprenants italophones de Français Langue Étrangère, élèves du secondaire (collège et lycée). Enfin, il présente le prototype du logiciel *Textbalancer,* qui pourra être utilisé pour le choix de textes adaptés aux différents niveaux de compétence des apprenants italophones de FLE.

Michela Murano

Rassegna di Linguistica Inglese

Margherita Ulrych e Maria Luisa Maggioni

Hendrik De Smet, *Functional motivations in the development of nominal and verbal gerund in Middle and Early Modern English*, "English Language and Linguistics" XII/1, 2008, pp. 55-102.

Non è possibile comprendere la storia del gerundio inglese senza uno studio attento dei meccanismi dell'intero sistema delle costruzioni che ne fanno uso. L'articolo di De Smet, basato su un corpus che copre il periodo 1250-1640, si propone di esaminare l'evoluzione del gerundio in funzione verbale e nominale in uno stadio determinante nello sviluppo diacronico della lingua. In inglese antico, attraverso la morfologia derivazionale, era possibile creare nominalizzazioni deverbali con l'uso dei suffissi *-ing* o *-ung*; questi derivati assumevano tutte le caratteristiche dei sostantivi. A partire dal tardo Medio Inglese iniziò ad affermarsi l'utilizzo del gerundio in funzione verbale e, nell'ultima fase del periodo considerato nel saggio, l'uso verbale del gerundio divenne un elemento assolutamente indispensabile della grammatica della lingua inglese.

I dati analizzati da De Smet – raccolti utilizzando come fonti il Collins COBUILD Corpus, l'Helsinki Corpus, l'*Oxford English Dictionary*, il Penn-Helsinki Parsed Corpus of Middle English, il Penn-Helsinki Parsed Corpus of Early Modern English e il Corpus of Late Modern English Texts – permettono all'autore di giungere a conclusioni secondo le quali il prevalere dell'uso verbale del gerundio (del tipo *eating the apple*) presenta motivazioni economiche e iconiche che, insieme alla sua maggiore flessibilità, costituiscono un plausibile vantaggio funzionale rispetto al suo uso nominale. Come conclude De Smet (p. 96) "the his-

tory of the gerund indicates that functionally driven language change is in fact possible, provided that it is implemented through repeated motivated choices in synchronic usage".

Maria Luisa Maggioni

Marina Dossena-Ingrid Tieken-Boon van Ostade (eds), *Studies in Late Modern English Correspondence*, Linguistic Insights, Studies in Language and Communication, Vol. 76, Peter Lang, Bern, Berlin, Bruxelles, Frankfurt am Main, New York, Oxford, Wien 2008, pp. 291.

The volume is a collection of papers presented during the 14th ICCEHL International Conference held in Bergamo in 2006. The studies presented in this volume concentrate on aspects of Late Modern English letter writing. The study of the interaction of individuals belonging to different social classes, writing for different purposes, and finding themselves in different social contexts, both in Britain and in its colonies, provides insights into the linguistic choices of people, into their believes and habits but most of all it shows how and to what extent textual codification was accepted.

In the Early Modern period letter writing stimulated the production of manuals: it was an art, a part of common social interaction but also a display of oneself (as for example in book prefaces written in letter style to patrons or epistolary novels) and there existed many types of letters, from private to business, from those written in person to dictated ones, from long messages to short ones. Letters often share the characteristics of both written and spoken language. Research in recent years has shown how analyzing the language of letters presents an opportunity to investigate a range of registers, styles and vocabulary: data derive mainly from

specially-designed corpora or corpora where let-
ters represent a significant part, following cur-
rent approaches to historical sociolinguistics
and pragmatics.

The papers in this book shed new light on a
number of aspects, especially methodological
ones. Arja Nurmi and Minna Palander-Collin
open the volume investigating the definition of
the letter as a genre, proving how many extra-
linguistic variables influence classification as
much as the language used; in particular the au-
thors focus on the presence of spoken discourse
markers. Ingrid Tieken-Boon van Ostade ad-
dresses instead on Robert Lowth's correspon-
dence, reconstructing his social network in
relation to his activity as a grammarian: the
paper tackles a crucial problem regarding the
availability of letters sent and received, since
only by studying the modes and extent of the
exchange can researchers give a real picture of
the social interaction of an individual. Gaps in
the correspondence must be filled in with in-
formation derived from other sources, e.g. pub-
lications, biographies etc.

Two contributions deal with the paleo-
graphical aspects, investigating idiosyncrasy in
writing conventions, i.e. the use of abbreviation,
punctuation, spelling conventions etc. While
Fitzmaurice proves that these are related to so-
cial status, Dury proposes to represent paleo-
graphical variation in the form of tags in
electronic corpora, as it is essential to get infor-
mation about the education and social back-
ground of the writer and the nature of his/her
relationship with the addressee.

An important issue in letter writing appears
to be grammar. Sairio presents a corpus of let-
ters written by Bluestocking women, focusing
on the position of prepositions before or after a
relative pronoun. She demonstrates that strand-
ing was disapproved of well before prescriptive
grammars stigmatized it and suggests that indi-
viduals of rank such as Mary Montague would
not use or need grammars, which were meant
for the young and illiterate, but actually set the

norms: prescriptive grammars reflected usage
among the upper class and educated people.
Letters contain information about the level of
literacy of their writers, self-corrections in par-
ticular are important; Fairman proves how the
lowly literate appear mainly concerned with
spelling problems while the highly educated au-
thors seem to be more concerned with style.

Style is also essential in the case of business
letters dealing with complaints or problems. By
using correspondence with the Bank of Scot-
land, Dossena delves into the pragmatic strate-
gies employed by these writers, who adapted
politeness and persuasion strategies to their
needs, thus varying their illocutionary aims ac-
cordingly. Finally Dollinger studies forms of ad-
dress, abbreviated verbal forms and the
alternation of *shall* and *will* in the first person
and concentrates on a corpus of business letters
sent to Australia and Canada up to 1850, thus
investigating the early stages of a 'globalized'
business English and proving an early rate of
differentiation in a colonial context.

The volume collects papers that use research
methods that are relatively new in historical lin-
guistics (corpora) and at the same time investi-
gates a genre which is well known to literary
critics but less so to linguists. Letters were not
just the source of biographical information and
cannot be seen as fiction but as a key part of
everyday life, as the most important means of
communication and as an excellent ground to
understand how discourse and standardization
spread and were shared by "speakers" of Early
Modern and Modern English, an aspect we are
all familiar with in the age of electronic mail.

Silvia Pireddu

Kristin Davidse-Tine Breban-An Van
Linden, *Deictification: the development of
secondary deictic meanings by adjectives in the
English NP*, "English Language and
Linguistics" XII/3, 2008, pp. 475-503.

Aggettivi che preferenzialmente fungono da at-
tributi nel sintagma nominale, come per esem-

pio *other* in *far other scene*, possono assumere la funzione di deittici secondari. Questi ultimi specificano la denotazione del sintagma nominale: *other*, per esempio (facendo riferimento al sintagma precedente) completa la denotazione del sintagma *the side*, specificandola. Davidse, Breban e Van Linden, autori del presente articolo, sostengono che tali aggettivi, nel proprio semantismo, sono potenzialmente dei deittici. Si tratta infatti di aggettivi che servono a identificare frammenti di realtà, ovvero a denotarli tramite indicazioni spazio-temporali. Nella deissi secondaria questo semantismo è completato da un riferimento relativo alla situazione (ovvero al parlante, all'interlocutore, al contesto) individuata dal deittico primario/principale del sintagma nominale (in inglese *noun phrase*, *NP*). Gli autori giungono ad affermare che la deissi secondaria nei sintagmi nominali assume lo stesso ruolo degli ausiliari nei sintagmi verbali. Il sintagma nominale dovrebbe essere inteso a livello di funzione come una gerarchia di determinazione e specificazione e non semplicisticamente appiattendone la funzione con la manifestazione, cioè descrivendolo come una stringa rigidamente organizzata in *determiners > attributes > classifiers > head noun*. Oggetto specifico dell'articolo è l'analisi di cinque aggettivi: *opposite, complete, old, regular, necessari*; tramite la deissi secondaria essi divengono punti di riferimento fondamentale all'interno del contesto comunicativo.

Erica Doppiati

Augusto Carli-Ulrich Ammon (eds.), *Linguistic Inequality in Scientific Communication Today*, AILA Review Vol. 20, John Benjamins Publishing, Amsterdam/ Philadelphia, 2007, pp. 137.

The dominance of English in international scientific communication has established a definite advantage for the members of specialized discourse communities in terms of the distribution and circulation of knowledge. However, the access and participation for non-native speakers with limited language competence has become increasingly difficult, leading to the under-representation of specifics academic and research approaches that emerge from countries speaking lesser known languages, i.e. other than English.

The volume of collected articles edited by Carli and Ammon in the AILA Review Series offers an introductory and broadly comprehensive perspective on the current situation of international scientific communication. It tackles a number of issues including efficiency and fairness in the participation in scientific debate, the consequences of a global language on the actual development of science, the responsibilities of English. The first contribution, by Florian Coulmas, is about the topic of inequality in scientific communication, which is a consequence of the dominance of English as the language of science.

The second paper, by Flowerdew, introduces the problem of publishing in English for university postgraduate students and young scholars in search of their academic "niche" in an increasingly globalized university system that highly prizes research output in English. In his article, Flowerdew presents some qualitative data in order to highlight the difficulties encountered by non-native speakers (NNS) of English in acquiring and implementing the complex language skills required by academic writing. He also comments on the efforts of these scholars in trying to refer to the main literature of their subject when writing, and on the problems of alleged plagiarism that this might cause. Finally, the author concludes with a brief outline of the strategies that NNS of English might adopt to alleviate the burden that writing in English might represent.

The article by Guardiano, Favilla and Calaresu investigates stereotypes that often surround the dominance of English in the domain of international research publication. The first part of the article offers an outline of the problems that NNS scholars encounter when facing

the problem of language in scientific publication. The statistics available show in fact that even though the academic community of non-Anglophone speakers is bigger than the native one the number of publications written by NNSs is only 20% of the total amount, due to four different aspects of non-native writing: problems associated with linguistic and discursive aspects; problems associated with the fact that composition problems are more constrained and laborious for NNSs; cultural differences and different rhetorical traditions, both strictly pertaining to the research article genre and to intercultural variation and individual authorial choices; and, finally, material disadvantages and limitations. Editors are aware that NNS are unable to stress the relevance of their contributions properly and have difficulties in interpreting the real meaning of reviewers' reports. The article then presents results from a questionnaire conducted among university researchers working both within the sciences and in scientific and humanities university courses.

Hamel focuses on the development of language use in scientific publications. In his study, Hamel concentrates on international periodicals, showing that 75% of recent output in the humanities and social sciences, and up to 90% in the natural sciences, was published in English. The central question that Hamel tries to entangle is the actual consequence that the hegemony of English has on scientific development. This has advantages and disadvantages: on the one hand there is the indisputable advantage of using a common language, but on the other hand there is the danger of the extreme homegenization of knowledge which could cause irrevocable damage to humanity. Finally, a proposal for the promotion of language diversity in science is put forward, and highlights the global advantage that such a move would bring about.

The article by Van Parijs represents the breadth of the scope that Carli and Ammon aimed at reaching with the volume. Van Parijs

is a philosopher, political economist and academic who in his research has focussed on, amongst other things, the economy of linguistics communication. In his contribution, Van Parijs, analyses the topic of English language hegemony over international communication in terms of a cost/benefit ratio. The article proposes a criterion of fair burden sharing for which native speakers of English should be required to compensate the linguistic efforts that non-native speakers have to undertake to participate in "global communication", via the payment of a linguistic tax. The provocative and original article by Van Parijs points at one of the most relevant issues of the subject at hand, that is the economic, and consequently cultural, hindrance that English as single lingua franca causes.

The following two articles concentrate on specific settings of international communication. The contribution by Gazzola and Grin, from Genève University, focuses on multilingual communication and the possibility of establishing a general analytical framework of assessment based on the principles of fairness and efficiency in the allocation of resources. Gill's article presents a case study based on the analysis of the linguistics shift from Bahasa Malaysia to English that Malaysia underwent in 2003 for the teaching of maths and science. The description of the event is taken as an introduction into the broader debate of language policy as a socio-political instrument.

The final contribution to the volume is by Ammon, whose wide and influencing contribution to the study of the role of language diversity in scientific communication has opened new horizons in the promotion of knowledge circulation in the setting of language preservation. Though admitting the dominant role that English has acquired in the last decades as the dominant instrument of scientific communication, Ammon's reflections cover a wider scope entangling a variety of topics and referring to a long term perspective into the future develop-

ment of scientific communication. Starting from an analysis of the current state of affairs of language use in science, Ulrich considers attempts to preserve diversity and promote the use of minor languages. In his reflection, Ulrich calls for two main points: the necessity of an objective description of the actual power of English in the scientific community and the need to analyse the current situation from a diachronic perspective. Although English is, and probably will be in the forthcoming decades, the dominant language of science, emerging developing countries, and particularly Brazil, China and India, might represent the linguistic challenge that lies ahead for the preservation of its power.

The book is a valuable contribution to the debate over language and science, as it highlights the topic from different perspectives while providing insights into the future of scientific communication and what may turn out to be only a temporary dominance of English.

Marcella Spano

PIOTR CAP, *Towards the proximization model of the analysis of legitimization in political discourse*, "Journal of Pragmatics" XL/1, 2008, pp. 17-41.

Grounded in the observation that legitimization, namely the claim to rightness, plays a cru-

cial role in political discourse, the paper discusses the legitimization strategies of assertion, implicature, common ground and proximization, illustrated by practical examples. Assertion, which enacts credibility by referring to factual information or to actions in line with the psychological, social, political or religious predispositions of the addressee was used by President Bush on the night of 9/11 to legitimize prospective actions against Al-Qaeda. The legitimization strategy based on implicature, prompting the addressees to interpret implied meanings, was instead repeatedly used by President Nixon following the 'Watergate' scandal in 1972, while legitimization exploiting common ground was utilized in the opening sentence of the decree of Afghan Islamic clerics (Ulema), regarding the US demands for the handover of bin Laden after the 9/11 attacks. Of crucial importance for the US legitimization of the military intervention in Iraq in March 2003 was proximization, through which the occurring events and their actors are presented as directly affecting the addressee. A cross-disciplinary model for the study of proximization is then developed and applied in the paper.

Costanza Cucchi

Rassegna di Linguistica Russa

a cura di Anna Bonola

Maria Cristina Gatti, *Lingvističeskie temy v prepodavanii russkogo jazyka kak inostrannogo* [Temi linguistici della didattica del russo come lingua straniera], EDUCatt - Ente per il diritto allo studio universitario dell'Università Cattolica, Milano 2008, pp. 213

Il merito principale di questo volume è quello di creare un importante quanto spesso trascurato collegamento fra linguistica teorica e didattica della lingua russa: infatti, molti aspetti essenziali della lingua russa sono stati indagati a fondo dalla linguistica teorica, ma spesso tali acquisizioni non vengono recepite dalla glottodidattica.

L'assunto di base è che una buona didattica deve simulare la percezione della lingua da parte del parlante nativo, la quale è condizionata dal rapporto fra strutture linguistiche e componenti comunicative del contesto. Il contesto, poi, non è una sorta di container vuoto da riempire, ma partecipa attivamente al processo di comunicazione, contribuendo a determinare il significato delle strutture linguistiche. L'autrice lo dimostra prendendo in considerazione un importante aspetto del lessico russo, gli affissi, e un'altrettanto fondamentale categoria grammaticale: l'aspetto del verbo.

Nel primo caso si dimostra che per assimilare il *vladenie jazykom* del parlante nativo, il discente straniero, oltre alla competenza lessicale deve padroneggiare la struttura dinamica del lessico: gli affissi contengono infatti significati nascosti (idee latenti), che possono essere inferiti dal parlante solo sulla base dell'enciclopedia. Il contesto e l'approccio inferenziale diventano dunque fondamentali.

Per quanto riguarda l'aspetto del verbo, MC. Gatti si concentra su due forme aspettuali concorrenziali: il perfettivo risultativo e l'imperfettivo fattuale generico, dimostrando come la scelta per l'uno o per l'altro sia determinata dal contesto ed esiga l'attivazione di numerose inferenze.

L'approccio didattico inferenziale risulta promettente oltre che interessante: si tratta di allenare i discenti alla percezione dell'implicito che si nasconde dietro la struttura linguistica ed emerge dall'interazione fra strutture linguistiche e contesto. La prospettiva interazionista è dunque fondamentale sia per la comunicazione, sia per la didattica.

Anna Bonola

AA.VV., *Fonetica i nefonetika. K 70-letiju Sandro V. Kodzasova* [Fonetica e non: studi in onore di Sandro V. Kodzasov], Jazyki slavjanskich kul'tur, Moskva 2008, pp. 846

Quest'opera collettanea è dedicata a Sandro Vasil'evič Kodzasov, fonetista, ma anche ricercatore insigne in ambiti come la sintassi e la tipologia (fondamentali sono i suoi studi sulle lingue caucasiche, per lo più compiuti in collaborazione con A.E. Kibrik).

L'ampiezza di interessi del dedicatario dà ragione dell'ampio spettro dei temi trattati nel volume: teoria linguistica e modelli di lingua, le lingue daghestane, la fonetica in diverse lingue e in particolare il russo, sintassi e fonetica, semantica e grammatica, pragmatica e comunicazione, discorso, lingua e società, testo letterario. A questi temi, che costituiscono altrettanti capitoli del volume, è premesso un capitolo con saggi di G.Ch Ibragimov, T.M. Nadeina, A.E. Kibrik, V.I. Belikov che presentano la figura di Sandro Kodzasov: ne emerge la raffinata e acuta capacità di analisi fonetica, la vastissima com-

petenza plurilingue, l'esperienza della ricerca sul campo (*polevaja lingvistika*) e la capacità di generalizzazione.

Tra i saggi di particolare interesse segnaliamo: A.A Kibrik sulla nozione di proposizione, E.V. Padučeva sull'inversione del soggetto e la sua funzione comunicativa, I.M. Kobozeva sulla particella *vot*, T.E. Janko sui mezzi prosodici dell'enfasi, M.V. Kitajgorodskaja e N.N. Rozanova sulle strategie dell'invettiva nella comunicazione urbana.

Completa la raccolta un interessante appendice con le cartine linguistiche redatte da Kodzasov e l'indice completo delle sue opere.

Anna Bonola

ANATOLIJ NIKOLAEVIČ BARANOV, *Lingvističeskaja ekspertiza teksta* [La perizia linguistica del testo], Flinta, Moskva 2007, pp. 592

Molto richieste a partire dall'inizio degli anni Novanta, le perizie linguistico-forensi sono diventate in Russia uno degli sbocchi della linguistica applicata; l'autore ne ha una pratica ventennale e in questo volume riassume la propria esperienza coniugandola con la riflessione linguistica. Alla base del volume ci sono 200 casi che riguardano contenziosi su svariati temi: vilipendio, brevetti, diffamazione, pornografia, diritti d'autore, difesa delle marche e pubblicità. Scopo dell'opera è informare sia riguardo ai fondamenti teorici sia sulla pratica della perizia linguistica.

Nel capitolo introduttivo vengono presentate l'attività del perito linguistico (classificazione dei tipi di *expertise* linguistico e le tappe del suo sviluppo) e nuove branche ad essa connesse, come la linguistica forense.

Il primo capitolo precisa concetti fondamentali che non trovano una definizione chiara nella giurisprudenza, ma che sono essenziali per il perito linguistico, come, per esempio, la distinzione fra informazione implicita ed esplicita, il concetto di asserzione ecc. Quindi vengono illustrati i fenomeni linguistici che più frequentemente l'esperto deve interpretare nel

corso della sua analisi: fraseologismi, metafore, referenza, nominalizzazione, tipo di discorso. Il terzo capitolo tratta gli effetti comunicativi del discorso e i procedimenti della sua manipolazione. Segue un capitolo ricco di esempi e di conclusioni teoriche sull'analisi della semantica della parola nella consulenza linguistica. Un intero capitolo, il sesto, è dedicato all'analisi dell'istigazione, con particolare attenzione al concetto di "appello". Il settimo capitolo approfondisce infine gli strumenti informatici dell'analisi, soprattutto i corpora. La monografia si conclude con lo studio di due casi.

Anna Bonola

VADIM VIKTOROVIČ DEMENT'EV, *Neprjamaja kommunikacija* [La comunicazione indiretta], Gnozis, Moskva 2006, pp. 376

La categoria di "comunicazione indiretta" viene illustrata in questa monografia come completamento di distinzioni già note nella linguistica, come quella fra comunicazione convenzionale e non convenzionale (Ju.M. Lotman), fra lingua scritta e parlata ecc. La necessità di precisare una nuova categoria può essere discutibile, ma l'autore la giustifica con il fatto che le distinzioni precedenti hanno sempre studiato i poli opposti, trascurando i numerosissimi casi intermedi fra comunicazione diretta e indiretta; inoltre, la comunicazione indiretta per Vadim Dement'ev è la norma su cui si evidenzia la comunicazione diretta, e non il contrario, come si è soliti pensare.

La comunicazione è diretta quando il piano del contenuto dell'enunciato coincide con il senso complessivo dell'enunciato stesso; la comunicazione indiretta esclude invece tale coincidenza e dunque richiede un processo di interpretazione più complesso che va al di là delle strutture linguistiche: si pensi all'interpretazione di fenomeni come l'implicitezza, gli eufemismi, gli atti linguistici indiretti, l'ironia, la metafora ecc.

Nel primo capitolo, introduttivo, la nozione di comunicazione indiretta viene confrontata

con numerose categorie affini, e in particolare con l'opposizione "lingua-discorso" e il concetto di asimmetria del segno linguistico. Il secondo capitolo propone un modello di comunicazione indiretta, basato su una serie di diadi che oppongono intenzioni comunicative dirette a indirette; per esempio: domanda-richiesta, domanda-complimento, asserzione-richiesta, mezzi di comunicazione verbale e non-verbale, destinatario diretto – indiretto ecc.

Il terzo capitolo considera la comunicazione indiretta all'interno delle strutture linguistiche non isosemiche, mentre l'ultimo capitolo analizza la parte che i generi hanno nella realizzazione della comunicazione indiretta.

Anna Bonola

Andrej Vladimirovič Oljanin, *Prezentacionnaja teorija diskursa* [La teoria del discorso presentativo], Gnozis, Moskva 2007, pp. 407

All'interno degli studi sulla pragmatica della comunicazione l'autore ha elaborato il concetto di discorso presentativo partendo dalla constatazione che spesso il nostro discorso ha la forma di una presentazione, non priva di elementi della teatralità. Il discorso presentativo si realizza tramite mezzi semiotico-linguistici (concetti e immagini), chiamati dall'autore "presentemi", organizzati in strategie e tattiche "presentative".

Il corpus analizzato nella monografia è tratto dai mezzi di comunicazione di massa e presenta diverse varietà di discorso: argomentativo, giuridico, religioso, politico, pubblicitario, rituale, gastronomico.

Nel primo capitolo viene presentata una gerarchia dei bisogni e dei discorsi, volti a soddisfarli. Quindi si passa a descrivere le caratteristiche pragmatiche della comunicazione di massa – soprattutto il concetto di *image* (capitolo II) –, per giungere, nel terzo capitolo, alle categorie semiotico-linguistiche che sono alla base del discorso presentativo: teatralità, densità dell'informzione, precisione o approssimazione dei processi nominali. I capitoli quarto e quinto sono centrali dal punto di vista dell'analisi: illustrano infatti il concetto di "presentema" e le strategie comunicative del discorso presentativo.

Anna Bonola

Rassegna di Linguistica Tedesca

a cura di Giovanni Gobber e Federica Missaglia

Marek Nekula-Verena Bauer-Albrecht Greule (Hgg.), *Deutsch in multilingualen Stadtzentren Mittel – und Osteuropas. Um die Jahrhundertwende vom 19. zum 20. Jahrhundert*, herausgegeben von, Praesens Verlag, Wien 2008, 212 Seiten.

Der Band sammelt Beiträge zum gleichnamigen Symposium, das am 16. und 17. Februar 2006 in Regensburg gehalten wurde. Im Buch wird die Spezifik der Mehrsprachigkeit in den Städten Budapest, Bukarest, Danzig, Lemberg, Lodz (Łódż), Prag und Rīga beschrieben.

Die ersten drei Beiträge sind Franz Kafkas Deutsch gewidmet: Zum einen werden Regionalismen (Verena Bauer) und Autokorrekturen in den Manuskripten seiner Werke (Boris Blahak) erforscht, die als Indizien für eine „austrophone" Mündlichkeit angesehen werden; zum anderen wird Kafkas Sprache als Musterbeispiel für den „multilingualism of a Prague Jew" diskutiert (Marek Nekula). Im vierten Beitrag wird der tschechische Einfluss auf das Wienerische kritisch bewertet (Peter Ernst).

Jeder von den folgenden sechs Beiträgen beschäftigt sich mit einer spezifischen mehrsprachigen Kommunikationstradition. Untersucht werden die Nonstandard-Varietäten des Deutschen in Budapest (Manfred Michael), die deutsche Sprachkultur in Bukarest (Hermann Scheuringer), die Polyglossie in Lemberger Zeitungen (Stefaniya Ptashnyk), das Deutsch in Łódż oder „Lodzer Deutsch" (Jörg Riecke), die Danziger Stadtsprache (Grażyna Łopuszańska) und die deutschbaltische Überlieferung (Ineta Balode).

Deutsch wird als Muttersprache und als Identitätsmerkmal von elitären städtischen Milieus untersucht, aber auch als Selbstdarstellungsmittel von mehrsprachigen Sprech – und Kulturgemeinschaften, denen die exaltierten monoglossischen Ideologien der Nationalstaaten fremd waren. Gerade in dieser Hinsicht wird heute in der Europäischen Union die damalige Erfahrung der Mehrsprachigkeit im Herzen Europas positiv bewertet und als Vorbild für ein zukünftiges fruchtbares Zusammenleben betrachtet.

Giovanni Gobber

Vilmos Ágel-Mathilde Hennig (Hgg.), *Zugänge zur Grammatik der gesprochenen Sprache*, Tübingen, Max Niemeyer Verlag 2007 (Reihe Germanistische Linguistik 269), 316 Seiten.

Unter Rückgriff auf verschiedene Ansätze wie *Construction Grammar*, *Interaktionale Linguistik*, Theorie des Nähe – und Distanzsprechens sowie Überlegungen zur Bedeutungskonstitution gesprochener Sprache setzt sich die Arbeit das Ziel, das derzeit bestehende Defizit bei der grammatiktheoretischen Verortung gesprochensprachlicher Phänomene aufzuarbeiten. Der Band umfasst zehn Einzeluntersuchungen, die auf verschiedene Fragestellungen eingehen wie z.B. *Was sind die grundlegenden Anforderungen an eine Theorie der Grammatik der gesprochenen Sprache?*, *Was können geeignete Bausteine für eine Modellierung einer Theorie der Grammatik der gesprochenen Sprache sein?*, *Welche Konsequenzen ergeben sich aus einer grammatischen Theoriebildung für die Untersuchung von Einzelphänomenen? oder Inwiefern ermöglicht uns die breite Anerkennung unseres Gegenstandes nun eine Umsetzung unserer Erkenntnisse in die Praxis (beispielsweise der Grammatikschreibung)?* Behandelt werden aber auch Fragestellungen, die in der Gesprochene-Sprache-Forschung bisher nur wenig oder über-

haupt nicht berücksichtigt wurden, wie z.B. die Frage des Verhältnisses von Regionalität und gesprochener Sprache (Péter Kappel, *Überlegungen zur diatopischen Variation in der gesprochenen Sprache*). Gegliedert ist das Buch in drei thematische Schwerpunkte. Während der erste Teil (*Gesprochene Sprache in Theorie und Praxis*) die Bandbreite möglicher Ansätze für die Beschreibung gesprochener Sprache widerspiegelt, befasst sich der zweite Themenbereich (*Nähesprechen in Theorie und Praxis*) mit dem Theoriebaustein des Nähe – und Distanzsprechens, in dem „der durch Peter Koch und Wulf Oesterreicher bekannt gewordene Ansatz ‚Sprache der Nähe – Sprache der Distanz' aufgegriffen, erweitert und auf weitere Untersuchungsfelder angewendet wird" (XIV). Im abschließenden dritten Teil (*Gesprochene Sprache und Grammatikschreibung*) plädiert Peter Eisenberg (*Sollen Grammatiken die gesprochene Sprache beschreiben? Sprachmodalität und Sprachstandard*) für eine modalitätsneutrale Darstellung der Sprache in Gebrauchsgrammatiken und bekennt sich selbst zu einer „Grammatik des geschriebenen Standards" (290), während Reinhard Fiehler (*Thesen zur Struktur einer Grammatik der gesprochenen Sprache*) eine Grammatik der gesprochenen Sprache befürwortet, weil diese – wie die Schriftsprache auch – eine eigenständige Verständigungsform ist, daher spezifischen Bedingungen unterliegt und entsprechende Regularitäten ausbildet.

Der Sammelband versteht sich nicht nur als eine Einführung in die grammatiktheoretische Fundierung empirisch gewonnener Detailerkenntnisse, sondern auch als eine systematische Ausrichtung, die für alle weitere Beschäftigung mit der Theoriereflexion über *gesprochene Sprache* von Nutzen sein wird.

Sandro Moraldo

Magdalena Putz, *Indikatoren für Verstehen, Missverstehen und Nichtverstehen in Gesprächen*, „Linguistik online", (32), 3, 2007, pp. 95-103.

Der Beitrag fokussiert ein kommunikatives Problem, welches sich auch in Gesprächen zwischen Muttersprachlern und Fremdsprachenlernern widerspiegelt: die Frage nach Kriterien, an Hand derer sich eine gelungene bzw. misslungene Kommunikation erkennen lässt. Die Autorin hebt hervor, dass ein hundertprozentiges Verstehen generell unwahrscheinlich und empirisch kaum nachweisbar sei und sich Verstehen nur entlang eines Kontinuums von Missverstehen und Nichtverstehen unterscheiden lässt. Schwierig wird das Realisieren der Phänomene zudem, wenn sie sich nicht explizit metasprachlich manifestieren, sondern von den Gesprächsteilnehmern absichtlich verdeckt oder gänzlich unbemerkt bleiben. Mittels transkribierter Visitengespräche erarbeitet Putz sprachliche und nonverbale Handlungen, die Verstehen (z.B. explizite vom Sprecher intendierte Reaktionen), Missverstehen (z.B. verzögerte Reaktionszeit) und Nichtverstehen (z.B. Abbruch eines Themas) signalisieren. Mit zwei Beispielen verifiziert die Verfasserin, dass diese Indikatoren helfen, verständnishemmende Einheiten in Gesprächen besser zu identifizieren. Mit deren Kenntnis könnten in Zukunft verständnishelfende Materialien für Fremdsprachenlerner entwickelt werden.

Jan Henschel

Katerin Schaad-Esther Zolllinger, *Warum Vorschulkinder nicht zurückgrüßen müssen. Beobachtungen zu Spezifika des kindlichen Sequenzmusters in der Grußhandlung,* „Linguistik online", (36), 4, 2008, pp. 59-76.

Auf der Basis einer Pilotstudie, in der das Grußverhalten von Kindern zwischen vier und sieben Jahren analysiert wird, demonstrieren die beiden Autorinnen, dass der Spracherwerb von Kindern nicht parallel zu deren Sozialisierungsprozess stattfindet. Kinder eignen sich vielmehr die grammatischen Grundstrukturen vor den sozialen Konventionen an. Mittels der transkribierten Beobachtung von Grußsituationen, an denen Kinder, Eltern und Erzieher eines Kindergartens beteiligt waren, legen die Verfasserinnen dar, dass Kinder die für Er-

wachsene konventionalisierten Sequenzmuster in den Grußritualen nur bedingt einhalten. So fehlt zum Beispiel in der Kommunikation unter Kindern der Gruß häufig gänzlich, von Erwachsenen an sie gerichtete Grüße werden nur selten mit Gegengruß erwidert. Trotzdem sind die Kinder zu einer Interaktion bereit, da sie die sich oftmals anschließenden Befindlichkeitsfragen bereits zu ca. 50 Prozent beantworten und auch den Blickkontakt aufnehmen. Dies zeigt, dass sich vor allen Dingen die jüngeren Kinder der Studie noch im Stadium der Ontogenese befinden, in der sie ihren eigenen Begrüßungssequenzmustern folgen. Die für die Sozialisation wichtige Aneignung und Umsetzung der konventionellen Grußpraxis findet erst in den Folgejahren statt.

Jan Henschel

HILKE ELSEN, *Phantastische Namen. Die Namen in Science Fiction und Fantasy zwischen Arbitrarität und Wortbildung*, Tübingen, Gunter Narr Verlag 2008 (= Tübinger Beiträge zur Linguistik, Band 509), 210 pp.

Namen sind nicht nur Schall und Rauch. Das beweist die Tatsache, dass sie in literarischen Texten mit über Erfolg oder Misserfolg des Produkts entscheiden können. Welche Gesichtspunkte oder Strategien – sofern sich solche nachweisen lassen – für die Autoren bei der Namensgebung für Gestalten (aber nicht nur) maßgebend sind, darüber berichtet der vorliegende Band. Ausgehend von originär deutschsprachigen Fantasy – und SF-Romanen und Geschichten wird hier ein Modell entworfen, das die Zusammenhänge zwischen Referenz und Struktur von Namen und deren morphologische Randbereiche untersucht, um die Vielfalt der Benennungen von Figuren und Szenarien in einem breiten begrifflichen Spektrum zu erfassen. Untergliedert ist der Band in drei Teile. Der erste beschreibt in einer Einführung Gegenstand und Ziel der Arbeit, die theoretischen Grundlagen und gibt zudem einen Literaturüberblick über die Textgattungen *Science Fiction* und Fantasy und über verschiedene Untersuchungen von SF-Lexemen. Der zweite Teil fokussiert die Struktur literarischer Namen anhand praktischer Beispiele. In drei Kapiteln wird zum einen die Wahl, Entstehung, Lautsymbolik und Wortbildung der Namen abgehandelt, zum anderen die Motivation, Bildungs – und Wirkungsweise von Kunstwörtern untersucht und schließlich die „Beziehung zwischen der Form eines Namens und bestimmten Eigenschaften des Namenträgers" (75) analysiert. Im abschließenden dritten Teil sucht Hilke Elsen „nach einer Erklärung für unterschiedliche Gemeinsamkeiten der Namen auf lautlich-graphischer Ebene" und hinterfragt weiterhin die Assoziationsqualitäten literarischer Namen mittels einer Rezipientenbefragung. Als Ergebnis lässt sich festhalten, dass die Namensgebungsstrategie der Autoren nicht immer nach den sonst üblichen Wortbildungsregeln erfolgt. Bei der Benennung u.a. von menschlichen, menschenähnlichen oder fremden Wesen wird nämlich nicht nur auf standardsprachliche, sondern in hohem Maße auf kreative Wortbildungsmuster zurückgegriffen. In drei Anhängen werden dann noch einmal die einzelnen Namen nach Referenten (Menschen, lokale Angaben, kulturelle Errungenschaften etc.) geordnet (Anhang I), die Belegtexte mit jeweiligem Kürzel aufgelistet (II) und schließlich die Stellungnahmen verschiedener Autoren zu einzelnen Fragen (III) angeführt.

Sandro Moraldo

KLAUS WELKE, *Einführung in die Satzanalyse. Die Bestimmung der Satzglieder im Deutschen*, de Gruyter, Berlin – New York 2007, pp. XIV+374

In diesem wertvollen Buch wird eine Einführung in die traditionelle Satzanalyse vorgeschlagen, die auf den Satzgliedern gründet. Da die Einheit „Satzglied" je nach den Satzmodellen verschieden aufgefasst wird, bietet der Autor im ersten Kapitel eine knappe Darstellung des Satzgliedbegriffes in Dependenz – und

Konstituentenstrukturgrammatiken. Aus der Diskussion geht hervor, dass ein Satzglied als eine syntaktische Relation zu betrachten ist, die in gewissen Beziehungen mit einer Wortartenkategorie steht. Sätze und satzwertige Konstruktionen werden dann untersucht, und zwar mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der verschiedenen Formen von Nebensätzen. Zur Veranschaulichung dieser Begriffe wird im zweiten Kapitel eine exemplarische Analyse vorgeführt.

Im folgenden Kapitel konfrontiert sich der Autor mit dem Attribut. Darunter wird eine abhängige Einheit in Satzgliedern unterhalb der Satzebene verstanden. Die wichtigsten Kriterien für die Unterscheidung von Attributen und Satzgliedern werden ausführlich behandelt, wobei Appositionen als Spezialfälle von Attributen erklärt werden.

In den Kapiteln 4 bis 8 wird die «Reise durch die Satzgliedlandschaft» fortgesetzt, die zur Anwendung in den Beispielanalysen vom zehnten Kapitel gebracht wird. Beschrieben werden Prädikate und Argumente der Satzstruktur, ebenso wie die so genannten Modifikatoren (Adverbialbestimmung und freies Prädikativ). Den so genannten komplexen Prädikaten wird besondere Aufmerksamkeit gewidmet. Sie «entstehen diachron dadurch, dass syntaktische Einheiten (Infinitive, Partizipien II, Substantive und auch substantivische oder präpositionale Wortgruppe) in das Prädikat inkorporiert werden» (S. 194). Diese Konstruktionen sehen äußerlich wie syntaktische Konstruktionen aus, sie werden aber von den Sprechern und von den Linguisten als morphologische Gebilde betrachtet. Das Thema ist von großer Bedeutung für die Definition des Wortes. Darauf wird leider im Buch nicht näher eingegangen.

Das neunte Kapitel enthält einen kurzen Einblick in die semantische Bestimmung von Satzgliedern. Es wird gezeigt, wie die traditionelle Analyse semantisch orientiert ist, was nicht notwendig negativ zu bewerten ist. Diese Tatsache gibt dem Autor die Gelegenheit, die

Beziehungen zwischen Dependenzgrammatik und Prädikatenlogik hervorzuheben, während die Konstituentenstrukturgrammatik eher der aristotelischen Logik entsprechen würde.

Zum Schluss sollen ein Paar Fehler in der Behandlung der Kategorialgrammatik korrigiert werden. Der berühmte Artikel über die „Syntaktische Konnexität" von Kazimierz (und nicht „Kazimirz"!, siehe Literaturverzeichnis) Ajdukiewicz erschien 1935 und nicht 1936. In seiner Notation erscheint *kein* mehrstelliges Prädikat und seine Grammatik entspricht keiner «Prädikatenlogik mit mehrstelligen Prädikaten, die diese nicht in mehrere einstellige Prädikaten auflöst» (S. 257). Unter solchen Mängeln leiden zwar Bar-Hillels und Lambeks Kategorialgrammatiken. Genau das Gegenteil gilt aber für das Modell, das Ajdukiewicz in Anlehnung an Stanisław Leśniewskis Auffassung der sog. „Bedeutungskategorien" entwickelte. Mit der Bezeichnung „Bedeutungskategorie" wollte sich Leśniewski explizit auf die vierte *Logische Untersuchung* von Edmund Husserl beziehen. Für die beiden polnischen Logiker bezeichnete der Terminus „Bedeutungskategorie" eine Klasse von sinnvollen Ausdrücken, die den Wörtern einer natürlichen Sprache gleichgestellt sind. Anders in den späteren kategorialen Grammatiken, in denen die Ausdrücke als logisch syntaktische Erscheinungen angesehen werden, für die eine sukzessive typentheoretische Semantik entwickelt werden kann.

Die Notation von Ajdukiewicz trägt dieser Tatsache Rechnung, indem eine *nicht-lineare* Hierarchie von Funktoren und Argumenten entwickelt wird, die sich auf die Logikkalkülen von Jan Łukasiewicz bezieht (den Terminus „Funktor" verdanken wir aber Tadeusz Kotarbiński, der ihn 1929 einführte). Darüber hinaus werden bei Ajdukiewicz ausschließlich *einstellige* Funktoren verwendet. Ein mehrstelliger Funktor wie das Symbol für die zweistellige Konjunktion *und* wird als stratifizierter einstelliger Funktor umformuliert. Dasselbe gilt für ein transitives Verb, das vom Typ (s/n)/n ist,

und nicht vom Typ s/nn, wie Welke behauptet (S. 256-257). Hier verwendet Ajdukiewicz eine «Technik», die Moses Schönfinkel 1928 entworfen hatte, die aber nach dem Namen von Haskell Curry als *Currying* bezeichnet wurde. Damit werden die leeren Argumentstellen beim Funktor schrittweise gesättigt: *bewundert* hat die Kategorie *(s/n)/n*, *bewundert Anna* ist ein *s/n* und *Emil bewundert Anna* ist ein *s*.

Es erübrigt sich zu sagen, dass Ajdukiewicz seine Kategorialgrammatik schon 1931 in einem polnischen Artikel mit dem Titel „W sprawie 'uniwersaljów'" („Über die Universalien") ausführlich dargestellt hatte; der Beitrag erschien im „Ruch Filozoficzny" vier Jahre vor der Veröffentlichung seiner „Syntaktischen Konnexität" (die im ersten Heft der „Studia Philosophica" zusammen mit der deutschen Version von Alfred Tarskis berühmtem „Wahrheitsbegriff" erschien).

Giovanni Gobber

Hans Scollo, *Deutsche Grammatik für Italiener. Una grammatica contro corrente, comparativa fra il tedesco e l'italiano, con riferimenti all'inglese*. Graphics Editore, Como: 2008, 560 pp.

Il volume intende operare "una presentazione sistematica, chiara e pratica delle strutture grammaticali" della lingua tedesca. Il punto di partenza è volutamente polemico: l'intento è quello di andare "contro corrente", ovvero contro la maggior parte delle metodologie dell'insegnamento moderno che non aiuterebbero il discente a raggiungere una chiara conoscenza delle strutture del tedesco corretto e una decisa padronanza delle sue regole. La polemica si rivolge esplicitamente contro H. Griesbach, il cui sistema di presentazione avrebbe influenzato le grammatiche oggi in uso, che pongono il caso genitivo in fondo alle declinazioni, allontanando troppo le forme grammaticali del tedesco da quelle delle lingue classiche.

Poiché il volume è destinato a discenti di madrelingua italiana, la presentazione delle strutture grammaticali è operata attraverso un'analisi contrastiva e in lingua italiana; titoli dei capitoli e nomi di regole sono invece forniti in entrambe le lingue. Nel deciso tentativo di supplire alla mancata esperienza linguistica diretta, il supporto audio al volume è un invito all'ascolto sistematico e alla memorizzazione delle strutture fondamentali del tedesco, presentate all'interno di brani e dialoghi in lingua riguardanti situazioni di vita quotidiana. L'invito allo studio mnemonico porta con sé un'interessante promessa: i discenti saranno presto in grado di assimilare un linguaggio naturale e preciso, perché aiutati a formare nella mente un modello linguistico su cui ragionare e da cui partire per ulteriori formulazioni.

Il volume si conclude con una ventina di pagine dedicate a metodi di lettura dell'ora, nomi dei popoli, alle preghiere e ad un utile indice analitico.

Lucia Salvato

Sandro M. Moraldo (Hg.): *Sprachkontakt und Mehrsprachigkeit. Zur Anglizismendiskussion in Deutschland, Österreich, der Schweiz und Italien*, Heidelberg: Universitätsverlag Winter 2008 (Sprache – Literatur und Geschichte. Studien zur Linguistik/Germanistik, Band 35), 286 pp.

Steht Europa trotz der von der EU proklamierten sprachlichen (und kulturellen) Vielfalt eine Anglisierung der Sprachen ins Haus? Die These der Überfremdung durch übermäßiges Eindringen von angloamerikanischem Wortgut erfreut sich ungebrochener Beliebtheit. Welche Bedeutung der deutschen und italienischen Sprache vor dem Hintergrund dieser Sprachkontaktsituation im mehrsprachigen Europa zukommt, welche Herausforderungen sich aus dieser Vorrangstellung des Englischen für die Sprach – und Bildungspolitik ergeben, darüber berichtet u.a. der vorliegende Band. Die Beiträge gehen auf einen internationalen Kongress zurück, der im März 2007 an der *Scuola Superiore di Lingue Moderne per Interpreti e Traduttori* der *Università degli Studi di Bologna* in Forlì stattfand. Die Frage liegt

auf der Hand, ob es überhaupt noch sinnvoll sein kann, über den Einfluss von Anglizismen zu diskutieren, ob es wirklich noch Fragestellungen gibt, die nicht schon bis zum Überdruss formuliert, bewertet, an – und ausdiskutiert worden sind. Die Lektüre des Bandes zeigt jedoch, dass sich neue Tendenzen in der Diskussion um Sprachkontakt und Mehrsprachigkeit aufspüren und erschließen lassen, nämlich durch Grenzüberschreitungen, durch neue empirische Untersuchungen und nicht zuletzt durch provokante Thesen. Das Spektrum der Themen reicht von der Fokussierung kontaktinduzierter Veränderungen als ambivalente Reaktion auf kulturellen und sprachlichen Kontakt, dem Eintreten einer wissenschaftlich fundierten Sprachpflege und Sprachkritik an der Schnittstelle zwischen Sprachwissenschaft und Öffentlichkeitsarbeit, über die Thematisierung der Pseudoanglizismen und *false friends* in Österreich bis zu der sehr komplexen Situation des schulischen Fremdsprachenunterrichts und der Englischkenntnisse bei Erwachsenen in der Schweiz und der in Italien vom Honorarpräsidenten der *Accademia della Crusca* vertretenen These der orthographischen Rekodifizierung des Englischen. Die Themen wollen Anstöße zur Reflexion und Anregungen für weitere Untersuchungen geben. Der Band verfolgt nicht zuletzt das Ziel, einer sprachbewussten und – kritisch eingestellten Öffentlichkeit ein besseres Verständnis von Sprachwandel zu eröffnen. Namhafte Wissenschaftler aus Deutschland, Österreich, der Schweiz, England und Italien zeigen auf, dass – auch wenn das Thema des unaufhaltsamen Fortschreitens von Englisch als Sprache der grenzüberschreitenden Verständigung fast schon ausgereizt schien – neue Erkenntnisse durchaus noch zu erwarten sind.

Federica Missaglia

HELMUT SPIEKERMANN, *Standardsprache im DaF-Unterricht: Normstandard – nationale Standardvarietäten – regionale Standardvarietäten,* „Linguistik online" (32), 3, 2007, pp. 119-137.

Welches Deutsch soll man in einem „Deutsch als Fremdsprache"-Kurs lehren, wenn selbst die Muttersprachler des Deutschen nicht völlig variationsfrei oder von regionalen Einflüssen unberührt sprechen? Von dieser Frage ausgehend gibt der Autor einen Überblick über die Sprachvariationen im deutschen Sprachgebiet, die von den großen Nationalvarietäten in Deutschland, Österreich und der Schweiz bis hin zu örtlichen Dialekten reichen. Auf Basis empirischer Untersuchungen weist Spiekermann dabei nach, dass in den letzten 50 Jahren ein Abbau dialektaler Formen, die Abkehr von nationalen standardsprachlichen Normen und der Bedeutungsgewinn regionaler Standardvarietäten zu verzeichnen sind. Neben der in Wörter-, Aussprachebüchern und Grammatiken kodifizierten nationalen Standardsprachform sollten deren Merkmale daher in einem kommunikativ angelegten Fremdspracheunterricht stärkere Beachtung finden, insbesondere, wenn er vor Ort stattfindet. Andere Standardabweichungen wie z.B. die Tilgung von Schwa in der 1. Pers. Sg. oder die Reduzierung unbestimmter Artikel, die quasi im gesamten deutschsprachigen Raum verbreitet sind, sollten zudem in die Landeskunde der Lehrmaterialien des „Deutsch als Fremdsprache"-Unterrichtes integriert werden.

Jan Henschel

ANTONIE HORNUNG, *Mediation – Vermittlung zwischen? Projekt einer interkulturellen Deutschdidaktik im Rahmen der Masterstudiengänge „Unternehmenskommunikation" und „Kulturmanagement" Mediazione e trattativa – lingua tedesca,* in: *Der Fall der Kulturmauer. Wie kann Sprachunterricht interkulturell sein?,* hrsg. von Ulrike A. Kaunzner, Waxmann Verlag, Münster, New York, München, Berlin, 2008, pp. 27-41.

Hornung stellt zwei interdisziplinäre Masterstudiengänge an der Universität Modena e Reggio Emilia vor, u.z. Comunicazione nell'impresa e nelle organizzazioni internazionali und Pro-

gettazione e gestione di attività culturali. Sie erläutert, wie Studierende die in deutschsprachigen Ländern üblichen Prozesse und Methoden der Mediation kennenlernen, indem sie sich auf Deutsch mit Konzepten und Beispielen von Mediation z.B. in Unternehmen oder anderen Organisationen auseinandersetzen. Die interkulturelle Ausrichtung der Kurse zeigt sich auch in der Übernahme didaktischer Konzepte aus den deutschsprachigen Ländern: Wenn möglich, finden die Veranstaltungen in Seminarform statt, und die Studierenden beteiligen sich aktiv an der Durchführung des Unterrichts.

Christine Arendt

SABRINA BALLESTRACCI, *Überindividuelle Merkmale des Grammatikerwerbs im Unterricht des Deutschen als Fremdsprache durch italophone Studierende. Ergebnisse einer empirischen Untersuchung*, „Deutsch als Fremdsprache", XLV, 3/2008, pp. 160-169.

Das im Beitrag präsentierte Forschungsprojekt der Universität Pisa, das sich an der Studie „Deutsch in Genfer Schulen (DiGS)" orientiert und diese vergleichend heranzieht, zielt auf die Ermittlung von Besonderheiten im Erwerbsprozess von italophonen Lernern von Deutsch als Fremdsprache ab. Gegenstand der empirischen Analyse, die sich auf statistische Auswertungen schriftlicher Arbeiten gründet, ist der Erwerb der Verbalmorphologie, der Satzgliedstellung und der Deklination von Nominalphasen im universitären DaF-Unterricht. Es soll in diesem Zusammenhang festgestellt werden, ob italophone Studierende für sie typische Erwerbsphasen durchlaufen.

Beate Lindemann

S. SCHMIDT-K. SCHMIDT (Hgg.), *Erinnerungsorte. Deutsche Geschichte im DaF-Unterricht. Materialien und Kopiervorlagen,* Cornelsen Verlag, Berlin, 2007, pp. 96.

Die in diesem Lehrwerk präsentierte Materialsammlung für den Landeskundeunterricht im Bereich von Deutsch als Fremdsprache gründet

sich auf den Ansatz des französischen Historikers, Pierre Nora, der in den 80er Jahren die Geschichte Frankreichs als symbolische Gedächtnisorte in Form von Essays vermittelte. Eine Arbeitsgruppe bestehend aus 15 Autoren präsentiert in diesem Sinne 13 Erinnerungsorte der deutschen Geschichte, die „wie Mosaiksteine die Identität einer Kultur, einer Nation, einer Gesellschaft bilden" und somit das kollektive Gedächtnis geformt haben. Ausgangspunkt für die Geschichtsvermittlung ist daher nicht die chronologische Abfolge der Ereignisse, sondern vielmehr die geschichtliche Symbolik verschiedener Orte in Deutschland. So impliziert beispielsweise der Blick auf geschichtsträchtige Plätze in Berlin ganz unterschiedliche historische Schwerpunkte: Berlin und die „Goldenen Zwanziger Jahre" der Weimarer Republik (1919-1933), das Mahnmal zur Bücherverbrennung (Nationalsozialismus, 10. Mai 1933), der Führerbunker (NS-Diktatur, Ende des Zweiten Weltkrieges) und natürlich die Berliner Mauer (Geschichte nach 1945: 1961-1989). Dresden hingegen steht für die Zerstörung einer Stadt im 2. Weltkrieg (Bombardierung Dresdens im Februar 1945). Nationale Symbolik wird in Frankfurt am Main mit dem Versuch assoziiert, eine Demokratie zu etablieren (1948 erstes gesamtdeutsches frei gewähltes Parlament in der Frankfurter Paulskirche). Weitere Beispiele für Orte, die zur Vermittlung der Geschichte herangezogen werden, sind die Hansestädte (vom Mittelalter und der Frühen Neuzeit bis heute), der Kölner Dom (Mittelalter und heute) und Neuschwanstein (19. und 20. Jahrhundert, Ludwig II.). Hervorzuheben ist die umfangreiche und differenzierte Materialsammlung, die in Form von authentischen Texten, Fotographien, Graphiken, Landkarten, Arbeitsblättern und einer Vielzahl von historischen Hördokumenten präsentiert wird und eine ausgesprochen vielseitige Verwendung im sprachlichen Unterricht ermöglicht.

Beate Lindemann